Lin Xuwu: Mao Zedong on the Zunyi Conference [1]
In January 1935, during the Long March, an enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo was convened in Zunyi. Known as the Zunyi Conference, this was an exceptionally important meeting that opened a new chapter for the Communist Party of China (CPC) during the New Democratic Revolution [1]. It left a heavy mark on the history of the CPC and possessed great significance as a historic turning point. The Zunyi Conference was not only closely linked to Mao Zedong but also altered his political career, becoming a major turning point in his life. Examining the records, it is easy to find that Mao discussed the Zunyi Conference on many occasions in his writings. In which documents did Mao discuss the meeting? How did he understand and evaluate it? What is the value of this understanding and evaluation? Looking at the current major research outputs on the Zunyi Conference in academic circles, focus on these questions remains insufficient. Therefore, this article intends to comb through and explore the basic documents, core views, and historical value of Mao Zedong’s discourses on the Zunyi Conference, with the aim of further deepening and enriching research on Mao Zedong and the conference itself.
I. Basic Documents of Mao Zedong’s Discourses on the Zunyi Conference
Through searching and analyzing materials such as the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, the Collected Works of Mao Zedong, and the Selected Letters of Mao Zedong, a rough statistical analysis shows that Mao discussed the Zunyi Conference in 20 separate writings, mentioning it a total of 40 times. Among these, it appears 11 times in the Selected Works of Mao Zedong, 29 times in the Collected Works of Mao Zedong, and 0 times in the Selected Letters of Mao Zedong. Looking further at the timeline, Mao discussed the Zunyi Conference 36 times before the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and only 4 times afterward. Among the 20 works, the earliest mention was in December 1936 and the last was in September 1963; specific statistical details can be found in Table 1.
Additionally, in Volume 15 of the Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949), Mao discusses the Zunyi Conference four times in the article "On the New Stage" [2], three of which are identical to passages in the article "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War." In Volume 19 of the same collection, the "Telegram from Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang to Zhou Enlai Regarding the Discussion of the Past Central Line (February 21, 1942)" mentions the Zunyi Conference twice.
II. Mao Zedong’s Understanding and Evaluation of the Zunyi Conference
Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference constitute the core content of his discourses on the subject. His numerous discussions regarding the conference present clear and consistent viewpoints. These discussions served either to summarize experience or to break new ground, reflecting the spirit of independence and the courage to innovate maintained by the Chinese Communists, represented by Comrade Mao Zedong, in the process of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution to solve a series of revolutionary problems.
(1) The Zunyi Conference corrected serious "Left" errors within the Party
A review of the aforementioned documents reveals that Mao expressed this important viewpoint in his earliest discussion of the conference. In December 1936, he pointed out in "Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War" that, in addition to the two errors of Chen Duxiu’s right-wing opportunism and Li Lisan’s "Left" opportunism, the CPC had committed two other errors during the revolutionary war. One was:
The "Left" opportunism of 1931–1934, which caused extremely serious losses to the Land Revolutionary War, resulting in our failure to defeat the enemy in the fifth counter-"encirclement and suppression" campaign [3], the loss of our base areas, and the weakening of the Red Army. This error was corrected at the enlarged meeting of the Central Politburo held in Zunyi in January 1935.
Clearly, Mao’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Conference began with the correction of "Left" opportunist errors within the Party. In Mao’s view, the "Left" line of 1934 was the most serious of the three "Left" lines that occurred within the Party between 1927 and 1935. On October 14, 1938, in the article "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," Mao discussed the conference again: "The Zunyi Conference corrected the serious errors of principle of a 'Left' opportunist nature committed in the struggle against the fifth 'encirclement and suppression'." However, the Zunyi Conference primarily opposed "opportunism in war," which was a "reflection of the war environment"; therefore, the conference "put the question of war in the first place" and "mainly solved only military problems."
In Mao’s view, the "Left" errors occurred because "when a national enemy invaded and the national bourgeoisie and the upper stratum of the petty bourgeoisie had changed, our policy did not change accordingly but remained the same old set of practices." Some comrades in the Party "did not humbly grasp past experience and lacked an understanding of China’s historical and social conditions, the characteristics of the Chinese revolution, and the laws of the Chinese revolution. They lacked a unified understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution." At the same time, "some leading cadres overestimated the enemy situation and our tasks, disregarded the actual facts, and mechanically applied foreign experience." To this end, "the Central Red Base Area [4] paid a tremendous price in sacrifices over a long period of three years (before the Zunyi Conference) before correcting [these errors] through lessons of blood." This precisely reflects the great achievement of the Zunyi Conference.
Regarding the specific manifestations of the "Left" errors within the Party, Mao held different views in different texts. He believed these errors included opportunist errors—the Zunyi Conference corrected "serious errors of principle of a 'Left' opportunist nature"; dogmatist errors—the conference "criticized dogmatism"; and subjectivist errors—"the so-called struggle on two fronts by the leaders of the 'Left' opportunist line from 'September 18th' [5] to the Zunyi Conference was subjectivist." There were also organizational and military errors. Although Mao believed the "Left" errors were multifaceted, his view that the Zunyi Conference corrected these serious "Left" errors remained consistent and was emphasized repeatedly.
(2) The Zunyi Conference promoted unity within the Party and the Red Army
Mao pointed out in "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War" that the Zunyi Conference "united the Party and the Red Army, enabling the Central Committee and the main force of the Red Army to successfully complete the Long March, move to the forward positions of the War of Resistance, and implement the new policy of the Anti-Japanese National United Front."
The reason the Zunyi Conference was able to unite the Party and the Red Army was, naturally, because it was built on the foundation of correcting "Left" errors. However, after the conference, Mao did not directly assume the position of the Party's person-in-charge; instead, he recommended Zhang Wentian [6] for the role. This was undoubtedly a consideration aimed at uniting comrades within the Party. Deng Xiaoping once pointed out that the reason Mao wanted Zhang Wentian—who had previously stood on the side of the Wang Ming line—to serve as the person-in-charge "was precisely to unite those comrades who had made mistakes, especially in difficult times. Comrade Mao Zedong's policy of correctly handling intra-Party issues united everyone, enabling them to weather the most difficult moments and complete the Long March." At the same time, considering that "discussing historical issues at the meeting would inevitably drag on for two or three weeks," the Zunyi Conference moderately set aside historical issues during its deliberations to prevent the central agenda from shifting. This effectively avoided the expansion of intra-Party contradictions and maintained Party unity.
Admittedly, at a meeting of the CPC Central Politburo in December 1940, Mao pointed out that the "Left" policies during the latter period of the Soviet Movement [7] caused the loss of nine-tenths of the army and more than nine-tenths of the Soviet areas—losses actually greater than those during the Li Lisan line. He argued that while the Zunyi Conference resolutions called it a military error, it was "actually an error in the [political] line," and the resolutions needed revision. However, this view was ultimately set aside because some comrades disagreed with labeling the errors of the late Soviet period as "line errors." Shortly thereafter, in the "Directive on the Current Situation and Policy" drafted for the Central Committee (the policy section of which was included in Volume II of the Selected Works of Mao Zedong under the title "On Policy"), Mao only stated that there were many "excessively Left policies" in the latter period of the Land Revolutionary War and that these were "'Left' opportunist errors," without mentioning "line errors." This approach was undoubtedly still intended to maintain internal unity.
At a meeting of the Central Politburo in November 1943, Mao stated that the Zunyi Conference focused only on clarifying the military line because, during the Long March, military leadership was the central issue, and "only thus could we unite our ranks." Previously, Mao had said, "The Zunyi Conference actually changed a political line. After the Zunyi Conference, the old line could no longer function politically, militarily, or organizationally, but the poisonous influence of subjectivism remained in ideology... the remnants of subjectivism and sectarianism were not cleared away, or still existed quite seriously." This outcome was precisely due to the need to maintain unity. A 1972 speech by Zhou Enlai confirmed this conclusion; he mentioned that "if everything had been labeled a line issue at that time, many people would have maintained reservations, which would have instead hindered the Party’s progress." He added, "This is Chairman Mao’s dialectical materialism: to solve contradictions, first solve the primary contradiction, and put the secondary ones later." Zhang Wentian’s explanation for this was that if it had not been done this way, "our alliance would have been impossible, and thus the Zunyi Conference could not have achieved victory," citing this as a model for intra-Party struggle.
The Zunyi Conference's promotion of unity within the Party and the army also relied on comrades who actively maintained that unity. Ye Yonglie [8] recorded a small-group conversation of Mao’s in his interview notes, stating that at that time, Politburo meetings often involved two opposing opinions: one side was Mao Zedong, Wang Jiaxiang, and Zhang Wentian with three votes, while the other side had four votes. Every meeting was three against four, and problems could never be solved. Thereupon, Mao said, "I will bring in the people from below who support our views, and you bring in the people from below who support your views; let’s hold an enlarged meeting." He proposed that in addition to the Politburo members and alternate members in Zunyi, responsible comrades from the Military Commission and major leaders from each army group should be invited. This suggestion was supported by Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian, and Bo Gu also agreed. As Mao said, "Without the support of all the comrades who opposed the 'Left' line, including some very important comrades who contributed to the errors of the third 'Left' line, the success of the Zunyi Conference would have been impossible." Even when discussing issues of leadership line, while Mao clearly stated that from the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee [9] to the Zunyi Conference, "the political strategy, military strategy, and cadre policy adopted by the central leading organs were incorrect in their main aspects," he specifically pointed out that "there was no dispute between us and the comrades who made mistakes on those fundamental issues of opposing Chiang Kai-shek and advocating the Land Revolution and the Red Army struggle." Therefore, the Zunyi Conference did not adopt a total negation of those who had made mistakes, but rather strove to win them over to the correct line—likewise for the purpose of unity.
It was precisely due to the active maintenance of unity within the Party and army by multiple parties that the Zunyi Conference "pointed out that the correction of errors in military leadership within the Party was not a divergence within the Party, but on the contrary, made it more united, put military leadership on the correct path, and further enhanced the prestige of the Party and the Military Commission." Mao summarized this in his political report to the Party’s Seventh National Congress, "On the New Stage," stating: "Since the Zunyi Conference and the overcoming of Zhang Guotao's [10] errors, our Party has been in its most united and unified period since the Sixth National Congress."
(3) The Zunyi Conference opened a new stage for the CPC to solve the problems of the Chinese revolution independently
On October 4, 1939, Mao Zedong pointed out in the "Introducing The Communist": "It was only after the Zunyi Conference (the meeting of the Politburo held at Zunyi, Guizhou, in January 1935) that the Party set out on the road of Bolshevization in a thoroughgoing way." The so-called "Bolshevization" essentially consists "first of all, in the ability to apply Leninism to the concrete and specific conditions of each country"—what is commonly referred to as integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China’s concrete reality. The reason Mao believed the Party only thoroughly embarked on the road of Bolshevization after the Zunyi Conference was mainly due to the awareness and capacity for independence and self-reliance demonstrated by the Chinese Communists during the conference.
Under the "Left" dogmatist command of Wang Ming [11], the Red Army passively dealt with the fifth "encirclement and suppression," which eventually failed and severely weakened the forces. Subsequently, the Battle of Xiangjiang cost the Red Army a heavy price; the number of losses exceeded the total reduction in personnel during the breakthrough of the first three blockade lines. The main force of the Red Army plummeted from over 86,000 at the start of the march to fewer than 40,000—a loss of more than half—forcing the continuation of the Long March. This is what Mao meant when he said, "The 12,500-kilometer Long March was glorious, but in reality, it was because of errors in the line that we were pursued by the enemy and had no choice but to go."
Wang Ming’s [12] "Left" adventurist dogmatism brought severe harm to the Chinese revolution, leading many comrades within the Party and the Red Army to recognize the errors of the Wang Ming line. The Zunyi Meeting criticized the errors of the Wang Ming "Left" dogmatist line. The Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on a Summary of the Opposition to the Enemy's Five "Encirclement and Suppression" Campaigns [13], drafted after the meeting, criticized the military opportunist errors of Bo Gu and Otto Braun [14], as well as their errors of dictatorial style in organization and leadership. This was the first time in the Party’s history that Comintern advisors were severely criticized in the form of a Central Committee document, demonstrating the independent consciousness of the Chinese Communists.
It is worth noting that a massive difference exists between the previous corrections of Chen Duxiu’s [15] Right opportunism and Li Lisan’s [16] "Left" opportunism and this correction of "Left" errors. The former were corrected under the direct intervention of the Comintern, while the latter was corrected spontaneously and through unity by comrades within the Party who combined the basic principles of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution during a period when the CPC had lost contact with the Comintern. The Zunyi Meeting effectively established Mao Zedong's leadership position in the Party Central Committee and the Red Army, and this too was decided independently by Chinese Communists. To a certain extent, all of this demonstrated that the CPC already possessed the capacity to independently explore the path of the Chinese revolution. "Since the Zunyi Meeting, our Party has been independently implementing policies, independently deciding guidelines, maintaining an independent status, and conducting affairs according to Chinese conditions."
Undoubtedly, independence became a crucial successful experience in the CPC’s leadership of the practice of the Chinese revolution. In the ten years from the Zunyi Meeting to the convening of the Seventh National Congress, "The main members of the Central Committee were elected by the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions. Only five members elected by the Sixth National Congress remain. That is to say, among the current twenty-five Central Committee members, the vast majority were elected by the Fourth and Fifth Plenary Sessions—the two sessions that 'flipped somersaults' [17]. The Sixth Plenary Session of 1938 also elected three. Precisely in these ten years, there were fewer somersaults and fewer messes; our work can be considered to have progressed." Mao Zedong regarded this as "a very important experience."
In March 1961, during a speech at the Central Work Conference in Guangzhou, Mao Zedong pointed out: "Some people say my military strategy relies on two books: Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Sun Tzu's Art of War. I have read Romance of the Three Kingdoms, but at that time I had not read Sun Tzu's Art of War. At the Zunyi Meeting, Kai Feng [18] said: 'Your stuff isn't particularly brilliant; it’s nothing more than Romance of the Three Kingdoms plus Sun Tzu's Art of War.' I asked him: 'How many chapters are there in Sun Tzu's Art of War? What is the title of the first chapter? Please tell us.' He couldn't answer. I said: 'You haven't read it either, so how do you know I am familiar with it?' Kai Feng himself hadn't read it, yet he said I was using it. When fighting back then, the situation was so tense—who cared about Sun Tzu or combat regulations? They were all forgotten. When fighting, one must estimate the enemy's situation and our own and make decisions quickly; who is going to recall those books? Haven't some of you studied the 'Four Great Tutorials' [19]? Do you use them every time you fight? If you did, that would be pure dogmatism!" From this, it is evident that the independence Mao Zedong spoke of meant treating neither ancient Chinese books, nor Marxism, nor foreign experience as dogma. "Foreign experience, no matter which country it comes from, can only serve as a reference."
In September 1963, in the article "Revolution and Construction Must Rely on One's Self," Mao Zedong discussed the Zunyi Meeting again: "In the past, we were like children whose hands were held by a teacher [20] to learn how to write. From the founding of the Party in 1921 until 1934, we suffered because of the teacher. The program and the resolutions of the Plenary Sessions were drafted by the teacher; especially in 1934, this caused us great losses. After that, we understood that we had to think through problems ourselves. It took us several decades to understand China. How can it work if Chinese people do not understand Chinese conditions? Real understanding of independence began with the Zunyi Meeting." At the Zunyi Meeting, the CPC broke free from the direct influence and control of the Comintern and began to resolve its internal contradictions independently. From then on, the CPC entered a new period of independently leading the Chinese revolution. This is the true portrayal of what Mao Zedong wrote in February 1935: "The idle boast the strong pass is a wall of iron, / With firm strides we are crossing its summit." [21]
(4) The Zunyi Meeting was a Key Turning Point in the Development of the CPC
In Mao Zedong’s understanding, the Zunyi Meeting was an extremely important meeting, a key turning point in the development of the CPC and the course of the Chinese revolution.
The Zunyi Meeting was the turning point for the Party's line. Mao mentioned many times that the Party's line after the Zunyi Meeting was correct: "From 1921 to the Zunyi Meeting in 1935, it took fourteen years to end the rule of several erroneous lines over the whole Party." Liu Shaoqi [22] also believed that "Since the War of Resistance, or rather since the Zunyi Meeting, the line and guidelines of the Party Central Committee have been completely correct." However, Mao also believed that "even with a correct line, it is possible to make individual mistakes; the chapter of the Zunyi Meeting itself is evidence of this." On February 21, 1942, in a telegram to Zhou Enlai, Mao Zedong and Wang Jiaxiang [23] again proposed: "From 'September 18th' [24] to the Zunyi Meeting (three years and four months in total), the Central Committee's line was erroneous. After the Zunyi Meeting, the line was correct." Although Mao admitted that the Zunyi Meeting "did not completely solve the problems," and while the "Left" line was liquidated, it was not done so thoroughly. Even if it was an incomplete liquidation, it still "played a crucial role in saving the Party and saving the Chinese revolution." Therefore, both the second and third historical resolutions [25] of the Party emphasize that the Zunyi Meeting "was a life-and-death turning point in the history of the Party."
Starting from the Zunyi Meeting, the Party’s ideological building got onto the right track. Ren Bishi [26] pointed out that in the period before the Zunyi Meeting, the CPC "did not attach much importance to leadership in the ideological sphere, and sometimes even ignored it." The Zunyi Meeting corrected the sectarianism caused by the "failure to eliminate the remnants of the past Lisan Line" and the "principled political errors of the time." After several changes since the Zunyi Meeting, "the sects that existed in our Party's history and played a negative role" ceased to exist. Mao Zedong even believed that the preparations within the Party for rectifying the "Three Winds" [27] to complete the ideological transformation began at the Zunyi Meeting.
Precisely because of the pivotal role of the Zunyi Meeting, Mao Zedong was the first to propose that "the Seventh National Congress should only draw conclusions on the period of history from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Meeting." This provided an important reference for the formation of the first historical resolution in the history of the CPC’s development—the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party.
III. Mao Zedong on the Historical Value of the Zunyi Meeting
Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Meeting is not only a matter of its historical contribution and status but also carries significant historical value for the cause of the Chinese revolution, construction, reform, and the study of CPC history.
First, Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation provided an important compliance for the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party to judge the meeting's historical status and contribution; some of these important understandings were directly adopted by the Resolution. Mao’s repeated discussions on how the meeting corrected "Left" errors within the Party laid the necessary foundation for the Resolution's key expression that the Zunyi Meeting "ended the rule of the 'Left' line in the Party Central Committee."
The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party mentions: "After the Zunyi Meeting, the political line of the Central Committee under the leadership of Comrade Mao Zedong was completely correct." This viewpoint similarly absorbed Mao Zedong’s views. Furthermore, the first historical resolution pointed out: "The Zunyi Meeting concentrated all its efforts on correcting the military and organizational errors, which were of decisive significance at the time; this was completely correct. This meeting began a new leadership of the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, marking the most historically significant transition within the CPC. It was precisely because of this transition that our Party was able to successfully conclude the Long March, preserve and temper the backbone of the Party and the Red Army under the extremely perilous conditions of the Long March, and successfully overcome the Zhang Guotao line [28]... and organize the Anti-Japanese National United Front." Similar expressions for all these viewpoints can be found in Mao Zedong’s relevant writings.
In 1941, Mao Zedong drafted the "Draft Conclusion on the Question of the Central Leadership Line Since the Fourth Plenary Session" for the enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held from September to October. This draft pointed out: The Zunyi Meeting "actually overcame 'Left' opportunism acting as the line" and resolved the most major problems of the time—the erroneous military line, the erroneous leadership style, and the erroneous cadre policy—"essentially completing the transition from one line to another, which is to say, overcoming the erroneous line and restoring the correct line." Although this draft conclusion did not become a formal resolution, "many of its important contents and ideological viewpoints were later absorbed into the Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party adopted by the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the CPC on April 20, 1945."
The Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party was drafted and adopted under the direct leadership of Mao Zedong; he was both the leader and the drafter. Thus, it was natural and logical for the Resolution to absorb and adopt Mao's important understanding. In fact, Mao's discourses on the Zunyi Meeting also served as the basis for the Resolution on Certain Questions Concerning the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China and the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century as they continuously deepened the evaluation of the Zunyi Meeting's historical status. For example, the latter notes that the Zunyi Meeting "opened a new stage for the Party to independently resolve the practical problems of the Chinese revolution," which actually absorbed the important understanding proposed by Mao that "real understanding of independence began with the Zunyi Meeting."
Second, Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Meeting adhered to dialectical materialism and historical materialism. On March 5, 1944, in the article "Our Study and the Current Situation," Mao Zedong proposed that the Seventh National Congress should only conclude the history from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Meeting, and that this conclusion should focus on gaining experience and lessons for the sake of the future, rather than focusing on punishment; it should only make political conclusions to achieve the goal of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones and curing the sickness to save the patient." He especially emphasized: "Regarding the history from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Meeting, we should not deny everything. At that time, I worked together with Comrades Bo Gu and Luo Fu [29]; we had common ground—we both wanted to fight Chiang Kai-shek. The point of divergence was how to fight him; it was a divergence in tactics." On the land issue, there was no dispute over the program in the Sixth National Congress resolution regarding the confiscation of land from the landlord class and its distribution to peasants with little or no land. The dispute was that after confiscation, Bo Gu, Luo Fu, and others advocated giving "bad land" to rich peasants and "no land" to landlords, which Mao disagreed with. "If we negate everything from the past, that would be a bias. We must analyze problems and not negate everything sweepingly. When I wrote Problems of Strategy in China's Revolutionary War, I also said we must preserve good things; only this is seeking truth from facts." On April 12, Mao published "Our Study and the Current Situation" again pointing out: "In dealing with any problem, one should take an analytical attitude and not negate everything." Regarding the leadership line of the Central Committee during the period from the Fourth Plenary Session to the Zunyi Meeting, he emphasized: "Analysis should be made from two aspects: on the one hand, it should be pointed out that the political tactics, military tactics, and cadre policies adopted by the central leading organs in that period were incorrect in their main aspects; on the other hand, it should be pointed out that on the basic questions of opposing Chiang Kai-shek and advocating land revolution and the Red Army’s struggle, there was no dispute between the comrades who made mistakes and ourselves." This is to say, although Mao repeatedly stated that the Zunyi Meeting corrected "Left" errors, he did not simply negate everything. The Party's political line before the Zunyi Meeting was wrong, and the line afterward was correct, but one cannot negate all guidelines and policies of that time just because the political line was wrong. Rather, one must "analyze from two aspects," seeing both commonalities and points of divergence. Only this is the attitude and principle of "seeking truth from facts." "If we negate everything from the past, that would be a bias." This precisely reflects the methodology of dialectical materialism and historical materialism.
Third, the principle of independence and self-reliance [30] manifested in Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of the Zunyi Meeting became an important historical experience of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) struggle over more than a century. The Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Centennial Struggle summarized ten items of historical experience from a century of Chinese struggle, of which independence and self-reliance is one. It can be said that the starting point of this historical experience began with the Zunyi Meeting and with Mao Zedong’s understanding and evaluation of that meeting.
It is well known that the Communist International (Comintern) performed meritorious service in the founding, development, and guidance of the Chinese revolution; one might even say their contribution was very great. However, it was inevitable that the Comintern lacked sufficient understanding and knowledge of China’s national conditions and the specific practice of the Chinese revolution, and the harm this caused to the Chinese revolution to a certain extent cannot be avoided. The Right-leaning and "Left"-leaning [31] errors within the CPC were inextricably linked to the Comintern. Mao Zedong pointed out: "The three 'Left' deviationist lines were all related to the Comintern, especially the Wang Ming line." [32] Therefore, in May 1930, Mao Zedong pointed out in his article Oppose Book Worship: "The victory of China's revolutionary struggle depends on Chinese comrades understanding Chinese conditions." Thirty years later, on March 23, 1961, in a speech at a central work conference in Guangzhou, Mao Zedong still emphasized: "The victory of China's revolutionary struggle depends on Chinese comrades understanding Chinese situations; we cannot rely on foreign comrades to understand Chinese situations, or rely on foreign comrades to help us win battles... There was a period when our Party relied on the Comintern to write resolutions, issue directives, and draft programs for us; the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee was written for us in Shanghai by Pavel Mif, the Comintern representative." However, after the Red Army began the Long March, the CPC gradually lost contact with the Comintern due to the interruption of communications. The Zunyi Meeting was an enlarged meeting of the Political Bureau held against the backdrop of lacking Comintern instructions; it solved the urgent and important military and organizational problems of the time through independence and self-reliance. History has proven that the successful resolution of these two major problems at this meeting was of vital significance for the Party, the Red Army, and the Chinese revolution. Thus, the CPC began a new stage of independently and self-reliantly exploring the Chinese revolution. Subsequently, Mao Zedong repeatedly emphasized the importance of independence and self-reliance. On October 17, 1945, in On the Chongqing Negotiations, he proposed: "China's affairs must be handled by the Communist Party and by the people." On December 25, 1947, Mao Zedong expressed his firm belief in the article The Present Situation and Our Tasks: "We should grasp our destiny entirely in our own hands," and not allow the slightest interference from other countries. On June 15, 1949, in his speech at the preparatory meeting of the New Political Consultative Conference, Mao Zedong again emphasized: "China's affairs must be decided and handled by the Chinese people themselves." Clearly, Mao Zedong repeatedly stressed that the Chinese revolution must adhere to independence and self-reliance. Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "The victory of the Chinese revolution was achieved because Chinese Communists—with Comrade Mao Zedong as their prominent representative—thought independently and formulated their own strategies and tactics based on China's reality."
After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong continued to emphasize the need to persist in independence and self-reliance. On April 25, 1956, in On the Ten Major Relationships, Mao Zedong proposed: "In principle, unity and independence represent a unity of opposites; there must be unity, but there must also be independence." He elaborated on the need to handle the relationship between unity and independence from a philosophical height when adhering to independence and self-reliance. In the 1950s and 60s, the rupture of relations between the parties and states of China and the Soviet Union once caused adverse effects on China's socialist construction, but China's socialist construction was not interrupted because of this. On September 3, 1963, Mao Zedong pointed out: "It was exactly at this time in 1960 that the Soviet Union withdrew its experts. Three years have passed now, and we have developed much of our own experience in industrial construction. When the teacher left, the student learned on his own. Having a teacher has advantages, but also disadvantages. Without a teacher, one reads books, writes characters, and thinks through problems by oneself. This is a truth." Consequently, he emphasized that "both revolution and construction must rely on oneself."
Precisely because Mao Zedong attached great importance to the fact that both Chinese revolution and construction must adhere to independence and self-reliance, independence and self-reliance became one of the "living souls" [33] of Mao Zedong Thought. After the start of Reform and Opening Up, Deng Xiaoping proposed to "follow our own path and build socialism with Chinese characteristics," still emphasizing the adherence to independence and self-reliance, and successfully opened a path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Later, Deng Xiaoping also made many important expositions on adhering to independence and self-reliance. Similarly, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping have all made many important expositions on this. Therefore, on the occasion of the centenary of the founding of the CPC, the Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Centennial Struggle listed "persisting in independence and self-reliance" as the fourth of the ten historical experiences: "Following one’s own path is the historical conclusion the Party has drawn from its centennial struggle. The Party has always persisted in Opening up its path forward independently and self-reliantly, persisted in basing the development of the country and the nation on the foundation of its own strength, and persisted in the principle that China's affairs must be decided and handled by the Chinese people themselves." The phrase "China's affairs must be decided and handled by the Chinese people themselves" originates from the aforementioned speech by Mao Zedong at the New Political Consultative Conference.
In summary, Mao Zedong was not only the leader and a direct participant of the Zunyi Meeting—making important contributions to its smooth convening and the resolution of military and organizational issues—but he also discussed the core content and significant value of the Zunyi Meeting on many occasions. He made important contributions to the judgments regarding the historical status and historical contribution of the Zunyi Meeting found in the Party’s three "historical resolutions." [34] Therefore, whether it is the precious historical value of the Zunyi Meeting itself, or the important historical and theoretical value of Mao Zedong’s discourse on the Zunyi Meeting, we must always cherish and remember them.
(The author is a Professor at the School of Marxism, Peking University) Source: Journal of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory, Issue 1, 2025 Web Editor: Ma Jingren