Hu Tianjiao: Mao Zedong’s Strategic Thought on Responding to the “Anti-China Grand Chorus” [1]
Placed within the turbulent and unpredictable environment of the Cold War, New China at one point faced an external crisis that Mao Zedong termed the "anti-China chorus." In the face of anti-China forces varying in nature, Mao adopted different solutions to neutralize them. He evaluated the overall nature of these forces through a global strategic lens, dialectically noting that negative elements contained the potential to transform into their positive opposites. Mao believed that the key to breaking the encirclement of anti-China forces and seizing the initiative lay in advancing China’s socialist construction in a unified, independent, and self-reliant manner.
At present, on the journey toward realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we must confront the accelerating evolution of the "changes unseen in a century" [1]. Regarding this, Xi Jinping clearly pointed out: "Since the 18th Party Congress, we have soberly recognized that persisting in and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era is a strenuous and great social revolution. Evaluation of various hostile forces shows they will never let us realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation smoothly. Based on this, I have repeatedly emphasized to the whole Party that we must carry out a great struggle with many new historical features, and we must be prepared to put in even more arduous and difficult efforts." To respond to the "grim and complex international situation and the succession of huge risks and challenges," we must have the courage and the skill to struggle, continuously enhance our ability to struggle, and handle external suppression and containment—which may emerge or escalate at any time—with a high degree of strategic wisdom. Therefore, reviewing Mao Zedong’s strategic thinking in responding to the "anti-China chorus" can provide certain historical insights for advancing the great cause of Chinese-path modernization today.
I. The Tense Situation of the International "Anti-China Chorus"
In the mid-20th century, the "anti-China chorus" grew clamorous. In his analysis of the international situation, Mao Zedong decomposed it into "three parts," represented by the United States, India, and the Soviet Union respectively. During this period, anti-China forces formed a posture of mutual resonance, creating significant external pressure on the development of New China.
New China faced provocations and blockades from the Western "Free World." Economically, the United States maintained a comprehensive embargo against China, with the list of banned materials exceeding the "international embargo list" applied to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries by more than five hundred items. Militarily, New China was surrounded by a vast number of U.S. military bases; "in Japan alone, the U.S. had over eight hundred military bases." In 1958, while receiving a Cambodian delegation, Mao Zedong said: "Our external difficulties are also great; the U.S. is against us. There are U.S. bases in Taiwan and South Korea, and also in Japan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand. The Philippines and Thailand have even joined military alliances." From September 1958 to May 1961, the U.S. continuously violated New China’s territorial waters and airspace, leading China to issue a total of 148 "serious warnings." Politically, the U.S. long obstructed New China’s entry into the United Nations and hindered the realization of national reunification. At the end of 1957, the U.S. attempted to downgrade the ambassadorial talks regarding the Taiwan issue, causing the talks to be suspended. Subsequently, it spread the "two Chinas" agenda internationally, causing tensions in the Taiwan Strait to escalate continuously.
India was the second non-communist-led country to establish diplomatic relations with New China. From 1950 to 1958, China and India enjoyed a period of friendly coexistence. India reached a mutual understanding with New China on issues such as calling for a ceasefire on the Korean Peninsula, supporting New China’s entry into the UN, and affirming that China’s Taiwan belongs to China. In 1955, India and other countries jointly invited China to participate in the Bandung Conference. At the conference, in the face of doubts and slanders against the communist movement from some countries, Nehru actively supported China. Guided by the spirit of "seeking common ground while reserving differences" proposed by Zhou Enlai, the conference was a success, resulting in the "Ten Principles" based on the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence." At this time, the harmony between New China and India reflected the desire of Asian peoples to unite and create a new world order following the collapse of the old colonial system.
However, the hidden dangers caused by colonial history did not dissipate entirely. On one hand, British and American forces resonated with Indian right-wing forces, cultivating Kalimpong [2] into a hub for Tibetan rebel forces and Western spies, thereby achieving the goal of using boundary disputes to divide China and India—specifically, to "strengthen the anti-CCP sentiment of Asian neutralism." On the other hand, regarding the legacy of colonialism, the Indian elite wanted to resist old colonialism while simultaneously attempting to inherit the illegal privileges obtained by colonialists in Tibet. After the Tibetan rebellion [3], Nehru formally raised the Sino-Indian border issue, demanding that China accept India’s claims in their entirety—especially recognizing the McMahon Line drawn by former British colonialists—and ordered Indian troops to enter disputed areas to build outposts. In August 1959, armed conflicts broke out between Chinese and Indian troops in the disputed zone. The Indian army fired first, and China only returned fire six hours later; the Indian side suffered two casualties. Following the conflict, India reacted strongly, accusing China of launching a "Cold War," and joined Western public opinion in driving a wedge between China and other neighboring countries, playing up the "China threat theory." Consequently, a "downpour of rumors and slanders fell upon China’s head."
During the same period, Sino-Soviet relations turned from warm to cold. "In 1958, the Soviet Union proposed building a long-wave radio station and a joint fleet, which was actually an attempt to control China militarily, to be followed by political control." Mao Zedong resolutely rejected this: "Why raise the issue of half-ownership? This is a political question. If you want to talk about political conditions, not even half a finger's worth will do... On this issue, we can go ten thousand years without aid." With "control vs. anti-control" as the point of contention, the Sino-Soviet conflict unfolded. Thereafter, the Soviet Union, preparing for negotiations with Britain and the U.S. on a nuclear test ban and the U.S.-Soviet summit, unilaterally stopped providing atomic energy technology assistance to China and withdrew some technical experts. After visiting the U.S., Khrushchev came to China to attend the tenth-anniversary celebrations of the founding of New China. During talks with the Chinese side, he suggested that China release American spies, blamed China for allowing the Dalai Lama to flee (claiming it put the international communist movement in a passive position), and even hinted that Taiwan could be independent like the "Far Eastern Republic" [4]. These were all fundamental issues of principle involving China’s sovereignty and were sternly refuted by Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and others. Consequently, Khrushchev alluded to China in public speeches as being "as keen on war as a fighting cock." As this series of events erupted, the differences between China and the Soviet Union regarding the future direction of the world, the nature of imperialism, the world liberation movement, and how to build socialism continued to widen, bringing Sino-Soviet relations to the brink of collapse.
II. Analyzing Different Types of Anti-China Forces and Adopting Different Countermeasures
In response to the international "anti-China chorus" rising from various quarters, Mao Zedong adopted different plans based on an analysis of the different natures of these anti-China forces. By grasping the primary contradictions in the international arena, New China avoided falling into a position of "striking out in four directions" [5] by alternating between "tension and relaxation" [6], thereby securing international solidarity and voicing the side of justice in support of national liberation and peaceful development for the vast majority of countries.
(1) Handling Sino-U.S. Relations: Flexibly Carrying Out Struggle and Diplomacy
During this period, because the U.S. implemented military deterrence and economic blockades against New China, obstructed China’s complete reunification, and interfered in the world’s national liberation movements, the primary aspect of the Sino-U.S. contradiction was a diplomatic one. Facing the threats and encirclement of the world’s most powerful country and its camp, China did not respond passively, nor did it strike out recklessly. Instead, based on the specific global situation, China identified the weaknesses beneath America’s strength and effectively neutralized or struggled against them. Mao Zedong used a vivid metaphor: "The United States is a powerful country, but it occupies too wide an area. Its ten fingers are pressing down on ten fleas, and it cannot move; it cannot catch a single flea. When strength is dispersed, things become difficult."
In July 1958, Iraq announced its withdrawal from the U.S.-orchestrated Baghdad Pact. U.S. and British troops immediately invaded Jordan and Lebanon, threatening the national independence movements of the Arab people and attempting to control the Middle East. Prior to this, the situation in Taiwan had also grown increasingly tense: In March 1958, the U.S. announced the merger of its military institutions in Taiwan to establish the "United States Taiwan Defense Command"; in May, the U.S. chose Taiwan for its first experimental missile launch in the Far East, a move with unmistakable deterrent implications for the People's Republic of China. In August 1958, while the eyes of the world were focused on the Middle East, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army shelled Kinmen [7]. This not only demonstrated the determination to defend sovereignty but also supported the world revolution through practical action. This move greatly shocked the U.S., forcing it to immediately mobilize half of its aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Strait. Mao Zedong used the "noose" theory to describe the U.S. global military strategy: although the military bases seemed vast, they were actually "nooses" placed around its neck by Lebanon, Taiwan, Kinmen, and Matsu. China could utilize these nooses to constrain and strike the U.S. with the force of "four ounces to move a thousand pounds" [8]—that is, using "brinkmanship to deal with the Americans' brinkmanship." While the U.S. attempted to turn Taiwan into a vassal state or even a trust territory and promoted the "two Chinas" issue, Mao used the shelling of Kinmen to reaffirm that the Taiwan issue was China’s internal affair. Simultaneously, he exploited the American desire to extricate itself to compel the U.S. to resume the previously interrupted ambassadorial talks.
(2) Handling Sino-Indian Relations: Seeking Unity on the Basis of Appropriate Struggle
Regarding India, Mao analyzed the nature of the state in diplomatic interactions, pointing out the potential dual aspects of newly independent nationalist countries. Mao clearly recognized that capitalism could be divided into imperialism—which oppresses other nations—and nationalism, which occupies an intermediate state. He said: nationalist countries "were originally the rear of imperialism, but because they are also anti-imperialist, they transform into the rear of our proletariat, the rear of socialism." Therefore, India might degenerate into national chauvinism and act as an anti-China henchman under the inducement of imperialist and domestic right-wing forces, but it also possessed anti-colonial desires and was an ally that could be won over.
In modern history, both China and India were once semi-colonies or colonies, suffering from imperialist aggression and oppression. Consequently, in the process of national liberation movements, the independence of India and China became two banners. Common historical memories once allowed China and India to reach mutual understanding under the Cold War structure. Mao Zedong once sincerely pointed out in a conversation with Nehru: "We Easterners have a feeling of wanting to unite and a feeling of wanting to defend ourselves... We have a great point in common, which is that we all have to deal with imperialism." Nehru also noted when evaluating the Asian-African Conference: "The Western countries may not like it, because they have been deciding our fate for a long time. But whether they like it or not, this thing is inevitable... The conference will represent the awakening of Asia and Africa after two hundred years of rule and exploitation by Western countries."
Against this backdrop, Mao Zedong strove for unity while upholding principles and engaging in appropriate struggle. Following the rebellion in Tibet, Nehru repeatedly expressed sympathy and support for the rebels amidst the Western anti-China clamor. In response, Mao asserted the need for public reasoning and struggle, ensuring that New China’s voice—neither haughty nor humble [9]—was heard in the arena of global public opinion. For instance, while revising an editorial, Mao shifted away from the previous stance of broad accusation: "Change it to: 'British imperialists and Indian expansionists, acting in collusion [10], have openly interfered in China's internal affairs in a vain attempt to snatch Tibet away.' Point directly at Britain and India; do not dodge." Subsequently, the People's Daily published an article titled "The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy," refuting Nehru's fallacies regarding democratic reform in Tibet.
On the basis of conducting struggle with good reason, advantage, and restraint [11], Mao rationally cooled the disputes and worked toward unity with India. While revising the Foreign Ministry’s draft reply to the Indian Foreign Secretary, Mao added a paragraph demonstrating China’s desire for peace. He noted that even though the Philippines, Thailand, and Pakistan had joined the SEATO alliance targeted at China, China still did not treat those three countries as enemies—let alone India, which had not joined the treaty. To this end, Mao stated sincerely: "We cannot treat friends as enemies; this is our national policy... The quarrel between our two countries is but an episode in the thousands of years of friendship between us... Indian friends, what is your intent? Would you agree with this line of thinking?"
After the Kongka Pass conflict on the western sector of the Sino-Indian border, the Chinese side demonstrated immense restraint and sincerity during the negotiations. Mao proposed that to avoid disputes, if the lines of actual control between Chinese and Indian troops were within twenty kilometers of each other, both sides should withdraw ten kilometers to create a "gun-free zone" and a "peace zone." This aimed to achieve the international public opinion effect of "retreating militarily to advance politically." Mao remarked, "Nehru said both sides should withdraw from Longju; I expanded that to the entire line of actual control—our love of peace has reached its pinnacle." This proposal, sent as a letter from the Premier, was recognized even by Indian politicians as being "rich in the spirit of conciliation." This fully demonstrated the profound connotation of New China’s concept of sovereignty: China’s external struggle for sovereignty was clearly directed at imperialism. Regarding border disputes with neighbors formed under the colonial system, these should be resolved based on the premise that "sovereignty belongs to us," with both sides negotiating at an appropriate time to reach a mutual understanding. This would allow the dispossessed and the violated of the Old World to unite and create new relations and a new order in the New World. Following the achievement of national independence, this measure undoubtedly pointed toward a revolution that more thoroughly crushed the shadows of colonialism.
(3) Handling Sino-Soviet Relations: Controlling Disputes and Striving for Unity
As the Sino-Soviet rift intensified, China hoped to maintain unity with the Soviet Union for the sake of the overall situation, keeping disputed issues restricted to "one finger out of ten" [12]. In his speech at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, Khrushchev publicly alluded to and criticized China's path of socialist construction. Mao, however, emphasized the importance of unity. He stated that the report of the 21st Congress generally accorded with the spirit of the Moscow Meeting and showed progress compared to the 20th Congress; as for the points of disagreement, he suggested "wait and see. We have differences between us, but let us not speak of them now." On several issues of contention, Mao repeatedly emphasized shelving disputes, not only to avoid conflict and maintain exchanges but also in the hope that historical development would naturally demonstrate the correctness of the respective paths, thereby creating a foundation for consensus and keeping the relations between the two parties normal and friendly.
Regarding Khrushchev’s excessive praise of the United States as a force for world peace following the Camp David summit, the leaders of the CPC held a different view. Mao pointed out that one must use "two hands"—peace and struggle—to deal with the United States, rather than harboring peaceful illusions: "For example, if they want to sabotage China, will they avoid sabotaging you, the Soviet Union? They will still sabotage... One day, as soon as the West turns its face, [the Soviet Union] will be in a passive position." Nevertheless, Mao upheld the principle that the proletarian parties of each country should correct their own mistakes, believing that "it is better for such mistakes to be corrected by them internally; it is not good for foreign parties to correct them." However, the Soviet Union broke this very principle established at the 1957 Moscow Meeting. On February 6, 1960, following the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Central Committee of the CPSU criticized China in an oral notification. In its reply, the CPC stated it could not agree with the CPSU Central Committee’s criticism: "We suggest that our two fraternal parties each reserve their own opinions and calmly wait for the development of objective facts to prove the truth and judge right from wrong." Through its own words and deeds, the CPC demonstrated the greatest possible pursuit of a more equal relationship between socialist parties and states.
Faced with disputes involving India and the Soviet Union, China insisted on principle and sought unity on the basis of moderate struggle. This neither wavered in expressing China’s policy toward specific events nor failed to show friendliness and the value placed on bilateral relations. Due to various historical reasons, Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated successionally during this period, but one cannot simply conclude that Mao’s strategy of "struggle and unity" was wrong or that China’s diplomatic efforts were in vain. It must be recognized that New China had just stepped onto the world stage, and its diplomatic measures concerned not only the countries involved but were also the focus of neighboring countries and the world at large.
Regarding the Sino-Indian conflict, in addition to sincere discussions with India, the Chinese side maintained full communication with the leaders of neighboring countries concerned about the event. For example, in talks with leaders from Afghanistan, Indonesia, and other nations, Mao expressed his attitude toward the Sino-Indian dispute and conveyed a desire for peace and unity, noting: "The trend for the whole of Asia to unite on the Bandung Principles is irresistible; quarreling cannot solve problems." China's understanding of sovereignty and its method of handling border disputes also won recognition from the peoples of other former colonial countries and regions. For instance, some African figures expressed support for China: "Oppose the McMahon Line created by British imperialism; point out that on the continent of Black Africa, many 'McMahon Lines' currently exist and must be abolished in the future." As the world closely watched the situation in the Asia-Pacific and the internal divisions within the socialist camp, China's actions and measures demonstrated an outstanding quality, helping to dispel misunderstandings about New China and allowing people to gain a deeper understanding of the nascent socialist regime in the East. This created favorable conditions for China to open a broader global diplomatic landscape and establish more universal economic, political, and cultural ties.
III. Interpreting the Essence and Impact of the "Anti-China Chorus" through Materialist Dialectics
When anti-China forces were at their peak, some comrades expressed that they were "very worried and found it hard to understand." In addition to proposing means of struggle for specific situations, Mao Zedong provided a high-level dialectical analysis of the essence and overall impact of the "anti-China chorus." This served to inspire the spirit and unify thinking with correct understanding, minimizing negative impacts as much as possible and transforming unfavorable factors into favorable conditions for building socialism. Although the "wind and waves were fierce" during this period and both East and West presented a climate of "tempestuous storms," Mao still maintained a spirit of revolutionary optimism, pointing out the possibility of opening up a bright future within the atmosphere of the "anti-China chorus."
(1) A Comprehensive Interpretation of the Essence of the "Anti-China Chorus": "Great Pro-China, Small Anti-China"
Mao Zedong pointed out that one should neither overestimate anti-China forces nor underestimate the energy of the world's people in supporting New China. In early 1960, China participated in the East Pakistan Industrial and Agricultural Exhibition; the Chinese exhibition sparked a wave of visitors across Dhaka and other cities in East Pakistan. At the World Agriculture Fair in New Delhi, the number of visitors to the China Pavilion reached over 3.5 million, the highest among all national agricultural pavilions. Based on this, Mao wrote a comment titled "On the Anti-China Issue," pointing out that anti-China forces accounted for only a tiny fraction of the world’s population: "It is estimated to be only a small percentage of humanity—say 5%, or at most 10%. Those who are truly anti-China are but a small handful [13]." The anti-China forces themselves were intermittent: "When there is a topic to exploit, such as the Tibet issue or the Sino-Indian border issue, they oppose us for a while."
At the same time, the anti-China camp—especially the imperialist camp—was not united. Imperialist countries in different positions had their own interest calculations. For instance, to maintain their large spheres of influence, Britain and the United States "became conservative, while West Germany and Japan wanted to expand. West Germany wants to expand; the US does not approve, and Britain approves even less." In July 1959, Mao read the summary of Zhang Wentian’s speech at a central foreign affairs meeting. The summary noted: "On many issues of common interest in the West, Britain is consistent with the United States in opposing us." Mao added a supplement after this sentence: "But on other issues, even several extremely important ones, Britain and the US are not consistent in dealing with us, but have serious differences." The internal divisions within the anti-China forces were bound to affect the sustainability of anti-China sentiment, potentially providing a relatively stable international environment for New China's construction.
Therefore, Mao judged that the overall situation of the so-called "Great Anti-China" was that "about 10% of the world's people oppose us chronically but intermittently." In the spatial dimension, New China had more than 90% neutral and friendly forces that could be united; in the temporal dimension, New China could strive for peaceful coexistence with the vast majority of countries outside of the intermittent anti-China phases. Overall, it was "actually Great Pro-China, Small Anti-China." Amidst the clamor of international hostile forces, Mao reversed the typical way of thinking and dissected the obscured favorable conditions: the anti-China camp possessed fragility and unsustainability; within the anti-China wave lay vast "pro-China" zones; and outside of intermittent anti-China periods, there were long periods of peace that could be fully utilized. This constituted the favorable environment and the focal point for New China to advance its domestic and international work.
(2) A Dialectical Analysis of the Impact of Anti-China Sentiment: Objectively Benefiting the People of the World and the People of China
As New China completed its socialist transformation and entered the stage of large-scale socialist construction, the "anti-China chorus" undoubtedly added discordant external "noise." How to understand the overall impact of anti-China sentiment on China and the world was also related to whether domestic confidence could be galvanized to form a consensus on construction. Mao dialectically pointed out that anti-China sentiment should not be seen as a purely negative factor; rather, one should use the momentum to transform it into a positive factor beneficial to China’s construction and the world’s national liberation movements.
Mao believed that anti-China forces objectively favored the awakening of the people of the world, allowing China to gain more steadfast support: "Anti-China and anti-communist activities are good for us. First, they expose the face of the reactionaries, causing them to lose prestige before the people." For example, when international anti-China forces falsely claimed that the cause of the Sino-Indian border conflict was China's attempt to invade Indian territory, China proactively proposed that both sides withdraw ten kilometers to create a "gun-free zone" within twenty kilometers of the disputed area. This program, imbued with a peaceful spirit, exposed the lies. Mao believed this process would weaken the credibility of anti-China forces and that China’s peaceful and sincere international image would stand the test of history, gaining the understanding and recognition of the broader masses of the world. Mao encouraged the Chinese people to trust that the people of the world possessed the wisdom to judge the direction of events and distinguish right from wrong: "We are prepared to be isolated—that is one aspect. On the other hand, we can gain the support of many countries, many peoples, and many Communist Parties. We have always believed in the broad masses; we will not be isolated."
Beyond this, anti-China forces could serve as a catalyst for socialist construction, stimulating the potential of the Chinese people and raising the consciousness of people worldwide. Mao Zedong pointed out: "Anti-China activity has its benefits. First, it exposes the enemy; second, it makes us indignant. We should not show our anger, but rather transform it into strength." He further noted, "I see the current Cold War and international tension as disadvantageous to the capitalist world, but relatively advantageous to the world's people's revolution." Here, Mao’s assertions were highly targeted [14]. At a time when the United States was shifting its strategy toward the socialist camp to "peaceful evolution" [15], and Khrushchev was vigorously advocating the "Three Peaces" policy [16] to reach a compromise with the U.S. for the goal of "jointly ruling the world," the artificial incitement of anti-China sentiment exposed the hypocrisy of Western imperialism. It showed they possessed "not only a side that talks of peace, but also a side that wages war."
As Western imperialism treated China today, so it would treat other countries in the socialist camp tomorrow, and the wave of anti-imperialist liberation movements the day after. This allowed the people of China and the world to understand the dual nature of imperialism and recognize the futility of seeking peace through pure compromise. "It will awaken the majority of the world's people; they will see that imperialism, reactionary nationalism, and revisionism are swindlers. The world is extremely bright. The thicker the dark clouds, the more light there is. Once the plum rain season passes, sunny days arrive" [17]. Under external pressure, the people of the New China could coalesce and collaborate more rapidly. Just as the humiliating experience of signing unequal treaties in modern China awakened the people's passion to save the nation, and as the peril of national subjugation during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression fostered a broad anti-Japanese national united front, the anti-China posture under the Cold War framework made the Chinese people clearly realize: to seize the initiative in the cruel international struggle, China must become stronger, realize modernization more rapidly, and transform anger and a sense of humiliation into the driving force for building socialism. In this sense, anti-China sentiment constituted the external condition for the Chinese people to forge consensus and march toward the future.
In short, Mao Zedong used dialectical thinking to see the possibility of transforming anti-China sentiment into favorable external conditions. With a high degree of theoretical confidence, he pointed out that anti-China sentiment represented only a small faction on a global scale, and China would not move toward closure or isolation as a result. Mao encouraged the Chinese people to unite with the world's people with an open and active attitude, establish links with the majority of neutral or potentially friendly countries, and actively guide and transform the emotions stimulated by external pressure into the subjective initiative to carry out socialist construction.
IV. The Fundamental Force for Weakening the Anti-China Wave: Advancing Socialist Construction Through Independence and Self-Reliance
Although the anti-China issue was deliberately manufactured by hostile foreign forces, Mao Zedong did not believe it was merely a diplomatic matter. In response to the blockades and smears from anti-China forces, it was naturally necessary for China to strike back and clarify the truth; however, doing so still ran the risk of falling into the "rhythm" set by the anti-China forces, leading to a passive situation of merely following their lead and struggling to cope. Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, proceeded from historical materialism to analyze the laws and prospects governing the emergence of anti-China forces, firmly grasping the initiative to solve the problem. Mao pointed out that anti-China forces often use domestic Chinese incidents to launch their activities: "If there is a topic they can borrow... they will oppose us for a while."
The incitement of anti-China sentiment by these forces usually has several aims: to infringe upon China's sovereignty; to exert pressure to delay China's development; and to stigmatize China before the world's people, thereby weakening the influence of the socialist New China. In short, the goal of imperialist anti-China activity lies not only in securing direct interests such as resources and control, but also in shaking the construction plans of the New China, subsequently using the failure of the New China's path to modernization to contrast with the "unique correctness" of their own path. Mao Zedong noted: "New things are always opposed by some. Once they are successful, people stop opposing them. If people oppose you, it means you haven't done well yet. People believe in the victory of the revolution, but they do not believe in the construction side." The construction path requires results to prove itself. "It needs to be proven domestically, and it needs to be proven internationally." Mao pointed out that to dampen the arrogance of anti-China forces at the source, the fundamental method was for China itself to be united, do its domestic work well, and accelerate socialist construction—using internal factors to drive the transformation of external factors. Regarding this, he said: "In short, the center of all problems lies in our own unity and our own work being done well." "If we manage ourselves well, we need not fear others being anti-China."
If construction and production could be smoothly advanced, it would not only powerfully neutralize the pretexts used by anti-China forces but also increase the cost of anti-China activities and reduce their benefits, causing such efforts to return empty-handed. Mao predicted that as China's total domestic output and per capita output gradually rose to the forefront of the world, the intervals of anti-China activity would be greatly lengthened. "This will force the Americans to establish diplomatic relations with us and trade on an equal footing; otherwise, they will be isolated." It is evident that Mao always grasped the direction of history with a dynamic and dialectical methodology. In his view, there was a trend of "waxing and waning" in the balance of power between China and the anti-China camp; anti-China forces could not sustain themselves long-term, and those hostile to China could be transformed into partners for China's development. China would not always be in a passive position of being opposed; this depended on the New China's own development. Regarding how to carry out socialist construction, Mao reflected from multiple perspectives.
(1) Persisting in establishing an independent and complete national economic system
Faced with severe external challenges and pressure, establishing an independent and complete industrial system—especially a manufacturing system—was the top priority for guaranteeing national security and development. Mao had provided a far-sighted explanation of this key strategy on the eve of the founding of the PRC. At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee [18], Mao for the first time formally proposed the development goal of establishing an independent and complete industrial system, setting the fundamental tone for the development of New China's industrial cause. After the founding of the PRC, in the face of numerous difficulties and challenges, Mao unswervingly upheld the concept of building a complete industrial system. For example, while reading and commenting on the Soviet Textbook of Political Economy, Mao responded to the textbook’s description of China "proposing the task of establishing a complete industrial system for itself" by noting that this was the result of a struggle and debate with the Soviet Union: "In the past, they and some Eastern European countries wanted us not to build a complete industrial system." History has proven that this development goal laid the economic base for our country to steadfastly carry out socialist construction amidst the raging storms of international turmoil. In addition to advocating for a complete industrial system, Mao systematically planned the overall development of the economy. Industry is not an island; it is embedded within the entirety of the national economic structure. Without an independent and complete national economic system, there can be no independent and complete industrial system. Based on the profound lessons of the Soviet "Stalinist model," Mao pointed out that only the coordinated development of agriculture and industry (both light and heavy) could ensure the long-term, healthy development of the industrial system. Combining the experiences and lessons of China’s own construction, Mao pointed out the need to explore a path of coordinated development among various industries: "simultaneously developing industry and agriculture while giving priority to the development of heavy industry," so as to balance immediate interests with long-term interests.
(2) Discarding "slave thinking" and daring to explore a construction path suited to national conditions
To unite the whole Party and the people and create a consensus for taking the path of independent construction, Mao pointed out that long-standing "slave thinking" must be discarded. "There exists a kind of slave thinking. This spiritual influence still exists among some people in our country today, so we must break down superstitions" [19]. This thinking had two historical sources: first, the long-term enslavement and humiliation of the Chinese people politically, economically, and spiritually since the beginning of the modern era, which produced "U.S.-phobia" and "West-phobia"; second, the poverty and weakness of the New China at the start of its construction journey, which created an urgent need to learn from the experiences of others and predecessors. In this process, a "borrowingist" [20] mindset of total imitation toward the Soviet development path emerged within the Party, fostering a trend of mechanically copying classical Marxist theory and classical development models. To this, Mao offered pointed criticism: "When we publish Marxist books, we don't dare write a preface or offer a single word of commentary; we are still in a state of slavery." "Our comrades currently exhibit a lack of spirit, which is a manifestation of a slave state—just like Jia Gui in the Peking Opera Famen Temple: he is so used to standing that he doesn't dare sit down" [21]. From this criticism, one can get a glimpse into the problem of dogmatic imitation that appeared during the construction process.
The founding of the New China and the victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea greatly encouraged the Chinese people. However, to completely reverse the suppressed and insecure situation of the Chinese people at the level of national social development and culture, it was necessary to discard the psychology of hoping to carry out construction through aid provided by "authoritative" or "powerful countries." Instead, it was necessary to integrate the principles of Marxism with China’s concrete reality. Based on China's actual conditions, primary contradictions, and the themes of the times, and by fully drawing on the rich experience of decades of the Chinese revolution, it was necessary to broadly mobilize the initiative and wisdom of the masses to explore a path of socialist construction suited to China's national conditions. Through independent practice, China would produce its own experience, results, theories, and confidence. Mao pointed out that as the times develop, the practice of future generations will continuously surpass that of their predecessors—just as the October Revolution and Lenin’s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism surpassed Marx's understanding in the 19th century. The Chinese revolution likewise surpassed Marx’s expectations: "Our practice has surpassed Marx; principles must emerge from practice... Do not belittle yourselves; do not look down on yourselves." "Marxism itself was created; it cannot be copied from books."
On the basis of fully absorbing and learning from the excellent development experiences of foreign countries, and in combination with the specific international situation and construction goals, Mao refined the construction line into: "Self-reliance as the primary focus, with foreign aid as a supplement; breaking down superstitions; independently carrying out industry, agriculture, the technical revolution, and the cultural revolution; striking down slave thinking and burying dogmatism; seriously studying the good experiences of foreign countries while also studying their bad experiences—to serve as a warning." At a moment of "high winds and turbulent waves" [22] when China was simultaneously confronting the world’s two strongest powers, the construction line proposed by Mao was of great historical significance for uniting and inspiring the people nationwide to open up a socialist construction path unique to China, thereby fundamentally deterring anti-China forces.
(3) Firmly upholding the socialist development path and remaining vigilant against "peaceful evolution"
Through Mao Zedong’s tireless efforts, a profound consensus was formed among Chinese Communists that developing the productive forces and advancing socialist construction constituted the fundamental solution to the anti-China problem. For example, Zhou Enlai summarized three strategies for responding to isolation by anti-China forces: "First, establishing an independent economic system; second, making breakthroughs in cutting-edge national defense; and third, Party unity." On this basis, Mao Zedong further added the requirement of building a technical workforce: "To develop an industrial system, we must establish a technical workforce... every large administrative region and every province must establish a proletarian theoretical workforce and a technical workforce."
The fundamental prerequisite for developing the productive forces and advancing socialist construction is persisting on the socialist road. During this period, as the overall domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union shifted, Mao Zedong began to think more deeply about the issues of persisting on the socialist road and remaining vigilant against "peaceful evolution" [23] within the specific global political and economic landscape. "Peaceful evolution" was a "soft" confrontation method conceived by [John Foster] Dulles in response to the U.S.-Soviet standoff—a method distinct from direct confrontation but equally capable of disintegrating an opponent. From late 1958 to early 1959, Dulles delivered a series of speeches, including "Policy for the Far East," "Ending the Cold War," and "The Role of Law in the Cause of Peace." In these speeches, Dulles proposed the idea of "peaceful evolution." "To seek peace by replacing force with justice and law... is a relatively new concept," Dulles explained. "Renouncing weapons does not mean maintaining the status quo, but rather means a peaceful transition." This meant that, in addition to maintaining a military presence worldwide, the United States would use international law to restrict the "illegal" actions of Communist regimes, provide economic aid to underdeveloped countries to steer them away from Communist "interference," and infiltrate Communist regimes through free trade and personnel exchanges, thereby containing the expansion of "international Communist" forces. Dulles pointed out: "Such an approach will accelerate the evolution of government policies within the Sino-Soviet bloc."
Mao Zedong’s understanding of the "peaceful evolution" policy also underwent a process of transformation. Initially, Mao understood Dulles’s speeches more in terms of a contraction of the U.S. diplomatic offensive: "Facts prove that imperialism is taking the defensive; there is no offensive at all... Dulles no longer talks about the brink of war or positions of strength." "To extinguish revolution and revolutionary war and preserve capitalist rule forever—this is Dulles’s goal. The imperialists have basically shifted to a position of maintaining the status quo." However, Mao Zedong soon realized the sharp edge of the offensive against the socialist camp hidden beneath the surface of this contraction: as the United States implemented the "peaceful evolution" policy, the Soviet Union increasingly compromised with international imperialism and domestic privileged groups, while forcing China to make the same compromises.
Anti-Chinese sentiment exists in multiple forms; there is not only armed intervention but also hidden erosion. Mao Zedong pointed out the need for high vigilance: "Who is to be transformed peacefully? It is us, these countries, through the conduct of subversive activities to make us internally conform to his ideology... using peaceful transition to corrupt us." Faced with the increasing shifts in Soviet policy, Mao did not view this as a unique problem of a specific time or place, but as a universal problem of whether socialist countries could maintain their revolutionary spirit and socialist essence in a new and complex international environment, facing "peaceful evolution" as a deceptive and long-term means of subversion. Therefore, Mao Zedong pointed out that in the process of advancing socialist construction, leading cadres must especially remain modest and prudent, guard against arrogance and rashness, seek truth from facts, always maintain flesh-and-blood ties with the masses, and always serve as servants of the people. In the historical environment of the long-term coexistence of socialist and capitalist states, how can Socialist China maintain its autonomy ("taking ourselves as the core") and avoid subversion and infiltration while participating in the construction of the world system and engaging in political, economic, and cultural exchanges with capitalist countries, while further advancing the socialist cause? This is a serious proposition of the era. Looking at history, Mao Zedong’s judgment was extremely acute; preventing "peaceful evolution" remains an important issue of concern in China’s development process to this day.
V. Contemporary Enlightenment from Mao Zedong’s Strategy for Responding to the "Anti-China Chorus"
In the New Era, China’s development has "entered a period in which strategic opportunities, risks, and challenges coexist, and uncertain and unpredictable factors are increasing," requiring us to "be prepared to withstand major tests of high winds, turbulent waters, and even dangerous storms." Xi Jinping has pointed out: "In the face of major risks and powerful opponents, it is unrealistic to always want to live a peaceful life without wanting to struggle. Falling victim to 'spinelessness' [24] or 'phobia' is of no help... We must grasp the historical characteristics of the new Great Struggle [25], carry forward the spirit of struggle, grasp the direction of struggle, seize the initiative in struggle, strengthen the will to struggle, master the laws of struggle, and enhance the ability to struggle, so as to effectively respond to major challenges, resist major risks, overcome major obstacles, solve major contradictions, defeat all hardships and obstacles on the road ahead, and continuously win new victories for the Great Struggle of the New Era." Standing at the historical node of "Changes Unseen in a Century" [26], reviewing Mao Zedong’s strategic thought on responding to the international "anti-China chorus" provides us with vivid wisdom and experience in struggle, helping us more deeply understand the overall layout of the path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics in the New Era.
First, identify the primary and secondary contradictions and the specific nature of anti-China forces to provide targeted responses, balancing struggle with unity. Faced with pressure from imperialist forces, one must dare to struggle and have the courage to make China’s voice heard in the arena of world public opinion in a manner that is neither supercilious nor obsequious. Regarding this, Xi Jinping pointed out: "History will prove that the historical footsteps of the Chinese nation toward Great Rejuvenation are unstoppable. No person or force attempting to impose their will on China through bullying, change the direction of China’s progress, or obstruct the efforts of the Chinese people to create a beautiful life for themselves will ever be accepted by the Chinese people!"
Second, dialectically analyze the international situation, make friends extensively and deeply, and unite the majority of countries to jointly build a backbone force for promoting world peace and development. We must "seek our own development while resolutely safeguarding world peace and development, and better safeguard world peace and development through our own development." China will always join hands with the peaceful forces of the world to "stand on the right side of history and the side of human progress." Currently, the deep advancement of the "Belt and Road" Initiative, the construction of a community with a shared future for humanity, and the exploration of the common values of all humanity demonstrate China’s responsibility and noble pursuit of values as a major world power.
Third, independently advance socialist construction as the fundamental basis for frustrating anti-China forces. We must adhere to the "Four Confidences" [27] and the people-centered approach, advance the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism, and continuously enrich and improve Chinese-path modernization in practice, using powerful facts to prove that history has not and will not "end." While deepening reform and opening up, we must build a more resilient modern industrial system, especially starting from the bottom-line thinking of breaking through the current situation where the U.S. and the West "choke our necks" [28] with technology and safeguarding national technological sovereignty, taking solid steps to carry out independent research and development of high-end technologies to respond to major national strategic needs. We must recognize both the overall development trend of "the East rising and the West declining" and the objective reality that capitalist and socialist countries will coexist in the world for a long time, maintaining historical determination and patience for advancing China’s socialist modernization. We must "neither take the old path of being closed and stagnant, nor the crooked path of changing flags and colors" [29], remain vigilant against "peaceful evolution," and drive social revolution through the Communist Party’s self-revolution, clearly and firmly following the "road to the exam" [30] of the New Era.
(Author: Hu Tianjiao, Lecturer at the school of Marxism, Central Party School (National Academy of Governance)) Web Editor: Tong Xin Source: Studies on Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories, Issue 10, 2024.