Xiao Ruping: British Archives and the Historical Narrative of the Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance
The Eighth Route Army was the people’s army led by the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. It served as the main force persisting in resistance behind enemy lines in North China and other regions, acting as the backbone of China's resistance and making an indelible historical contribution to the final victory of the World Anti-Fascist War. The Eighth Route Army’s resistance behind enemy lines is a vital field in the study of wartime history, and domestic research has already yielded prolific results. In recent years, archival materials concerning the CPC and the Eighth Route Army’s resistance held in overseas collections have received significant attention. The British National Archives (TNA), specifically within the Foreign Office (FO) and War Office (WO) files, house a vast quantity of materials on the CPC and the Eighth Route Army during the war. Fully extracting and organizing these archives possesses important academic value for further enriching and deepening the historical writing and research on the Eighth Route Army’s resistance behind enemy lines.
The Eighth Route Army’s Resistance in Embassy Reports
During the war, the British Embassy in China utilized its diplomatic intelligence network to collect information on the CPC. The Embassy periodically summarized and submitted this information to the British Foreign Office in the form of monthly reports. The content covered the development of the CPC, the construction of Anti-Japanese Base Areas, and the military activities of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, providing rich material for researching and writing the history of the resistance behind enemy lines.
After the outbreak of the full-scale national war of resistance, Archibald Clark Kerr succeeded Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen as British Ambassador to China. Shortly thereafter, he held his first meeting with Zhou Enlai and others. This meeting provided Clark Kerr with his initial understanding of the CPC’s propositions for resistance and its political philosophy. In 1938, with Clark Kerr’s assistance, the Eighth Route Army’s Hong Kong Office was established, primarily responsible for securing international aid for the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. On April 29, Clark Kerr reported in detail to the Foreign Office on the Eighth Route Army’s combat situation: "After occupying Taiyuan city, the Japanese army had to halt its march south of the Yellow River to consolidate its lines of communication, because these lines were being severely harassed by the Eighth Route Army." Subsequently, Clark Kerr regularly reported to the British government on the resistance in North China. In early July, Edgar Snow sent Clark Kerr a proposal regarding the Eighth Route Army’s armed defense of Wuhan. Simultaneously, Clark Kerr received a report from Peter Fleming, The Times correspondent in China, concerning the Eighth Route Army’s operations in North China. Influenced by Snow and Fleming, Clark Kerr developed a keen interest in the Eighth Route Army and even discussed the feasibility of visiting Yan'an with Snow.
Following the establishment of the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and the Eighth Route Army’s Chongqing Office in 1939, the Party adopted a flexible international united front policy, proactively establishing contact with British and American institutions in China. Clark Kerr’s interactions with Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and others became increasingly close. It can be said that Clark Kerr was among the earliest high-ranking British officials to have contact with key leaders of the CPC and the Eighth Route Army. Through these interactions, Clark Kerr gained a deeper understanding of the CPC; he grew dissatisfied with the anti-communist actions of the Kuomintang (KMT) diehards and greatly admired the resolve of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army. In 1941, he reported to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden: "The CPC emphasizes that China's task is to resist the Japanese invaders, and the 18th Group Army [1] is also willing to cooperate toward this goal." However, "the Communists find themselves in a position where they actively resist the Japanese, yet face the suspicions of the National Government, receiving only a pittance of strategic supplies from them." After the Southern Anhui Incident [2], Clark Kerr strongly advised the British government to join the United States in pressuring the KMT to prevent the situation from deteriorating. In January 1942, Clark Kerr reported to Eden: "A determination to resist to the end and adhere to the united front remains the keynote of Communist policy."
During the Pacific War, as the armed forces led by the CPC—such as the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army—rapidly expanded and demonstrated a strength that could not be ignored in the World Anti-Fascist War, British political figures like Eden and Churchill began to view the CPC in a new light. In 1942, Horace Seymour succeeded Clark Kerr as Ambassador. He strengthened ties with the Southern Bureau and the Chongqing Office, paying closer attention to the resistance behind enemy lines. In 1943, a British Embassy report noted: "Although the Eighth Route Army is indeed poorly equipped compared to the Central Government's forces, they have effectively resisted and halted the tide of the Japanese army's further infiltration into North and Northwest China single-handedly." The guerrilla warfare conducted by the Eighth Route Army in North China "pinned down a large number of Japanese troops and to a large extent prevented the Japanese from exploiting the agricultural resources of the occupied territories." In 1944, the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office received two reports: from 1943 to 1944, casualty rates on the North China battlefield were gradually shifting in favor of the Eighth Route Army. As the Japanese moved troops south from North China in 1944, the Eighth Route Army capitalized on the momentum to launch offensives in Shandong, Hebei, Shanxi, and northern Jiangsu. "They fight at night, moving like invisible phantoms through the mountains, flickering like dancing tongues of fire around Japanese strongpoints and communication lines." From January to June 1944, the Eighth Route Army killed or wounded over 66,000 Japanese soldiers, captured 303, and accepted the surrender of 45. In 1945, acting on Comrade Mao Zedong’s instructions to "eliminate the enemy and puppet forces, expand the Liberated Areas, and shrink the occupied territories," the Eighth Route Army launched its Spring and Summer Offensives. Regarding this counter-offensive, British archives record: "In early January, the main forces of the 7th and 8th sub-districts [3] of the Taihang Liberated Area began attacking Japanese and puppet forces south of the Ping-Han Railway and north of the Long-Hai Railway. By January 29, the Eighth Route Army had liberated a population of one million, recovered 1,250 square kilometers of territory, and captured over 40 Japanese-puppet strongpoints."
In short, the British Embassy reports of that time presented, from an Allied perspective, the magnificent process by which the Eighth Route Army persisted in resistance behind enemy lines and gradually developed into a vital force in the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War.
The Eighth Route Army’s Resistance in Military Intelligence
Following the outbreak of the full-scale national war of resistance, British military departments dispatched additional military attachés and intelligence personnel to China. They were responsible for collecting operational information from the Chinese theater, compiling periodic reports on the Sino-Japanese military situation, and operated under the dual leadership of the Ambassador and military intelligence departments. Unlike the diplomatic departments, these attachés and intelligence personnel focused more on the military specifics of the Eighth Route Army, such as troop organization, strategy and tactics, weaponry, and operational conditions.
First, military intelligence provided a general record of the Eighth Route Army’s development. At the start of the reorganization, British sources recorded the Red Army’s transition in Northern Shaanxi and its operational zones, emphasizing that the Eighth Route Army was part of the Second War Zone under the command of Yan Xishan. As the Eighth Route Army grew through operations behind enemy lines, British interest intensified, and they also recorded KMT attempts to restrict its growth. In 1940, the National Government demanded that all Eighth Route Army units south of the Yellow River retreat to the north and sought to limit the army's size. In 1941, Clark Kerr emphasized to Eden in a telegram: "The Communist forces already have 500,000 troops. They are fighting in the most dangerous sectors within Japanese lines; their numbers should not be reduced, but rather increased." In July 1942, Brigadier Gordon Grimsdale reported to MI2: "The 18th Group Army can muster one million trained and partially trained soldiers in North China, though only a portion are armed." By July 1945, the War Office had detailed reports on organization and strength, showing the Eighth Route Army possessed 367,000 regular troops.
Second, military intelligence highly praised the Eighth Route Army’s guerrilla tactics. In October 1938, the British government received a report stating: "Guerrilla warfare may cause more distress to the Japanese army than the positional warfare conducted by regular armies in the south." It noted that "guerrilla warfare causes an average of 100 Japanese deaths and 150 injuries daily... to deal with it, the Japanese have been forced to deploy approximately 175,000 troops in North China." In July 1944, Major Stover of MI2 wrote: "On most fronts, guerrilla warfare is an adjunct to positional warfare, but in China, it pins down the majority of the Japanese army. Prior to March 1944, at least 22 divisions—64% of Japanese forces in China—were engaged in the rear with the Eighth Route Army. Even after the Henan Offensive (Battle of Central Henan) began, this proportion remained at 47%." Meanwhile, KMT forces operating behind enemy lines suffered crushing defeats. "In 1941, KMT troops behind enemy lines numbered nearly one million; now only 20,000 to 30,000 remain." Many were destroyed by the Japanese, "but shamefully, a large portion defected to the Japanese; over 60% of puppet troops [4] came from the KMT army."
Finally, military intelligence analyzed the difficulties faced by the Eighth Route Army during "mopping-up" operations [5]. In 1942, the Japanese launched massive campaigns in Eastern and Central Hebei. They delved deep into the Base Areas and established blockades, "adopting the methods Chiang Kai-shek used during the 'Encirclement and Suppression' campaigns against the Red Army in Jiangxi, building networks of blockhouses roughly a mile apart." The reports noted that "in many North China villages, approximately two-thirds of the houses were burned by the Japanese," and "the Japanese adopted semi-guerrilla tactics, with light troops moving rapidly, sometimes dressed in civilian or even Chinese military uniforms, conducting night raids and surrounding villages." Furthermore, intelligence noted other hardships: a lack of arms and ammunition ("a battle without captured weapons is considered a failure"); the destruction of railways served both to disrupt enemy transport and to obtain scrap metal for making firearms. Additionally, there was a severe lack of medicine; during the hardest periods of the mopping-up campaigns, amputations were performed with butcher knives and carpenter saws, and sewing needles were used for sutures, often without anesthesia.
Through British military intelligence, one can see the Eighth Route Army conducting flexible guerrilla warfare under grueling conditions. While resisting and pinning down vast numbers of Japanese troops in North China, it continued to grow, fully demonstrating the advantages of resistance behind enemy lines.
The Eighth Route Army’s Resistance in Reports by British Journalists and Residents
The Chinese people's resistance won the respect and support of peace-loving people worldwide. Many British journalists and residents traveled deep into the Anti-Japanese Base Areas for interviews and investigations, some even living and fighting alongside Eighth Route Army soldiers. In October 1937, James Bertram arrived in the Shaan-Gan-Ning Border Region, conducting exclusive interviews in Yan'an with Comrade Mao Zedong and generals like Peng Dehuai. In 1939, the British teacher Lindsay (Lord Lindsay of Birker) visited the Jin-Cha-Ji [6] Base Area, meeting with Nie Rongzhen, Xiao Ke, and others. After the Pacific War broke out, Michael Lindsay and William Band went to work in the Jin-Cha-Ji Base Area. These eyewitnesses provided not only detailed descriptions of the Base Areas and guerrilla warfare but also revealed, to an extent, the reasons behind the Eighth Route Army's success.
In 1941, a British resident who had lived in a North China base area described tunnel warfare (地下避难所): in central Hebei, villagers built underground shelters to evade the Japanese. Later, these were connected within villages and eventually between villages, forming an ingenious system. Guerrillas could escape Japanese encirclements through these tunnels, which were protected by landmines above and traps below. The use of mines had progressed significantly, causing heavy Japanese casualties. The report also highly praised the guerrilla lines: almost all of North China was a guerrilla front organized by the Eighth Route Army, forming various permanent and non-permanent base areas that the Japanese could only penetrate during large-scale "mopping-up" operations. "These guerrilla lines have seriously hindered Japan's plunder of North China's resources."
Gunther Stein, who interviewed subjects in Yan'an for nearly five months, believed that the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the people's army under its leadership had "successfully awakened a stagnant peasant society." Coincidentally, another expatriate wrote in a report: "The North China peasants, formerly indifferent to politics, now understand the significance of the War of Resistance and are willing to endure all hardships to continue resisting... they take enormous risks to help hide Eighth Route Army soldiers." In 1943, during the Japanese military’s massive "mopping-up" [7] campaigns against the Northwest Shanxi anti-Japanese base area, the Eighth Route Army's field hospitals were forced to evacuate. Patients were hidden in specially prepared caves or disguised and dispersed throughout small villages. The villagers "provided the wounded with better food than they ate themselves, and when necessary, hid and protected them." In 1945, The Times published two expatriate reports mentioning that villages in the North China anti-Japanese base areas, formerly adept at making firecrackers, had transitioned to producing landmines. "In one courtyard, I saw men, women, and children making black powder, casting mine casings, and neatly stacking the loaded mines. There is a metal shortage here, so they hollow out large rocks to make stone mines." In the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region [8], each village organized 50 stretchers and 100 permanent porters; "this is not difficult in the Border Region, as the villages are generally large and heavily populated." Conversely, the Kuomintang (KMT) [9] troops in Henan were detested by the broad masses of peasants. One report stated: "Due to corruption, misconduct, and the extortion of grain from peasants who had suffered consecutive famines, the KMT troops in Henan are hated to the bone by the peasantry."
British journalists and expatriates were also deeply impressed by the conditions of "all people being soldiers" in the North China anti-Japanese base areas. In March 1944, William Band, who had lived and worked in the North China anti-Japanese base areas for nearly two years, submitted a "Report on Communist Areas" to Ambassador Horace Seymour. It covered nine aspects, including the anti-Japanese base areas, the Jin-Cha-Ji Border Region Government, and the organization and resistance activities of the Eighth Route Army. The report stated: youth, workers, peasants, and women in the Jin-Cha-Ji anti-Japanese base area joined the Anti-Japanese National Salvation Federation [10] in succession; when the Eighth Route Army attacked Japanese strongholds, guerrillas, militias, and local civilians all participated actively; militias and self-defense corps planted mines, dug tunnels, carried ammunition, and transported the wounded, while civilians brought picks and shovels for digging tunnels and ladders for the troops to cross trenches. In 1944, the British Foreign Office received a report regarding the International Peace Hospital [11] in Southeast Shanxi. In this report, Dr. Hans Müller [12] spoke highly of the militia’s role, stating: "Our remarkable development over the past few years has been the people's militia; their military work is increasing, and they now fight as frequently as the regular army. This is reflected in the increasing number of militia casualties." In January 1945, The Times published an article titled "Guerrilla Warfare in China." In the article, the author lauded the North China militia as the "eyes and ears" of the Eighth Route Army. It was precisely through the effective coordination of the militia, self-defense corps, and the masses that the Eighth Route Army was able to maximize the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare, drowning the Japanese army in the "vast ocean of people's war."
In addition to the aforementioned types of reports, the National Archives of the United Kingdom also house other precious historical materials concerning the resistance of the CPC and the Eighth Route Army. Although these archives do not reflect the full picture of the Eighth Route Army’s resistance, they vividly and authentically embody the historical status and role of the Eighth Route Army’s resistance behind enemy lines within the context of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. They present the basic forms and characteristics of the Eighth Route Army’s operations behind enemy lines and, to a certain extent, answer why these operations were able to achieve victory. Although the British side possessed various motives when collecting this intelligence, these historical materials corroborate the great significance of the Eighth Route Army’s resistance from an "other" perspective, providing new references for researching and writing the history of the Eighth Route Army’s War of Resistance.
(Author: Xiao Ruping, Chief Expert of the National Social Science Fund Major Project "Collation and Research of the British Embassy in China Archives during the War of Resistance" and Professor at the School of History, Zhejiang University) Source: Guangming Daily, June 11, 2025, Page 11 Web Editor: Tongxin