Zhang Youliang: The Historical Significance and Lessons of Leading Troops to the Jinggang Mountains and the Tongdao Meeting Turning Point

As early as March 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping required leading officials at all levels "to understand the origin and development of the cause of our Party and country, to draw upon the historical experience of our Party and country, and to correctly understand the major events and important figures in the history of the Party and country. This is highly necessary for a correct understanding of the Party’s situation and the national conditions, and it is also highly necessary for creating the future." "Leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the "Tongdao Transfer" are major historical events of great strategic turning-point significance in our Party’s history, having played an important role in the Chinese revolution’s movement toward victory. "Leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" was the key decision by which the Communist Party of China (CPC) shifted the focus of the revolution to the countryside after the setbacks of the Autumn Harvest Uprising ^[1], marking the beginning of a new path for the Chinese revolution. The "Tongdao Transfer" ^[2] laid the foundation for the successful convening of the Liping Meeting ^[3] and the Zunyi Meeting ^[4], and for our Party’s realization of a great strategic turn. Although these two "transfers" occurred long ago, the logic contained within them still allows us to deeply understand such major questions as "why the CPC 'can,' why Marxism 'works,' and why socialism with Chinese characteristics is 'good'."

In 1927, Mao Zedong led the troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising through a circuitous journey up the Jinggang Mountains to establish a rural revolutionary base area ^[5], initiating the prelude to the classic work of the Sinicization of Marxism and allowing the Party's revolutionary cause—like a single spark—to gradually form a prairie fire. In December 1934, during the Long March, the Central Red Army passed through Tongdao, Hunan, where the Tongdao Meeting was convened. The decision to march into Guizhou allowed the Party and the Red Army to attain new life at a moment of life-and-death stakes, laying an important foundation for the successful convening of the Zunyi Meeting and the realization of the great turn of the Long March. From "Leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" to the "Tongdao Transfer," what is manifested is the historical process in which Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, engaged in the arduous exploration of the path and laws of a revolution with Chinese characteristics by integrating Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution; it manifests the difficult journey of Chinese Communists toward initial maturity and their confidence in the path, theory, system, and culture ^[6].

Marx believed that similarities exist in historical events, and that this similarity is "created under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the past." It is not a simple repetition, but is reflected through the dynamic evolution of the relationship between sensuous activity and its objects. Similarity or difference is both an inherent attribute of the development of human history itself and an object of comparative historical research. Therefore, similarity or difference is indispensable to both history itself and to comparative historical research. In the glorious history of our Party spanning over a century, many historical events possess a certain degree of similarity, representing a unity of historical necessity and contingency. This is also true of "Leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the "Tongdao Transfer" during the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War ^[7]. By analyzing and expounding upon the historical significance of these two "transfers" through the similarities in their profound historical causes and principal leaders, we can "gain inspiration and find resolve from history."

I. The Profound Historical Causes of the Two "Transfers"—The Unity of Historical Necessity and Contingency

Historical development and its direction are a unity of necessity and contingency. "In historical development, contingency plays its role, and in dialectical thinking, just as in the development of an embryo, it is included within necessity." Both "Leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the "Tongdao Transfer" possess profound historical causes and represent a unity of historical necessity and contingency.

(1) The Historical Necessity of the Two "Transfers"—"Left" Errors Resulted in Great Losses for the Revolution; the Revolution Realized Major Turns Amidst Setbacks

The CPC was established and grew steadily with the support of the Communist International (Comintern). From the founding of the Party to the series of revolutionary movements it led, and from the formation of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to the establishment of the Chinese Soviet regime, every step of progress the Party made during its growth received varying degrees of support and assistance from the Comintern and the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Joining the Comintern meant that the CPC was a part of the international communist movement and had to accept the leadership of the Comintern. According to the "Conditions of Admission to the Communist International," joining required acknowledging the Comintern's leadership position in the relationship between the two parties and executing the Comintern's instructions. Under various strict regulations, the Party lacked autonomy; coupled with its own meager strength, it could only follow the instructions of the Comintern. However, the Comintern did not fully understand the actual conditions in China, making errors in its guidance of the Chinese revolution inevitable. During the Great Revolution ^[8] period, the Comintern misjudged the situation of the Chinese revolution, restricted the Party's development of armed forces, and made constant concessions to the Kuomintang (KMT), ultimately leading to the failure of the Great Revolution. During the Agrarian Revolutionary War, errors such as Qu Qiubai’s "Left" putschism, Li Lisan’s "Left" adventurism, and Wang Ming’s "Left" dogmatism appeared within the Party’s leading organs at different times. These erroneous "Left" ideologies caused serious losses to the Party’s cause. The Comintern and our Party attempted to take measures to remedy these errors, but in the end, the Chinese revolution still suffered major setbacks.

Under the guidance of "Left" putschist ideology, the Chinese revolution adhered to the "city-centered theory." In a situation where the KMT reactionaries possessed powerful armed forces, our Party intended to achieve a one-time final victory for the revolution by attacking major cities; the final result of this was predictable. In early 1928, the CPC successively led and launched nearly a hundred armed uprisings, but the vast majority ended in failure very quickly. The troops of the Autumn Harvest Uprising suffered heavy losses while still on the way to attack Changsha and were forced into a strategic retreat. After more than four hours of fierce fighting, the Nanchang Uprising ^[9] troops temporarily occupied the city of Nanchang but held it for only three days; under the siege of heavy KMT forces, they had no choice but to head south to Guangdong, eventually suffering major losses in the Chaozhou-Shantou area. Objective factors, such as the timing of the revolution and the extreme disparity between the strength of the enemy and our own, inevitably pushed the developmental focus of the Chinese revolution toward the vast countryside to carry out agrarian revolution. However, Qu Qiubai still maintained that "the situation of the Chinese revolutionary struggle is undoubtedly rising." Mao Zedong, based on the actual situation of the Chinese revolution at the time, decisively, timely, and proactively abandoned the original plan to attack Changsha. He led the uprising troops along the Hunan-Jiangxi border to explore a way forward, seeking a new foothold. Ultimately, he "led the troops to the Jinggang Mountains," established rural base areas, extensively mobilized the masses, and carried out agrarian revolution. Following the opinion of Besso Lominadze, the Comintern representative, the Provisional Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee disciplined the leaders of the Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings. For a time, a trend of "punitivism" prevailed within the Party; Comrade Mao Zedong was removed from his post as an alternate member of the Provisional Political Bureau, and there were even false rumors that he had been "expelled from the Party."

By the time of the Central Soviet Area ^[10] period, Wang Ming pushed "Left" ideology to the extreme, eventually leading to the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression." The Party was once again dealt a heavy blow: the rural revolutionary base areas were almost entirely lost, the number of Party members plummeted, and few Red Army troops remained. The Central Red Army was forced to evacuate the Soviet Area in October 1934 and begin the long Long March. At that time, the main leaders of the Central Committee still persisted in "Left" errors during the retreat, committing the error of "flightism." The Battle of the Xiang River alone resulted in the loss of over 30,000 troops from the main force of the Central Red Army, causing it to suffer catastrophic losses. This series of problems triggered dissatisfaction among the vast number of Party members and Red Army officers and soldiers regarding the "Left" errors. Various negative emotions began to breed and spread, doubts arose concerning military command and the general line, and the desire to change leadership grew increasingly intense. These subjective wishes greatly facilitated the smooth realization of the "Tongdao Transfer."

When the Central Red Army advanced toward Tongdao, Chiang Kai-shek had already determined the Central Red Army’s strategic intention to move north into western Hunan based on relevant intelligence. He mobilized forces five to six times the size of the Central Red Army and set a "large pocket" (trap) in places like Jingzhou, Huitong, Hongjiang, and Suining on the way to western Hunan, waiting for the Central Red Army to enter. Faced with such peril, on December 12, 1934, the Central Committee held an emergency meeting within the borders of Tongdao County (today’s Tongdao Dong Autonomous County). At the meeting, leaders shackled by "Left" ideology still insisted on continuing north to join forces with the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups. In the end, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission listened to Mao Zedong’s suggestion and decided to urgently adjust the direction of the march to avoid the heavy encirclement of the KMT, realizing a major strategic shift known to history as the "Tongdao Transfer."

(2) The Contingency of the Two "Transfers"—The Chinese Revolution Achieved Major Turns Through "Geographical Advantage and Popular Support"

1. The convenience of "geographical advantage" (dìlì)

After suffering defeat in the attack on Changsha, the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops led by Mao Zedong journeyed through various places. The reason they finally chose to settle in the Jinggang Mountains was that it offered the convenience of "geographical advantage." While leading the troops south to southern Hunan and conducting struggles along the Hunan-Jiangxi border, Mao Zedong gained a deep understanding of the geographical location and economic conditions of Lianhua, Yongxin, Ninggang, Lingxian, and other places they passed through. Through analysis and comparison, he felt that the Jinggang Mountains in the middle section of the Luoxiao Mountains was the best place to establish a base area. It was relatively far from provincial capitals like Jiangxi and Hunan, with complex and precipitous terrain that was easy to defend but difficult to attack. It was a "grey zone" where the KMT's ruling power was relatively weak, making it an excellent place for military separatism. The surrounding counties had a self-sufficient agricultural economy, large forested areas, and were rich in rice, tea-oil, tea, timber, nan bamboo, and various medicinal herbs, which could provide a good economic foundation for establishing a base area. As Mao Zedong later pointed out in The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains, the "existence and development of an armed independent regime of workers and peasants" possessed "terrain favorable to military operations."

After the Central Red Army forced the crossing of the Xiang River, on December 4, 1934, Commander-in-Chief Zhu De issued a telegraphic order to advance west toward Tongdao, requiring the Central Red Army to continue westward with the objective of reaching the areas south of Tongdao, Boyangsuo, and Changanbao. The telegram clearly indicated that the Central Red Army's westward destination was Tongdao. However, after the Central Red Army entered Tongdao, the KMT "Pursuit and Suppression" Army’s Liu Jianxu headquarters had already moved to Jingxian to "oversee the suppression." His subordinate Chen Guangzhong’s division attacked the Yanmenpu area of Tongdao, Tao Guang’s division closed in on the Jingwuzhou area of Tongdao, and Zhang Liangji’s division struck directly at the Linkou and Xiaxiang areas, while the divisions of Wang Dongyuan and He Ping moved to Jingxian to provide support. Southward, the divisions of the Guangxi warlords Liao and Xia had reached the Sanjiang-Linxi line; to the west were five regiments of the Guizhou warlord Wang Jialie. The more than 30,000 troops of the Central Red Army were tightly squeezed into a narrow strip of northwest Tongdao by hundreds of thousands of KMT troops. The route for the Central Red Army to move north to western Hunan to join the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups was completely blocked by heavy KMT forces. Under such circumstances, it was no longer possible to realize the original plan; a transfer was imperative. Meanwhile, looking at the KMT’s military strength and deployment, the enemy’s "solidity" lay to the north of Tongdao; the enemy’s "void" (weakness) was in Guizhou, where defensive forces were thin, consisting only of Wang Jialie’s five regiments. Moreover, Tongdao, located on the southwestern border of Hunan at the junction of three provinces (Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou) and six counties, was a "passageway" (tōngdào) in both name and reality. Since ancient times, Tongdao had held an important strategic position. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it was a "strategic border region of southwestern Lizhou"; when Qin Shi Huang conquered the Baiyue tribes in the south, he took the route through Tongdao, "stationing an army at the pass of Tancheng Ridge" to bring Lingnan into submission; Zhuge Liang also passed through Tongdao during his Southern Campaign, leaving behind a "Marquis Wu’s War Drum"; and when Shi Dakai led 400,000 Taiping Army troops to fight in Guizhou, he also went from Guangxi through Tongdao. This was the convenience of "geographical advantage" for the "Tongdao Transfer."

2. The benefit of "popular support" (rénhé)

In Lianhua County, Jiangxi, Mao Zedong learned from a secret letter sent by Song Renqiong: "There are our Party’s armed forces in Ninggang County, with dozens of rifles." To the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops, who were desperately searching for a place to settle, this was undoubtedly "sending charcoal in the snow" (timely assistance). After leading his troops to capture the county seat of Lianhua, Mao Zedong immediately presided over a meeting of the Front Committee and decided to "lead the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and advance toward Ninggang. On September 27, 1927, Mao Zedong led his troops out of Lianhua and officially marched toward the Jinggang Mountains. At the same time, because the Jinggang Mountains already had a local armed force controlled by the CPC, an important foundation was laid for Mao Zedong’s successful leadership of the troops there. On October 6, 1927, Mao Zedong and Yuan Wencai met for the first time in Dacang, Ninggang. Yuan Wencai dispelled his suspicions and immediately expressed his willingness to accept and support the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army in making their home in the Jinggang Mountains, donating 1,000 silver dollars to the army. On October 10, 1927, Mao Zedong led more than 700 men of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army to station in Maoping, officially settling in the Jinggang Mountains. As General Zhang Guohua recalled: "The Red Army led by Comrades Mao Zedong and Zhu De was able to gain a foothold in the Jinggang Mountains not only because of the role of the Party organizations in the neighboring counties, but also because it was inseparable from Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo's acceptance of the CPC's leadership. Had they continued their life as outlaws, it would have been difficult for the Red Army to gain a foothold in the Jinggang Mountains, because they both had a certain social base."

Before the Long March, for reasons of secrecy, the issue of the troops' relocation was restricted to a few top leaders. The vast number of Red Army officers and soldiers had not received extensive or deep ideological mobilization, and thus lacked sufficient understanding and preparation. Consequently, the troops' morale was unstable and their thinking was somewhat confused. From the fifth [counter-campaign against...]

From the failure of the "Encirclement and Suppression" ^[11] campaigns to the forced commencement of the Long March, and particularly the heavy losses suffered during the Battle of the Xiang River, leaders ranging from Lin Biao (Commander of the First Red Army Group) and Nie Rongzhen (Political Commissar) to Peng Dehuai (Commander of the Third Red Army Group), and even Zhu De (Commander-in-Chief of the Red Army) and Zhou Enlai, all began to harbor doubts regarding the erroneous military command and line of Bo Gu and Otto Braun ^[12]. Zhou Enlai stated explicitly: "From the border of Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, Chairman Mao, Wang Jiaxiang, and Luo Fu ^[13] began criticizing the military line, arguing through meetings all along the way. From Laoshanjie to Liping, the debates at Liping were especially fierce. At that time, Braun advocated turning toward eastern Guizhou, which was also extremely mistaken and would have led us into Jiang Jieshi’s ^[14] trap. Chairman Mao advocated going to the Sichuan-Guizhou border to establish a Sichuan-Guizhou base area. I decided to adopt Chairman Mao's opinion, following the original route of the Second Front Army to move west, cross the Wu River, and go north. Braun flew into a rage because he lost the argument. After that, my relationship with him gradually grew distant." At the same time, the vast ranks of Red Army officers and soldiers grew skeptical of the established plan to link up with the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups in western Hunan. Especially as the Central Red Army approached Tongdao, facing heavy enemy forces several times their own size, Bo Gu and Braun still insisted that the 30,000 exhausted troops head north to western Hunan to meet the Second and Sixth Groups. This practice of ignoring reality caused the Red Army at large to lose confidence in Bo Gu and Braun’s command. Faced with painful defeats and a bleak future, the desire of the Party and the Red Army to change leadership grew increasingly intense, once again focusing their gaze on Mao Zedong, who had led them to successfully create the Jinggangshan Base Area and had won many victories. Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Zhang Wentian, and the broad masses of Red Army generals all fervently hoped that Mao Zedong could resume command of the Red Army to save the Party and the force. Furthermore, before the Central Red Army reached Tongdao, two other Red Army units had already passed through, their red flags unfurling across the region. Between December 1930 and December 1934, the Seventh Red Army led by Deng Xiaoping and Zhang Yunyi, and later the Sixth Red Army Group led by Ren Bishi, Xiao Ke, and Wang Zhen, passed through Tongdao, sowing the seeds of revolution and expanding the revolutionary ranks. These factors constituted the advantage of "human harmony" ^[15] for the "Tongdao Transition."

II. The Primary Leader of the Two "Transitions"—Mao Zedong Turning the Tide at a Critical Moment for the Revolution

Amongst ten thousand mountains, there must be a main peak; though a ship weighs a thousand tons, it relies on one person at the helm. Great historical events are inevitably inseparable from the historical initiative ^[16] fully exerted by key historical figures and authoritative personages.

The two important "transitions" of "Leading the Troops to Jinggang" and the "Tongdao Transition" were both inseparable from Mao Zedong's strategic wisdom, through which the revolution turned from a dead end toward a bright future.

(1) Assessing the Situation: "Leading the Troops to Jinggang" Ignites the Spark of the Chinese Revolution

1. The "Wenjiashi Transition": A Key Step in "Leading the Troops to Jinggang" After Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces in a frustrated attempt to attack Changsha, he decisively altered the original plan based on the grim situation where the enemy was strong and we were weak, deciding to temporarily withdraw the remnants of the uprising army to Wenjiashi in Liuyang. Subsequently, Mao chaired a meeting of the Front Committee in Wenjiashi to discuss the direction of the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army's subsequent actions. However, Division Commander Yu Shadu insisted that if they did not attack Changsha, the revolution would have no way out, and they must follow the original plan to "take Liuyang and attack Changsha directly." Mao Zedong resolutely opposed attacking Changsha again to avoid further massive losses, strongly advocating for moving the remaining troops to mountainous areas and rural regions where the enemy's strength was weaker to accumulate power. He counseled the troops: "Everyone wants to enter Changsha. But at present, a city like Changsha is not a place where we can stay. We must find a place where the enemy's strength is thin, establish a foothold, build up our strength, and keep fighting the enemy..." Yet some people firmly opposed Mao's proposal, insisting that going to the mountains to conduct revolution was essentially becoming "mountain kings" ^[17]. Mao patiently educated and persuaded them, pointing out: "Our 'mountain king' is a special kind of mountain king—a mountain king led by the Communist Party, possessing a doctrine, a policy, and a method, acting as a worker-peasant armed force representing the interests of the people." With the courage and resourcefulness of a proletarian revolutionary, Mao overrode all objections and made the major decision to shift from attacking major cities to marching into the countryside, taking the crucial first step for the troops' "Leading the Troops to Jinggang" from Wenjiashi toward the success of the Chinese revolution.

At the same time, to smoothly realize the "Wenjiashi Transition" and lead the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army to open base areas in the countryside, Mao Zedong delivered a mobilization speech to the uprising officers and soldiers to strengthen their conviction and will to march to the rural areas. Mao said: "Victory and defeat are common in war; do not be careless when winning, and do not lose heart when defeated." "We are like a small stone, and Jiang Jieshi is like a large water vat. The small stone will smash that large vat, and there will come a day when we turn things over."

2. The "Sanwan Reorganization": Laying the Foundation for a New Type of People's Army When Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops from Wenjiashi to Sanwan Village in Yongxin County, Jiangxi, the force had fewer than a thousand men and morale was extremely low. At that time, desertion and betraying the revolution had become an open secret. Some opportunists even asked each other, "Are you leaving?" and "Where are you going?" Facing serious problems such as a severe reduction in personnel and combat effectiveness, an excess of officers relative to soldiers, and more rifles than men, Mao realized deeply that if the troops were not reorganized in time, even if they did not degenerate into "roving bandits" ^[18], they would be unable to shoulder the historical responsibility of the Chinese revolution. On the night of September 29, 1927, Mao chaired a meeting of the Front Committee in Sanwan Village and made the major decision to reorganize the troops. First, the troops were downsized, reorganizing the original First Division of the First Army of the Worker-Peasant Revolutionary Army into a single regiment. Second, the Party branch was established at the company level, the system of Party representatives was instituted, and the principle that "the Party commands the gun" was established. Third, soldiers' committees were formed to allow soldiers to participate directly in the democratic management of the army, establishing a new type of relationship between officers and men. Following the "Sanwan Reorganization," the look of the troops was completely refreshed, and the soldiers truly understood for whom they carried rifles and for whom they fought, strengthening their confidence and determination to march to the Jinggang Mountains. In 1957, Marshal Luo Ronghuan wrote in The Autumn Harvest Uprising and the Early Period of Our Army: "The Sanwan Reorganization was actually the rebirth of our army. It was from this moment that the Party's leadership over the army was established. At that time, if Comrade Mao Zedong had not brilliantly resolved this fundamental issue, the force would have had no political soul and no clear program of action. The habits of old-style armies and the liberal, loose ways of the peasantry could not have been transformed. As a result, even if it were not destroyed by a powerful enemy, it could only have become roving bandits." Following the "Sanwan Reorganization," the troops happened to encounter seasonal infectious diseases and faced extremely difficult lives, yet the officers and soldiers did not complain or grumble. Although a very small number of people subsequently left the Party or betrayed the revolution, this troop not only did not collapse but gradually developed and grew, establishing the Jinggangshan Revolutionary Base Area and igniting the spark that led the Chinese revolution toward victory.

(2) Reasoning and Persuading to Facilitate the "Tongdao Transition" and Opening a New Path for the Party and the Red Army

1. Conducting Ideological Work for the "Transition" during the Long March After the Long March began, Mao Zedong, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang often discussed major Party and Red Army affairs together on their stretchers, turning the stretchers into a political stage for debating the fate of the movement. The discussion focused on the main reasons for the failure of the fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign. Zhang Wentian spoke of his various arguments with Bo Gu and his dissatisfaction with the erroneous command of Braun and Bo Gu. Mao Zedong compared the failure of the fifth campaign with the victories of the previous four, providing a detailed analysis of Braun and Bo Gu's errors in military command, such as "pure defense" and the rejection of mobile warfare. Before crossing the Xiang River, Mao also suggested to the Center that they should not force a crossing but should instead go to southern Hunan, which was not a focal point of the Kuomintang ^[19] defense, where forces were relatively thin and fortifications had not yet been built. He argued that the Communist Party had greater influence among the masses there and a good mass base, which would facilitate flexible and mobile operations. Simultaneously, they could take advantage of the fact that various Kuomintang units were still being redeployed and the Central Army units had not yet converged, allowing the Red Army to concentrate superior forces to seek and destroy a portion of the enemy, thereby reversing the situation and turning passivity into initiative. However, Bo Gu and Braun rejected Mao's suggestion, insisting on forcing the Xiang River crossing and following the Comintern's instructions to link up with the Second and Sixth Red Army Groups in western Hunan, which resulted in the Central Red Army suffering devastating losses.

To change this predicament, Mao Zedong spent the march conducting ideological work among Central leaders and Red Army generals. As Wu Xiuquan recalled: "Comrade Mao Zedong took every possible opportunity to carry out persuasion and education work among relevant cadres and Red Army commanders and fighters, using facts to enlighten their consciousness and help everyone distinguish what was correct from what was wrong." Mao first worked on Wang Jiaxiang and Zhang Wentian, and later on Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and other generals. Through in-depth analysis and conversation along the way, Zhang Wentian’s thoughts and views gradually unified with Mao’s, and he realized profoundly that the failure of the fifth campaign was primarily due to strategic and tactical errors in military leadership. However, these discussions and persuasions provoked Braun's dissatisfaction. Mao, disregarding personal gain or loss and keeping the big picture in mind, continued to seek a way out for the Red Army. While still at Laoshanjie, Zhang Wentian—along with Mao and Wang Jiaxiang—openly criticized the major failures since the start of the fifth campaign within the Political Bureau, pointing out they were caused by strategic and tactical errors in military leadership.

2. Arguing Forcefully at the Tongdao Meeting In less than two months, the Central Red Army had been reduced from 86,000 men at the start of the Long March to just over 30,000 following the bloody battle at the Xiang River. Where was the way out for the Red Army? Where was the way out for the Chinese revolution? These major questions concerning the fate of the Party and the Red Army weighed on the heart of every soldier. At this moment of life or death, Mao Zedong, who had been "sidelined" at the time, did not just stand by as a bystander because he had been marginalized. Instead, he exerted historical initiative, involving himself fully to think through and explore a path for the Red Army. "At that time, although Comrade Mao Zedong was in a difficult position, he remained constantly concerned with the safety of the Party Central Committee and the Red Army." During the long march, Mao "stayed with this army group for a while and that army group for a while," constantly discussing the military line and the direction of the march with everyone, gradually forming the correct opinion to change course toward Guizhou. Based on intercepted Kuomintang military telegrams and the balance of forces, Mao strongly urged the Center to abandon the original plan and stop heading north to link with the Second and Sixth Groups. However, the military leaders of "Leftist" ^[20] thought, such as Bo Gu and Braun, completely ignored the safety of the Red Army and stubbornly insisted on the northward plan. Thanks to the active efforts of Mao and others, on December 12, 1934, the Central leadership decided to hold an emergency meeting in Tongdao to discuss the direction of the Red Army's strategic shift. At the meeting, Braun naively insisted: "Should we let those enemy troops chasing us on parallel lines or rushing toward strategic points in the west pass us, while we ourselves turn north behind them to establish contact with the Second Army Group? Relying on their base area, plus the troops of He Long and Xiao Ke, we can attack the enemy in a broad area and create a large Soviet area in the triangle where Hunan, Guizhou, and Sichuan meet." Mao Zedong resolutely opposed this and argued forcefully, contending that a westward move into Guizhou had three advantages: first, it would avoid engagement with superior enemy forces. Attempting a decisive battle with 30,000 exhausted troops against an enemy five or six times their size, well-prepared and well-equipped, was highly unfavorable. Second, it would allow them to strike the weak while avoiding the strong to seize the initiative. Looking at the balance of power among the various Kuomintang forces, the Guizhou provincial troops had poor weaponry, lacked discipline, and had the weakest combat effectiveness; furthermore, internal factional struggles within the Guizhou army were complex, and the Red Army could exploit these contradictions to defeat them one by one. Third, this move could disrupt the Kuomintang's plan to encircle and annihilate the Red Army, and allow the Central Red Army to form a "tripod" position with the Fourth Front Army and the Second and Sixth Groups, which would favor future strategic development. Mao's proposal gained the approval and support of the majority of comrades, including Zhou Enlai, Zhang Wentian, and Wang Jiaxiang. Finally, the meeting agreed to adopt Mao's correct proposal, voluntarily abandoned the original northward plan, and decided to "transition" the troops west into Guizhou. At 7:30 PM on December 12, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission issued an "ultra-urgent" telegram to the heads of all army groups and columns to move west into Guizhou. On December 13, the Central Red Army split into two routes and transitioned west within Tongdao, avoiding the heavy encirclement of the Kuomintang and escaping the total disaster that a northward march to western Hunan would have likely incurred, thus opening a new path for the Party and the Red Army. Liu Bocheng later wrote in Reviewing the Long March: "It was at this critical moment that Chairman Mao saved the Red Army... At that time, if Chairman Mao had not resolutely advocated for a change in policy, the only future for the remaining 30,000 Red Army soldiers would have been destruction."

III. The Lessons of the Era from the Two "Transitions"

General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out:

"History is the best textbook. For us Communists, the history of the Chinese revolution is the best nutrient." Mao Zedong led the Autumn Harvest Uprising forces to "turn from attacking large cities to marching toward the countryside, which constituted a decisive new starting point for the Chinese revolution." Mao Zedong’s strenuous efforts to bring about the Tongdao Diversion ^[21] took the correct first step toward changing the Red Army’s strategic direction of advancement, leading the Red Army from defeat toward victory. Reviewing, analyzing, and summarizing these great historical chapters of the Party still provides important inspiration for our current work.

(I) We must always persist in seeking truth from facts

General Secretary Xi Jinping has profoundly pointed out: "Seeking truth from facts is the fundamental viewpoint of Marxism; it is the fundamental requirement for Chinese Communists to understand and transform the world, and it is our Party’s basic ideological method, work method, and leadership method. Whether in the past, present, or future, we must persist in proceeding from reality in all things, integrate theory with practice, and test and develop truth through practice." During the Autumn Harvest Uprising and the early period of the Long March, the troops suffered setbacks mainly because our Party was influenced at the time by "Leftist" ^[22] tendencies and failed to treat and handle the practical problems of the Chinese revolution by seeking truth from facts.

After the failure of the attack on Changsha led by Mao Zedong, he evaluated the actual situation of the enemy and our own forces, took the initiative to abandon the original plan to attack the city, and diverted the troops to Wenjiashi. Ultimately, he "led the troops to the Jinggang Mountains," established rural revolutionary base areas, and pioneered a revolutionary path with Chinese characteristics—the Jinggangshan Road. The Central Red Army was passive and took a beating everywhere during the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" ^[23] and the early stages of the Long March, resulting in heavy losses. However, the Red Army gained a new lease on life after the "Tongdao Diversion" and especially after the Zunyi Conference ^[24], moving continuously from victory to even greater victory. The primary reason for this significant shift lay in our Party’s persistence in proceeding from reality and adopting strategic maneuvers that had been proven effective through practice.

Throughout the glorious journey of over a hundred years, the Party has always persisted in proceeding from China’s basic national conditions, exploring, forming, and continuously improving a developmental path with characteristics suited to China’s situation. Since the 18th National Congress ^[25], under the strong leadership of the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups nationwide have forged ahead with fortitude, comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization. Chinese-path modernization is a broad avenue that persists in seeking truth from facts, stands firmly on the vast Chinese land, and aligns with China’s specific national conditions.

(II) We must persist in the integration of theory and practice

Theory is the precursor to action; without revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary action. At the same time, "practice divorced from theory is blind practice; theory divorced from practice is hollow theory." Marxism is our Party’s fundamental guiding ideology. Marxist theory is the guide to action for our various historical periods of revolution, construction, and reform—it is not a dogma. It must advance with the times, continuously enriching and improving alongside the development of practice. It must undergo Sinicization to take root and sprout; it must be localized to enter the homes of ordinary people and win their hearts; and it must be modernized to grasp the pulse of the era. For over a century, the key reason the Party has successfully completed glorious yet arduous historical tasks that other political forces found difficult or impossible to achieve is its consistent persistence in combining the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities and with China’s fine traditional culture, while continuously advancing the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism. Mao Zedong’s "leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the subsequent establishment of rural revolutionary base areas, as well as his facilitation of the central emergency meeting at Tongdao to achieve the great diversion of troops, represented a new path. This path was forged in the lessons of blood and fire by Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, who resolutely overcame the shackles of "book worship" ^[26] and persisted in integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with the specific practice of the Chinese revolution.

(III) There must be a strong leadership core

For a country or a political party, a leadership core is of paramount importance. Only when the Party Central Committee has a core, and the whole Party has a core, can the Party possess strength. Engels pointed out: "The necessity of authority, and of imperious authority at that, will nowhere be found more evident than on board a ship on the high seas. There, in time of danger, the lives of all on board depend on the instant and absolute obedience of all to the will of one." The stars are brilliant, but it is the Big Dipper that guides the way. During these great strategic shifts such as "leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the "Tongdao Diversion," Mao Zedong historically became the lighthouse for the giant ship sailing through stormy waves, playing the role of a stabilizing force ^[27].

After leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising, Mao Zedong timely "led the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" based on the actual revolutionary situation to preserve revolutionary strength. He turned his attention to the vast rural areas where the Kuomintang’s ruling power was relatively weak, actively mobilizing and organizing peasants, establishing extensive base areas, and launching a vigorous agrarian revolution. The great struggle and practice pioneered by Mao Zedong, as well as his brand-new theoretical creations, caused many revolutionaries—whether studying abroad or struggling at home—to focus their attention on the revolutionary struggle and practice he led. At that time, although Liu Bocheng was studying far away in Moscow, he followed the domestic revolutionary situation at every moment. After reading Mao Zedong’s articles "Why is it that Red Political Power can Exist in China?" and "The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains," he was greatly encouraged and remarked with deep emotion to his classmate Qu Wu: "'Why is it that Red Political Power can Exist in China?' has opened my eyes and strengthened my confidence. It seems the future of the Chinese revolution is bright. From 'The Struggle in the Jinggang Mountains,' one can see that the domestic struggle is still very difficult. I truly wish I could return home right now, go up to the Jinggang Mountains, and fight alongside Mao Zedong and Zhu De!" After leading the South Hunan Uprising, Zhu De resolutely declared he would "go find Mao Zedong!" After leading the Pingjiang Uprising, Peng Dehuai also moved his troops toward the Jinggang Mountains without hesitation, like a torrent returning to the sea. For a time, armed uprisings and revolutionary struggles in other regions set off a surge of learning from and exploring Mao Zedong’s revolutionary method. Mao Zedong became the lighthouse atop the mast of the great revolutionary ship of China, illuminating the direction of the revolution’s progress. During the "Tongdao Diversion," it was precisely due to Mao Zedong’s strenuous persuasion and heated arguments that the Center finally agreed to hold an emergency meeting to discuss the major issue of the Red Army’s direction. At the meeting, central leaders began to resist the erroneous command of Bo Gu and Li De ^[28], ultimately deciding to divert the troops westward into Guizhou, "transforming what might have been a demoralized retreat into a spirited victorious march." This momentous change is inseparable from the important role played by Mao Zedong. It can be said that the Tongdao Diversion was the beginning of Mao Zedong’s move toward the leadership core of the Red Army and the Party Central Committee. The Collection of Important Meetings of the Communist Party of China (1982) notes: "From the Tongdao Meeting to the Houchang Meeting, Mao Zedong's leadership in military affairs actually began." Shi Zhongquan, in his book The Long March, evaluated the Tongdao Meeting thus: "It laid the initial foundation for realizing the first great turning point in the Party’s history and establishing Mao Zedong’s actual core leadership position in the Center." From the Tongdao Meeting to the Liping Meeting, and then to the Zunyi Conference, Mao Zedong played a vital leadership role. Zhang Wentian ^[29] later recalled the Zunyi Conference and evaluated its historical significance, Mao Zedong’s achievements, and his own role, saying: "...The credit for this meeting, of course, belongs to Comrade Mao Zedong; I was merely a supporting actor."

When the mountains are ten thousand peaks high, one looks to the main peak; when sailing the great sea, one looks to the lighthouse. The Party’s establishment of Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the whole Party, and the establishment of the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, are major historical conclusions drawn from a profound summary of the Party’s century of struggle and the great practice since the 18th National Congress. The extraordinary journey of the New Era eloquently proves that the "Two Establishments" are not only the winning code for achieving historical achievements and undergoing historical transformations since the New Era began but are also the fundamental guarantee for the CPC, the Chinese people, and the Chinese nation to continuously overcome various difficulties and obstacles on the new journey toward an even more brilliant future.

(IV) We must carry forward the spirit of self-revolution

"The secret to the Party remaining full of vitality after a hundred years of vicissitudes lies in its consistent persistence in upholding truth and correcting errors. The greatness of the Party lies not in never making mistakes, but in never concealing its sickness for fear of treatment ^[30], actively conducting criticism and self-criticism, daring to face problems head-on, and having the courage for self-revolution." From Mao Zedong leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising troops to withdraw from Changsha, to "leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains," and then to his strenuous efforts to facilitate the central meeting at Tongdao to realize the diversion to Guizhou—all these are important manifestations of the spirit of self-revolution carried forward by Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, in their courage to correct serious "Leftist" errors. During the Period of Agrarian Revolutionary War, the "Leftist" ideology existing within our Party once caused significant losses to the Chinese revolution. Numerous uprisings focused on attacking large cities failed one after another, and the failure of the fifth counter-campaign against "encirclement and suppression" forced the Long March, causing heavy losses to the Central Red Army. The spirit of self-revolution is the powerful support for the Party to maintain its youthful vitality. Self-revolution not only profoundly reveals the fundamental reason why the Party succeeded in the past but also scientifically points to the core code for how it can continue to succeed in the future. It is the Party’s "second answer" ^[31] to escaping the historical cycle of rise and fall.

(V) We must enhance the ability to recognize, adapt to, and seek change

"Change" is the essence of things. Facing changing circumstances, we must improve our ability to see the first signs of change, develop "piercing eyes" ^[32], gain insight into opportunities, and maximize advantages while avoiding disadvantages. Both "leading the troops to the Jinggang Mountains" and the "Tongdao Diversion" were instances where Mao Zedong, after accurately recognizing major changes in the revolutionary situation, creatively opened up new revolutionary prospects amidst a crisis, finding "a way out when all seemed lost" ^[33] and setting the revolution back on the right course. Currently, China’s developmental environment faces profound and complex changes; the evolution of the international situation deeply affects domestic development, the world's once-in-a-century changes are accelerating, and the international balance of power is undergoing profound adjustments. Faced with these circumstances, every Party member and official must effectively enhance their ability to recognize, adapt to, and seek change. They must take the initiative to recognize and adapt to change, accurately understand the general trend of world development, scientifically grasp China’s new historical position in development, and be adept at nurturing new opportunities in the midst of crisis and opening new prospects in the midst of change. This is of great significance for coordinating the two overall situations of domestic and international affairs and for comprehensively advancing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation through Chinese-path modernization.