Gui Tengfei: Memories of the Resistance War in the Archives of the Hundred Regiments Offensive [1]
July 22, 1940: Preliminary Order of Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan Regarding the Sabotage of the Zhengtai Railway (Collection of the Central Archives) August 8, 1940: Operational Deployment of Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan Regarding the Sabotage of the Zhengtai Railway (Collection of the Central Archives)
The Hundred Regiments Offensive, spanning from August 1940 to January 1941, was the largest and longest-running strategic offensive launched by the Eighth Route Army [1] under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in North China since the start of the nationwide War of Resistance. The Central Archives preserve a precious set of records witnessing this history, including the Preliminary Order and the Operational Deployment authored by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War. Let us approach these historical remains of the war years to relive the memories of the resistance left to us by the archives of the Hundred Regiments Offensive.
Seizing the Initiative: From "Strangulation" to Breaking the "Cage"
In the summer and autumn of 1940, Japanese imperialism prepared to implement its "Southern Advance" policy. On the Chinese battlefield, it intensified efforts to induce the Kuomintang (KMT) to surrender while continuing to use its primary forces to strike the CPC and its led armies. Specifically, it accelerated the "Cage Policy" [2] in North China, directing the spearhead of its offensive fully against the Eighth Route Army in an attempt to destroy the North China anti-Japanese base areas [3] and consolidate its occupied territories. With successive defeats on the Frontal Battlefield [4], some high-ranking KMT officials advocated for "making peace with Japan." The morale of the Chinese resistance fell to a low ebb. At that time, the country was permeated with an atmosphere of pessimism, confusion, and compromise. The Chinese people urgently needed a victory to boost morale.
In the early morning of July 22, 1940, an order from the Eighth Route Army Headquarters was transmitted to the leaders of various divisions and military districts behind enemy lines. This was the Preliminary Order Regarding the Sabotage of the Zhengtai Railway signed and issued by Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan. The order pointed out: To strike back at the enemy's "Cage Policy," break the enemy's attempt to invade Xi'an, strive for a more favorable development of the war situation in North China, and influence the national resistance situation, "it is decided to take advantage of the current green sorghum season [5] and the rainy season—when the enemy's 'mopping-up' [6] operations against the Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei, Northwest Shanxi, and Southeast Shanxi regions are relatively relaxed and the Zhengtai line is relatively empty—to launch a massive strike to destroy the Zhengtai Railway."
"The tactical objective is to thoroughly destroy several key passes on the Zhengtai line, annihilate portions of the enemy, recover several famous scenic passes and strongpoints, sever traffic on the line for a relatively long period, and capitalize on the victory to expand and remove several strongpoints in the areas north and south of the line... essentially aiming to cut off the line’s transport." Headquarters required all units to make full preparations regarding reconnaissance along the line, grain reserves, demolition equipment, troop movements, and mass work [7] before the start of combat. It also stipulated that "strict secrecy shall be maintained before the battle begins; before preparations are complete, the operational intent may only be disclosed up to the brigade-level commanders."
On the afternoon of August 8, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, and Zuo Quan issued the Operational Deployment Regarding the Sabotage of the Zhengtai Railway. This "extremely urgent" order specified the combat zones, key objectives, and mutual coordination for each unit, stating that "the aforementioned groups and the Headquarters Special Operations Regiment shall be under the direct command of Headquarters," and set the "start of combat for August 20." This great battle to seize the initiative and break the "cage" was about to begin.
Flexible Adaptation: From 22 Regiments to 105 Regiments
On the night of August 20, the battle commenced. Red signal flares soared into the sky, interlacing with the fire along the Zhengtai line as various guerrilla units vied to be first to pounce on enemy strongpoints. Earth-shaking explosions, stirring bugle calls, and the sound of machine guns formed a grand combat symphony that echoed across the entire Zhengtai line. The Eighth Route Army Headquarters had originally planned to deploy 22 regiments. However, after the battle began, morale in the various base areas soared. According to the provision in the Preliminary Order that "the strength of units cooperating in combat on other railway lines shall be determined by each district," many units took the initiative to join the fight. The scale of participating forces expanded rapidly, eventually reaching 105 regiments, totaling approximately 200,000 men.
The Instruction from Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan to All Army Groups on Expanding Publicity of the Results of the Hundred Regiments Offensive, dated August 26, records how the name "Hundred Regiments Offensive" came to be: "In the Zhengtai campaign, our utilized strength is approximately one hundred regiments. Combat began on the night of the 20th, and the initial victory has been achieved. This campaign is named the 'Hundred Regiments Offensive'."
The offensive was divided into three stages, with the flexible operational maneuvering of the Eighth Route Army running through the entire campaign. In the first stage, all units struck simultaneously, creating a "full-bloom" [8] effect. When the Japanese army mobilized heavy forces to counterattack, the Eighth Route Army quickly broke down into smaller units, shifting to guerrilla warfare. In September, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan decisively moved into the second stage of operations. In the Second Stage Operational Deployment, they pointed out: while continuing to sabotage transport lines, the focus should shift to capturing Japanese strongpoints along the transport lines and deep within the base areas. In early October, the campaign entered its third stage, primarily countering the retaliatory "mopping-up" operations of the Japanese and puppet forces. On October 19, Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan issued the Plan for Anti-'Mopping-up' After the Hundred Regiments Offensive, emphasizing that "operations should primarily center on resolute guerrilla warfare to wear down and exhaust the enemy, seeking to destroy them piece by piece, rather than directly engaging in larger decisive battles." This was the response of the Eighth Route Army—unafraid of violence and fighting to the end—against the Japanese army's hardened "cage" using flexible adaptive strategies.
In their operations, the Eighth Route Army combined typical ambushes with surprise attacks, executing the "heart-extraction" [9] battle at the Jingxing Coal Mine, which left the enemy lamenting. Lacking heavy weapons, they ingeniously invented dozens of sabotage methods such as "stripping rails," "digging up roadbeds," and "destroying bridges." They even learned "skills" from veteran masters on how to burn and bend rails. In siege tactics, they adapted to local conditions to defeat the enemy, using "clumsy methods" [10] to modify weapons, often achieving unexpected attack effects. This "surprise force" of the Eighth Route Army used flexible strategies to give the Japanese army a head-on blow across the North China plains, writing a grand battle song of the weak defeating the strong with wisdom and courage.
Hard Struggle: Using "Country Bumpkins" to Defeat the "Invincible"
The telegram from Peng Dehuai and Zuo Quan to Nie Rongzhen and others on August 24 regarding the extension of the sabotage period stated: "In the Hundred Regiments Offensive, our determination must be resolutely implemented on the Zhengtai line, striving to extend the time as much as possible. Persisting for half a month of sabotage can yield considerable results... supporting units on other lines should also extend their time to ensure the continued expansion of victory on the Zhengtai line." On the same day, a telegram from Liu Bocheng and Deng Xiaoping to Chen Geng and others also stated: "The significance of the Hundred Regiments Offensive is immense; the longer we persist, the greater the victory." In the archives of the campaign, words like "persistence," "heroism," and "boldness in sabotage" are frequently seen.
At the start of the campaign, the Eighth Route Army faced immense difficulties. The Japanese had constructed a rigorous defense system along the Zhengtai line, with blockhouses at every station, heavy troops guarding important bridges, and deep trenches and barbed wire on both sides of the tracks. The Eighth Route Army soldiers, meanwhile, were short on ammunition. Their weapons, aside from a small number of captured rifles, were mostly "country bumpkin" gear [11]—even broadswords and long spears. It was despite this equipment gap that the Eighth Route Army soldiers created miracle after miracle.
In the battle for Niangzi Pass, they carried broadswords on their backs and grenades around their waists, climbing steep cliffs under the cover of night. Some soldiers were spotted while climbing and, after being hit by multiple bullets, used their last strength to hurl grenades into enemy machine-gun nests. In the battle for the Jingxing Coal Mine, they braved a hail of bullets, laying door planks and quilts over electrified fences, opening paths for their comrades with their own bodies. In the Yushe-Liao xian Campaign, they braved heavy shelling, using shovels and picks to dig communication trenches, advancing the attack positions to within tens of meters of enemy blockhouses. Demolition teams followed one after another, sacrificing their lives to clear the way. Some soldiers, hit in the abdomen with their intestines spilling out, still persisted in crawling under enemy blockhouses to detonate explosives. They illustrated what it means to be "iron-blooded warriors" and what "unyielding and indomitable" means.
One Heart Between Army and People: From "Small Streams" to a "Vast Ocean"
Under the Party's leadership and call, a large number of local armed forces and militia joined the fight, and hundreds of thousands of civilians participated in road sabotage, transport, and reconnaissance. The various base areas in North China provided material, intelligence, and personnel support. During the preparation phase, people along the Zhengtai Railway pretended to work by day and assisted the Eighth Route Army in scouting enemy movements by night. Once combat began, the masses cooperated closely with the soldiers: the army was responsible for blowing up bridges and stations, while the people were responsible for destroying rails and wires. To help transport military grain, women and children joined in, using various ingenious disguises to smuggle grain past Japanese checkpoints. During the anti-"mopping-up" phase, many civilians were brutally murdered by the Japanese for protecting wounded Eighth Route Army soldiers.
According to the 1940 Statistics on Mobilization of Central Shanxi Counties for the Zhengtai Campaign, the number of militia mobilized in Central Shanxi alone reached over 10,000. Villagers also prepared vegetables, chickens, sheep, roasted flour, clothing, and shoes for the soldiers. In these statistics, Eighth Route Army soldiers also kept detailed records of whether grain was borrowed temporarily and whether receipts were left. In the telegram exchanges between the 129th Division and other units with the Army Headquarters, many telegrams can also be seen regarding the participation of the masses in combat actions.
It was the active participation of the masses that let the Japanese invaders fall into the "vast ocean of people's war." A Japanese staff officer recalled after the war: "The resistance morale of the Eighth Route Army was extremely high. Residents of the Communist areas moved together to support the Eighth Route Army; even women and children used bamboo baskets to help transport grenades. Some of our units were often caught off guard, surrounded by enemies wielding broadswords, and fell into bitter fighting." Some Japanese soldiers wrote in confusion: "In every battle, the Eighth Route Army's wounded vanish mysteriously, while their ammunition remains inexhaustible." Indeed, what was "inexhaustible" was not just ammunition, but the "invisible army" in the green sorghum fields, the rolling torrent of support for the front, the life-and-death protection born of blood-thick water, and the fish-and-water sentiment [12] of a shared destiny. The Hundred Regiments Offensive produced a war epic of military-civilian unity and shared hatred for the enemy.
The victory of the Hundred Regiments Offensive dealt a heavy blow to the Japanese army's "Cage Policy," tied down a large number of Japanese troops, and suppressed their arrogance. The offensive not only tempered the people's army and enhanced the prestige of the CPC and the Eighth Route Army, but also uplifted the national spirit when the resistance was at a low point, becoming a key turning point in reversing the stagnation of the war. It serves as another ironclad piece of evidence of the "mainstay" role [13] played by the CPC and its led armed forces in the national War of Resistance. The CPC and its Eighth Route Army demonstrated to the world the patriotism that "every man shares responsibility for the fate of his country," the national integrity of "facing death with equanimity and preferring death to surrender," the heroic spirit of "fearing no violence and fighting to the end," and the conviction of victory in being "unyielding and indomitable." This provides an inexhaustible spiritual impetus to encourage us to remain true to our original aspiration and founding mission.
Source: Study Times, June 27, 2025, Page 5 Web Editor: Tongxin