Yi Fenglin: "Making the Party Truly Mass-Oriented": The Developmental Direction of the Early Grassroots Organizations of the Communist Party of China
The early history of the Chinese Communist Party (from the Party’s founding to the Great Revolution period [1]) occupies a significant position in the history of the Party’s organizational construction. During this period, the development of the revolutionary movement—specifically "the arrival of the climax of the Great Revolution, the victory of the Northern Expedition, and the surging of the worker-peasant movement"—created favorable conditions for the CCP's growth, allowing its organizational development to achieve "considerable progress." Within this context, the construction of the Party's primary-level organizations [2] also advanced through exploration, yielding marked results. Alongside the rapid expansion of the membership, primary-level organizations grew from small to large and from weak to strong, extending from intellectuals toward the worker and peasant masses, gradually achieving the "mass-oriented nature of the Party."
Current scholarly research on the CCP’s early primary-level organizations focuses primarily on the establishment processes, operational mechanisms, and developmental explorations of local organizations. However, there is still a lack of research that combines macro and micro perspectives to comprehensively summarize and distill the diverse paths and working mechanisms of these early organizations. This article intends to make an attempt in this direction.
I. Organizational Development: From Reliance on Traditional Social Relations to Revolutionary Standardization
In its early years, the CCP began to focus on exploring issues of Party building in conjunction with the realities of revolutionary development. The most prominent manifestation of this was the timely adjustment of the Party's mode of organizational development: a shift from emphasizing traditional social relations at its inception toward a revolutionary and standardized approach.
In the initial period after the Party's founding, due to the clandestine nature of the organization and the harsh revolutionary environment, Party expansion work was generally conducted covertly, utilizing the traditional social networks of its members as links. Looking at the creation of local Party organizations during this period, it was a common phenomenon to use a core figure as the center of a concentric circle, absorbing Party (and Youth League) members through academic (school-based), geographic (hometown-based), or professional ties, thereby establishing local branches. Regarding the creation of the Jiangxi provincial organization, figures such as Zhao Xingnong, Yuan Yubing, and Fang Zhimin primarily developed members through networks formed at Nanchang No. 2 Middle School, Nanchang First Normal School, Nanchang No. 1 Middle School, and the "Jiangxi Creation Society" established by their students. This mode of development, relying mainly on traditional social relations, enabled the Party to gradually expand its ranks within a complex and hostile revolutionary environment while maintaining secrecy to avoid destruction by the enemy.
However, with the progress of the First United Front [3]—and especially the rapid development of the revolution during the May Thirtieth Movement [4]—the CCP urgently needed to rapidly strengthen its organizational power. The expansion method relying on traditional social relations clearly could not keep pace with the changing revolutionary situation; nor did it conform to the correct direction of organizational development or facilitate the institutionalization and standardization of organizational work. Therefore, based on an objective recognition of these deficiencies, the development mode of the CCP's primary-level organizations began to transition toward revolutionary standardization.
On June 21, 1926, the Shanghai Regional Committee issued a notice regarding the Party’s organizational issues, pointing out that in the past, developing new members often relied on "using the personal emotional relationships of Party members as the starting point for introducing new comrades," which led to many malfunctions. For example, if a single member developed "unhealthy tendencies" or suffered a setback, all other members introduced by that person would sever their ties with the Party. Expansion based on personal sentiment easily led to the fragmentation of the organization; members lacked normal "comradely" relations, which seriously diluted the Party's organizational character and discipline. Consequently, the Shanghai Regional Committee believed it was necessary to standardize the correct orientation for organizational development: "Henceforth, focus must be placed on using the collective strength of the Party branch to develop members. Specifically, members should be developed through the work process of the branch (i.e., absorbing brave revolutionary elements during various actions). The strength of the branch's work must be directed toward conquering the surrounding environment of the masses, allowing the masses to gain confidence by seeing the activities of the Party as a whole, and then admitting them to the Party through formal introductory procedures. In other words, we must ensure that those entering the Party are truly joining the Party they trust, rather than a Party linked by the emotional ties of their good friends or 'sworn brothers and sisters' [5]. Only then can the Party have a true foundation."
As stated above, "using the collective strength of the Party branch to develop members" strengthened the core role of the branch in expansion on one hand, while reinforcing the organizational consciousness of members on the other. This branch-based working method was significantly more powerful and organized than relying on individual social networks; it allowed members to trust the Party more authentically, thereby consolidating the Party’s foundation. In June 1926, Chen Duxiu proposed at a joint meeting of the CCP Central Committee and the Shanghai Regional Committee that the shortcomings of previous recruitment—such as utilizing personal social relations or even feudalistic "gang" [6] ties—must be changed. He argued for adhering to fixed organizational principles and focusing on using the strength of the branch to absorb members.
This shift in the CCP’s early organizational development became increasingly evident as the Great Revolution progressed. Generally speaking, while expansion based on traditional social relations once held an important position, revolutionary and standardized expansion began to dominate after the Northern Expedition [7].
This was true of recruitment within the labor movement. After the Party's founding, it used primary-level organizations as combat bastions, penetrating into factories to have close contact with workers, publicize the Party’s revolutionary propositions, and carry out expansion work. Through revolutionary propaganda and the practice of the labor movement, the Party raised the class consciousness of the workers. In particular, the victory of strikes led by the Party greatly stimulated the revolutionary enthusiasm of workers; many began to believe in the power of labor unions and took the initiative to approach the Communist Party. Especially after the Northern Expedition, the revolutionary sentiment of the masses—represented by revolutionary workers—"surged like a high tide." They rose up to launch labor movements, strive for their own rights, and demand improvements in their livelihoods, making the Party's revolutionary work proceed quite smoothly. Consistent with the development of the labor movement, the Party's influence and organizational capacity among workers grew daily. The number of worker-members increased continuously, and the Party organization "developed accordingly," which in turn better promoted the labor movement, forming a virtuous cycle. A similar pattern was seen in the expansion within the peasant movement.
Through the worker and peasant movements, Communists went deep into the masses to understand their revolutionary demands, while also making the workers and peasants recognize the Party's revolutionary programs. This interaction strengthened both sides. On one hand, under the Party's leadership, workers and peasants joined trade unions and peasant associations, gaining organizations to protect their interests. In Hunan, from the summer of 1926 when the Northern Expeditionary Army entered the province until February 1927, the membership of peasant associations skyrocketed from 400,000 to 2 million, accounting for nearly half of the province's peasants. In Hubei, by November 1926, membership reached 200,000; in Jiangxi, by February 1927, it reached approximately 300,000. On the other hand, the Communist Party absorbed revolutionary workers and peasants into the Party from these unions and associations. For example, following the May Thirtieth Movement, CCP membership grew from fewer than 1,000 at the beginning of 1925 to "over 10,000 by the end of the year, a tenfold increase." The Kuomintang (KMT) also felt strongly about the revolutionary wisdom of the Communists in embedding themselves among the masses. In their view, "all masses are in the hands of the C.P.," and they found the Communist Party somewhat "frightening." This "frightening" quality referred to the fact that the CCP’s "policies were mature and profound" and that it "possessed the masses." Having a deep mass foundation was precisely the vital bedrock that allowed the Party’s early primary-level organizational development to transition from a reliance on traditional social relations toward revolutionary standardization.
II. Expanding Organizational Direction into New Regions and Domains
A key reason the CCP was able to grow into a political party with a broad mass foundation was that Communists continuously opened new regions and domains for organizational development, allowing the Party’s "organizational blood vessels" to penetrate deep into the grassroots of society. The early CCP conducted preliminary explorations in this regard.
(1) Relying on the Party’s organizational strength to expand the primary-level organizational network from small to large
During the Party's founding period, organizational work focused on opening new geographic regions. At the time of the First National Congress, there were only about 50 members. In these circumstances, to break open the revolutionary situation, one of the Party's primary tasks was to vigorously develop the organization and strive to lay out a network of primary-level branches across various locations.
Geographically, Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Changsha, and Jinan were the initial hubs where early Party organizations flourished. These locations were regions where transportation was relatively developed and revolutionary movements arose early; Shanghai, for instance, was the "central city with the densest concentration of the industrial working class" at that time. These early organizational sites formed the critical geographic foundation for the CCP's development. First was the area centered on Shanghai. Shanghai possessed the revolutionary foundation of the Party's birthplace and the cultural heritage of the Jiangsu-Zhejiang region; surrounding areas like Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Anhui were deeply influenced by Shanghai, gradually giving rise to revolutionary movements and Party organizations. Second was the area centered on Beijing. As the national political center and the site where the May Fourth Movement [8] broke out, it was also one of the birthplaces of early Party organizations. Influenced by Beijing, Party organizations gradually formed in northern regions such as Tianjin, Shandong, Shanxi, Hebei, and the Northeast. Third was the area centered on Guangdong. Guangdong was the most important revolutionary base for the Kuomintang and possessed unique cultural characteristics. During the period of KMT-CCP cooperation, Guangdong became the center of the National Revolution. Under its influence, primary-level organizations were extended to neighboring provinces like Guangxi, Fujian, Guizhou, and Yunnan. Finally, there were the areas centered on the "Two Hu" (Hunan and Hubei). The influence of these two provinces was particularly evident during the Northern Expedition, as revolutionary movements in provinces like Jiangxi and Sichuan developed rapidly, leading to a quick increase in Party branches and members.
Broadly speaking, due to the uneven development of the revolution, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou established organizations earlier. As the revolution pressed forward, the revolutionary territories expanded, and the scope of the Party's organization grew daily. Primary-level organizations were eventually distributed across various regions, preliminarily constructing a nationwide grassroots network. However, it must also be noted that compared to the lightning-fast growth in the Jing-Hu [Beijing-Shanghai] and Xiang-E [Hunan-Hubei] regions, expansion was relatively slow and membership remained low in regions like the North and Yu-Shaan [Henan-Shaanxi], where the mass movement faced high-pressure suppression under the rule of various warlord forces.
(2) Primary-level organizations spanned factories, schools, and rural areas, reaching social strata such as workers, peasants, and intellectuals
In terms of new domains, the early CCP was very active in penetrating various organizational units and emphasized achieving basic coverage of different fields through various methods. Among these, factories were the priority, while schools, government offices, residential streets, and rural villages were key components, together forming an interlaced, multi-domain organizational network.
The CCP’s understanding of primary-level organizations and the domains they inhabit underwent a developmental process. The Party Constitution of the Second National Congress explicitly stipulated: "In all rural areas, factories, railways, mines, barracks, schools, and other offices or their vicinities, whenever there are three to five members, a 'group' (组 zǔ) shall be established." The "group" was the first name for the Party's primary-level organization established in Party history. The Third National Congress adjusted "group" to "small group" (小组 xiǎozǔ), keeping the principles of establishment unchanged. The Fourth National Congress officially changed "small group" to "branch" (支部 zhībù), stipulating that "a branch shall be established in all rural areas, factories, railways, mines, barracks, schools, and other offices or their vicinities wherever there are three or more members." It also explicitly stated for the first time: "The basic organization of the Party should be the branch organized with the industrial unit or office as the unit," and "when a branch cannot be organized with an office as the unit, the geographic standard may be used." Shortly after the conclusion of the Fifth National Congress, the "Resolution on the Third Amendment to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party" passed by the Central Techical Bureau (Politburo) explicitly stipulated for the first time that "the branch is the basic organization of the Party." From these regulations, it is clear that the principles for setting up early CCP primary-level organizations were based mainly on industry and offices; thus, factories, schools, rural areas, and offices became the key new domains for Communists to exploit.
Factories were the top priority for the CCP’s expansion of its primary-level organizations. This was consistent with the central position of the labor movement in the Party's work at that time and the expansion policy focused on workers.
On September 26, 1925, the Shanghai District Committee pointed out that following the May Thirtieth Movement [9], the reactionaries had launched an offensive against the workers; therefore, the Party had to strive to develop Party members within factories to "accumulate our strength, preparing to develop openly and launch a full-scale offensive when the next change in the political situation occurs." Schools were also an essential component of the grassroots organizational network. Zhu Yiyue, a native of Lianhua County, Jiangxi, was influenced by Li Dazhao [10] and accepted revolutionary ideas early on, joining the Communist Party of China. To advance the revolution in his hometown, Zhu Yiyue returned there under the guise of inspecting rural schools. He spread revolutionary ideas throughout the urban and rural areas of Lianhua and identified potential recruits. Later, after consulting with Zhu Shengwu and others, he decided to establish schools across Lianhua County, setting up organs in the name of education, which directly facilitated the founding of the CPC Lianhua County Group. The countryside was another vital field for the development of CPC grassroots organizations. Especially around the period of the Northern Expedition [11], rural grassroots Party organizations grew steadily alongside the rise of the peasant movement. In the Party’s view, recruiting large numbers of members from among the peasantry and establishing a foundation for the Party was a critical basis for the launch and victory of the peasant movement. Conversely, if the foundation of Party organizations was not established in the countryside, then "the peasant movement will face great danger in the future, and this danger will surely fall upon the Party itself." Furthermore, government organs and residential streets served as important focal points for Communists to establish grassroots units and as vital fields into which the organizational lifeblood flowed.
The social class coverage of grassroots organizations showed a similar trajectory. Corresponding to the establishment of grassroots units in factories, schools, and rural areas, the organizations also expanded toward various social classes, including workers, intellectuals, and peasants. During the founding period, the Party placed great importance on workers joining the Party while maintaining a relatively cautious attitude toward other classes. The May Thirtieth Movement aroused the people's enthusiasm for national revolution, and within the rising revolutionary movement, Communists truly felt the revolutionary power of different classes. They gradually adopted an open and proactive mindset, absorbing outstanding elements from all strata into the Party’s ranks. According to statistics, by the time of the Fifth National Congress [12], the number of Party members nationwide had surged from 994 before the Fourth National Congress to 57,967, among whom workers accounted for 53.8%, peasants 18.7%, and intellectuals 19.1%.
(3) Establishing revolutionary mass organizations across various regions and fields as a breakthrough for grassroots organizational development
The establishment of early CPC organizations was deeply rooted in revolutionary societies. The early Beijing Party organization was closely linked to the "Society for the Study of Marxist Theory" [13] organized by Li Dazhao and others; the early Shanghai organization to the "Shanghai Marxist Research Society" initiated by Chen Duxiu; the early Changsha organization to the "New People's Study Society" [14] and the "Russia Reform Society" organized by Mao Zedong and others; and the early organizations in Wuhan, Jinan, and Guangzhou were all closely connected to their local "Societies for the Study of Marxist Theory." These early Marxist research groups provided essential organizational strength for the creation of the Party.
After the Party’s founding, it continued to develop revolutionary societies represented by Marxist research societies and social problem research societies to provide strong support for expanding the Party’s grassroots organizations. In November 1923, the "Resolution on the Issue of Educational Propaganda" adopted by the CPC Central Committee stipulated that "wherever possible, social science research societies should be established." Although the Social Science Research Society and the Marxist Research Society differed in name, their purposes and functions were similar: to study revolutionary books and periodicals such as New Youth [15], answer revolutionary questions, and propagate revolutionary ideas. Based on awakening the revolutionary consciousness of their members, they would absorb outstanding elements into the Party. Following the instructions of the CPC Central Committee, revolutionary societies were established in many places. For instance, in November 1923, the Shanghai Local Committee commissioned Shanghai University to organize a Social Problems Research Society, while reading groups were established in places like Chengdu.
Revolutionary societies primarily targeted intellectuals, while the vast majority of ordinary workers and peasants with lower educational levels rarely had the opportunity to participate. To effectively organize the workers and peasants, ensure they received revolutionary education within the organization, and subsequently recruit active revolutionary workers and peasants into the Party, the CPC attached great importance to the formation of trade unions and peasant associations across the country. By the time of the Fifth National Congress, over 2.8 million workers and 9 million peasants had been "organized." The recognition of the Communist Party among many trade union and peasant association members reached unprecedented levels, providing an important foundation for the Party’s vigorous expansion among workers and peasants. These revolutionary mass organizations became an important bridge connecting the Party organization with various social classes and served as a major breakthrough for the CPC to expand its grassroots organizational network.
III. An Organizational Development Approach of Balanced Quantitative and Qualitative Growth
The early CPC also made preliminary explorations into handling the relationship between the quantity and quality of grassroots organizational development. Broadly speaking, "balanced development of quantity and quality" was the organizational development approach maintained by Communists during this period.
(1) Particular emphasis on the quantity of grassroots organizational development
The CPC’s early strategy for grassroots organizational development was not entirely clear from the start and possessed an experimental character. With the vigorous development of the Great Revolution [16], the CPC Central Committee adopted various methods to achieve rapid growth in the number of grassroots organizations and Party members.
One important method was the formulation of relatively proactive organizational policies. This was particularly evident during the Northern Expedition. For example, on July 9, 1926, the National Revolutionary Army took the oath of mobilization in Guangzhou for the Northern Expedition. As the war progressed victoriously, the worker and peasant movements also reached a climax. However, compared to the needs of the revolution, the Party’s organizational strength was clearly insufficient. Thus, the CPC Central Committee formulated proactive organizational policies and expanded the Party vigorously based on the practical needs of the revolution. On October 17, 1926, Chen Duxiu wrote to Party committees at all levels, pointing out that increasing the number of members was currently the most important issue, and in particular, workers and peasants should be vigorously absorbed into the Party; he proposed that the entire Party should develop more than 40,000 members before the Fifth National Congress. Regarding regions, Chen Duxiu suggested that the Jiangsu-Zhejiang, Guangdong, Hunan, Hubei, and Northern districts were the focus of development, while Anhui, Fujian, the Three Eastern Provinces [17], Yunnan, and Guizhou should also be included in the scope of expansion. Local Party organizations actively implemented this instruction, formulating local expansion plans. For instance, on December 1, 1926, the "Plan of the Shanghai District Committee for Expanding the Organization" stated: "The letter from Comrade Duxiu mentioned above expresses the hope for the Jiangsu-Zhejiang district to develop 7,000 comrades; every comrade should, upon reading this, feel that this is a very important opinion and must be carried out absolutely." Regions like Hunan also responded to the call by formulating corresponding methods for expansion.
Another important method was shortening the probationary period and simplifying the introduction procedures to provide more convenience for rapidly absorbing the masses into the Party. On August 31, 1925, the CPC Central Committee issued a circular titled "Flexible Measures for Introducing New Members, and the Organization and Tasks of Party Fractions within Groups," emphasizing that to rapidly absorb members, the procedures for recruitment established at the Fourth National Congress must be revised, the qualifications for sponsors lowered, and the probationary period shortened. This was a necessary move to adapt to the needs of revolutionary development under the conditions of the time.
Thanks to these measures, the number of grassroots Party organizations and members increased rapidly. In January 1927, the Communist International (Comintern) mentioned in its "Resolution on the Organizational Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party" that "the number of members of the Chinese Communist Party has tripled in the past year... such a rapid increase indicates that a great deal of work has been done." By March 1927, Party organizations or activities had been established throughout the country "except for Xinjiang, Qinghai, Guizhou, Tibet, and Taiwan."
(2) Gradually beginning to focus on the quality of grassroots organizational development
After reaching a certain base quantity, our Party began to pay more attention to the quality of grassroots organizational development. Issues that emerged at the time, such as the failure of branches to perform their role as combat bastions and the low caliber of some members, further prompted the Party to accelerate its pace of adjustment.
Importance was placed on rectifying branches. In December 1926, the CPC Central Committee pointed out: "Regarding our Party's organizational issues at this time, while we must strive for quantitative development, we must even more so rectify the branches to enable each branch to work and act spontaneously." In September 1926, the Jiangsu-Zhejiang District Committee pointed out incisively in its work report that through rectifying branches, one should "make the Party's foundation firm, so that the branch can play a significant role in every action," "ensure every comrade understands and applies the Party’s tactics without error," "embed the Party deeply among the broad masses," and "cultivate many talented cadres." From the perspective of local practice, the rectification of branches generally included: improving branch executive committees and establishing their prestige within the branch; strictly enforcing Party discipline; purging members ("unrevolutionary and nominal comrades are to be cancelled without exception"); paying attention to the screening of new comrades; requiring weekly branch meetings; and so on.
Importance was placed on Party member education. Local Party organizations conducted education either by establishing Party schools or through training within branches. In March 1927, the Shaanxi-Gansu District Committee, in an instruction letter to Party committees at all levels, proposed that besides holding regular branch meetings and encouraging members to read, internal education and training should "strive as much as possible to open Party schools to train personnel for agitation and propaganda among the masses." The proactive promotion of education was a crucial reason why the number of communists could surge during the Great Revolution while still maintaining cohesion and combat effectiveness.
Strengthening the management of Party members. Within this, the screening of members was a key aspect. On March 31, 1926, the Zhabei Department of the Shanghai District Committee pointed out that regarding deficiencies such as "the general lack of clear concepts and adequate training among students upon joining the Party," remedial measures should be taken—namely, "strictly inspecting, training, and criticizing the comrades in charge to see whether their actions, thoughts, living environments, work capabilities, and understanding of the doctrine have achieved appropriate results and meet the necessary conditions for a Party member." In March 1927, the Shaanxi-Gansu District Committee also explicitly required that comrades must be strictly screened to correct their erroneous ideas in a timely manner and improve work efficiency. Meanwhile, punishing corrupt members was also a key part of member management. On August 4, 1926, the "Circular of the Central Enlarged Plenum—Resolutely Cleanse Corrupt Elements" pointed out that only by struggling against corruption "can we strengthen our camp and establish the Party's prestige among the masses." As the "first document in the Party's history to punish corruption," these strict requirements for members' words and deeds helped maintain the stability of the Party organization and inner-Party unity, ensuring that the Party's work could be carried out more smoothly.
In terms of overall trends, "balanced development of quantity and quality" was the general approach to the organizational development of the early CPC. Quantity was the basic requirement and the organizational foundation for the forward development of the revolution; quality was the safeguard and the crucial guarantee for enhancing organizational leadership.
IV. Fully Stimulating the Vitality of Inter-Organizational Coordination
The development of the Party’s grassroots organizations is inseparable from the healthy interaction between different levels of the organization. The organizational relations of the early CPC followed the principle of democratic centralism, actively stimulating the synergy of coordination between organizations at all levels.
(1) Fully exerting the role of requests and reports as a bridge and link
Renowned for its iron discipline, the CPC took democratic centralism as its fundamental organizational principle and used "requests for instructions and reporting" [18] as a bridge and link to standardize the relationship between higher and lower level Party organizations.
For the Central Committee, an important part of its work was providing timely guidance to local organizations. Sending personnel to supervise local units and replying to local requests and reports were concrete manifestations of this guidance. Whether the guidance was timely directly affected local organizational development. For example, in the view of local leaders, one reason organizational development in regions like Fujian was relatively slow was being "without money, without people, and having poor communication with the Central Committee."
Reporting by local organizations to the Central Committee was a vital channel for reflecting local information to the center. Generally speaking, local organizations were expected to report to the Central Committee at least once a week, reporting clearly on various local tasks, with organizational work being the focus. Regional organizational reports had to include the status of branches, local committees, and the expansion of membership, as well as the situation of meetings, the collection of Party dues, and the distribution of work among members. Furthermore, reporting from local committees to district committees, from county committees to local committees, and from branches to county (or local/district) committees was a regularized mechanism. Through requests and reports, higher authorities could conveniently obtain first-hand information from subordinates and subsequently issue corresponding work instructions, including guidance on grassroots organizational development.
According to the Selected Documents of the CPC Central Committee...
Texts from 1926 reveal frequent interaction between the Central Committee and the Guangdong Regional Committee. According to statistics, within the single year of 1926, the Central Committee sent six instructional letters to Guangdong and passed three resolutions regarding Guangdong issues; meanwhile, Guangdong proactively submitted one political report and two letters of request. For instance, on October 4, the Central Committee issued the "Letter to the Guangdong Region—Regarding Policies Toward the Kuomintang Leftists [19], etc.," instructing the Guangdong regional Party organization on the fundamental principles to uphold when handling relations with the Kuomintang (KMT) Leftists. To effectively study and implement this central directive, the Guangdong regional Party organization submitted the "Letter from the Guangdong Region—A Reply to the Central Committee's October 4 Letter" on October 21. On November 23, the Guangdong regional Party organization submitted the "Guangdong Region Political Report" to the Central Committee, reporting on the regional political situation and related policies; in December, the Central Committee passed the "Resolution on the Guangdong Region Political Report" to guide the region's next steps.
This situation existed in other regions as well. For example, on September 7, 1926, the Hunan regional Party organization submitted the "Hunan Region Political Report" to the Central Committee. On September 27, the Central Committee replied to the Hunan region, providing instructions on military, political, and mass movement strategies, as well as Party work in Hunan. It is evident that during the initial stage of organizational development, our Party overcame numerous difficulties and consistently maintained real-time connectivity between higher and lower-level organizations centered on revolutionary work, so as to respond to the increasingly complex revolutionary situation and various issues in organizational development.
(2) Special Envoys’ "Communication of Superior Intent" and Routine Inspections
To improve the effectiveness of guidance for lower-level Party organizations, the Central Committee successively appointed special envoys to go down to local areas "to convene various forms of temporary meetings." Local organizations also had special envoys (or inspectors [20]—the titles varied) at the same level: "Regional and local committees must, when necessary, travel to various places to inspect and investigate work." In the early period of the Communist Party of China, the primary task of special envoys was to communicate the instructions of higher-level organizations, guide the work of lower-level organizations, and provide timely feedback to the higher-level organizations. The number of special envoys gradually increased along with the vigorous development of the organization. Especially after the Northern Expedition [21], the CPC appointed special envoys to various regions more frequently to guide the workers' and peasants' movements. According to the "Central Bureau Report (October and November)" dated December 5, 1926, among the new special envoys dispatched by the CPC Central Committee, there were 16 in Shaanxi, 20 in Zhili [22], 26 in Henan, 30 in Hunan, 13 in Anhui, 22 in Sichuan, 11 in Shandong, and 9 in Jiangsu; including those in Fujian, Jiangxi, and other places, the total reached 218. The report suggested that while these special envoys responsible for guiding workers' and peasants' movements were scattered across various locations, "although it cannot be said that great organizations and movements will occur immediately, it can at least be said that our work in these places has begun."
In addition to special envoys for guiding the workers' and peasants' movements, there were also special envoys specifically for inspecting Party affairs. For example, on June 11, 1926, the Hangzhou Local Committee sent a special envoy to "inspect Party affairs in Lanxi, Jiande, Jinhua, and Fuyang," conducting a 12-day inspection and producing a related report that identified organizational development problems in these locations and proposed specific suggestions for Party expansion. Another common scenario involved special envoys providing comprehensive guidance for the work of lower-level organizations. For instance, the Yinxianggang Departmental Committee under the Shanghai Regional Committee dispatched special envoys to directly guide branch work, which yielded significant results.
Routine inspection of the work of lower-level organizations was also a responsibility and a proactive measure of higher-level organizations. It was a very common practice for the Central Committee to inspect the work of regional (or local) committees, and for regional committees to inspect the work of local or departmental committees. Only by regularly visiting lower-level organizations to investigate their work could one understand the "actual conditions of the lower-level Party headquarters and provide guidance at any time," communicate the "policy and status of work" to the lower levels, and subsequently enable the Party to "have deep grassroots foundations." As the basic-level organization of the Party, the branches should have their work progress regularly inspected by all levels from the local committee downward. By evaluating branch work at close range, higher-level organizations actively promoted the development of grassroots organizations.
During this period, the Communist International (Comintern) attached great importance to the development of the CPC’s grassroots organizations and issued specific instructions. This was mainly reflected in three areas: First, emphasizing the improvement of grassroots organizational structures. On September 12, 1926, the Mission of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in its "Report on the Results of the Investigation into Political and Party Relations in Guangzhou," affirmed the work of the Party organization in Guangdong but also noted that the branches lacked centralized, unified, and organized leadership, and that the Party had not yet fully implemented democratic centralism. On the eve of the Fifth National Congress of the CPC, the Comintern passed the "Resolution on the Organizational Tasks of the Communist Party of China," proposing that "a branch must have a small, highly capable administrative body (3 to 5 people)" and that "specific organizational labor division should be made among members of each branch." These suggestions were largely absorbed by the Fifth National Congress, which preliminarily established the organizational structure and division of labor system for Party branches. Second, emphasizing the acceleration of the pace of Party expansion. The Comintern held a very optimistic view of the CPC’s grassroots organizational development after the May 30th Movement [23]. On September 28, 1925, the Comintern instructed the CPC to "vigorously strengthen propaganda, agitation, and organizational work to attract new Chinese democratic masses to participate in the national liberation movement." Under these instructions, the CPC formulated increasingly proactive Party expansion policies. Third, emphasizing the importance of member education. The Comintern once instructed the CPC that "the work of developing new members should be carried out simultaneously with the work of raising the political level of members and generally strengthening the Party's ranks." It should not be overlooked that the Comintern also brought several negative influences to the early development of the CPC’s grassroots organizations, such as an excessive bias toward recruiting members from among workers and failing to guide the CPC in formulating correct organizational policies after the April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup [24].
V. Conclusion
The development of the early grassroots organizations of the Communist Party of China expanded the Party's influence among the masses, allowed the Party to truly take root in grassroots society, and preliminarily achieved the Party's "mass-ification" (群众化). Precisely because the CPC used grassroots organizations as fighting bastions and remained closely connected to the social masses, the Party's political influence grew daily, to the extent that "no matter the matter, the Leftists (referring to the KMT Leftists—ed. note) would first ask for the C.P.’s [25] opinion; if the C.P. did not express an opinion, they dared not act." That the early grassroots organizations of the CPC could achieve such significant development was inseparable from the Party’s emphasis on multi-directional paths of organizational development. Such diversified paths of development represented the CPC’s deep exploration, guided by Marxism, into solving grassroots organizational problems. They fully demonstrate the Party’s multi-faceted thinking regarding grassroots organizational development, as well as its adaptability in adjusting organizational policies in a timely manner based on revolutionary realities.
Author Biography: Yi Fenglin, Researcher at the Institute of History, Jiangxi Academy of Social Sciences.
Source: Party Documents (党的文献), Issue 6, 2025. Editor: Huihui.