Xu Cenchen: The Emergence, Interaction, and Evolution of the Concept of "Modernization" During the New Democratic Revolution [1] Period
The successful practice of modernization in China is inseparable from its deep theoretical exploration. Whether it was Deng Xiaoping’s first proposal of "Chinese-style four modernizations" [1] on the foundation of the "Four Modernizations" at the start of the Reform and Opening-up, or General Secretary Xi Jinping’s systematic summary of the prominent characteristics of Chinese-path modernization at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee and his subsequent comprehensive exposition of it at the 20th National Congress—outlining the grand blueprint of "comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization" [2]—these milestones have sparked eager academic discussion on the issue of modernization. Regarding the Communist Party of China's (CPC) understanding of modernization, a long-standing view held that after the founding of New China, Mao Zedong proposed "building our country into a socialist state with modern industry, modern agriculture, and modern science and culture," which was considered "the embryonic form of the CPC’s thought on modernization" [3]. However, in recent years, many scholars have keenly noted that during the New Democratic Revolution period, discussions surrounding modernization in Chinese intellectual circles were already multifaceted and intense, and even "blazed a trail for the study of Chinese modernization thought" [4]. How did the concept of "modernization" emerge? Why did it merge with the concept of "national rejuvenation" during its dissemination to form the intellectual seeds that continue to influence us today? How did the CPC and the left-wing intellectuals under its leadership scrutinize the concept of "modernization" and its related issues from the standpoint of historical materialism? These questions can be interpreted through the historical evolution of the emergence, interaction, and transformation of the "modernization" concept.
I. The Emergence and Dissemination of the Concept of "Modernization"
By the 1920s, the concept of "modernization" (现代化, xiàndàihuà) was already known to the academic community, but discussion was not yet robust. In early 1922, an article in The Eastern Miscellany (东方杂志, Dōngfāng Zázhì) suggested that George Russell’s poetry was "relatively more modernized" [5]; this is likely the earliest existing documented expression of "modernization." At this time, the semantics of "modernization" were close to and often conflated with "modernity" (近代化, jìndàihuà), leaning more toward the meanings of "modern" (摩登, módēng) or "novelty," and was frequently regarded as a synonym for "Westernization" (西化, xīhuà) or "Europeanization" (欧化, ōuhuà) by proponents of Westernization in that period. It was not until after the 1930s, following the widespread dissemination of the concept, that "in new debates, the concept of 'modernization' was proposed to replace the narrow concept of 'Westernization'" [6]. From then on, the Chinese people gradually began to examine China’s development from the perspective of global modernization.
(1) Intellectual discussions on "modern civilization" in the 1920s provided the context for the emergence of "modernization"
In the modern era, Western powers used force to open China’s doors, dragging the country into the historical process of global modernization. In 1919, the May Fourth Movement [1] not only spread new ideas and culture but also inspired and enlightened the Chinese people, causing a profound shock in intellectual circles. Based on a deep introspection of traditional Chinese culture, how to view Western and Eastern civilizations became a question of universal concern for progressive figures. This led to "modern civilization" (现代文明) and "contemporary civilization" (近代文明) being semantically closer to today’s concept of "modernization" during the 1920s. Intellectuals such as Qu Qiubai, Hu Shih, Fan Shoukang, and Chang Yansheng all participated in these discussions.
As early as 1923, Qu Qiubai wrote "Problems of Modern Civilization and Socialism," in which he scrutinized the differences between socialist modern civilization and capitalist modern civilization with a keen eye. Although Qu did not explicitly use the term "modernization" here, he utilized the perspective of historical materialism to see that the development of modern Western technology could not truly "emancipate humanity." He believed that only "after the social revolution gradually completes the transformation of relations between people will the path of technical development become entirely different" [7]. It is clear that Qu Qiubai’s understanding of "modern civilization" was highly advanced for the intellectual circles of the time. He believed that so-called "modern civilization" included not only the civilization of science and technology but also the emancipation of human beings themselves. He even argued that the rapid advancement of true science and technology must be built upon the revolution of the relations of production, which was undoubtedly a significant exposition of modernization from the perspective of historical materialism.
In the 1920s, the person most responsible for initiating the debate on "modern civilization" was likely Hu Shih. Continuing the logic of the debates between Eastern and Western cultures during the May Fourth New Culture Movement, Hu equated "modern civilization" or "contemporary civilization" with "Western civilization," believing the two were fundamentally different from Eastern civilization. For example, in his article "Our Attitude Toward Modern Western Civilization," Hu pointed out that "discontent" in Western culture spurred the continuous advancement of technology and the process of political democratization. He claimed that "the degree to which modern Western civilization can satisfy the requirements of the human spirit is far beyond what old Oriental civilization could ever dream of" [8]. During this period, some disagreed with Hu. Although they agreed that "civilization" included both material technology and spiritual concepts, they felt Hu’s equation of "modern civilization" with "Western civilization" was biased. For instance, Chang Yansheng directly criticized Hu’s practice of "repeatedly using the term 'contemporary civilization' to replace Western civilization" [9]. In the same year, Fan Shoukang also published an article glassing Hu, noting: "In my personal view, there is no absolute distinction between Eastern and Western civilizations; both contain both spiritual and material aspects, and both are progressing in the same direction—it is just that at present, there is a slight difference in the degree of progress" [10].
It is evident that although "modernization" was not a "hot" term in the 1920s, discussions on "modern civilization" were already intense. Whether it was Qu Qiubai’s exposition of the significance of human emancipation within "modern civilization" based on historical materialism, Hu Shih’s views with their "Westernizing" tint, or the critiques of Hu by Fan Shoukang and Chang Yansheng, all reflected an attempt to explore the essential reasons for China’s lag behind the West from a more grand, holistic perspective. That is, China’s backwardness was not a result of innate national or cultural deficiencies, but simply a matter of falling behind in the historical process of global modernization. As Zhou Gucheng recalled in his 1943 article "On China's Modernization": "Since the May Fourth Movement, what our countrymen called the differences between Chinese and Western cultures and societies was finally understood to be matters of the same nature, with only differences in the degree of evolution" [11]. The opening of this global vision laid an important foundation for the widespread dissemination of the "modernization" concept in the 1930s.
(2) The dissemination of the "modernization" concept in the 1930s shifted the intellectual focus toward examining Chinese issues from the holistic perspective of global modernization
After the 1930s, alongside the intellectual call to "save the nation and the people," numerous periodicals such as The Shenbao Monthly (申报月刊), Independent Review (独立评论), New China (新中华), China Youth (中国青年), Century Review (世纪评论), and October Talks (十月谈) published the views of intellectuals and political figures on the issue of "modernization." In particular, the 1933 special issue of The Shenbao Monthly titled "The Issue of China's Modernization" popularized the concept. This discussion featured 10 short essays and 16 monographs by famous figures including Yang Xingzhi, Chen Gaoyong, Tao Menghe, and Wu Juenong. Although their understandings of "modernization" varied greatly, they all began to consciously break through the logical limitations of "China-West opposition" found in the cultural debates of the 1920s, beginning instead to consider China’s path forward from the holistic perspective of the global wave of modernization.
The reason for this was that the intense discussion in the 1930s was essentially a profound introspection by scholars regarding various Chinese problems within the global modernization process, as well as an endless anxiety over China’s internal strife and external threats. "A strong sense of crisis and a sense of mission for the era prompted the intellectual community to more clearly raise the issue of 'modernization' and launch the first formal grand discussion on modernization in modern history" [12]. After the 1930s, the modernization efforts of Western capitalist countries and the Soviet socialist state became increasingly familiar to the Chinese people, while China remained in a state of depression. This feeling was expressed by Yang Xingzhi in his opening remarks: "China is a backward country. Because it is backward, it shows a trend of declining day by day, becoming even more backward, constituting what seems to be a non-modern country standing outside the 20th-century circle of civilization" [13]. This description of China’s backward status was present in almost all articles discussing modernization. As someone noted in 1933 when analyzing why "modernization" was being talked about so widely: "Enthusiastic people, seeing that 'revolution' and 'reform' (维新, wéixīn) had no practical effect, specifically raised the issue of 'modernization' in hopes of trying something new, so that a China stuck in the 'Middle Ages' could leap into becoming a 'modern' country" [14].
In terms of content, the 1930s intellectual discussions focused on two main themes: First, how China could achieve modernization. Some believed "a modernized country requires two conditions: order and discipline" [15]; others argued China’s "path to modernization should begin with the construction of transportation" [16]; and so on. Second, what kind of culture was needed for modernization. Having emerged from discussions on "Eastern" and "Western" civilizations, the concept of "modernization" naturally continued the exploration of cultural differences during its dissemination. For example, in 1933, Chen Gaoyong explicitly pointed out in "How to Modernize Chinese Culture": "Only if we can make Chinese culture suitable for the modern era can the Chinese state then survive in the modern era" [17].
Throughout this series of discussions, many scholars again reiterated and clarified the concepts of "Westernization" and "modernization." A representative figure was Zhang Xiruo, who pointed out in "Total Westernization and the Chinese Standpoint": "Modernization can include Westernization, but Westernization cannot include modernization. This is not about quibbling over a hollow term; it involves many facts of different natures. Complex social conditions do not allow us to be vague" [18]. It can be said that after the 1930s, the concept of "modernization" began to further shed its "Westernization" undertones as it was disseminated and discussed. When examining the differences between China and the West, Chinese intellectuals began to abandon a purely cultural perspective, which undoubtedly marked a more rational state of understanding concerning civilizational differences.
In addition, discussions in this period were characterized by a gradual expansion (泛化, fànhuà) of the concept. Beyond the general issue of "national modernization," various extended topics appeared. For instance, Chen Xuqing’s 1933 "The Sinicization and Modernization of Education" explored the evolution of education during the modernization process; Hu Zhaochun’s 1935 "A Preliminary Discussion on the Cooperation between Modernized Museums and Schools" was one of the earliest articles on museum modernization; and Ning Hu’s 1936 "The Modernized Italian Navy" discussed how modernization promoted naval development. Furthermore, articles emerged discussing the modernization of railway construction, architectural design, urban planning, and libraries, reflecting that "modernization" had become a widely accepted and essential concept in Chinese intellectual circles.
II. The Convergence and Interaction of the Concepts of "Modernization" and "National Rejuvenation"
During the New Democratic Revolution period, the process of the emergence and dissemination of "modernization" was also a process of convergence and interaction with other concepts. As early as 1929, Hu Shih emphasized in "The Conflict of Cultures" that "China must take a selective path toward modernization... with the hope that China might realize a cultural renaissance like Japan" [19]. This was an early instance of Chinese intellectuals placing the concepts of "modernization" and "rejuvenation/renaissance" (复兴, fùxīng) together. If the discussions in the 1930s surrounding "modernization" provided a broader global perspective, then the passionate dissemination of the concept of "national rejuvenation" (民族复兴, mínzú fùxīng) greatly stimulated national consciousness. These two concepts interacted within a specific historical context, forming the intellectual bedrock that continues to influence China today.
(1) The convergence of "modernization" and "national rejuvenation" was a phenomenon that accompanied the rational scrutiny of the nation's future and culture by the Chinese people.
After the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression in 1931, Chinese intellectual circles engaged in another round of heated verbal sparring centered on the differences between Chinese and Western cultures. This debate touched upon numerous topics such as "Chinese-based culture" and the "Asiatic mode of production." However, looking at the ideological core, this East-West cultural debate differed from the "anti-traditionalism" of the May Fourth New Culture Movement. During this period, it was rare to find anyone who fully supported the "Wholesale Westernization" [6] views of figures like Chen Xujing; even Hu Shih, a key representative of the Westernizers, explained during this time that his original intent for "Wholesale Westernization" was merely "thorough worldization." Consequently, "national rejuvenation"—as a vital concept encompassing the reshaping of national culture and the revitalization of the national economy—was quickly recognized by both the intellectual community and various political forces.
For example, in the articles published in the first issue of Volume 1 of Reconstruction Monthly (Fuxing Yuekan) in September 1932, every piece—except for summaries of current events—contained the word "rejuvenation" (fuxing). Examples include Huancheng’s "The Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and its Relationship to the World," Zhao Zhengping’s "Historical Observations on the Question of the Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation," Liu Linsheng’s "Literature in the Era of Rejuvenation," and Shen Yiyun’s "Rejuvenation? Even an Ordinary Woman Shares Responsibility." Furthermore, during this period, the "Renaissance Faction" (Zaisheng pai), including Zhang Junmai, Zhang Dongsun, Luo Longji, Liang Shiqiu, and Pan Guangdan, also launched fervent discussions on national rejuvenation through The Renaissance (Zaisheng) magazine. According to data from the Shanghai Library’s "Full-text Database of Late Qing and Republican Periodicals," various propaganda reports surrounding national rejuvenation increased year by year in the 1930s, peaking between 1934 and 1936. During this peak, over 500 articles annually featured the term "national rejuvenation" directly in their titles, illustrating the intense level of discussion at the time.
In the 1930s, the concepts of "national rejuvenation" and "modernization" frequently appeared together in scholarly discussions. From the content of these discussions, the focus was primarily on two topics: "culture" and "the countryside." First, there was an emphasis on "cultural rejuvenation" and "cultural modernization." This was because the topic had remained a focal point for the intellectual community since the May Fourth New Culture Movement; thus, many scholars believed that cultural modernization was a crucial link in achieving national rejuvenation. For instance, in 1933, Chen Gaoyong pointed out in his article "How to Modernize Chinese Culture" that "the culture we need today is not a declining capitalist culture, nor a utopian cosmopolitan culture, but a culture of how to liberate and rejuvenate the nation." Second, there was an emphasis on "rural rejuvenation" and "rural modernization." This was largely because after the 1930s, the Chinese countryside became increasingly desolate and plagued by various problems, leading many intellectuals to view modernization as the cornerstone of rural rejuvenation, which was in turn the prerequisite for national rejuvenation. In articles specifically discussing rural rejuvenation, there were many reflections on agricultural modernization. For example, in 1935, Zuo Qingchun argued in "Humble Opinions on Rural Rejuvenation" that rural rejuvenation required strengthening seven areas, including rural education, improving agricultural planting, promoting rural side-line industries, implementing cooperative enterprises, focusing on peasant hygiene, improving peasant entertainment, and achieving peasant self-governance. In essence, he proposed the seven tasks of Chinese agricultural modernization.
(2) The intersection of the concepts of "national rejuvenation" and "modernization" completed their mutual supplementation in terms of national perspective and theoretical interpretation.
After the 1930s, both "modernization" and "national rejuvenation" emerged amidst a deepening national crisis. The Chinese people’s strengthening sense of national identity and their sense of responsibility for national salvation [7] were important factors allowing these two concepts to spread rapidly and interact. The intersection of these concepts produced at least two significant effects.
First, "national rejuvenation" provided a "national" (minzu) perspective for "modernization," accelerating the disenchantment with the "Westernization theory" behind it. When the concept of "modernization" first appeared, it was seen by many as a variation of "Westernization." However, alongside the fervent discussions of national rejuvenation in the 1930s, the concept of "modernization" began to be endowed with a stronger national perspective. As Feng Youlan remarked: "In the past, people often said we wanted 'Westernization'; now people often say we want 'modernization.' This is not merely a change in terminology; it represents a change in people's perspectives lately." To some extent, this "change in perspective" referred to the intellectual community beginning to discuss modernization from the standpoint of China's national conditions or national characteristics. This was mainly reflected in two aspects. On one hand, the intellectual circle generally believed that to realize modernization, China had to resolve the reality of the Chinese nation's oppression—that is, "to rejuvenate China and set it on the path of modernization, imperialism must fundamentally be overthown." On the other hand, many recognized that China's modernization should possess its own national characteristics. For instance, Chen Gaoyong pointed out that Chinese cultural construction must "take the liberation of the nation as the central issue... and the development of national capital as a concrete task." On the basis of opposing both Wholesale Westernization and "Soviet-style civilization," Hu Qiuyuan proposed that "so-called modernization is nothing other than industrialization and mechanization; it is national industrialization." It was through this intersection and collision that "modernization" ceased to be equated with "Westernization." Blazing a path of modernization that possessed national characteristics and suited China's national conditions gradually became a conviction among the Chinese people.
Second, "modernization" provided a more theoretical analytical perspective for "national rejuvenation," prompting the Chinese people to scientifically examine the basic path of national rejuvenation from multiple angles such as cultural construction, economic development, and science and technology. If the early iterations of "national rejuvenation" carried more emotional expressions of national salvation, "modernization" introduced a rational and concrete analytical framework. For example, in the debate over culture, Zhang Xiruo argued that cultural modernization should not only promote industrial construction and develop natural sciences, but also advocate for modern scholarship and scientific thinking: "Without these multifaceted modern academics, it is impossible to satisfy complex modern life and thought, nor can one become a modern state." Similar views more or less influenced the discussions on national rejuvenation at that time, such as the "academic foundation of national rejuvenation" advocated by Zhang Junmai. In his view, "academic" carried a more rational connotation: "If our country's philosophical circles can truly produce great works like those of Kant; if our social and natural sciences can produce works like those of Hegel, List, and Humboldt; and if our literary circles can produce works like those of Dante and Goethe... then the nation's thoughts will have a standard, the people's emotions will flourish, and national discourse will be unified. Why then worry that the great cause of national state-building cannot be realized? This is what I call the academic foundation of national rejuvenation." It is easy to see that Zhang Junmai's so-called "academic foundation" was essentially the basic path to cultural modernization.
III. New Interpretations of the Modernization Issue by Chinese Communists
During the period of the New Democratic Revolution, the intellectual community continuously promoted the spread of the "modernization" concept in China through successive debates. Although Chinese Communists used the term "modernization" less frequently at the time, this does not mean they lacked reflection on the issue. The reason was that the "special circumstances of the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the New Democratic Revolution made it impossible to publicly enter these polemics." In fact, the Chinese Communists' understanding of modernization during this period differed from that of general intellectuals, characterized by two features: first, basing the understanding of the essence and connotation of modernization on the Marxist historical materialism; and second, the belief that the CPC should commit itself to China's industrialization in the coming period.
(1) A new interpretation of modernization based on historical materialism
During the New Democratic Revolution, Chinese Communists and left-wing intellectuals influenced by Marxism did not stop at understanding modernization metaphysically through the lens of Sino-Western cultural differences. Through a series of discussions, they argued that China's modernization required the guidance of scientific theory, specifically the need to correctly understand the essence of modernization based on historical materialism. They sought to explore the basic path for China's modernization starting from the transformation of the mode of production of human society and the principal contradictions facing China.
First, there was the question of whether China's modernization required the guidance of scientific theory. In 1933, the New Moon Fortnightly (Shuowang Banyuekan) published an article by the left-wing intellectual Wang Yiming titled "'Isms,' 'Problems,' and 'Modernization'." The editor-in-chief of the journal, Xu Langxi, was a famous modern democratic revolutionary who maintained close contact with the underground CPC organization around 1933, often subtly supporting and disseminating Marxist theoretical views. In terms of content, this article criticized Hu Shih’s "Introduction to the Problems of State-Building," arguing that Hu’s abstract discussion of state-building was erroneous. On one hand, the article proposed that China’s modernization needed medical guidance from scientific theory. China’s modernization process was not an abstract theoretical problem but a concrete practical one, requiring reflection not only on whether revolution was necessary but also on the standpoint of that revolution. As the article mentioned: "How to build? Who will build? This involves the 'isms' that Dr. Hu detests"—this clearly aligned with the proletarian standpoint emphasized by Marxist theory. On the other hand, the article highly affirmed the path of Soviet socialist modernization, arguing that the early Russian socialist revolution did not stagnate the economy but instead rapidly promoted its modernization: "When it comes to the Soviet Union, even Dr. Hu cannot deny its progress; there is no need for us to say more." Although the article did not explicitly mention "Marxism" and used euphemistic expressions for the concept of "revolution," this was likely due to the political pressures in Shanghai around 1933.
Second, there was the question of how to examine the essence of modernization based on historical materialism. In 1936, Ai Siqi published the article "What is Called Progress?" In this piece, Ai Siqi specifically discussed the significance of Britain's invention of the steam engine, pointing out that attributing the invention and the Industrial Revolution solely to geographic factors was clearly biased. He noted: "The nature of production in human society promotes human efforts, and human efforts in turn affect their social production, leading to progress in social production. This is an interaction, one of the dialectics of human life." Although Ai Siqi did not directly use the concept of "modernization," it is well known that the invention of the steam engine was a hallmark of Europe's industrial revolution and its step toward modernization. He further used historical materialism to provide a philosophical analysis of social "progress," noting that a country's "progress" cannot be simply reduced to geographic determinism or technological determinism. Returning to historical materialism, the essence of such "progress" should be examined within the dialectical relationship between human social interaction ([8] jiaowang) and the development of productive forces. Therefore, the "progress" Ai Siqi discussed here clearly shared a very similar meaning with the concept of "modernization" within a Marxist context.
Third, there was the question of how to clarify the prerequisites for China's modernization using the method of contradiction analysis. During the New Democratic Revolution, the intellectual community had many discussions on whether certain conditions were necessary for China to modernize, which can be categorized into four types. Firstly, some believed that cultural and rural rejuvenation were the prerequisites. This view basically followed the logic of the Sino-Western cultural debate, arguing either that traditional Chinese culture and the countryside had completely decayed and could only be modernized by learning from the West, or that they were unique and Western methods would not work, necessitating the reconstruction of traditional ethics and rural order. Secondly, some argued that China should first establish the rule of law. "Because if laws and regulations are ineffective, industrialization will fail immediately." such views emphasized learning the "spirit of contract" from the West to prevent disorder. Thirdly, some believed that China's modernization required sufficient capital. "Applying capital to various planned undertakings in order of urgency is, I believe, the prerequisite for promoting modernization." Fourthly, others believed that the conditions required for China's modernization were numerous and complex. "A sound economy, clean politics, a stable society, appropriate education, and a good psychological state... all of these are prerequisites for implementing China's modernization." Through these four types of views, it is evident that the intellectuals' understanding of the prerequisites for modernization was often based on individual subjective perceptions.
It is common knowledge that Marxist theory itself emerged as a response to the problems brought about by the Industrial Revolution and modernization—namely, a call for the proletarians of the world to unite and carry out a revolution to forge a new society. Based on this, "revolution" naturally became the essential prerequisite for realizing China's modernization in the eyes of the Chinese Communists and progressives on the Left. In On Contradiction (1937), Mao Zedong pointed out: "In the case of China, imperialism occupies the principal position in the contradiction that forms its semi-colonial status; it oppresses the Chinese people, and China has changed from an independent state into a semi-colonial one." [45] Only by launching a revolution to eradicate a series of major contradictory factors—namely imperialism, feudal forces, and bureaucrat-capital—could the establishment of a New China become possible.
The Chinese Communists' analysis of the prerequisites for Chinese modernization, grounded in Marxism, also profoundly influenced the Leftists of that period. Yang Xingzhi, heavily influenced by leftist thought, cited extensive passages from the Communist Manifesto’s interpretation of the modern capitalist mode of production in his article "On China's Modernization" and praised it highly. He argued that Marx and Engels had clearly pointed out the inevitability of China's transformation, that history would certainly dig a grave for capitalism, and that the Soviet path of socialist modernization was the inevitable road to victory. However, to embark on this path, "the answer is, of course, that we must first eliminate the reactionary fortresses that obstruct China's progress and move China out of the clutches of imperialism and feudal forces." [46]
(II) Emphasizing the Start of Industrialization and Sketching the Blueprint for New China’s Modernization
In fact, by the 1930s, many Chinese Communists were already directly using the concept of "modernization." For instance, in January 1938, while summarizing the experience of the protracted War of Resistance, Zhou Enlai proposed that "improving military technology and the modernization of equipment are urgently needed." [47] In May of the same year, Mao Zedong emphasized in On Protracted War that "innovating the military system is inseparable from modernization." [48] Also in May, Zhu De stated while summarizing the experience of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare that the victory of the War of Resistance required "a modernized National Revolutionary Army as the main force to achieve the objective." [49]
It is not difficult to see that when Chinese Communists discussed "modernization" at this time, they mostly focused on the modernization of the military, equipment, and technology. This clearly stemmed from a deep understanding of the practical realities of the Chinese revolution. As Mao Zedong pointed out in 1938 in On the New Stage: "Undoubtedly, we should look at problems from a practical standpoint; at present, what are actually fighting are large quantities of low-grade weapons." [50] Without an industrial base, China would inevitably fall once more into a plight of misery and oppression by imperialism. It was precisely this logic of seeking truth from facts that laid the ideological foundation for the Communist Party of China (CPC) to begin modernization through industrial construction. By the 1940s, the CPC's vision for China’s future became increasingly clear and firm: under the guidance of Marxism, to take the socialist road and achieve China's industrialization and the modernization of agriculture [9], thereby changing the reality of China’s poverty, weakness, and backwardness. This was a major factor in why the CPC, during the New Democratic Revolution period, leaned toward discussing "industrialization" rather than "modernization."
In 1940, the 98th and 99th combined issue of Jiefang (Liberation) magazine published Mao Zedong’s "On New Democracy," which scientifically answered the question of "whither China." "We want to change a China which is politically oppressed and economically exploited into a China which is politically free and economically prosperous, and change a China which is being kept ignorant and backward under the sway of the old culture into a China which is being enlightened and advanced under the sway of a new culture." [51] Although Mao did not use the specific term "modernization," he emphasized that the New China should be politically free, economically prosperous, and civilly advanced, pointing out the general direction for New China's modernization.
In 1944, before the victory of the War of Resistance, Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out that the CPC must strive for China's industrialization and called on Chinese Communists to detach themselves from abstract "revolutionary work" and "learn all kinds of technical knowledge to industrialize China." [52] Subsequently, in his conversation with the British journalist Gunther Stein, Mao again emphasized that China needed to develop industrialization and expressed agreement with some of Sun Yat-sen's views on industrial construction.
In 1945, in On Coalition Government, Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out that after the realization of a New Democratic society, it would be necessary to "gradually establish heavy and light industries over a number of years, transforming China from an agrarian country into an industrial one." [53] He further emphasized: "Without the efforts of the Communist Party of China, without the Chinese Communists as the mainstay [10] of the Chinese people, the independence and liberation of China are impossible, as are China's industrialization and the modernization of agriculture." [54] From then on, discourses such as "changing from an agrarian country to an industrial one," "China's industrialization and the modernization of agriculture," and "realizing industrialization" became common parlance in the speeches of Mao Zedong and other central leaders.
In the same year, the Seventh National Congress of the CPC was held. "Mao Zedong's vision for New China at the Seventh Congress differed from the discussions in works like 'On New Democracy'; it was not only more specific but also more practical and operational." [55] He summarized the historical experience of the CPC over more than 20 years and formulated a series of lines, programs, and strategies, reflecting the CPC's systematic thinking on the issue of modernization.
In August 1947, as the War of Liberation achieved successive victories, Dong Biwu proposed at the National Land Conference: "After the revolution wins nationwide victory in the future, we must industrialize China and gradually focus on developing industry." [56] Only in this way could rapid development be achieved in various fields such as agricultural production and transportation. One month later, at the Financial and Economic Conference of the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei Border Region [11], Dong Biwu again emphasized the importance of Mao Zedong’s directive to "develop production and ensure supply." Dong Biwu pointed out: "In terms of developing production, we should develop industry and tend toward industrialization." [57] At the same time, he noted: "We have some machine production, but most of it falls within the scope of the munitions industry." [58] Therefore, it was necessary to correctly understand the relationship between industrialization and the practical needs of the masses: "What are our most basic and largest needs? Obviously, they are food and clothing—grain and cloth." [59]
In March 1949, the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CPC Central Committee was held. With the victory of the War of Liberation imminent, Mao Zedong pointed out at the meeting: "China already has about 10 percent modern industrial economy; this is progressive." [60] Mastering these was the only way to truly grasp the lifeblood of national development. Meanwhile, regarding the relatively backward, scattered, and individual agricultural and handicraft economies, Mao proposed to "cautiously, gradually, and actively lead them toward modernization and collectivization." [61] This was undoubtedly a clear judgment on China's industrialization process.
In June of the same year, while celebrating the 28th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Mao Zedong again emphasized: "The state under the people's democratic dictatorship must solve the problem of national industrialization in a step-by-step manner." [62] This further clarified the relationship between consolidating socialist political power and industrialization. In September of the same year, the Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference [12] not only explicitly stated that carrying out land reform was the basis for national industrialization, but also stipulated in Article 35: "Priority should be given to the restoration and development of heavy industry in a planned and systematic manner, such as mining, iron and steel, power, machinery manufacturing, electrical engineering, and major chemical industries, so as to create the foundation for national industrialization." [63] By this point, the basic content of New China's path to industrialization had become increasingly clear. This series of theoretical judgments also prepared the ideological and theoretical groundwork for the formal introduction of "socialist industrialization" and the "Four Modernizations" after the founding of the People's Republic.
Conclusion
Through a historical investigation of the concept of "modernization" during the New Democratic Revolution period, several conclusions can be drawn:
First, the push for the emergence of the concept of "modernization" by the Chinese intellectual community during this period reflected the urgent desire of Chinese intellectuals to seek a brand-new China. Discussions surrounding modernization allowed them to gradually move beyond the limitations of early debates between Chinese and Western cultures and begin examining Chinese issues from a broader global perspective.
Second, based on the practical background of the outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the two concepts of "modernization" and "national rejuvenation" became popular almost simultaneously. They continuously intersected and collided, achieving complementarity at both the level of national perspective and theoretical interpretation.
Third, although the Chinese Communists did not use the concept of "modernization" frequently during the New Democratic Revolution, it does not mean they were not thinking about it. Their greatest characteristic—distinquishing them from other intellectuals—was their firm belief that solving China’s problems required the scientific guidance of Marxist theory. They recognized that social progress could only be achieved by using revolution to break through all factors hindering the development of the productive forces. In particular, Mao Zedong clearly recognized that China's modernization must be integrated with the reality of the Chinese revolution and construction, "using the proletarian world outlook as an instrument for observing a nation's destiny and reconsidering one's own problems." [64] This laid the important foundation for the idea that China’s modernization should begin with industrialization. It was precisely this series of theoretical explorations, along with the historical practice of the CPC leading the Chinese people to successfully advance the New Democratic Revolution, that promoted the Sinicization and localization of the concept of "modernization" and its associated discourse.