Yang Mingwei: The Zunyi Meeting: Turning a New Page

The Zunyi Meeting, convened from January 15 to 17, 1935, in fact established the leadership position of Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army. It marked the beginning of establishing the leadership of the correct Marxist line, represented primarily by Comrade Mao Zedong, within the Party Central Committee; the beginning of the formation of the Party's first generation of central collective leadership with Comrade Mao Zedong at its core; and the opening of a new stage in which the Party independently solved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution. It was a life-and-death turning point in the history of the Party.

Before the Zunyi Meeting

Summarizing the experiences and lessons of failure was a major component of the Zunyi Meeting.

At the end of 1934, the Central Red Army suffered its most serious losses since the start of the Long March. On December 1, except for the 34th Division of the Fifth Red Army Group and the 18th Regiment of the Third Red Army Group, which were blocked on the east bank of the Xiang River, the entire Central Red Army crossed the river. However, their numbers had plummeted from over 80,000 at the start of the march to just over 30,000. This was a grave consequence caused by erroneous military leadership.

Where should the main force of the Central Red Army go after crossing the Xiang River? The original plan was to head toward western Hunan to join forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups. However, this strategic intent was detected by Chiang Kai-shek’s clique. Consequently, He Jian, the "Commander-in-Chief of the Pursuit Army," was ordered to assemble nearly 200,000 troops in the areas of Hongjiang and Zhijiang in Hunan, and Songtao, Tongren, and Shiqian in Guizhou. They set up four lines of defense, creating a "pocket formation" ^[1] in an attempt to draw the main force of the Central Red Army into an encirclement.

Regarding the direction of the Red Army's strategic shift, disputes arose within the leadership of the Party Central Committee. Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian began to criticize the Central Committee's military line, arguing that the failures since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" ^[2] were caused by an erroneous line in military leadership. Given that the road to the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups was already heavily guarded by Chiang Kai-shek’s concentrated forces and the Central Red Army had lost the initiative to reach western Hunan, Mao Zedong suggested to the Party Central Committee: abandon the plan to join the Second and Sixth Army Groups in western Hunan and instead advance toward Guizhou, where enemy forces were weak, to establish a base area in the Sichuan-Guizhou border region.

On December 12, the Party Central Committee held an emergency meeting in Tongdao, Hunan. At the meeting, Mao Zedong strongly advocated for marching into Guizhou, while Bo Gu, Otto Braun (Li De) ^[3], and others resolutely opposed it, still pinning their hopes on joining the Second and Sixth Army Groups. Because opinions were not unified, the meeting could not decide on the general direction of the strategic shift, but it did make deployments to move west and occupy Liping, Guizhou. As the debate continued, the Central Politburo held a series of meetings while on the march after entering Guizhou, continuously discussing issues surrounding the future and fate of the Party and the Red Army, as well as the power of decision-making and command.

On December 18, the Central Politburo held a meeting in Liping, Guizhou. After intense debate, the majority of comrades, including Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang, agreed with Mao Zedong’s opinion to cross the Wu River to the west, head north, and establish a base area in the Sichuan-Guizhou border region. The meeting adopted the Decision of the Central Politburo on Strategic Principles and decided to summarize the experiences and lessons of military command since the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" after capturing Zunyi. On January 1, 1935, the Central Politburo held a meeting at Houchang in Weng’an County, Guizhou. The Houchang Meeting criticized Bo Gu and Otto Braun’s insistence on not crossing the Wu River and wanting to turn back to join the Second and Sixth Army Groups. It reaffirmed the proposal put forward by Mao Zedong and agreed upon at the Liping Meeting to establish a new base area in the Sichuan-Guizhou border region, and adopted the Decision of the Central Politburo on the New Operational Principles After Crossing the River. To strengthen the Central Politburo’s leadership over the Military Commission and change the situation of Otto Braun’s arbitrary military command, the meeting also decided: "Regarding operational principles, as well as the selection of the time and place of combat, the Military Commission must report to the Politburo meetings." Two days later, on January 3, the Central Secretariat instructed the heads of various army groups to convey this decision to cadres at the regimental level and above.

On January 2, with the assistance of the 2nd Division of the First Red Army Group, leaders such as Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and Zhou Enlai safely crossed the Wu River along with the Military Commission column and subsequent units. By the 6th, the main force of the Central Red Army had completely crossed the Wu River from three ferry points. On January 7, the 2nd Division of the First Red Army Group made a surprise attack and occupied the city of Zunyi. This provided the conditions for convening the Zunyi Meeting.

Establishing Mao Zedong’s Leadership Position

At a critical juncture, Mao Zedong dared to wage a resolute struggle against the erroneous line and was able to make correct decisions on the strategy and tactics of the Party and the Red Army regarding major issues. His core role was obvious to all.

On January 9, 1935, Mao Zedong entered Zunyi with the Military Commission column and stayed with Zhang Wentian and Wang Jiaxiang at the residence of Yi Shaoquan, a former brigade commander of the Guizhou Army, in Gushi Lane in the new city of Zunyi.

On the third day after entering Zunyi, Mao Zedong delivered a speech at a county-wide public assembly, explaining the various policies of the Communist Party of China and the Red Army. He pointed out that the CPC was willing to unite with all circles of the people and all armies throughout the country to resist the Japanese together, emphasizing that only the Soviets ^[4] could save China.

From January 15 to 17, the Central Politburo held an enlarged meeting in Zunyi (commonly known as the "Zunyi Meeting"). At the meeting, Mao Zedong delivered a long speech on various disputed issues since the Long March, primarily the most urgent issue of the military line. In his speech, he criticized the view in Bo Gu’s report that the main reason for the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" was the strength of the enemy versus our weakness. Mao argued that the failure was primarily caused by errors in military command and strategy and tactics. He also pointed out that Bo Gu and Otto Braun had replaced decisive defensive warfare with a purely defensive line, substituted mobile warfare with positional and fortress warfare, and supported a purely defensive strategic line with the so-called "short, swift thrusts" ^[5] tactical principle, causing losses to the Red Army. Mao Zedong emphasized that this line was completely contrary to the basic principles of strategy and tactics through which the Red Army achieves victory.

Mao Zedong’s opinions received the support of the majority of the attendees. The Central Politburo entrusted Zhang Wentian to draft the Resolution of the Central Committee on the Summary of Opposing the Enemy's Five "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns based on Mao Zedong's suggestions and the content of the majority's speeches, to be submitted to the Central Politburo for approval and then printed and distributed.

The Zunyi Meeting proposed changing the decision of the Liping Meeting regarding establishing a base area in the Sichuan-Guizhou border. It decided that the Red Army should cross the Yangtze River to the north and establish a base area in the southwest or northwest of Chengdu. The meeting additionally elected Mao Zedong as a member of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo, abolished the "Three-Man Group" ^[6], and revoked the supreme military command power of Bo Gu and Otto Braun. It was decided that military affairs would still be commanded by the main leaders of the Central Military Commission, Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, with Zhou Enlai being the person entrusted within the Party to make the final decisions on military command. After the meeting, the members of the Central Standing Committee divided their labor, with Mao Zedong serving as Zhou Enlai's assistant in military command. Deng Xiaoping, who attended the meeting, later recalled: although nominally he (Mao Zedong) did not serve as General Secretary or Chairman of the Military Commission, in reality, his command of the army and his decision-making on major issues were recognized by other leaders.

The Zunyi Meeting ended the rule of Wang Ming’s "Left" adventurist line within the Party Central Committee, in fact established Comrade Mao Zedong’s leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, and began to establish the leadership of the correct Marxist line represented primarily by Comrade Mao Zedong in the Party Central Committee. At the most critical moment, it saved the Party, saved the Red Army, and saved the Chinese revolution, laying the foundation for the victorious completion of the Long March.

Forming a New Central Collective Leadership

The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party ^[7] pointed out: "After the Zunyi Meeting, the political line of the Party Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong was completely correct."

After the Zunyi Meeting, Mao Zedong and the Military Commission column left Zunyi on January 19, 1935, to continue the Long March. For a period afterward, the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army on the Long March continued to explore the direction of advance and a place to settle, while further establishing and consolidating the new collective leadership.

On January 26, Mao Zedong and others arrived in Tucheng. At this time, two brigades of the Sichuan Army reached the city of Chishui ahead of the Central Red Army to block its northward advance, while the pursuing Sichuan Army moved into the area east of Tucheng. On January 28, the Cadre Regiment of the Military Commission column, along with the Third and Fifth Red Army Groups and part of the First Red Army Group, launched a fierce attack from the north and south on the enemy located in the Qinggangpo area east of Tucheng. After a full day of fierce fighting, the battle was lost. At this point, two brigades of the Sichuan Army's follow-up units quickly arrived as reinforcements, and two brigades of the Sichuan Army located at Wanglong場 took the opportunity to attack the Central Red Army from the flank and rear. In this situation, Mao Zedong proposed calling a meeting of the main leaders of the Central Politburo and decided to withdraw from the battle immediately. Subsequently, the combat units and the Military Commission column quickly lightened their loads, crossed the Chishui River to the west, and began the world-famous "Four Crossings of the Chishui River" battle of the Long March.

On February 5, Mao Zedong and the Military Commission column arrived at Jimingsansheng Village at the border of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Here, Mao Zedong talked with Zhou Enlai about Zhang Wentian’s proposal regarding changing the leadership of the Party Central Committee. Regarding this matter, Zhou Enlai once recalled: "At that time, Luofu (Zhang Wentian) proposed to change the leadership; he said Bo Gu was not up to it. I remember very clearly that Chairman Mao sent for me and said, 'Luofu wants to change the leadership now.' We said at the time, of course it should be Chairman Mao, we listen to Chairman Mao. Chairman Mao said, 'No, we should let Luofu do it for a period of time.'" Subsequently, the Central Politburo decided that Zhang Wentian would take over Bo Gu's general responsibility within the Party. Although Mao Zedong did not take "general responsibility" ^[8] in a formal sense at this time, his breadth of mind, foresight, and leadership ability were further recognized by the Party and the Red Army.

On February 8, to implement the spirit of the Zunyi Meeting, the Central Secretariat issued the Outline of the Resolution of the Enlarged Meeting of the Central Politburo on Summarizing the Experience and Lessons of the War to Smash the Five "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns. It focused on summarizing the experiences and lessons of the failure of the fifth counter-campaign and reaffirmed the series of correct basic principles of strategy and tactics summarized by Mao Zedong based on his experience in war practice. Immediately after, members of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo, including Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Chen Yun, successively went to cadre meetings of the Military Commission column and various army groups to convey the spirit of the resolution. That month, Mao Zedong composed a poem, which included the lines: "Idle boast the strong pass is a wall of iron, / With firm strides we are crossing its summit." ^[9]

Soon after, at the Gouba Meeting, Mao Zedong persisted in his principles and persuaded the majority as part of the minority, saving the Party Central Committee and the Central Red Army once again from the danger of total annihilation. After the meeting, Mao Zedong believed that combat operations could not be collectively discussed by so many people as in the past; command needed to be concentrated, and it was better to establish a small group of several people. Upon his suggestion, the Party Central Committee decided that Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong, and Wang Jiaxiang would form a new "Three-Man Group" with full authority to command military operations. This completed the Zunyi Meeting’s task of changing the Party Central Committee’s supreme military leadership body and further established and consolidated Mao Zedong's leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army.

Since the Zunyi Meeting, the Communist Party of China began to independently apply the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism to solve major problems concerning the future and destiny of the Chinese revolution, and began to reach political maturity. From then on, the history of the Red Army's Long March turned a new page; the history of the Chinese revolution led by the Communist Party of China also turned a new page.

(The author is a researcher at the Institute of Party History and Literature of the CPC Central Committee)