Liu Benson: A Comprehensive Examination of the Positioning of China's War of Resistance Within Western Discourse
China’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression was a great struggle of the Chinese nation for national salvation and survival, as well as a vital component of the World Anti-Fascist War. However, for a long time, there has been a systematic bias in the academic positioning of the War of Resistance within Western academia. Although this situation has gradually begun to change in recent years—for example, Professor Rana Mitter of Oxford University published Forgotten Ally: China’s World War II, 1937-1945, and Hans van de Ven, [1] Deputy Vice-Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, proposed "placing the Chinese experience within the concept of World War II"—overall, Western academia’s positioning of the War of Resistance still falls short regarding its historical status and global significance. Therefore, the Chinese academic community needs to conduct a critical examination based on a comprehensive review of relevant research and establish a theoretical system for the War of Resistance that seeks global recognition based on Chinese discourse.
Cognitive Biases in Western Perceptions of China’s War of Resistance
The cognitive biases in Western academic positioning of the War of Resistance primarily manifest in the following four aspects:
First, the "marginalization of the Eastern Theater" in global historical narratives. For a long time, research on the history of World War II in Western academia has followed a "Western-centric view." For instance, William Hill held that "China’s struggle was merely a supporting actor compared to the great battles of Europe." Gerhard Weinberg argued that while Chinese resistance tied down Japanese troops, it did not significantly alter the strategic balance in the Pacific Theater. Entering the 21st century, the rise of a global historical perspective, alongside reflections on Western-centrism, led to the widespread application of the "China-centered view" in Western China studies. However, the strategic positioning of the "Main Eastern Theater" has still not received sufficient attention from scholars. Although Rana Mitter proposed that China was a "forgotten ally," he still narrated the Chinese theater within the framework of the "Pacific War," leading to an insufficient assessment of its significance.
Second, the positioning of the war as a "war of attrition" [2] which weakens the strategic value of China’s resistance. While Western academia has long recognized the tragedy and tenacity of China’s resistance, its evaluation of China's contribution remains inadequate. There is a long-standing theoretical tendency to reduce China’s War of Resistance to a "war of attrition." Alastair Haskey [3] argued that China’s role in defeating Japan was more a matter of attrition than a strategic victory. In Shanghai 1937, Peter Harmsen characterized the Battle of Shanghai as a "model of modern urban warfare," yet limited its strategic value to a battle of attrition designed to "buy time for Britain and America to prepare for war." Richard Frank of the U.S. Naval War College simplified the Chinese theater to a "tripwire" [4] that merely hindered the Japanese military. Rana Mitter emphasized that "although China's resistance to Japan was not an independent, decisive military victory, it was crucial in consuming vast amounts of Japanese military resources, preventing the Japanese army from committing its full strength to other theaters." This narrative of "indirect contribution" not only weakens the strategic value of the Chinese theater but also reflects the cognitive bias of Western historiography toward the Eastern theater.
Third, a lack of holistic understanding regarding China’s resistance, a misunderstanding of the nature of "People’s War," [5] and a neglect of the internal complexities of the resistance. Western academia focuses excessively on the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, ignoring the social diversity of the resistance, such as the participation and sacrifice of local governments and ethnic minority regions. Jonathan Spence’s The Search for Modern China, when touching upon the War of Resistance, overlooks how various social strata and political forces fought together. Jonathan Fenby’s research neglects the importance of national unity and cooperation throughout the process. Andrew Kennedy, in discussing the resistance, reduced the nature of "People’s War" to a mere political strategy of the Communist Party. Lynch argued that the concept of People's War was a tactical necessity for the Communist Party but did not fully reflect the mobilization of the entire Chinese people. Such perceptions are misunderstandings of the image of China’s War of Resistance, and even constitute smearing or slander.
Fourth, the exaggeration of the role of foreign aid. While Allied aid played an important role, the autonomy and persistence of China’s resistance cannot be erased or diluted. External aid was important, but not decisive. Anthony Kubek, in How the Far East Was Lost, constructed a "determinism of American aid," attributing the victory of the War of Resistance to external factors like the "Stilwell Road." John Dower’s War Without Mercy discussed how American aid changed the situation but failed to fully consider the autonomy of China’s resistance and the strategic nature of the protracted war. Such assertions exaggerating foreign aid diminish the status and significance of China’s struggle.
Political and Academic Factors Leading to Cognitive Bias
The cognitive bias in Western academia regarding the position of China’s War of Resistance is not merely a temporary phenomenon; it is rooted in deep ideological prejudices, academic theoretical constraints, and selective biases in the acquisition and interpretation of materials.
First, Cold War thinking and ideological prejudice. Cold War mindsets and prejudices against the ideology of Communist China are significant factors in why some Western scholars refuse to recognize the international status of China’s resistance. Rana Mitter remarked bluntly that the West knows little about China’s role in WWII partly because, at the start of the Cold War, China transitioned from an anti-Japanese ally to a member of the opposing camp, making it difficult for Western scholars to study the history objectively. Currently, this ideological bias remains deeply entrenched in Western academia and is the most fundamental issue that Chinese academia must confront.
Second, the theoretical constraints of Western-centrism. The inception and development of WWII history studies in Western academia were grounded in a Western-centric view, placing high importance on the European theater and the U.S. role in the Pacific War, while consistently disregarding the Chinese theater. For example, John Keegan, in The Second World War, placed the Chinese resistance outside the European and Pacific theaters, considering it a "marginal theater." Furthermore, under the influence of John King Fairbank’s "impact-response" model, modern China is described as passively responding to various shocks, and the War of Resistance is simplified into a linear narrative of "passively responding to Japanese aggression." Although the influence of a global historical perspective has changed this to some extent, breaking the theoretical constraints of Western-centrism still requires the advancement of more international collaborative research.
Third, selective bias in the use of research materials, especially archives. Western scholars initially focused on Western sources, leading to research that emphasized the West and ignored the Chinese theater. With the digitization of Japanese documents, Western scholars have shown a narrative weight that reinforces the Japanese perspective. This has resulted in an insufficient highlighting of China’s international contribution and its status as the Main Eastern Theater. In the 21st century, the opening of Chinese materials, represented by the Diaries of Chiang Kai-shek at the Harvard-Yenching Institute, has played a role in changing this. Thus, the Chinese academic community should exert more effort in opening, organizing, and digitizing relevant archival materials to change the state of being "voiceless" caused by selective bias.
Paradigm Shift: From "Self-Image Defined by Others" to "Self-Defined Image"
General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized: "Compared with the historical status and significance of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and compared with the impact of this war on the Chinese nation and the world, our research on the War of Resistance is still far from enough. We must continue to conduct in-depth and systematic research." The Chinese academic community should give full play to its institutional advantages and regional characteristics. By constructing historical data engineering projects such as the "Documentary and Data Platform of the War of Resistance and Modern Sino-Japanese Relations," and establishing transnational research communities, we should foster academic dialogues involving both domestic and foreign scholars to create an autonomous knowledge system of the history of the War of Resistance that possesses both historical depth and a global perspective.
The struggle for the right to speak in history is essentially a contest of civilization-narrative capabilities. American scholar Elizabeth Perry pointed out: "For a long time, Chinese research has been in a 'theory-input stage' and has not yet entered a 'theory-output stage'." The Chinese academic community must abandon simple theoretical following or even theoretical transplantation, independently explore innovations in research paradigms, and construct an autonomous and explanatory theoretical framework for the study of the War of Resistance at the international academic level. We might consider the "Renaissance Paradigm" as an attempt to construct an autonomous discourse system and "self-define" China’s image. This paradigm adheres to the guidance of the Marxist historical materialist view, is rooted in traditional Chinese historiographical narrative, and draws on existing Chinese and Western research paradigms. Standing upon the arduous journey of the Chinese people achieving national rejuvenation under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, it adopts a long-term historical view, a global perspective, a China-centered approach, and diverse methodologies. It emphasizes both grand narratives and respects micro-empirical evidence, representing an integration and coordination of existing paradigms.
While constructing an autonomous knowledge system, the Chinese academic community’s history of the War of Resistance needs to actively integrate into the global historiographical narrative of anti-fascism, anti-imperialism, and anti-colonialism. It should reveal in an all-around way the paradigmatic significance of China’s resistance for the World Anti-Fascist War and the global national liberation movements. When Western scholars begin to admit that "China also became another model, namely, as a non-European nation-state, it successfully advocated anti-imperialist ideas—not just against Japan, but also including Britain," we need all the more to prove to the world: the Chinese theater was not only the Main Eastern Theater in terms of geographical space, but also a spiritual high ground shaping the modern world’s civilized order.
(This article is a staged result of the National Social Science Fund General Project "Research on China's War of Resistance in Western Discourse and its World Significance" (23BDJ074)) (The author is a professor at the Faculty of Marxism, Shandong Normal University)