Ye Zipeng: The Chinese Logic for Breaking the Bureaucratic Dilemma: Constructing a New National Governance Structure Under the Party's Comprehensive Leadership
Bureaucracy, as an essential tool for realizing the functions of state and social management, originated in pre-modern societies, reflecting the human aspiration and exploration toward overcoming the constraints of uncertainty in managerial activities. Entering the era of industrial civilization, with the formal debut of the "Administrative State," modern bureaucracy—relying on more rigorous and precise administrative regulations and clear systems of authority and responsibility—made further significant strides in achieving the goals of control and coordination within large-scale organizations. However, this does not mean that the "ideal bureaucracy" envisioned by Max Weber has entered a completed state in reality. On the contrary, state governance under bureaucratic conditions still faces challenges such as the excessive development of bureaucratic rationality, informal organizations, and "hidden rules" [1], as well as "dysfunctional" bureaucratic issues like low-efficiency rigidity, conservatism, and solidified differentiation. Among these are the frequently mentioned issues of formalism and bureaucratism [2] within the local Chinese context; the full text of the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC explicitly mentioned the problems of formalism and bureaucratism three times. In a situation where it is "difficult to imagine an alternative form to bureaucracy," one can only attempt to seek solutions to these dilemmas from the supra-systems of rational bureaucracy. In the practice of Chinese-path modernization state governance—which has introduced the Party as a primary subject and constructed a ternary structure of "Party-State-Society"—the Communist Party of China (CPC), through its comprehensive leadership over the state governance structure, permeates the administrative process of state governance with political goals. This creates the possibility and opens the path for breaking through bureaucratic barriers and achieving the organic unity of the logic of Party governance and the logic of state governance.
I. The Origins and Dilemmas of Modern Bureaucracy
In Weber’s theoretical presuppositions, bureaucracy is an organizational principle corresponding to the management of modern large-scale industrial societies. Since the 19th century, the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy in Western countries has extended in all directions, bringing about a wave of managerialist revolution in the administrative field, profoundly influencing and reshaping the relationship between state and society in the practice of modern state governance. However, with the advent of the information economy era and post-industrial society, the limitations of bureaucracy in state governance have been exposed with increasing lack of disguise. Among these, although the problems of formalism and bureaucratism may seem like mere "diseases of the skin" [3], allowing them to develop will not only have an extremely negative impact on administrative efficiency but is also very likely to gradually erode the foundation of public trust in policy legitimacy and even the legitimacy of the entire government. Particularly for a socialist country like China, the political consequences of formalism and bureaucratism must not be underestimated. Therefore, how to reform the existing bureaucracy to "establish and maintain a responsive and responsible bureaucracy" has become "one of the conundrums of modernizing and modernized societies—whether capitalist or socialist, developed or backward."
The element of "documentalism" [4] in the traditional Chinese bureaucratic system ensured that the level of institutionalization in Chinese state governance was indeed higher for a long time than that of Western European societies, which lacked written laws and unified administrative authority. However, it is precisely this system of documentation, dedicated to reducing irregularity, uncertainty, and uneconomical practices in the governance process, that can completely move toward its opposite in the evolution of governance practice. Where its malpractices lie, at best they lead to the failure of government decrees and administrative decay; at worst, they result in the disorder of law and discipline and the alienation of superiors and subordinates. Yet, as Mr. Wang Ya’nan [5] stated: "Bureaucratic politics can exist in any historical era... the (bureaucratic) style can indeed be seen in any society where officials are established to govern." Clearly, simply attributing the problems of formalism and bureaucratism directly to China's political traditions or political cultural characteristics can neither help us find the true locus of the disease nor help us find a more reasonable solution by prescribing the right medicine.
Relatively speaking, it is particularly necessary to diagnose the dilemma of bureaucracy by clarifying its practical logic. Tracing back to the source, in the practical logic of bureaucratic operation, the crisscrossing and multi-directional hierarchical system serves as the carrier. On one hand, it uses impersonal rules as norms; on the other, it uses specific authority as the basis for "command-obedience," driving policies from initiation to completion within the bureaucratic system. The characteristics of this system's existence mainly lie in: (1) In traditional bureaucracy, a "principal-agent" relationship often exists between superiors and subordinates, and this relationship diffuses outward from the bureaucracy itself like "ripples." Any node other than the two ends of the bureaucracy simultaneously assumes the dual identity of "agent" and "principal," needing to complete the supervision of lower levels while simultaneously avoiding and escaping supervision from higher levels. Generally speaking, the more difficult a policy is to implement, the more significant this tension becomes. Meanwhile, during long-term operation, bureaucratic organizations will conduct selective and adaptive implementation based on their own interest considerations, leading to the problem of "middle blockage" [6] in policy implementation. (2) The specific structure of traditional bureaucratic operation is highly correlated with the scale and volume of the objects it governs. The governance of a large-scale society implies high complexity in both vertical and horizontal dimensions of the bureaucratic structure. For individuals in large organizations, this may also mean that the impact of an individual's specific behavior on the organization as a whole is weakened—in other words, the seriousness of local problems is "diluted" by the size of the organization. Consequently, the principle of strict adherence to impersonal rule systems emphasized in the basic principles of bureaucratic operation may undergo polarization, exacerbating the reduction of bureaucracy's responsiveness to governance needs. (3) The regulations of bureaucracy cannot completely radiate to all subjects who actually influence politics or the policy process. Correspondingly, informal organizations may "emerge as a new force" [7] to fill this power vacuum, a phenomenon that is particularly evident in grassroots governance practices. This often leads to a sharp decline in the effectiveness of the principle of correspondence between power and responsibility in the bureaucracy. All the aforementioned characteristics, in the concrete practice of bureaucratic operation, are largely reflected in the problems of formalism and bureaucratism that people detest, and these problems become more prominent in the Chinese political scene facing many internal and external risks and challenges. In fact, in Weber’s work, his research implied a very obvious "Eurocentrism" tendency. China, under his pen, was treated as the "Other," existing as a China that had lost its autonomous discourse and was reconstructed as a demonstrative tool. Subsequent Western research on Chinese bureaucratic behavior was actually merely the empirical unfolding in China of the modernization theory imagination shared by Western social science theories of the same period.
The problems of formalism and bureaucratism under bureaucratic conditions are, in essence, the alienated results of public power gradually deviating from the principle of publicity in its operation, and the exposure of their specific cruxes is often inextricably linked to the characteristics of bureaucracy itself. Obviously, this determines that it is difficult to solve related problems merely by relying on the self-adjustment of the bureaucracy itself. In fact, in past internal reforms of bureaucracy, problems such as replacing old formalism with new formalism and creating "redundant rooms upon rooms" [8] of new bureaucratic agencies to replace old ones have often occurred. This profoundly reflects that bureaucracy, as a mere administrative tool, can never break through the constraints of managerialism in its level of rationalization. This is because, from the perspective of managerialism, although formalism and bureaucratism damage administrative efficiency, they generally do not involve the foundation for maintaining managerial authority; on the contrary, they can be understood as normal "government failure" behaviors and seen as part of the "management costs" paid by society. However, when we introduce political considerations, the nature of the problems of formalism and bureaucratism undergoes a qualitative change. They will no longer be simply seen as "normal attrition" but rather as the origin of negative influences that weaken the political legitimacy of the regime, damage the basis of political identity, and even concern the attributes of the fundamental political system. Correspondingly, they should not and cannot be discussed purely in the technical field. Such an understanding provides a space for thinking about formalism and bureaucratism within the framework of political issues, thereby breaking through the bottleneck constraints of bureaucratic performance improvement. Although so-called structural bureaucracy developed rapidly in New China, we have reason to realize that China's unique ternary modernized governance structure of "Party-State-Society"—along with the institutional characteristics that bridge the solving of political and administrative problems—possesses a greater possibility of overcoming and transcending the governance limitations of bureaucracy compared to the Western models of state-society dichotomy and politics-administration dichotomy.
II. Responding to the Dilemmas of Modern Bureaucracy from the Perspective of State Governance Structure
Distinguished from the Western institutional foundations upon which bureaucracy exists, the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics grants the CPC both the theoretical and practical possibility of mastering bureaucratic tools. To understand China, one must understand bureaucratic organization. In contemporary China's state governance system, the CPC, as the governing party, leads government construction, and its organization is highly embedded in administrative agencies at all levels. As a proletarian governing party, while continuously exploring the laws of governing a large country, the CPC always takes it as its mission to maintain the "self-revolution" qualities of a revolutionary party, practicing the organic integration and internal unity of political and administrative goals in the practice of local modernized state governance. A state's ideological concepts have a foundational and pivotal influence on the creation and operation of its polity. In the process of Chinese-path modernization, the "party-government structure" under the comprehensive leadership of the CPC—concentrated and unified—can often break through the administrative bureaucratic operation process by exercising political power. Centering on specific governance matters and bypassing complex bureaucratic chains, it can precisely target tasks and their supporting resources to specific levels, agencies, and positions to improve implementation efficiency and prevent performance losses caused by information distortion and goal displacement. The characteristics of this new state governance structure under the comprehensive leadership of the CPC can avoid the "insensitivity" brought by bureaucracy as much as possible; in other words, it is more capable of handling increasingly complex affairs of modernization in a large country with ease.
In a sense, since the founding of the People's Republic of China, this institutional model has fully supported the continuous advancement of socialist construction and reform in practice, and through practice, it has achieved increasingly mature experiential summaries and theoretical refinement. The report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC pointed out: "The most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the greatest advantage of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the Communist Party of China is the highest political leadership force; and upholding the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee is the highest political principle." This discourse regards the Party’s comprehensive leadership as an important advantage of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics. This mindset of highly strengthening the Party’s comprehensive leadership means, on one hand, that sufficient space and room are reserved in China’s modernization system for an active subject with super-coordinating power to play its role; on the other hand, it also reminds people that the Party’s comprehensive leadership will not be realized naturally because of the Party’s political authority, but rather requires institutional guarantees and practical implementation based on clarifying and grasping the relationships between politics and administration, and between leadership and governance.
General Secretary Xi Jinping has explicitly pointed out: "Upholding and strengthening the Party's overall leadership is both an intrinsic requirement and a major task for deepening the reform of Party and state institutions; it is the political theme that runs through the entire process of reform." It is patently clear that within the political framework of upholding and strengthening the Party's overall leadership, administrative reform is ultimately aimed at serving political objectives. In fact, tracing back to the historical origins and process of the Communist Party of China's (CPC) revolution, state-building, and system-building, modern China's governance model had already fundamentally diverged from the Western model—which emphasizes the dichotomy between politics and administration—as the CPC deeply embedded itself within the governance structure of New China. In response to this, some scholars have attempted to describe this with a structural label, arguing that through innovation in the political system, the CPC constructed a new mechanism to provide a stable order for the state, forging its own path of political development that provides stable support for national development. Other scholars, summarizing the experience of the CPC's incremental institutional transformation and value construction centered on responsibility, efficiency, rationality, and the rule of law over forty-plus years of reform and opening up, believe that China's political system has achieved a transition from a "Party-governed state system" (党治国体制) to a "Party-developed state system" (党兴国体制). Still others have analyzed the changes in the CPC's leadership system since the 18th National Congress in light of major shifts in national and Party conditions, using the term "Party-led administration" (以党领政) to summarize the basic characteristics of the relevant systems. While these specific expressions may be subject to debate, there is a common intersection of fundamental understanding: the role of the Chinese Party-state system—distinct from the so-called classical Western model—in the modernization of governance and indeed the entire process of Chinese-path modernization has received widespread attention and recognition.
In what sense, then, can China's bureaucracy constitute a conceptual type? While contemporary China has grown steadily along the path of Chinese-path modernization, and the West has generally experienced "political decay" and become increasingly mired in governance dilemmas, people have realized with increasing clarity that the Western politicians and scholars often view the Chinese Party-state system through "tinted glasses." They define it as an obstacle to achieving governance modernization or even the goal of "modernization" itself—something to be changed within the horizon of the "transition paradigm" [9]. However, examined from the perspectives of modernization governance performance and modernization political significance, the embedding of the CPC within China's national governance structure transcends the explanatory categories of both traditional Western party organizational logic and Western state governmental organizational logic. Unlike Western political parties, the CPC possesses inherent political authority and is the dominant organization and force of the state. Through its own leadership over the administrative system and by embedding its own organization, institutions, and values into the state, it shapes and determines the state's form, character, direction, and future. This has formed a unique Chinese Party-state system and established a unique logic of systemic operation, which is exceptionally helpful in addressing various contradictions and problems in the field of modernizing state governance within the Chinese political context.
Of course, the internal advantages of this system are precisely manifested through continuous adjustment in the practice of modernizing state governance. In the process of transcending the dilemmas of bureaucracy, the CPC has remained unswervingly committed to exploring the establishment of a rational and scientific national governance structure. Historically, this relationship once manifested for a period as a model where "the Party and government were not separated" (党政不分) or "the Party replaced the government" (以党代政). This left bitter lessons, such as the tendency toward "pan-politicization" [10] impacting normal administrative management and policy processes, as well as the excessive negation of rational regulations within the bureaucracy. However, after realizing the drawbacks of this model, the CPC began to actively explore a path of reform to rationalize the national governance structure without shaking the fundamental political prerequisite of the Party's leadership. After the 13th National Congress, concepts such as the normalization of Party-government relations and the division of labor between the Party and government were gradually introduced into the process of improving the new type of national governance structure. In the New Era, the Party and the state have gained a more comprehensive and systematic grasp of the laws governing the continuous advancement of this system along the path of Chinese-path modernization and in accordance with indigenous Chinese developmental logic: (1) This system is built upon a clear understanding of the Party's status within the national governance structure. The Party Constitution of the 19th National Congress revised the definition of Party leadership from "political, ideological, and organizational leadership" to "The Party exercises overall leadership over all areas of endeavor in every part of the country." The 20th National Congress went further by directly writing "The Party is the highest force for political leadership" into the Party Constitution. This achieved a high degree of coupling between the CPC as the leader and representative subject of the people's will and as the subject for the concentration and operation of the state's will. (2) Effective Party leadership also imposes higher requirements and standards for modernized governance performance. Consequently, promoting administrative reform and continuously improving the rational layout of the national governance structure have naturally become inherent requirements for consolidating and developing the Party-state system with Chinese characteristics. It is within this discourse that the political theme of upholding the Party's overall leadership and the administrative theme of promoting the modernization of national governance have achieved organic unity. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee specifically studied the issue of upholding and improving the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics and advancing the modernization of China's system and capacity for governance. One of its focuses was to rationally adjust the structure of state power and achieve the modernization of national governance through the reform of Party and state institutions. (3) In the specific practice of handling the national governance structure, the people-centered political stance and the problem-oriented [11] problem-solving mindset should both be used as assessment indicators. It is necessary to improve the Party leadership's systems and mechanisms while simultaneously preventing certain ideological misconceptions: one must neither crudely misinterpret the Party's overall leadership as "the Party replacing the government" in a one-sided manner, nor misinterpret the division of labor between the Party and government as the "separation of Party and government" (党政分开).
Returning to the issue of addressing formalism and bureaucratism within the bureaucracy, it is precisely this effort to continuously improve China's new type of national governance structure that allows the Chinese system—having broken the boundary between political and administrative issues—to provide a new possibility for solving these chronic ailments: (1) The fusion of political and administrative issues increases the weight of administrative issues. The requirement that "no matter involving the people's interests is a small matter" (人民利益无小事) has, to a certain extent, curbed the "dilution" effect of the "problems unique to a large party" [12] that inevitably arise from organizational scale. (2) The tension of the "principal-agent" identity [13] under traditional bureaucracy finds the possibility of full resolution because of the Party member status held by bureaucratic officials. The internal unity of the requirements to be responsible to the Party and responsible to the people changes the rigid roles of officials on the "chain" of the state machinery as mechanical "screws" executing the will of superiors. At the same time, the organic unity of the logic of Party governance and the logic of state governance inevitably requires the maximum resolution of potential self-interest within the bureaucracy and the degeneration of public power holders. This is vividly reflected in the continuous improvement of the assessment regulations for Party and government leading cadres in recent years. (3) The process of the Party exploring the scientific laws of governance and administration necessarily requires breaking through the shackles of bureaucratic routine. Just as the national governance structure itself adapts to changing needs of modernized governance through continuous adjustment, the bureaucracy within the Chinese system should naturally be absorbed into the overall scope of reform—and reform is precisely a potent "medicine" for solving bureaucratic inertia. (4) Strengthening the Party's leadership necessarily requires resolving all factors that hinder the simple translation of the will of the Party and state into specific administrative actions, including the influence of various informal organizations or "hidden rules" (潜规则). In the consideration of political goals, these issues are no longer artificially ignored or treated as "necessary costs" paid to maintain the feasibility of the administrative process. In short, in the process of deepening the reform of the Party-state system, the Party's overall leadership will inevitably be strengthened while simultaneously eradicating defects in the modernized state governance structure and dissolving the soil in which various bureaucratic dilemmas are grown.
III. The Political Logic of Achieving "Governance of China" Through the "System of China"
Following the theoretical tradition initiated by figures such as Woodrow Wilson and Frank Goodnow, the understanding of the ideal state of national governance structures in mainstream Western political theory often fails to break free from the traditional logical trap of the dichotomy between politics and administration. This view holds that the state has two concomitant functions: expression and execution. Politics acts as the expression of the state's will, and administration acts as the execution of that will. The former is primarily manifested by political parties through congress or parliament, while the latter is handled in detail by the government. Under the premise of this dichotomy, and depending on the degree of "mutual independence" or "interdependence" between parties and government, Western national governance structures can be categorized into three models: "non-interference between party and government," "party dependence on government," and "government dependence on party." However, in any of these models, the way political parties exert influence over administrative agencies and the administrative process is relatively singular and indirect. This analytical framework is clearly unsuitable for describing and explaining the specific realities in the Chinese context. In fact, regardless of the logic used, the relationship between the party and the government in China's modernized governance structure differs significantly from the Western model. Correspondingly, the relationship between politics and administration in the Chinese context also exhibits exceptionally distinct Chinese characteristics.
Since the founding of the People's Republic, the CPC has always been committed to breaking through and transcending the limitations of bureaucracy, and the rational definition of the national governance structure has been one of the focal points of this struggle. In the early days of New China, our country primarily followed the Soviet model of the integration of Party and government, where the Party intervened comprehensively in administrative work through organizational means. In the historical process of exploring the construction of a new type of national governance structure, the CPC once attempted to achieve modernization through the direct governance of the state by the political party. However, limited by the expansion of the scale of governance and the exponential increase in the complexity of governance levels and affairs, this model in its practical operation still needed to rely on the basic framework of a traditional bureaucracy—it merely transplanted this framework from the governmental subject to the ruling party subject. Simultaneously, the CPC also attempted to thoroughly break the shackles of bureaucracy by using relatively simplified, flattened "new types" of organizations, supplemented by "great democracy" (大民主) and mass movements to solve problems. However, this unconventional exploration of modernized national governance ultimately yielded results that ran counter to their original intentions and, of course, failed to cure the problems of formalism and bureaucratism at their roots. It was on the basis of these trial-and-error experiences that the CPC gradually mastered the laws of "the governance of China" (中国之治). It realized the need to leverage the advantages of the "Chinese system" (中国之制)—breaking the walls between politics and administration and embedding Party organizations within the bureaucracy—while correctly handling the relationship between the Party's overall leadership functions and the government's administrative functions. This involves using the attributes and mission of a revolutionary party to transform the bureaucracy within the indigenous Chinese political scene, while even more crucially preventing the political party itself from being transformed and eroded by the bureaucracy.
The 18th National Congress of the CPC clarified that "the general basis for building socialism with Chinese characteristics is the primary stage of socialism; the general layout is the Five-Sphere Integrated Plan; and the general task is to achieve socialist modernization and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." Guided by these goals, a series of changes occurred in the framework of state-building and the objectives of national governance. In the reform of the administrative system, the elements coupled with political goals have become increasingly prominent. The 2018 reform of government institutions was, for the first time, coupled and coordinated with the reform of Party institutions. Departing from the fundamental foothold of perfecting and developing the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and following the requirements for modernizing national governance, the Plan for Deepening Reform of Party and State Institutions was formed. This institutional reform was a profound transformation aimed at constructing a new type of national governance structure under the Party's comprehensive leadership and advancing the modernization of the national governance system and governance capacity. The communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee explained the objectives of this institutional reform at its very opening. This fundamentally determined that the overall logic of the 2018 institutional reform was to integrate reform into the macro-layout of perfecting Party and state institutions, profoundly reflecting the constitutional principle that "the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most essential feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics." The new round of the Plan for Reform of Party and State Institutions released in March 2023 continues this logic. "Since the 18th National Congress, an important purpose of our deepening the reform of Party and state institutions has been to uphold and strengthen the Party's comprehensive leadership... ensuring this leadership is implemented across all fields, aspects, and links in terms of institutional functions." At the Second Plenary Session of the 20th CPC Central Committee, General Secretary Xi Jinping once again provided a profound exposition on deepening the reform of Party and state institutions.
On the surface, this formulation appears different from the principle emphasizing the "separation of Party and government" [14] at the start of Reform and Opening-up. However, looking at its essence, it is not difficult to find two points. First, a "red thread" of reform purpose has consistently run through both historical stages: a commitment to comprehensively improving the rationality of government institutional setups and functional allocations, and practicing the mission of the People's Government serving the people. "The reform of Party and government institutions is the focus and the difficulty; its core lies in how the Party can better lead a modern government that is increasingly powerful and prone to functional differentiation." In this sense, the "separation of Party and government" is not entirely equivalent to a negation of the principle of the Party's leadership, but was rather a countermeasure implemented for specific problems under specific historical conditions. Second, examining the relationship between administrative reform and its era background, both the previous emphasis on "separation" and the current emphasis on the basic principle that "the Party leads everything" reflect the CPC's original aspiration and character of seeking truth from facts and being determined to achieve good governance (锐意求治). This reflects the extraordinary capacity for self-perfection and adjustment within the governance system led by the Party. Based on the CPC's continuously deepening understanding of the laws governing the administration of a large country, strengthening the Party’s comprehensive leadership does not mean returning to the old path of "the Party replacing the government" (以党代政) [15]. Instead, it means the Party has developed the governing capacity to navigate reform more skillfully and handle governance dilemmas more adeptly. It means the institutional advantages of the Chinese-path modernization in resolving issues such as the bureaucratic dilemma can be more fully realized. "The leadership of the CPC is the basic principle and characteristic of China's political and government administrative system, which makes the relationship between the Party and government, as well as rational institutional settings, particularly important." Therefore, an accurate understanding of the connotation of the "division of labor between Party and government" (党政分工) has become the key to grasping the logic of reconstructing the national governance structure in the New Era.
In past political practice, the reason the "Party-government integration" (党政合一) model failed to thoroughly eradicate the soil of formalism and bureaucratism—and instead allowed these bureaucratic elements to erode and spread from administrative organs into political organizations, causing chronic problems within the Party—was that it vaguely subsumed administrative functions under political affairs. It simply had political institutions act on behalf of administrative ones. While this made everything appear "political" on the surface, in reality, it failed to clarify the relationship between the political goals of the administrative process and the principles of scientific administration. This led to a quiet metamorphosis from "politicized administration" to "administrativized politics." Conversely, in the reforms pushed after Reform and Opening-up based on the "separation of Party and government" principle, the Party’s leading position in the national governance structure was sometimes weakened, making it impossible to sufficiently suppress or correct formalism and bureaucratism within administrative organs. This similarly stemmed from a failure to clarify the relationship between the relative independence and specialization of administrative affairs and the fact that administrative results universally possess political impact. Thus, as a tool to overcome the bureaucratic dilemma, the functioning of the Party-government system relies on the continuous and rational adjustment of the national governance structure. The "elasticity" of the Party-government structure and the "complexity" of its functions are precisely where "governance efficacy" (治理优效) originates. Since the 18th National Congress, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has proposed the idea of the "division of labor between Party and government" based on past experiences. It pointed out that "to handle the governance structure well, we must first uphold the Party's leadership; under this major prerequisite, there is a division of labor. No matter how the work is divided, the starting point and end point are to uphold and improve the Party's leadership... Under the Party's leadership, there is only division of labor, not separation." This reform logic is a major political judgment made in the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics entering the New Era regarding how to strengthen and improve the Party's comprehensive leadership, and it points out the rational path for optimizing contemporary China’s national governance structure.
Specifically, the "division of labor between Party and government" refers to a rational allocation of functions between "Party" and "government" under the prerequisite of the Party’s comprehensive leadership, followed by appropriate separation or integration in organizational carriers to achieve efficient operation. Theoretically, as a political organization, the Party’s primary function is political leadership; as state organs, the government’s primary function is managing state and social public affairs. This is to realize the different emphases of each: strengthening the political leadership function of the party in modernization while optimizing the management and service functions of the government. However, this functional distinction is not absolute. First, it means the Party needs to subsume the exercise of government administrative functions through the exercise of its political functions, setting political goals for administrative affairs. Under this prerequisite, administrative procedures and behaviors that may seem to comply with traditional bureaucratic regulations might need re-examination and adjustment. For example, overly rigid "authorization-responsibility" procedures may sometimes need to give way to the political goal of responding to the concerns and demands of the masses in a timely and effective manner. Meanwhile, the CPC's fundamental attribute as a revolutionary party requires it to impose higher demands on its members than those placed on technocrats in other systems, regulating the behavior of its cadres with Party discipline that is stricter than national law. This creates a condition of political regulation higher than that of the bureaucracy. It drives Party and government organs to treat formalism and bureaucratism as high-level political issues, fundamentally rejecting the view that these are "normal overhead" (正常损耗) of bureaucratic operations. Instead, it addresses all problems contrary to the people-centered stance with the mindset of "curing a disease" (治病).
The Party-government system, involving both the separation and integration of functions, touches upon the unique Party-government relationship characteristic of socialist countries. From the initial orientation of government reform toward "modernization" at the start of Reform and Opening-up to the 2018 orientation toward "Chinese-path modernization," the value orientation of "the Party's comprehensive leadership" has been especially emphasized. This shift fully demonstrates that through forty years of exploration, the CPC has not only found a bright path to lead Chinese-path modernization by building a new type of national governance structure but has also found its own institutional roots and "soul of values" (价值魂魄). This is critical for the CPC as it shoulders the mission of building a modern civilization for the Chinese nation. If a country's governance structure lacks modern content, it will inevitably lose the competence to realize the people's well-being; if it lacks indigenous roots, it will inevitably wither in the face of storms due to a lack of internal stability (定力). This is true for the governance structure and for the modernization process directly related to it. In this sense, China's path to overcoming the drawbacks of formalism and bureaucratism within the bureaucracy unfolds by absorbing the global experience of solving such problems while fundamentally standing firm in its political position and rooting itself in indigenous solutions. In terms of administrative reform orientation, we follow a logic precisely opposite to the classic Western dichotomy between politics and administration. This brings about the historical ambition and grand future of "China's Governance" (中国之治) in solving the bureaucratic dilemma better than "Western Systems" (西方之制) through "China's System" (中国之制).
IV. Constructing a New National Governance Structure Oriented toward Chinese-path Modernization
On the basis of establishing the political logic of the division of labor between Party and government, the central departments of the Party have undergone four reforms since the 1980s (in 1982, 1988, 1993, and 1999), and State Council institutions have undergone seven reforms (in 1982, 1988, 1993, 1998, 2003, 2008, and 2013). This continued through the 2013 State Council reform after the 18th National Congress and the Party and state institutional reforms of 2018 and 2023, echoing the overall logic of reform. In these reforms, the political logic of reconstructing the national governance structure and the division of labor between Party and government has been systematically reflected. In the process of these reform practices, basic experience has gradually been formed in resolving the inherent formalism and bureaucratism of the bureaucracy through the intervention of political factors in the administrative process.
First, Chinese-path modernization, especially the modernization of national governance, requires the construction of a new type of national governance structure as a prerequisite. Since the operation of public power is primarily led by a political party in modern democratic politics, the nature and stance of the party itself shape the value coordinates and behavioral orientation of the entire national governance structure. Historically, the CPC's logic of Party governance has always been highly consistent with the development logic of Chinese-path modernization. On one hand, the CPC represents the people in exercising state power and administrative authority, leading the people to effectively govern the country and protect their interests, thereby overcoming alienation in the operation of public power. On the other hand, the demands of modern state-building and governance internally drive the CPC to continuously improve its level of competence in governance. As a political organization guided by Marxism and shaped through the history of revolution, construction, and reform, the CPC upholds a people-centered value stance and a derivative practical philosophy. These differ significantly from typical modern bureaucratic principles, and this difference is conducive to correcting various contradictions and problems in bureaucratic operations. Thus, we can judge that the realization of the Party's political leadership and the formation of a rational pattern for the division of labor between Party and government can regulate the bureaucracy across multiple dimensions—institutional, structural, process, and outcome—through the value orientation and behavioral trends of the entire Party-government structure. Accordingly, to ensure that national public power operates along the correct value track, we must start with the profound adjustment of the Party-government system, grasp the grand purpose of political goals, and promote the adaptation of governance mechanisms at the meso and micro levels to reform. Only then can we fully utilize the political logic of the governing party to reshape the management logic of state functional organs, fundamentally creating the momentum to break through the bureaucratic dilemma.
Secondly, at the level of macro-reform thinking, the construction of a national governance structure must be anchored in the value orientation of strengthening the Party's leadership and enhancing the government's executive capacity. The formation of the CPC’s leading position is not only an inevitable trend of the Chinese historical process and a necessary choice for realistic development, but also fundamentally depends on the Party's inheritance of its own position, nature, and purpose. Our emphasis in the New Era on adhering to the Party's comprehensive leadership and implementing the principles of the Party's political leadership is built upon the foundation of the CPC always maintaining a people-centered position. In the Chinese political context, the political value preferences of the governing party also shape the behavioral patterns of the entire state apparatus. It is necessary to take the Party's political building as the soul [16], enhance the awareness of political organs, and be adept at using systems thinking to reposition the duties and missions of institutions within the overall situation of the causes of the Party and the country. Therefore, Party building manifests a dual connotation here: on the one hand, maintaining the original character of a revolutionary party without changing its nature; on the other hand, better implementing the Chinese path where political logic guides administrative logic by enhancing the Party’s leadership capacity. Specifically, this requires tangibly strengthening the Party's leadership in all aspects, playing its role in setting the direction, goals, and major policies, while also exercising political control over the processes and results of professional administrative affairs. This is manifested specifically as follows: it is necessary to clarify the powers and responsibilities of Party committees at all levels in coordinating major affairs, avoiding a one-sided emphasis on the distinction between professional administrative affairs and the Party's political leadership to prevent Party committees from becoming "rubber stamps." Simultaneously, Party committees should implement the principle of "division of labor but not separation" between the Party and government during the leadership process. This involves actually intervening in the decision-making and supervision of major items while also fully respecting the opinions of administrative professionals and giving full weight to the autonomy and initiative of administrative organs in specific policy processes. This relies more on a model of "pre-coordination, process participation, and consequence evaluation" to achieve scientific leadership over administrative organs. At the same time, it relies on Party organizations at all levels, especially the "nerve endings" of primary-level organizations, to play the role of linking the government and the masses, creating the conditions for an administrative environment where a good Party style drives the development of a good government style.
Thirdly, at the level of meso-supporting reforms, it is necessary to clarify the construction logic of the national governance structure from the dimensions of national organizational laws and internal Party organizational regulations. National organizational laws and internal Party organizational regulations are the guarantees for promoting the procedural, institutional, and standardized setup and operation of Party and government institutions; they are also guides for avoiding the "negative functions" of the existing bureaucracy. Following the governance laws common to Chinese-path modernization, China's rule of law process has evolved under conditions that transcend the existing Western empirical system. We need to construct a system of regulations that is fully adapted to the unification of the logic of governing the Party and the logic of governing the country, "persisting in the unity and coordination of reform and the rule of law, so that every step of reform proceeds in an orderly manner within the legal framework." This system contains scientific and clear provisions for the principle of the division of labor between the Party and government, while also reflecting the requirements for political command and regulation of administration. It should be observed that current national organizational laws and internal Party organizational regulations still have certain shortcomings and lags in effectively responding to the practical needs of the reform of Party and state institutions in the New Era. In response, one should consciously take the supporting improvement of national organizational laws as the lead, while ensuring that the perfection of internal Party organizational regulations follows closely behind. Premised on the natural coupling and connection between Party and government institutions, we must strengthen institutional building that promotes the "integration and embedding" of Party and government institutions, truly explore the scientific laws of the system of division of labor and cooperation between the Party and the government with Chinese characteristics, and actively introduce Party elements that transform the bureaucracy at the normative level.
Finally, at the level of micro-supporting reforms, it is necessary to smooth out the construction links of the national governance structure by starting with the scientific allocation of powers and responsibilities within the internal departments of Party and government organs. Summarizing past experiences and lessons, it is not difficult to find that the unreasonable and uncoordinated setup of Party institutions and administrative business departments is often a major reason restricting the play of China's institutional advantages. Since the Reform and Opening-up, successive institutional reforms have mainly adjusted Party and government departments as a whole, while the reform of internal business departments has been relatively limited. Especially since the implementation of the "Large Department System" reform [17] in 2008, after some ministries with similar functions merged to form "super-ministries," the internal departments within these agencies were not correspondingly integrated. The number of sub-ministerial and bureau-level internal bodies remained high, and the problem of overlapping powers and responsibilities among various internal business departments was prominent. Consequently, there remain significant institutional loopholes and fertile ground for the breeding of formalism and bureaucratism. The reform of Party and state institutions in the New Era has merged Party and government organs through "joint establishment" or "merged offices" [18], which also caused overlapping responsibilities among internal business departments post-merger. The "merger" in principle has not been fully transformed into a "merger" throughout the entire process of administrative work, leading to the continued widespread existence of the "two skins" [19] phenomenon between the Party and government. In view of this, future institutional reforms should focus on the adjustment and optimization of the powers and responsibilities of the internal business departments of Party and government organs. The scope of these powers should be clarified and refined through legal means. Simultaneously, more importance should be attached to the coordination between the internal structures of Party organizations at all levels and their corresponding business departments, allowing the specific organizational regulations and disciplinary norms of the Party to be organically integrated into the work requirements for administrative organs and personnel.
V. Conclusion and Discussion
In general, while the bureaucracy meets the needs of modern social governance, the problems of formalism and bureaucratism follow it like a shadow. This not only damages the rational basis of its organizational activities and limits efficiency improvements but also adversely affects the legitimacy of the bureaucracy itself. While fully affirming the world-renowned achievements in the cause of the Party and the country, the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC also pointed out that our work still has shortcomings and faces many difficulties and problems, including the fact that "the phenomena of formalism and bureaucratism remain prominent." The practice of modernized governance in a socialist country requires, on the one hand, the use of bureaucratic tools, and on the other hand, the resolution of bureaucratic dilemmas to transcend the limitations of the traditional bureaucracy.
As the concentrated and unified leading force for promoting Chinese-path modernization, the political attribute of the CPC is the essential characteristic and greatest advantage of the modernization of China's national governance. Long in power and leading the people both to "win the country" and "rule the country" [20], the CPC’s integration into and leadership of Chinese-path modernization, and its integration into and leadership of the systems and mechanisms of the modernization of China's national governance, is the legal basis and inevitable requirement for the CPC, in its dual identity as a revolutionary party and a governing party, to lead and govern the state. Therefore, the national governance structure under the comprehensive leadership of the CPC is precisely the organizational support for achieving the dialectical unity of politics and administration in the practical process of the modernization of China's national governance; it is in itself essentially the manifestation of the dialectical unity between politics and administration. On the new journey of building a strong country and national rejuvenation, the process of constructing a new type of national governance structure is also the process of realizing the dialectical unity of "political" factors from the CPC (as a revolutionary and governing party) with the "administrative" factors of the modern bureaucracy in contemporary Chinese national governance. Through the political leadership advantages of this uniquely Chinese new national governance structure, "negative functions" of the "administration" can be effectively suppressed, thereby overcoming the shortcomings of modern governance—such as the loss of norms and loss of efficacy—and opening up a new path for eliminating the formalism and bureaucratism that accompany the bureaucracy.
Of course, it must be noted that this attempt to integrate political goals into the administrative process of national governance only creates the possibility and opens the path for breaking through bureaucratic barriers and realizing the organic unification of the logic of governing the Party and governing the country. As a possibility or a path, it by no means signifies that formalism and bureaucratism will naturally go extinct within the construction of a new national governance structure led by the CPC; the "confrontation" with formalism and bureaucratism will exist for a long time. A clear recognition of this fundamental logic is vital; otherwise, it is very easy to fall into another bias of institutional "totalitarianism" [21]. In the process of constructing a new national governance structure under the comprehensive leadership of the CPC, we must, on the one hand, proceed from the "political nature" of the Party, using the attributes and purpose of a revolutionary party to transform the bureaucracy in the local Chinese political scene. On the other hand, we must also consider the "administrative nature" of the national governance structure, neither departing from nor ignoring the laws of administration themselves. At the same time, we must recognize the long-term and complex nature of bureaucratic ailments. It is precisely this appropriate grasp of "political nature" and "administrative nature," and this sober understanding of various problems in the process of modernization, that allows the new national governance structure under the Party's comprehensive leadership to take deep root in Chinese soil, organically integrate into the local construction process of the theory and practice of socialist political development with Chinese characteristics, and thus continuously promote the resolution of various difficult problems and the development of various undertakings.