Mao Lihong: Research on Issues Related to Hadapu and the Red Army’s Long March [1]
On September 18, 1935, the Central Red Army arrived at Hadapu south of Min County (present-day Dangchang County), Gansu, during the Long March. On September 22, at a meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment held in Hadapu, Mao Zedong explicitly proposed: "The national crisis is deepening day by day; we must continue our movement and complete the original plan of going north to resist Japanese aggression. First, we must go to northern Shaanxi [1], where Liu Zhidan’s Red Army is located." Consequently, Mao Zedong and the Central Red Army defined and concretized the forward direction of the Long March from "going north" to "going to northern Shaanxi." While there have already been many research findings regarding Hadapu and the Long March, certain details still merit further exploration and clarification. This article intends to sort through and analyze these issues based on relevant historical materials, aiming to push related research toward greater depth.
I. Concerning "Newspapers Determining the Direction" at Hadapu
Regarding the issue of the Central Red Army finding a "footing" for the Long March at Hadapu, the narrative of "newspapers determining the direction" has long received significant attention from academic circles. Authoritative official Party histories generally adopt the account that news of the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area was obtained through newspapers at Hadapu. For example, Volume I of the History of the Communist Party of China points out that after the Central Red Army reached Hadapu, "Here, based on information obtained from locally found newspapers indicating that the northern Shaanxi Red Army and base areas still existed, Mao Zedong proposed going to northern Shaanxi." One Hundred Years of the Communist Party of China notes that in Hadapu, "Mao Zedong and others learned from a newspaper that there was a considerably large base area and Red Army activity in northern Shaanxi." The Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong (Mao Zedong Nianpu) notes that before entering Hadapu, Mao instructed the vanguard units to "find some 'mental pablum' [2] in Hadapu—bring back any newspapers or magazines, provided they are recent or relatively recent." It continues, "During the stay in Hadapu, Mao Zedong learned from Kuomintang (KMT) newspapers that there was a fairly large Soviet area and a significant number of Red Army troops in northern Shaanxi." These accounts all affirm newspapers as the source of information. Through an examination of historical materials, the relevant accounts can be categorized into two types.
One type refers vaguely only to "Kuomintang newspapers." The aforementioned Chronological Biography of Mao Zedong is an example. When Ye Jianying, Li Weihan, Yang Chengwu, and Geng Biao mentioned this in their memoirs, they also stated the news was obtained from KMT newspapers but did not specify which ones. For instance, Ye Jianying recalled, "I and several comrades saw news regarding the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area in KMT newspapers, and subsequently suggested to the Central Committee the plan of going north to Shaanxi." Li Weihan recalled that before reaching Hadapu, at a market town by a river, he saw Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Liu Shaoqi "leafing through a local KMT newspaper, which carried news of Chiang Kai-shek [3] sending a large army to 'encircle and suppress' the 'Communist bandits' under Liu Zhidan in northern Shaanxi. Only then did we learn specifically that such a large Red Army was actively operating in the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area. The Party Central Committee immediately decided to go to the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area to join forces with the northern Shaanxi Red Army." According to Yang Chengwu’s memoirs, Mao Zedong said at the meeting of regimental-level cadres in Hadapu: "Thanks to the Kuomintang newspapers, they provided us with relatively detailed news of the northern Shaanxi Red Army: not only is Liu Zhidan's Red Army there, but also Xu Haidong's Red Army, and a base area!" Geng Biao also recalled that while staying in a peasant's house in Hadapu, "I discovered the walls were covered with fresh newspapers and began to browse them. I inadvertently found a piece of news in one newspaper saying, 'The Communist army attacked Zhiluo Town, failed to take it, and fled...' I was overjoyed. Regardless of whether the KMT newspaper's reporting was accurate, it was beyond doubt that there was a Red Army in northern Shaanxi and that they were fighting the enemy. I told the landlord I wanted to buy the newspaper and gave them one silver dollar [4] as compensation, then used a knife to carefully peel that palm-sized piece of news off the wall. The old fellow was completely perplexed and asked repeatedly, 'What use is it?' I said, 'This is more precious than finding a golden baby.' I wrote a letter and sent it along with that piece of newspaper to the Army Group Headquarters to be forwarded to the Central Committee."
The other type specifies the names of the newspapers. For example, the History of the Communist Party of China in Gansu believes "the sources of the newspapers were multiple and varied," including "L'Impartial (Ta Kung Pao), Jinyang Daily, and Central Daily News." Others believe that Mao Zedong and other central leaders leafed through July and August issues of "L'Impartial, Republic of China Daily, Central Daily News, Xi'an Gazette, and Shaanxi Daily." Still others believe the source was the Tianjin edition of L'Impartial. This version mainly stems from Zhang Wentian and his wife, Liu Ying. The article "The Developing Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Revolutionary Movement," written by Zhang Wentian during his stay in Hadapu, drew its materials primarily from the Tianjin L'Impartial. This article was a "reading note" written by Zhang on September 22, 1935, and published in the third issue of Forward (Qianjin Bao) on September 28. In this article, Zhang excerpted news related to the northern Shaanxi Red Army and the 25th Red Army led by Xu Haidong from July and August 1935 issues of the Tianjin L'Impartial. For instance, it excerpted the July 23 issue: "The bandit Communists in northern Shaanxi are extremely rampant; of the 23 counties in northern Shaanxi, almost none have not been 'reddened' [revolutionized]. Eight are completely reddened, and over ten are semi-reddened. The Communist forces now have the power to expand their regional influence without using armed force." The August 1 issue stated: "Those occupying northern Shaanxi are the 26th Red Army. The exact number is impossible to calculate, but they have over 10,000 rifles. The bandit commander Liu Zhidan oversees three divisions, serving as the main bandit force, with 14 guerrilla detachments under him." "In mid-July, Xu Haidong led over 3,000 fierce bandits to break through from Shang, Luonan, Zhen’an, and Zuoshui counties... subsequently, the bandit units passed through Lantian, exited the Luonan mountain pass, and entered the Yingjiahuizhen area of Chang’an County, with another group emerging from Ziwukou." Based on prior knowledge that "the 25th Army led by Comrade Xu Haidong had previously occupied Liangdang and Hui counties in southern Gansu, approached Tianshui, captured Tai'an, crossed the Wei River, and reached the Shaanxi-Gansu border, achieving many great victories," Zhang Wentian further deduced: "I now suspect they have already established contact with the 26th Army in northern Shaanxi." Consequently, Zhang pointed out in the article: "Judging from various reactionary newspapers, the Red Army and Red guerrilla detachments are developing generally across Shaanxi and Gansu provinces." Regarding the content of this article, the Chronological Biography of Zhang Wentian notes, "The notes excerpted in detail and analyzed the activities of the Red Army in Shaanxi-Gansu and the situation of the Northern Shaanxi Revolutionary Base Area as disclosed in the Tianjin L'Impartial. On this basis, it revealed the Central Committee's intention to lead the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment to settle in northern Shaanxi: 'To coordinate, collaborate, and merge with the 25th and 26th Armies and the Tongnanba guerrilla areas, and to provide help, organization, and leadership to the guerrilla movements developing in this region,'" thereby completing the task set by the Mao'ergai Meeting to "connect with the Soviet guerrilla areas existing on the Shaanxi-Gansu border to form a contiguous Soviet area."
Zhang Wentian's wife, Liu Ying, also mentioned the Tianjin L'Impartial many times when recalling this history. In her memoirs, she said: "When the vanguard units captured Hadapu, they obtained many newspapers from the local post office, primarily the July and August issues of the Tianjin L'Impartial. Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, Zhou Enlai, and Bo Gu leafed through these newspapers and talked with great excitement. It turned out that from the news published in these papers, they knew for certain: there was a Soviet base area in northern Shaanxi, there was a Red Army, and there were guerrilla forces. It was truly a joy falling from the heavens." In an interview, she similarly recalled: "It was September 21, 1935, when Chairman Mao, Zhang Wentian, and other Central Committee leaders arrived at Hadapu, a small town in southern Gansu. The vanguard sent over a batch of Tianjin L'Impartial newspapers, and they were overjoyed after reading them. They learned from the papers that in the 23 counties of northern Shaanxi, there were Red Army or guerrilla activities in all of them. The main force of Liu Zhidan’s 26th Red Army had three divisions and over 10,000 rifles. Xu Haidong’s 25th Red Army had 3,000 elite troops and had already moved to the Shaanxi-Gansu border. After understanding these conditions from the newspapers, the Party Central Committee made the crucial decision to take northern Shaanxi as the footing for the Long March."
There is also a claim that it was the Shanxi Daily. For example, according to Nie Rongzhen’s memoirs: after the troops arrived in Hadapu, "We obtained a copy of the KMT Shanxi Daily, which contained a report of Yan Xishan’s troops attacking Liu Zhidan’s northern Shaanxi Red Army units. I quickly dispatched a cavalry messenger to send this newspaper to Comrade Mao Zedong," feeling "this was truly celestial news." According to Li Fuchun’s recollection, "In Hadapu, the First Column found a copy of Shanxi Daily... Thus, the Central Committee learned there was a fairly large Soviet area and a significant number of Red Army troops in northern Shaanxi."
In addition, there are other similar claims, but regardless of which specific account is used, the acquisition of information from newspapers—specifically Kuomintang newspapers—is a widely accepted fact.
Of course, a decision as significant as settling in northern Shaanxi would not, in reality, be made solely based on news from one or several newspapers. The so-called "newspapers determining the direction" reflects more the Red Army’s yearning to establish a stable base area and open a new revolutionary horizon after experiencing repeated life-and-death trials and wandering. As Liu Ying stated: "Since crossing the Yudu River at night, the Central Committee had always wanted to find a footing and establish a new base area. Exactly where to go, no one was clear... Now, learning that there was a piece of Red Army territory in northern Shaanxi, it was only natural to decide to settle there." Yang Shangkun also said when recalling this history: "After long-distance campaigning, the troops were indeed extremely exhausted! Moreover, for a considerable period during the Long March, we moved through Tibetan areas where the population was sparse and historical ethnic estrangement made recruiting and foraging very difficult. Everyone hoped to find a more populous area to create a base as soon as possible." In Hadapu, it just so happened that news was obtained from newspapers that the northern Shaanxi Red Army and the 25th Red Army—also on its own Long March—had already reached the Shaanxi-Gansu border. Thus, heading to northern Shaanxi to join forces with these two Red Army units not only tallied with the Central Committee's established "going north" policy but was also not far from Hadapu. It was based on these circumstances that the Party Central Committee decided at Hadapu to continue north and to establish and consolidate a base area in northern Shaanxi.
On September 27, 1935, the Standing Committee of the CPC Political Bureau met in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, Gansu Province. At this important meeting, Jia Tuofu—who had served as the Secretary-General of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and had been with the Central Red Army throughout the Long March—attended as a non-voting participant and provided crucial intelligence for the Central Committee to understand the Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area. According to relevant materials, upon learning news of the northern Shaanxi Red Army, Mao Zedong immediately "summoned Jia Tuofu to ask for details about northern Shaanxi." "Jia Tuofu gave a detailed report to Mao Zedong on the activities of the Shaanxi-Gansu guerrillas and the 26th Red Army, and the revolutionary struggle in Shaanxi before the Shaanxi Provincial Committee was sabotaged in July 1933," and "suggested the Central Committee take root in northern Shaanxi." Combining the intelligence provided by Jia Tuofu with the information obtained from newspapers in Hadapu, the Bangluo Town Meeting "officially decided to head to northern Shaanxi to defend and expand the base area." On October 22, 1935, Mao Zedong stated at a meeting of the CPC Political Bureau: The Bangluo Town Meeting (attended by Standing Committee members) changed the decision of the Ejie Meeting. Because "new materials" were obtained at that time, and we knew there was such a large Soviet area and Red Army in northern Shaanxi, we changed the decision to defend and expand the Soviet area in northern Shaanxi. The "new materials" Mao spoke of here likely refer to the information obtained from the newspapers in Hadapu and from Jia Tuofu.
II. Concerning Hadapu as a "Gas Station" on the Long March
Hadapu was an important transit point on the Red Army’s Long March. The main forces of the First, Second, and Fourth Front Armies all visited here. At Hadapu, the Red Army received significant replenishment and rest in terms of material supplies, manpower, political alignment, and morale. They recovered their physical strength, expanded their ranks, unified their thinking, and boosted morale, thereby enhancing their combat effectiveness. General Yang Chengwu recalled this period saying: Hadapu was "a 'gas station' in every sense of the word on our Long March."
From a material perspective, Hadapu provided the exhausted, hungry, and shivering officers and men of the Red Army with sufficient material supplies and medical treatment. When the broad ranks of Red Army commanders and fighters arrived at Hadapu after traversing the Snowy Mountains and the High Grasslands [6] and enduring continuous, fierce combat, their clothes were in tatters and their bodies were extremely weak. Peng Dehuai once remarked that during the seven or eight-day journey from Ejie to Hadapu, "the area was sparsely populated and provisions were difficult to find." Many Red Army soldiers were reduced to skin and bone and were physically debilitated; "during the march, one often saw comrades collapse by the roadside and die for no apparent reason." Although Hadapu is situated on the periphery of Gansu, it was a relatively prosperous market town with a dense population and abundant produce. Since the population of Hadapu consisted mostly of Han and Hui peoples who shared a common language, communication was convenient; furthermore, the local masses held a favorable view of the Red Army, which objectively provided advantageous conditions for the Red Army's replenishment and rest. Additionally, "the enemy defenders of Hadapu, in their hasty retreat, left behind several hundred dan [7] of rice and white flour, as well as over 2,000 jin [8] of salt, allowing the Red Army soldiers—who had been marching through the Snowy Mountains and Grasslands for months in a state of constant hunger—to receive timely material replenishment." From the capture of Hadapu on September 18, 1935, to their departure on the 25th, the Central Red Army [9] rested in Hadapu for a total of seven days. During this period, the Party Central Committee decided to issue one silver dollar to every person to improve their meals. The General Political Department of the Red Army specifically raised the slogan: "Everyone should eat well." Yang Dinghua, who accompanied the Central Red Army on the Long March, recalled: "Every company mess unit slaughtered chickens, ducks, pigs, and sheep. There were three meals a day, each with three meat dishes and two vegetable dishes. The soldiers ate until their mouths were slick with oil. Everyone was beaming with joy and exulting in high spirits."
Furthermore, the Red Army collected a vast amount of materiel in Hadapu. Xu Guozhen, a founding Major General and Gansu native, noted in his article "Collecting Grain on the Long March": "We collected a large amount of grain in Hadapu, mainly purchased with silver dollars. At the same time, we bought salt, medicine, and other necessities for the troops from merchants and the masses." In Lichuan Town, some 20 li [10] from Hadapu, the Red Army's vanguard "intercepted an enemy transport team and captured a large quantity of cloth and cotton," thereby "solving the problem of protection against the cold." On August 1, 1936, upon learning that the Second and Fourth Front Armies were heading north and would soon arrive in southern Gansu, Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Peng Dehuai—then in Northern Shaanxi—sent a telegram to the two armies. While reporting on the enemy situation in southern Gansu, they specifically noted: "It is five hundred li from Baozuo to Hadapu, with five or six dangerous passes... north of Lazikou, one leaves the 'Fan' [Tibetan] regions; the terrain is open and the population is dense, making it convenient for the troops to rest and reorganize." When the Second and Fourth Front Armies reached Hadapu at the end of August 1936, the people of Hadapu, who were not wealthy themselves, once again gave everything they had to support the Red Army. Chen Zhenguo of the Second Front Army recalled: "At that time, Hadapu was relatively prosperous; goods were plentiful and fairly cheap, and the masses treated us with great warmth. After two months of life in the Grasslands, where we saw no people and had no grain to eat, arriving suddenly in such a wonderful place made us simply overjoyed. As soon as the troops were stationed, they bought chickens and pigs to improve their meals, and everyone ate several wonderful feasts." Yang Xiushan, also of the Second Front Army, said: "For Red Army soldiers coming out of the Snowy Mountains and Grasslands, arriving in such a fine place was truly like reaching heaven." The masses of Hadapu and the Red Army were like one family, helping the Red Army collect a large amount of grain. As it was autumn, the masses had significant surplus grain, making the collection relatively smooth. Simultaneously, because the Red Army had lacked doctors and medicine during the Long March, the treatment of many wounded and sick personnel had been delayed. Hadapu happened to be a well-known distribution center for medicinal herbs with many traditional Chinese medicine shops, which was perfect for treating and conditioning illnesses. At that time, many wounded and sick Red Army soldiers received meticulous care and medical treatment in Hadapu. This material replenishment and physical healing created favorable conditions for the Red Army commanders and fighters to recover their strength and health for the march into Northern Shaanxi.
In terms of manpower, the Red Army conducted recruitment in Hadapu, strengthening its armed forces. While there are currently few records regarding the Central Red Army's "Expansion of the Red Army" (扩红) [11] in Hadapu, there are memoirs and records of such expansion by the Second and Fourth Front Armies as they passed through the area. Zhang Ziyi of the Second Front Army recorded in his diary: "Arrived in Hadapu today... held a departmental meeting to discuss the policy for collecting grain and funds and the expansion of the Red Army." Xiang Hansheng of the Second Front Army recalled: "In addition to the masses providing great material support to the Red Army, over 1,000 people joined the Red Army ranks. At the same time, a local democratic government was established, and a workers' and peasants' guerrilla force of over 2,000 people was formed, strengthening the revolutionary forces." Yan Hanwan, then head of the Mass Movement Section of the Political Department of the 18th Division, Sixth Legion, recalled the local masses enthusiastically joining the army: "The Front Army Command instructed each division to immediately organize recruitment work teams to go to the countryside. The task was: one squad per bao [12], one company per district, and one regiment per county." Within about ten days, "a total of nearly 3,000 new soldiers were recruited, greatly expanding the army and changing the situation." The recruitment efforts of the Fourth Front Army were also highly effective. The History of the Communist Party of China in Gansu records that the Fourth Front Army established county and township Soviets and local armed forces in Minxian (including present-day Dangchang): "The Hadapu regional guerrilla force had three battalions under its jurisdiction, totaling about 2,000 men." "Within one month, over 3,000 young people from the Min-Tao-Xi region joined the Red Army and were organized into a new recruit regiment." Of course, these figures include other areas in Southern Gansu, but Hadapu must have served as an important station for manpower replenishment. For Long March units suffering from severe attrition, this undoubtedly served as a "refueling" boost.
Politically, Hadapu was not only an important assembly point for the Long March but also a vital site for reorganization, further consolidating the Party's absolute leadership over the army. The Red Army conducted political training for its cadres in Hadapu. On the morning of September 22, Mao Zedong pointed out at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau held in Hadapu: "To consolidate the troops, it is necessary to understand the cadres," and "the current cadres are the essence [of the revolution] and must be protected." He explicitly called for understanding and protecting cadres. That afternoon, Mao attended a meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above. He first conducted ideological and political work, carrying out a resolute struggle against Zhang Guotao's [13] separatist errors, further enabling the Red Army commanders and fighters to clearly recognize the situation and unify their thinking. Subsequently, to implement the spirit of the Ejie Conference, the First Army, Third Army, and the Military Commission Column were reorganized, formally announcing the establishment of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Peng Dehuai as Commander and Mao Zedong as Political Commissar, consisting of "three columns totaling over 8,000 people." After this reorganization, the organizational structure of the troops was significantly optimized, the Party's leadership over the army was strengthened, and the combat effectiveness of the troops was markedly improved, providing a strong guarantee for the march into Northern Shaanxi. From August to September the following year, the Second and Fourth Front Armies also assembled in Hadapu in succession, using it as a command center to launch the "Cheng-Hui-Liang-Kang Campaign" and the "Min-Tao-Xi Campaign." Following reorganization and assembly, the three main forces of the Red Army all accumulated strength in Hadapu before setting out once more, ultimately achieving a victorious junction of the forces.
Spiritually, the replenishment and rest in Hadapu gave the Red Army's mental outlook a fresh appearance and bolstered their revolutionary morale. As mentioned earlier, Hadapu's flourishing trade and abundant produce provided the Long March with sufficient provisions. Here, the Red Army improved its diet, bathed, cut hair, and mended uniforms; everyone looked radiant and was in high spirits. Mao Zedong's poem The Long March: a Seven-character Quatrain, Zhang Wentian's The Developing Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Revolutionary Movement, and the song Go to Northern Shaanxi, composed overnight in Hadapu by Peng Jialun (head of the First Column's propaganda section), all serve as evidence of this history. According to Yang Shangkun's recollections, at the meeting for cadres of regimental level and above, Mao Zedong "informed everyone that there was a Red Army in Northern Shaanxi and shared the detachment's new direction of advance." "Upon hearing the news of the Red Army in Northern Shaanxi, everyone was extremely excited." At the same time, Mao clarified Zhang Guotao's split with the Central Committee. "Originally, the Central Committee did not allow the details of Zhang Guotao's separatism to be discussed freely with those below, but many middle and lower-level cadres found out anyway, and morale was somewhat low along the way. Now, everyone knew that not far ahead there were our own Red Army and base areas, and spirits generally soared." Mao also encouraged everyone, saying: "Our line is correct. Although our Northward Vanguard is small in number now, our target is also smaller and less conspicuous. There is no need for pessimism; we still have more people now than the Fourth Army had when it descended from the Jinggang Mountains in early 1929!" "From here to the Northern Shaanxi Revolutionary Base Area created by Liu Zhidan is only seven or eight hundred li. Everyone must pull themselves together and continue north." After hearing this, the broad ranks of Red Army commanders and fighters swept away the gloom resulting from the hardships of the Snowy Mountains and Grasslands and Zhang Guotao's refusal to go north to split the Party and the Red Army. From central leaders to ordinary soldiers, everyone beamed with joy, filled with the excitement and vision of nearly being "home." They "stepped onto the final stretch of the journey toward the anti-Japanese front with vigor." Evidently, the Red Army gained vital "refueling" in terms of revolutionary morale and spirit in Hadapu, providing a powerful spiritual impetus for the victory of the Long March.
It is noteworthy that Hadapu's ability to become a vital "refueling station" on the Long March was inseparable from the Red Army's strict execution of the Party's mass discipline and its ethnic and religious policies. Before entering Hadapu, Mao Zedong instructed the troops to "maintain strict discipline" and "punish violators severely." Upon arriving in Hadapu, the Red Army maintained strict discipline, "not taking a single needle or thread from the people" (qiuhao wufan) [14], and even distributed captured rice and flour to relieve the impoverished masses while actively helping them with their labor. "The local Hui and Han masses were deeply moved, repeatedly praising the Red Army as the people's own army. They enthusiastically gave up their housing for the Red Army and brought firewood and boiled water." When the troops departed, the masses saw them off spontaneously and warmly, with many eagerly joining the Red Army. To better implement the Party's ethnic policy, the General Political Department of the Red Army formulated and promulgated the "Regulations for Hui Inhabited Areas," ordering all units to strictly observe them and to write slogans such as "Protect the Hui People" and "Protect the Mosques." "The Red Army practiced the Party's ethnic policy through their own actions, winning the support of the various ethnic groups in the area. They vied to give their own grain, clothing, and fodder to the Red Army, and competed to have Red Army soldiers stay in their homes, providing meticulous care to the wounded and sick." According to Tang Chenggong of the Sixth Division, Second Legion, "During the ten-day rest in Hadapu, the Legion leaders... required commanders and fighters to consciously respect Hui customs everywhere, especially paying attention to protecting mosques and consulting 'Imams' (Ahong) on any issues. Several leaders of the Legion headquarters went deep into the Hui community to perform solidarity work with the Imams. Therefore, in our daily lives and in the recuperation of the weak and sick, we received a great deal of help from the local Hui people." These details not only reflect the "fish-and-water" [15] deep affection between the Red Army and the people of Hadapu but also serve as important reasons and powerful evidence for Hadapu becoming a "refueling station" on the Long March.
Looking at the entire history of the Red Army's Long March, there were many "refueling stations" large and small, but the station at Hadapu holds special significance. Hadapu is the only "refueling station" that all three Front Armies visited; it was the "refueling station" for the final sprint to victory. The Party Central Committee and the First Front Army "refueled" here, found their destination in Northern Shaanxi, and established the headquarters of the Chinese Revolution in the Northwest. The Second and Fourth Front Armies "refueled" here to move toward the great junction of the three armies and seize the final victory of the Long March.
III. On the Relationship Between the Hadapu Meeting, the Ejie Meeting, and the Bangluo Town Meeting
The Ejie Meeting, the Hadapu Meeting, and the Bangluo Town Meeting were three important meetings held successively after the Party Central Committee entered the Northwest. They played a vital role in the Central Committee "resolving the strategic decision to use Northern Shaanxi as the headquarters for leading the Chinese Revolution." The author believes that to clarify the issues related to Hadapu and the Long March, it is necessary to examine the Hadapu Meeting in connection with the Ejie and Bangluo Town Meetings and conduct a systematic study.
The Ejie Conference [16] laid a solid foundation for the Hadapu Conference and for the Party Central Committee’s decision to make Northern Shaanxi its final destination. The Ejie Conference was the first enlarged meeting of the Politburo held after the Party Central Committee entered the Northwest. Regarding its content: first, it discussed and passed the "Decision on the Errors of Comrade Zhang Guotao," exposing and criticizing Zhang Guotao’s [17] separatist errors from the perspective of the political line. It maintained that the dispute between the Central Committee and Zhang Guotao was "essentially due to fundamental differences in estimating the current political situation and the balance of power between ourselves and the enemy," and "called upon all comrades in the Red Fourth Front Army faithful to the Communist Party to unite around the Party Central Committee and wage a resolute struggle against this tendency to consolidate the Party and the Red Army." Second, it reorganized and streamlined the Red Army forces heading north, strengthening Party leadership over the military and improving the mobility and combat effectiveness of the troops. The meeting decided: "The Red First Army, the Red Third Army, and the Military Commission Column shall be organized into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, with Peng Dehuai as Commander, Lin Biao as Vice Commander, Mao Zedong as Political Commissar, Wang Jiaxiang as Director of the Political Department, and Yang Shangkun as Deputy Director; a Five-Man Group consisting of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, and Wang Jiaxiang shall be established for military leadership; and an Organization Committee composed of Li De (Otto Braun), Ye Jianying, Deng Fa, Cai Shufan, and Li Weihan shall be formed to preside over the reorganization of the troops." Third, it focused on the Red Army’s future strategic guidelines, continuing to adhere to the policy of heading north to resist Japanese aggression. However, because the Red First and Fourth Front Armies had already split their operations, the strength of the Red Army heading north was greatly reduced. Consequently, the original "plan to create a base area in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu" was adjusted. It was decided to use guerrilla warfare to "establish contact with the International [Comintern], reorganize and rest the forces, expand the Red Army ranks, and first create a base area in a location close to the Soviet Union, developing eastward in the future." Mao Zedong also noted in his conclusion: "That victory can be achieved first in one or several provinces is undeniable; it is true now and will be true in the future, though it will not be in Jiangxi, but in Shaanxi and Gansu." Although the Ejie Conference changed the plan for creating a base in the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu area, it still regarded the Shaanxi-Gansu region as the site where the hope of the Chinese Revolution lay. It intended to pass through Northern Shaanxi and Northeastern Gansu to reach the area near the Soviet Union to establish a base and gain assistance to grow in strength before developing into the wider Shaanxi-Gansu region. Although this plan was later altered due to new intelligence obtained in Hadapu, the policy of persisting in heading north to resist Japan and the general direction of marching toward Shaanxi and Gansu established at the meeting did not change. Thus, it laid the foundation for the Hadapu Conference and the Central Committee’s decision to settle in Northern Shaanxi.
The Hadapu Conference was a continuation of and a major breakthrough from the Ejie Conference. The Hadapu Conference actually comprised two levels of meetings: one was the meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Politburo on the morning of September 22, 1935; the other was a meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment that afternoon. In terms of content, the Politburo Standing Committee meeting primarily discussed organizational work, implementing the Ejie Conference's decision to reorganize the northward Red Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment and dividing the troops into three columns. The afternoon meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above first expressed support for the Ejie decisions, carried out the political struggle against Zhang Guotao's separatism to unify thinking, and formally announced the establishment of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Based on information obtained from newspapers during their stay in Hadapu, it was proposed to "complete the original plan of heading north to resist Japan" and that "first we must go to Northern Shaanxi," encouraging everyone to "bolster your spirits and continue north." According to the memoirs of Yang Shangkun, the Ejie Conference "only made a decision regarding the reorganization of the Red First Front Army into the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment; the formal reorganization took place in Hadapu. Because the military situation was urgent, the troops continued north after the meeting." It is evident that the Ejie Conference only made the decision to reorganize, while the actual work of reorganization was not completed until Hadapu. At the same time, the Hadapu Conference decided to "send Xie Juezai and Mao Zemin to Xinjiang to establish a communications station and find a way to open international relations." This, too, was a continuation of the tasks set at the Ejie Conference. Regarding the choice of development direction and final destination, these two meetings also differed. In light of Zhang Guotao's separatist actions which seriously weakened the strength of the Red Army heading north, the Ejie Conference adjusted the strategic guideline of creating a base in Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, planning instead to create a base near the Soviet Union to obtain international aid. The Hadapu Conference was different; by this time, Mao Zedong and other central leaders had confirmed from newspapers that Liu Zhidan’s Red Army was in Northern Shaanxi. They made a prompt decision, clarifying for the first time the march toward Northern Shaanxi to join forces with the Red Army there and settle in Northern Shaanxi. This was clearly a major adjustment and breakthrough from the Ejie Conference.
The Bangluo Town Conference further confirmed and developed the contents of the Hadapu Conference. Reorganizing the troops to continue north to resist Japan and finding the forward direction for the Red Army’s Long March were the two major contributions of the Hadapu Conference, which were also the issues to be further clarified at the subsequent Bangluo Town Conference. The Bangluo Town Conference also included two levels of meetings. First was the Politburo Standing Committee meeting held on September 27, 1935, in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, which changed the Ejie Conference's decision to establish a base near the Soviet Union. It determined that the Party Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment would settle in Northern Shaanxi, "formally deciding to head to Northern Shaanxi to defend and expand the base area." Second was the meeting of cadres at the company level and above of the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment held on September 28. Mao Zedong attended the meeting and delivered a report on the current situation and tasks, focusing on five issues: "(1) The gravity of Japanese aggression in the North; (2) The status of the Northern Shaanxi base area and the Red Army; (3) The economic and political conditions that could make the North a new front for resistance against Japan; (4) Avoiding combat with Kuomintang [KMT] troops to concentrate quickly in Northern Shaanxi; (5) Strictly rectifying discipline, paying full attention to mass line work, publicizing the significance of our army heading north to resist Japan, and focusing on recruiting new soldiers." At the same time, he "called on the entire detachment to break through the final barrier of the Long March—the blockade line at Guyuan and Pingliang—and join forces with our comrades in Northern Shaanxi." It can be seen that the Hadapu Conference only proposed going to Northern Shaanxi, whereas the Bangluo Town Conference formally decided on settling the Red Army’s Long March in Northern Shaanxi in the form of a Politburo meeting, further confirming the content of the Hadapu Conference. On the basis of the Hadapu Conference, the Bangluo Town Conference further resolved the issue of the specific location for establishing a base in Shaanxi and Gansu—an issue the Ejie Conference failed to resolve—and determined the major strategic decision to defend and expand the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area. This was of decisive significance for the Party Central Committee and the Red Army settling in Northern Shaanxi and for making Northern Shaanxi the forward position for the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the headquarters for leading the Chinese Revolution.
Therefore, regarding the settlement in Northern Shaanxi, the Ejie Conference proposed the concept, the Hadapu Conference clarified the direction, and the Bangluo Town Conference made the decision. Viewed this way, the Hadapu Conference played a crucial role as a bridge between the three meetings. The three were part of a single lineage in persisting in heading north to resist Japan and closely linking the establishment of base areas with the salvation of the nation from peril; in seeking the forward direction of the Long March, they were progressive, becoming increasingly clear and defined.
IV. On the Strategic Significance of the Red Army Clarifying the Long March Destination in Hadapu
The Party Central Committee finding a destination for the Long March in Hadapu holds important strategic significance.
From the macro-perspective of the Long March, it accelerated the historical process of the Long March's victory. Since the start of the Long March, where exactly the Central Red Army would settle and establish a base area had always been a major issue considered by the Party Central Committee. Plans were made to settle in Western Hunan, the Sichuan-Guizhou border, the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border, Western Sichuan, and Northwestern Sichuan, but none could be realized due to the enemy's pursuit and blockades or the poverty of the regions. After joining forces with the Red Fourth Front Army, the Central Committee advocated heading north, attempting to create a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area as a destination. However, due to Zhang Guotao's personal ambitions and his insistence on heading south—openly running counter to the Central Committee—this was abandoned. To avoid further splitting the Party and the Red Army, Mao Zedong and others were forced to lead the Red First and Third Armies and the Military Commission Column north first. Subsequently, the Ejie Conference, noting the insufficient strength of the northward Red Army, decided to abandon the plan to establish a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base and prepared to establish a base near the Soviet Union. Until this moment, the Party and the Red Army only had the general strategic direction of heading north to resist Japan; the specific location to settle had not yet been determined. It was precisely at this moment that the great news of the Northern Shaanxi Red Army was obtained from newspapers in Hadapu—a true "charcoal in the snow" [18], "the shade of willows and the brightness of flowers" indicating a path through the impasse [19]. Therefore, Mao Zedong decisively proposed "Go to Northern Shaanxi" in Hadapu, timely pointing out the strategic direction and destination for the Long March. Soon after, the Bangluo Town Conference "changed the Ejie Conference decision regarding creating a base near the Soviet Union" and formally made the decision to "place the destination of the CPC Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment in Northern Shaanxi," confirming the Hadapu decision. It was precisely along the correct direction proposed in Hadapu that the Party Central Committee and the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment packed their gear and continued forward, ultimately achieving the great victory of the Long March.
From the perspective of the National War of Resistance, it was an important link in persisting with the policy of heading north to resist Japan. Before the Central Red Army's Long March, the CPC Central Committee had already clarified the strategic goal of heading north to resist Japan. After the September 18th Incident [20], "at the grave moment of national crisis, the Communist Party of China took the lead in raising the banner of armed resistance against Japan," publishing a series of declarations of war. In October 1933, an anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang [Kai-shek] agreement was signed with the 19th Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army stationed in Fujian. In July 1934, the Northward Anti-Japanese Vanguard of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, formed by the Red Seventh Corps, was the first to fly the banner of heading north to resist Japan. During the Long March, even when facing severe situations, the Party and the Red Army continued to hold high the banner of heading north to resist Japan. In June 1935, after the Red First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, the Party Central Committee's strategic advocacy for heading north to resist Japan became even firmer. On June 15, Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others published the "Manifesto Against Japan’s Annexation of North China and Chiang Kai-shek’s Treachery," calling for "resolute combat against Japan, the recovery of all lost territories, and the expulsion of Japanese imperialism from China." On June 29, at the Lianghekou Conference, Mao Zedong clearly proposed that "we must publicize opposition to Japanese imperialism within the troops," believing that "this is best able to mobilize the masses." On August 17, regarding the "Letter to All Compatriots for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation" (the "August 1st Manifesto") published by the CPC delegation to the Comintern in the name of the CPC Central Committee, Mao Zedong told Yang Chengwu: "The route of heading north to resist Japan is the correct route, decided by the Central Committee after studying the current situation," and instructed him to "clearly explain to the comrades the reasons why the Central Committee decided to cross the grasslands to head north to resist Japan." On September 12, the Ejie Conference criticized Zhang Guotao’s separatist behavior of heading south, arguing that Zhang "underestimated the intensification of the current national revolutionary situation, especially the upsurge of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary movement of the Chinese people caused by the active aggression of Japanese imperialism," which "resulted in a loss of confidence in creating a new Soviet area in the Northwest of China, the front line of the resistance against Japan." The Ejie Conference persisted in the strategic guideline of heading north to resist Japan, planning to first create a base area near the Soviet Union before seeking an opportunity to develop eastward. Upon reaching Hadapu, the Party Central Committee found the destination for the Red Army’s Long March and proposed going to Northern Shaanxi, making the strategic guideline of heading north to resist Japan increasingly clear and feasible. As Mao Zedong said: "The national crisis is deepening day by day; we must continue to act and complete the original plan of heading north to resist Japan." He also called on all commanders and fighters: "March forward to victory! It is only seven or eight hundred li [21] to Northern Shaanxi; that is our destination, our forward position for the resistance against Japan!" Thus, it is clear that one of the important purposes of the Red Army's clear proposal in Hadapu to go to Northern Shaanxi was to more closely link the establishment of a base area with the national war of resistance.
From the perspective of the overall strategic situation, Hadapu provided an important opportunity for the center of the Chinese revolution to shift toward the North. Since the rise of the modern bourgeois-democratic revolutionary movement, the center of the Chinese revolution had always been in the South. From the very beginning of their founding, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China viewed Southern China as the fertile soil and center of activity for the revolution. In the 1930s, as the Japanese invaders occupied the Northeast and advanced into North China, the revolutionary movement centered on the theme of resistance against Japanese aggression and national salvation grew increasingly intense in Northern China. Simultaneously, through the Northern Expedition [22] and the Central Plains War [23], the northern warlords and reactionary ruling forces were greatly weakened. At this juncture, the center of the Chinese revolution began to gradually shift from the South to the North.
Before the Long March of the Central Red Army, following the failure of the various Red Army units in the South during the anti-"encirclement and suppression" campaigns, the successive fall of various base areas, and the failure of efforts and plans to establish base areas in southern regions such as Western Hunan, the Sichuan-Guizhou border, and the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border during the Long March, the Party and the Red Army urgently needed to look North for a new, more reliable, and stronger support base and foothold. After the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, the strategic guideline formulated was to "create a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet Area" in order to "strive for victory in the provinces of Northwest China and even the whole of China"; later, it was further pointed out that they must "rapidly form a leadership center for the revolutionary movement in Northwest China and throughout China."
At Hadapu, the Red Army explicitly proposed going to Northern Shaanxi (Shaanbei), pointing the way for the northward shift of the Chinese revolutionary center and the construction of a new strategic layout. After the victorious joining of forces at the end of the Long March, the Wuqi Town Meeting not only "announced the conclusion of the Central Red Army's Long March," but more clearly pointed out that "now the General Headquarters of the national revolution has arrived here," and that they must "lead the national revolution from the Northern Shaanxi Soviet Area." After the Shaanxi-Gansu Detachment joined forces with the 25th and 26th Red Armies in Northern Shaanxi, they "laid a solid foundation for developing the grand situation of the Northwest Soviet movement and the communization of all of China," and "opened up a new phase for the Chinese revolution." Subsequently, Mao Zedong deployed and commanded the Zhiluo Town Campaign, the Eastern Expedition, the Western Expedition, and the Shanchengbao Campaign, causing the Kuomintang's attempts to surround and annihilate the Red Army to go completely bankrupt, ensuring that the Chinese revolution had a long-term, stable base camp in the Northwest.
At the same time, the fact that the Party Central Committee and the Red Army settled in Northern Shaanxi caused Zhang Guotao's [24] separatism to collapse of its own accord, laying the foundation for the Red Army to recuperate, integrate revolutionary forces, and achieve new development. In April 1945, Mao Zedong explicitly pointed out in his report to the Party's Seventh National Congress: "Some say that Northern Shaanxi is not a good place, that the land is barren and the people are poor. But I say, without Northern Shaanxi, we would have had no place to set foot. I say Northern Shaanxi consists of two points: a landing point and a starting point."
History shows that adhering to the policy of going North to resist Japanese aggression was the grand strategy of the Red Army's Long March and the grand strategy of the Chinese revolution, and Hadapu was an important link within it. The critical choice made at Hadapu prompted our Party to successfully transfer the strategic center of the Chinese revolution to Northern Shaanxi, thereby enabling us to gain a foothold in the Northwest and plan a new strategic layout. It is precisely because a "landing point" was found at Hadapu that the Chinese revolution survived its lowest ebb and achieved a major historical turning point, laying the foundation for the Chinese revolution to begin the historical process of leading the national revolutionary movement with Northern Shaanxi as its center.
(Author Profile: Mao Lihong is a Second-Level Investigator in the Scientific Research Management Department of the Party History and Local Chronicles Office of the CPC Fujian Provincial Committee) Internet Editor: Tong Xin Source: Party Documents (《党的文献》), Issue 6, 2024