Zheng Yongnian: Modernization is not ideology but developmental experience
When I was working in the United States and the United Kingdom, they were implementing the Thatcher Revolution and Reagan’s neoliberal revolution, which subsequently pushed forward a massive wave of globalization.
To digest this experience and apply it to China’s current environment, we should emphasize two points: first, in our next step of promoting globalization, we must value the role of private enterprises; second, we need further openness and the formation of closer cooperative relations with the "Global South." The Global South consists of countries that are either agrarian or whose economic and technological demands lean toward the low-to-medium end. China's technology is at the upper-middle end; if combined with the needs of the Global South, we can form a collective force for modernization. The reason why the "Belt and Road Initiative" has been successful is precisely because it fits the development needs of the participating countries and regions.
Before the 2008 international financial crisis, many Americans spoke of free trade; not doing so was virtually "politically incorrect." Today, however, if you speak of free trade in the U.S., people might think you are a "madman." In recent years, the U.S. has been practicing economic nationalism and trade protectionism, while China has taken up the banner of free trade. Personally, I feel China can do even more and even better. Do not underestimate the power of China’s comprehensive and territory-wide opening up. One might even say: do not underestimate the power of the U.S. to destroy the free trade system, but do not underestimate the power of China to reshape it.
Openness is a distinct hallmark of Chinese-path modernization. Under the new situation, where will the "new departure" of opening up lead? What new contributions can China make in promoting global collective openness? In this lecture, I will primarily share and exchange ideas with you around these questions.
Interactions with all parties require a mindset of peace and win-win cooperation
In modern times, modernization first developed in Western countries and then spread to the rest of the world, forming several major models:
The first model can be called the Latin American model. Latin American economies are highly dependent on the West, with many industries vital to the national economy and people's livelihoods [1] controlled by large European and American corporations. This economic structure created two forces: one extremely pro-Western and one extremely anti-Western, manifesting politically as a struggle between the far-left and far-right.
The second model is characterized by high dependency within the system, primarily referring to Japan, the "Four Asian Tigers" [2], and European countries like Germany, most of which are U.S. allies. The U.S. alliance system is, in fact, very hierarchical. Countries in the tier of Japan, South Korea, and Germany depend on the U.S. in the fields of security and diplomacy; they do not have fully independent sovereignty, and thus they must constantly examine their own independence.
The third model can be summarized as the isolated model outside the system, or the mode of external isolation. The former Soviet Union and today’s Cuba and North Korea are representative of this.
New China is indeed a special case. Since reform and opening up, our modernization has achieved development while maintaining independence; our development has integrated into the world economic system while maintaining political and economic independence and autonomy. This has been no easy feat.
Personally, I feel that China has undergone two major waves of opening up in modern history: the first was the forced opening after the two Opium Wars; the second was the reform and opening up after 1978, where we actively interfaced with the world. The rise of the Shenzhen urban cluster and the development and opening of Pudong [3] are both related to this wave.
During the second wave of opening up, there were several factors behind China joining the world system: one was geopolitics—that is, the U.S. at the time was relatively friendly toward China to counter the Soviet Union; another was the demand of capital. After the Thatcher and Reagan neoliberal revolutions, where was Western capital to go? The core of neoliberalism is privatization and financial deregulation. The question was: where does capital go? China became a "new frontier" for capital. Furthermore, the West at that time harbored an illusion that China would become a Western-style country after reform and opening up, and would not pose a pressure on the Western hegemonic system.
Today we wish to continue opening up, but not only has the U.S. stopped talking about free trade, but "anti-globalization" is also prevalent. This is a new situation. To develop, we must certainly open up. In fact, the "Five-Sphere Integrated Plan" of Chinese-path modernization sets very high standards. To achieve this goal, we must still have a broad environment of openness. Under these circumstances, we should make a very scientific judgment of the international situation. Several conditions require our high attention:
For instance, the development speed of the West has indeed declined in recent years, but this is relative, not an absolute decline. Looking at it today, the U.S. remains one of the faster-growing countries in the world.
Additionally, students of international relations must note that although we are in an era of multipolarity, we must have a scientific assessment of it. Besides the U.S. not pursuing multipolarity, which other countries like or dislike it? According to my observation, France likes multipolarity very much, and the "Global South" is also willing to promote it. This is because multipolarity implies that the international community should be more democratic and not let U.S. hegemony dominate everything. However, we also need to consider: how does multipolarity affect China? We cannot look at multipolarity in the abstract; we must seriously assess "what kind of multipolarity is beneficial to China, what kind might be detrimental," and "what specific impact the current unfolding of multipolarity has on China."
Furthermore, we must have an objective assessment of the "Global South." It is indeed becoming an increasingly important international political force, with three main focuses: first, inequality of interests. The Global South believes the distribution of interests in the international community is unequal and that it receives insufficient help. Second, inequality of responsibility, mainly manifesting in climate issues. The Global South is the victim of climate change, yet Western society refuses to shoulder its due responsibility and attempts to shift [4] it onto the Global South. Third, inequality of rights within international organizations. In the UN and numerous regional organizations, the representation and discourse power of the Global South are still insufficient.
From the current state of development, the "Global South" seems to be only a global political movement, not yet institutionalized. Its boundaries are relatively blurred and constantly shifting. The U.S. also does not sincerely wish for the Global South to unite and exert real influence. As you have seen, the U.S. has used the power of Congress in an attempt to "expel" China from the "Third World" [5], and has actively helped India so that India might represent the Global South.
We must have our own capacity for judgment regarding these issues. In the process of interacting with all parties, we must maintain a mindset of peace and win-win cooperation. On the issue of "small parcels crashing the U.S. small-business market," we must indeed consider their feelings and think about actively changing and improving our own business models. If we produce everything ourselves and view overseas only as a market, we will encounter much trouble. If BYD has 20,000 parts, and we produce 10,000 ourselves while laying out the other 10,000 across other European countries, would that not help achieve greater development in the global market? Look at Tesla; its supply chain and industrial chain layout are very broad.
Facing the "changes unseen in a century" [6], I think there is no need to be so pessimistic or even nervous. Among all countries, our situation is the best. We must maintain strategic focus [7], avoid major mistakes, and persist in doing our own business well.
Chinese-path modernization requires not just an economic view, but strategic consideration
Regarding the promotion of Chinese-path modernization, I have a few views to share:
On one hand, development is still the "hard truth" [8]. Competition between major powers is primarily a competition of development models. Personally, I believe today's U.S. follows a development-oriented model that could be called "Original Capitalism 2.0." It regulates capital, but where does the power come from? Mainly from a bipartisan consensus, though today that consensus is dwindling. Under these conditions, capital has instead gained unprecedented freedom. Therefore, we should not underestimate the ability of American capital to reshape the American government.
In the era that classical Marxist authors focused on, the state was the agent of capital, and American capital never jumped out directly to engage in politics. This time, Elon Musk standing out so high-profile in the election is indeed a political event of major significance in American history.
At the same time, the connotation and extension of the Fourth Industrial Revolution are still developing. We have no reason to underestimate its impact on politics, economy, society, and the international order. I am very concerned about this: the world is hyping the China-U.S. AI competition, but objectively speaking, all "meaningful competition" is happening primarily between American companies, not between Chinese and American enterprises.
The technologies of the first, second, and third industrial revolutions were relatively dispersed, starting from places like Britain and gradually spreading to other countries. The current AI wave, to this day, is mainly concentrated in two regions of the U.S.: one is the narrow strip from Silicon Valley in California to Texas, and the other is from Boston to New York.
In the past, technology was a tool; now, conversely, AI will shape us—this is terrifying. For this reason, our development model must be adjusted. At the 2024 China International Import Expo (CIIE), I chatted with an Italian official. I told him bluntly that if Europe does not adjust, it is finished. Europeans are good at making rules, which makes it hard for new technologies to land. "Industry 4.0" was first proposed by Germany, but how is the execution? French President Macron has been calling for Europe to reduce regulation, but the EU has yet to take action.
Looking at China’s situation, we examined three fields: biopharmaceuticals, the Internet, and AI. These are also several fields that represent new quality productive forces.
In biopharmaceuticals, we used to imitate; now we have reached the stage of original innovation. However, much of what we laboriously research and develop is bought by American companies for a few hundred million dollars, whereas the actual market value is in the hundreds of billions of yuan. After the drugs are produced, we have to import them—this is a great pity.
As for the Internet, the gaming industry is quite typical. Black Myth: Wukong is very popular, but there are a vast number of other games that cannot get "license numbers" [9] for various reasons.
In recent years, the number of papers China has published in the field of AI basic research has caught up with the U.S. In some areas, it is even far more than the U.S., and the quality is higher. But why are our related applications few, and why are most just "following in someone's footsteps"? Many enterprises go to Silicon Valley if they can't find opportunities—what does this indicate? People have found that over two-thirds of "unicorn" companies in Silicon Valley were founded by first or second-generation immigrants, including many from China.
The last time I went back to Zhejiang, everyone was discussing the China-U.S. "chip war." Someone joked that this isn't a China-U.S. chip war, but a war between Zhejiang people who fled to America and China's chips. It’s not that we lack creativity or technical ability; the key issue lies in "landing" (implementation).
"Made in America" is not "Made by Americans," but "Made in America" by a group of smart people from around the world; the U.S. mostly just provides the venue and platform. How do we change this? I think we can look at signs from Singapore and Vietnam, using comprehensive institutional openness and effective management to promote the landing of ideas and industrial applications.
I think Singapore is managed very well. Having worked there for many years, I think we can learn from them. What is regulation? First, you must let the child be born, then think of ways to cultivate and manage them well. If you don't even let the child be born, what kind of regulation is that? Non-development is not regulation; regulation based on development is true regulation. Many countries in the world do this; we should have confidence.
On the other hand, persist in deepening high-level opening up. The Third Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee clearly proposed "expanding proactive opening up" and "expanding unilateral opening up to the least developed countries." I have further called on various occasions to expand unilateral opening up to developing countries. Unilateral opening up is not unprincipled; it is accurately promoted according to one's own needs, including determining which contents can be prioritized, progressing step-by-step, using specific points to lead larger areas, and promoting fully only after pilot projects have matured. This is an important variable in reshaping the global trade landscape.
Last time I gave a lecture at a national ministry, I said we should not overemphasize "reciprocal openness." In world history, there has never been true reciprocal openness; developed countries like Britain and the U.S. were all unilaterally open. The greatest thing about the U.S. is its unilateral openness. The U.S. has three major open systems: an open system for education and talent, which made the U.S. the world's largest education base and talent center; an open system for enterprises, which gives the U.S. a steady stream of excellent entrepreneurs from all over the world; and an open system for finance, which in one stroke established the international status of Wall Street.
In a certain sense, deepening high-level opening up and expanding unilateral opening [10] are also effective ways to build a community with a shared future for humanity. The United States is not a monolith; Wall Street, the agricultural states, the scientific community, many local governments, and ordinary citizens still hope to continue engaging with China. Currently, American political logic does not entirely align with the logic of capital, the logic of the market, or the logic of science and technology. At the 2024 China International Import Expo (CIIE), I encountered several entrepreneurs who stated that for any quality commodity, selling it in China means discovering a massive market. Expanding unilateral opening can dissolve adversarial thinking, enlarge common interests, and promote the better convergence of global capital, technology, markets, talent, and many other high-quality resources.
China’s greatest success is Chinese-path modernization.
The "Global South" has also suffered deeply at the hands of the West. The West does not grant them technology; it merely views them as a market and tethers trade and investment to political factors such as human rights. Modernization is not an ideology, but rather a set of developmental experiences. Can we summarize the experience of Chinese-path modernization—which is both developmental and independent—and provide it to the Global South as a developmental reference?
In advancing Chinese-path modernization, we must look beyond economics and include strategic considerations. I have observed that economies such as Japan, South Korea, and Singapore have strategically surrendered certain economic activities to international actors; we should also actively refine this approach. Currently, some cities in the Yangtze River Delta and the Pearl River Delta are permitting the entry of wholly foreign-owned hospitals. The goal is to forge a developmental form where "you are within me, and I am within you" [11].
The world is chaotic enough; China should do its best to contribute something to the international community. Many things are beyond our control, but what we can control is ourselves. At such a critical juncture, our self-perception is vital. Only with a correct self-perception can we unleash our potential, achieving our own high-quality development and sustainable development while making greater contributions to the international community.
(Zheng Yongnian: Honorary Dean of the Institute of Political and Economic Studies at Shanghai Jiao Tong University; X.Q. Deng Presidential Chair Professor, Dean of the School of Public Policy, and President of the Institute for International Affairs, Qianhai, at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen; former Director of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore.)