Niu Zelin: An Inquiry into the Red Army's Techniques for Rapid Night Marching in Mountainous Terrain
During the period of the Agrarian Revolutionary War, faced with the overwhelming reality of the disparity in strength between themselves and the enemy, the Red Army was compelled to engage in frequent mountain maneuvers under the cover of night to contend with the Kuomintang forces. To transform passiveness into initiative and disadvantage into advantage during nighttime mountain marches, the application of technique became particularly vital. Regarding the Red Army’s techniques for nighttime mountain marches, there has yet to be a detailed or meticulous academic investigation. How did the Red Army march rapidly through mountainous terrain at night, and how was their formidable marching capacity forged? This article intends to utilize relevant historical materials to analyze these questions, focusing primarily on the technical dimension.
I. Techniques of Mountain Marching
From a historical perspective, the Red Army's mountain operations were linked to the Communist Party of China's (CPC) exploration of a revolutionary path characterized by encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power through armed force following the failure of the Great Revolution [1]. It was specifically and closely related to the strategic shift of "going up the mountain" proposed by Mao Zedong. "Going up the mountain" was necessary because "it was impossible to live below," and the great flag of revolution was not permitted to be "planted in the city," but could only be "planted atop the mountain." After ascending the mountains, the specific and crucial problems became how to face the enemy’s "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns, and how to march flexibly between mountains to master the initiative in war. Under the historical conditions and objective environment of the time, from the perspective of marching technique, the Red Army had to "be tempered through a thousand hammers and ten thousand refinements, and be capable of walking."
(1) Tactical Training for Mountain Marching
To march rapidly in the mountains, tactical training was indispensable. From the day of its birth, the Red Army, through practical drills and exercises, eliminated "those pretentious, tedious, and empty formalities that have little relevance to combat," focusing instead on "formal training that bolstered the spirit." Mountain-climbing training was the primary subject for the Red Army's mountain movements. Since the CPC "went up the mountain," being at one with the mountains became the fundamental state of wartime life. To overcome the enemy and achieve victory, the Red Army placed significant emphasis on climbing training. Climbing not only built physical fitness but also enhanced combat effectiveness; it was an essential skill for marching and fighting. Consequently, the Red Army frequently climbed mountains to practice speed and endurance, improving combat skills through training in running, climbing, and jumping over obstacles.
Beyond climbing drills, the Red Army also paid particular attention to physical strength training, emphasizing that only "robust physical strength allows one to run over a hundred li [2] a day, seize more than ten hilltops, and fight several fierce battles." Based on this, the Red Army Headquarters treated "exercising the body to increase physical strength" as "the primary task in Red Army military training," requiring that every one to two months "a physical strength competition be convened for each column and unit directly under the army," viewing it as "the sole requirement for increasing the Red Army's combat effectiveness." Consequently, various Red Army units actively organized diverse physical exercises and competitive activities, including long jump, high jump, racing, wall-climbing, and rope-climbing. Because many Red Army soldiers were swift and agile, they even earned the nickname "Apes." Simultaneously, the Red Army held sports meets of varying scales during major festivals to enhance the competitiveness of physical training. By showcasing and comparing cross-country abilities and marching techniques, they strengthened the troops' emphasis on mountain marching capabilities and further tempered the military quality of unity and coordination in the process. Through physical exercise and long-term military practice, the Red Army's mountain marching ability improved rapidly, becoming an important tactical asset for flexible maneuvering against enemy forces.
(2) Technical Essentials in Mountain Marching
Red Army operations in mountainous terrain required commanders and fighters to possess knowledge of military geography. To address this issue, the CPC organized military geography and topography training classes specifically for Red Army officers and soldiers, offering courses in military geography, topography, and engineering techniques. To comprehensively learn military geography and understand the specific terrain of combat areas, "all assignments in the training classes were to be conducted on maps of those provinces where the Red Army and guerrilla forces were currently carrying out armed struggle."
Familiarity with the terrain and environment was the fundamental condition for the Red Army's mountain marches. Unlike the plains, getting lost or taking the wrong path is common in the mountains. The Red Army had a natural advantage in solving this problem. Most Red Army soldiers came from peasant backgrounds and were predominantly locals. In the First Front Red Army, "the percentage of local people was even higher, averaging three-quarters of the total." When marching through complex and rugged mountainous terrain, "for these native Red Army commanders and soldiers, it was like adding wings to a tiger." When the Red Army moved into unfamiliar environments to fight, they would recruit local soldiers to replenish their ranks. During the Long March, when the Red Army entered Tibetan areas, they specifically established a Tibetan Independent Division, where "most of the soldiers in the Independent Division were locals who were familiar with the regional situation."
However, if entering an entirely unfamiliar territory, a guide played a decisive role. After the Second and Sixth Corps of the Red Army arrived in Guizhou—a region with high mountains, deep valleys, and narrow roads—the greatest problem they faced was "unfamiliarity with the terrain" and "having no military maps, relying entirely on finding guides to ask for the way." Therefore, when marching in the mountains, the Red Army often sought local people to serve as guides. There were clear regulations on how to select a competent guide. Generally, they were required to be young and strong, capable of running on flat ground and climbing mountains; more importantly, they had to be "familiar with the routes, having a clear understanding of the paths forward, backward, and on both flanks." The Red Army required that guides be treated with warmth, "providing them with preferential material treatment and conducting political propaganda to ensure they led the way with peace of mind and loyalty."
In the southern topography, mountains and rivers often coexist; thus, "opening roads through mountains and building bridges over waters" was an inevitable problem encountered during mountain marches. The southern regions where the early Red Army operated were themselves characterized by developed water systems. In southern Jiangxi alone, amidst numerous mountain ranges and their spurs, there were over a thousand tributaries densely distributed, converging toward the center in a radial pattern to form nine major tributaries [3]. The water system in Western Fujian was even more characterized by a grid-like pattern, boasting the highest river network density in East China. During the Long March, according to incomplete statistics, the Red Army crossed 24 major rivers, including the Wujiang, Xiang, Jinsha, and Dadu Rivers. How to cross rivers became a difficult problem that the Red Army had to solve during its marches.
Regarding river-crossing techniques, due to the lack of technical equipment for constructing military bridges, the Red Army’s bridge-building work mostly relied on traditional methods. Generally, several strands of wire were twisted into a cable, the ends of which were fixed to both banks of the river, and wooden planks were laid horizontally across the cable to form a simple floating bridge. Bridge-building materials were primarily simple and practical. For example, in late November 1934, the Engineer Company of the 22nd Division of the Ninth Red Army Corps was ordered to build a bridge over the Xiang River near Jieshou, Guangxi. Under the pressure of time and the difficulty of gathering materials, the engineers carried door panels and bamboo rafts on their shoulders to erect a simple bridge, ensuring the Red Army’s breakthrough at the Xiang River. From January 3 to 6, 1935, various engineer companies and the Cadre Regiment built a floating bridge 300 meters long and 5 meters wide at Jiangjiehe using yellow bamboo and mountain timber, ensuring the Central Revolutionary Military Commission Column could cross the Wujiang River and head directly to Zunyi. When the Red Army forced a crossing of the Wujiang, they also used local materials, tying bamboo and wood from the banks into rafts and securing them to tree trunks, stakes, or rocks with thick ropes to create simple floating bridges for the troops.
Communication and liaison are "the eyes and ears of the army, bearing a heavy relationship to the victory or defeat of a battle," and this is especially true in mountain marches. From its inception, the Red Army placed special emphasis on communication to facilitate mountain movements, requiring soldiers to know how to scout enemy outposts and identify targets. At crossroads in complex terrain near the enemy, "guards had to be posted," and when the guard changed, "the enemy's movements had to be handed over." Flag signals, bugle calls, and verbal commands passed along the ranks were common means of liaison. After the founding of the Chinese Soviet Republic, the CPC established a Red Army Communications School in Ruijin, setting up eight major detachments for bugle calls, telephone, flag signals, and radio. Among them, six or seven hundred people studied the bugle, over one hundred studied flag signals, and dozens per term studied radio. Flag signaling was a method where the Red Army used different styles of flags and movements on mountain peaks to direct and transmit signals. Bugle calls were frequently used because they were unaffected by mountainous terrain or weather and could be sent from hidden locations. Every company in the Red Army had a bugler; they utilized different musical intervals of the brass bugle to transmit commands such as "advance," "retreat," and "rest." The Central Military and Political School of the Chinese Soviet Republic specifically published materials such as the Military Bugle Scores of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Red Army Whistle, Light, and Flag Signals for use in actual marches and battles. Verbal commands passed through the ranks was a method where short commands were relayed from soldier to soldier during a march, rapidly delivering the operational intent to every individual.
(3) Technical Characteristics of Mountain Marching
Mountain marching emphasizes secrecy; appearing and disappearing mysteriously and moving with phantom-like agility are basic requirements. Therefore, equipment had to be simple and not exceed regulation limits. Red Army commanders and fighters needed to know the direction of the march, the roads, and the destination in advance. During the march, military discipline had to be strictly observed to ensure swift movement, aiming to achieve victory through surprise with a rapid and decisive style. This marching style was employed from the very beginning of the Red Army. For instance, the term "walking in circles" (da quan), which frequently appeared in the early period, meant leading the enemy in circles and striking them swiftly when they became exhausted. During the first four "Encirclement and Suppression" campaigns, the Red Army utilized this tactic, using their superior mountain marching skills to implement the tactical principle of "utilizing terrain and features, maximizing firepower, destroying the enemy, and preserving oneself" in both military training and specific combat.
How to choose a route in mountain marching is the key to whether a battle can be won. In the first four campaigns against "Encirclement and Suppression," the Red Army used circuitous routes or "circling" tactics to bypass the enemy's spearhead, even moving a thousand li to maneuver against the foe. However, during the fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign and for a period during the Long March, the Red Army temporarily adopted a linear marching method, "as if always moving in a straight line toward a single destination along a route drawn on paper with a pencil." This was an erroneous tactic under the mistaken military guidance of Li De [4] and Bo Gu, which caused the Red Army to lose its advantage of flexibility and led to successive failures. Conversely, during the fifth "Encirclement and Suppression," the enemy learned from previous lessons and adopted a "curvilinear" marching method, making it impossible for the Red Army to predict their route. As the Kuomintang forces implemented this new method of warfare, the Red Army "found no opportunity for mobile warfare," which became a major tactical lesson of that campaign.
Following the Zunyi Meeting, the Red Army implemented a more mobile marching style, remaining in a state of high-speed flow for most of the time and boldly executing circuitous penetrations. With such marching routes, "the units naturally had to walk more and became more fatigued. However, the enemy could not grasp our movements, allowing us to conceal our intentions and transform the army from a state of passiveness to initiative." This tactic and marching technique were centrally applied and reflected in the Battle of Crossing the Chishui River Four Times, giving full play to the Red Army's advantage of flexibility. Under the conditions of the time, the Red Army had to overcome many difficulties to execute this tactic. Since the Yunnan-Guizhou region is characterized by high mountains, dense forests, and numerous rivers, and its mountainous towns are sparsely populated, the Red Army marched at high speeds for long durations with difficult supplies, often falling into food shortages. "The soldiers were not full and often marched on empty stomachs," yet they still had to "march every day, at least eighty li." To defeat the enemy, the Red Army overcame these difficulties with strong will and excellent military caliber, successfully achieving a strategic shift and breaking through the enemy's heavy encirclement. Although figures like Li De criticized "Crossing the Chishui Four Times" as "a month of exhaustion and useless wandering," facts proved that circuitous penetration and flexible marching were the tactics most suited to the Red Army.
II. Techniques of Nighttime Marching
Faced with the objective situation where the enemy was strong and the Red Army was weak, the Red Army had to adopt mountain marching tactics to avoid head-on battles under unfavorable conditions, while simultaneously giving full play to the advantages of nighttime marching and combat to harass and strike the enemy unexpectedly. With the cover of night, the Red Army could hide its tracks and evade enemy reconnaissance. During the Long March, the Red Army often found that "there were too many enemy planes, making it very difficult to march during the day." In this situation, to "conceal operational intentions and targets and prevent enemy reconnaissance and bombing, they adopted the method of resting during the day and marching at night." Nighttime marching thus became an important way for the Red Army to conceal itself and strike the enemy.
(1) Tactical Training for Nighttime Marching
When Mao Zedong established the Training Detachment of the Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Army at the Hunan-Jiangxi border in 1928, he particularly emphasized "strengthening nighttime training" and mastering the skill of "walking at night." Liu Bocheng, who was long engaged in Red Army military education, also repeatedly emphasized: "Night movement is a good habit of our troops and something the enemy fears." The Red Army should "prepare bayonet skills on the one hand, and step up training in nighttime march formations, assault formations, orientation, communications, reconnaissance, guarding, and even defensive positioning on the other."
The technical and tactical training for the Red Army's nighttime marching had a clear practical orientation. Xu Xiangqian once pointed out: Night marches and night battles...
"...all for the purpose of using speed to suppress the enemy and achieving a quick resolution. At night, the enemy retreats into their quarters; their ears and eyes are ineffective, making it easy for us to concentrate our forces, move with divine speed, and approach them in secrecy. At night, the enemy is often lax in their precautions and sleeps soundly, making it easy for us to catch them unawares and break through with a surprise attack. At night, the enemy’s field of vision is limited, and the superiority of their firearms and firepower is difficult to bring into play, making it easy for us to leverage our specialty in close-quarters combat and resolve the battle quickly. At night, it is not easy for the enemy to ascertain the Red Army’s strength; at the first sound of a gun, they perceive every bush and tree as an enemy soldier [5], also making it easy for us to achieve the effect of the few defeating the many." Precisely because night marches could effectively weaken the enemy's superior equipment and numbers, they became a key subject of the Red Army's military training.
The Red Army’s night marching and night combat training began with the basics, including emergency night assemblies and rapidly donning gear to prepare for battle within a short timeframe. Night marching and combat placed particular emphasis on vision and hearing; therefore, daily training focused on skills such as rapidly judging the enemy's position, accurately identifying friend from foe in the chaotic darkness, and smoothly navigating obstacles during a night march to reach the destination quickly. To strengthen night vision during the specific training process, the Red Army frequently simulated night marching and combat scenarios, carrying out actions according to actual combat requirements after nightfall. Night military technical training was also a vital link, specifically including night shooting, grenade throwing, and bayonet charging, all of which had to be continuously improved through concrete drills. At the same time, executing actual tactics such as offensives, defenses, night raids, and night infiltrations during night marches were important components of the Red Army’s daily training.
In night march combat training, Red Army commanders and fighters also had to train at designated locations in full gear, especially training the ability to move in silence at night. In the specific training process, they practiced the ability to move noiselessly by frequently performing vigorous jumps while changing postures. If any sound was made during the drill, they had to re-adjust their gear and continue practicing until not even the slightest sound could be heard even during violent jumping. Through continuous training, the Red Army's night marching and night combat capabilities were greatly enhanced. When the 265th Regiment marched at night, they were as silent as "civet cats prowling at night"; passing through villages, they could "prevent chickens and dogs from being startled or barking, and in battle, they could weave through enemy formations freely without being detected." Moreover, they could "maintain command structures and communications even in situations of severe melee," thereby earning the title of "Night Tigers."
(2) Technical Essentials of Night Road Marching
When the Red Army marched at night, they generally transmitted information via bugle calls or whistles. Bamboo forests are dense in mountainous areas, so the Red Army often used local materials, utilizing bamboo to create a "bamboo tube signal." This involved taking a section of bamboo, cutting one end open with a knife, and then inserting a thick piece of burning incense in the middle to release a signal. To identify approaching persons at night, the Red Army used bamboo to make a type of liaison whistle. The sound of this bamboo whistle was shrill and piercing, audible even amidst the thunder of artillery fire. Due to long-term night marching, the Red Army was also very skilled in making torches. Some were made by hollowing out bamboo tubes and filling them with kerosene; some used pine branches and resin gathered from the mountains for illumination; others directly found thinner dry bamboo, bundled them, and lit them. Such torches were not only bright but also long-burning. Although torches could illuminate the night path, they also easily exposed one's position during a night march. Therefore, the Red Army had clear regulations on the number of torches during night marches. For example, before the start of the Long March, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission explicitly ordered that during night marches, each mess unit was permitted to light three torches, and those carrying loads [6] were allowed one torch for every six loads. If a night march occurred under enemy threat, or if troops entered plains, approached "White areas" [7], or entered a combat state, torches were no longer permitted. When implementing aerial concealment, all items that could expose the target had to be hidden, especially easily identifiable white objects. During night marches, all red or white clothing and caps worn by combat units were dyed gray or green; even "white horses had to be dyed black or green without exception." During the third campaign against "Encirclement and Suppression" [8], the Red Army, during its night marches, "subjected all items that could produce sound or light to silenced and lightless treatment, even painting white horses black." To avoid leaking information, "if a fork in the road was encountered during the march, no road signs were set; markers [soldiers] were used instead." In night marches without enemy threats and lacking torchlight, because white is easily seen and black or dark colors are difficult to distinguish, white objects became the Red Army's "guiding beacons." When the Red Army marched, each person was issued a white towel to be draped over the shoulder or tied to the arm; the person behind could then fix their eyes on the white dot in front and grope forward in the darkness. Zhao Rong of the Ninth Army Group recorded a scene of a night march during the "Four Crossings of the Chishui River" [9] in his diary: "It rained continuously throughout the night, and it was so dark you couldn't see your hand in front of your face. This caused great difficulty for our march; we had no choice but to wrap white towels around our necks, and the people behind followed by watching the white shadows in front."
(3) Technical Characteristics of Night Road Marching
Concealment and absolute secrecy were the greatest characteristics of night road marching.
During the third campaign against "Encirclement and Suppression" in July 1931, facing the menacing Nationalist [10] troops, the Red Army—then still in Fujian—decided to avoid the enemy's main force and take a thousand-li detour from Western Fujian back to Southern Jiangxi to concentrate forces and seek opportunities for battle. On the way back, the Red Army encountered Nationalist troops. To slip through the 20-li wide gap between the units of Chen Cheng, Han Deqin, and Luo Zhuoying, the Third Army Group decided to move at night. This night march mission could be described as "dancing on the edge of a blade." To ensure the plan was foolproof and avoid detection by the enemy, the Red Army established strict night marching regulations before the departure. It was required that during the night march, "all reflective items carried, such as iron buckets and vegetable basins used by the mess units, must be wrapped in dark cloth or paper; firearms, ammunition, canteens, and grain bags carried by individuals must be checked and practiced with tirelessly to ensure no sound is made during the night movement." On the night the mission was executed, "there was no moonlight; the soldiers followed one after another, no one speaking or coughing—only the rustle of rapid, light footsteps. Whenever crossing a bridge, a ditch, or other obstacles, squad and platoon leaders would automatically stop, standing to one side to guide and assist others, only following the tail of the column after everyone had passed." The troops set out at 10:00 PM that night, and after more than four hours of rapid, silent night forced marching, they successfully passed through the narrow mountainous terrain blockaded by the Nationalist army at 2:00 AM the next morning without being detected.
Agile tactical response capability was an essential quality for night road marching. When encountering unexpected emergencies or enemy situations during a night march, one had to adapt flexibly based on the actual circumstances.
In September 1935, when the Red Army entered Gansu territory during the Long March, the Left Column marched to Gongyipǔ and its surroundings to camp and rest. Quite thrillingly, at 10:00 PM, a large number of enemies were suddenly discovered only 15 li from the station. The troops immediately decided to escape the enemy by marching at night; during the march, "it was forbidden to light lanterns or torches, and bugling, smoking, shouting, and coughing were prohibited." Ultimately, they avoided the enemy in silence.
Precisely because night operations offered numerous advantages, the Red Army often implemented night marches during major actions. For instance, at the start of the Long March, the Central Revolutionary Military Commission clearly pointed out: "To conceal movements and avoid aerial reconnaissance and bombing, night marches should be employed. Assemble before dusk, move after dusk, and stop at dawn." During the Long March, the Red Army mostly marched at night. Chen Yun once said that during the first eight months of the Long March from October 1935 to June 1936, the troops' marches "were still often night marches." During the Long March, the Nationalist army, relying on its command of the air, conducted frequent reconnaissance and bombing of the Red Army; night marching could quite effectively evade such dangers. The Nationalist troops, in the process of chasing and intercepting the Red Army, also discovered that the Red Army's "actions were mostly in the dead of night, with each person carrying a bamboo tube containing burning incense. They climbed mountains and crossed ridges, avoiding the roads."
Of course, although night marching could catch the enemy off guard and inflict heavy damage, or escape powerful enemies through high concealment, there were also many uncontrollable accidental factors. The most common was taking the wrong road or taking an unnecessarily long route.
In February 1930, the Longzhou Uprising troops marched at night through a range of high, rugged mountains with unfamiliar terrain. After marching all night, they found they were still in the same spot. They finally realized that because it was too dark to find the exit, the troops had been turning in circles on a "pantuó road" [11] all night. When blocked by mountains or water, under the same terrain conditions, marching across mountains and crossing rivers at night was naturally more difficult than during the day. During night marches on the Long March, the Red Army "whenever encountering a narrow pass, an ascent or descent, or crossing a bridge or water," realized that if the vanguard was obstructed, it often caused the entire column to "take three steps and stop for ten," greatly slowing the overall march. Additionally, unpredictable severe weather was a major test often faced by the Red Army during night marches. If the weather suddenly changed during a night march, with violent wind and torrential rain drenching both men and horses, the march might cover only a few kilometers in an entire night. Unpredictable road conditions during night marches could also cause delays. In March 1934, during a night assault by the 5th Army, "due to the darkness and slippery roads, movements were sluggish; soon after the attack began, dawn broke, and the enemy immediately split their forces to counterattack." Consequently, our side missed the tactical opportunity and achieved little.
III. Techniques of Rapid Marching
Although the Red Army's equipment was simple, they "honed two sets of skills in the practice of war: walking and fighting." The exercise of these two skills "was inseparable from the word 'speed'." The Red Army's extraordinary marching speed was demonstrated in numerous campaigns, and the ability to march rapidly was, in turn, a reflection of the Red Army's solid organizational discipline and political work.
(1) The Marching Speed of the Red Army
During the Red Army's early founding period, its daily marching speed could reach over a hundred li. For example, when the 5th Army returned from Ruijin to the Jinggang Mountains, the troops marched 80 to 90 li a day, or even over 100 li. During the Longzhou Uprising, when the 8th Army established the connection between Longzhou and Baise, they covered 120 li in a single night march. During the Jinggang Mountains period, the Red Army's marching speed further increased. Based on the requirements of guerrilla tactics, Zhu De repeatedly emphasized the importance of "running fast, fighting fast, ending fast, and shifting fast," focusing on training rapid units to conduct "flying" lightning raids on poorly defended areas to achieve the tactical effect of catching the enemy by surprise. Even in harsh environments where marching and camping were extremely difficult and the enemy pursued in shifts, the Red Army could still maintain an average daily forced march of over 90 li. In September 1929, the 5th Column of the 5th Army crossed the Mufu Mountain range; to maintain stealth and maneuverability, they mostly marched at night and camped at dawn, covering 120 to 140 li per night in mountainous terrain.
During the period of anti-"Encirclement and Suppression," the Red Army's marching speed was further tempered. During the second anti-"Encirclement and Suppression" campaign, the Red Army created the brilliant record of sweeping across 700 li within half a month. In the third campaign, they again used continuous forced marches and night marches to bypass the enemy over a thousand li, shattering the Nationalist "Encirclement and Suppression." In October 1932, the Red Army took advantage of the unfinished deployment of the Nationalist "Encirclement and Suppression" against the Central Soviet Area to seize the initiative through rapid marching. Luo Binghui led his unit on a forced march of over 140 li, capturing two county seats in a single day, and was praised by Zhu De as the "Two-Legged Cavalry." In the writings of foreign journalist Nym Wales, Luo Binghui's unit "was a special mobile force, specializing in raiding and dispersing enemy troops so they could not concentrate to attack the main Red Army," thus calling him the "Divine Traveler" [12], and the army he led was called the "Divine Army."
Regarding the marching speed during the Red Army's Long March, the famous "Luding Bridge" incident is widely known. During the dash to seize the bridge, the Red Army completed a forced march of 240 li in one day and night, finally arriving at Luding Bridge on schedule and defeating the deployed Nationalist defenders. At an altitude of nearly 2,500 meters, the Red Army created the extreme marching record of "two hundred and forty li in a day and night" to seize Luding Bridge, shattering Chiang Kai-shek's attempt to make the Central Red Army a "second Shi Dakai" [13]. Such an extreme marching speed led Edgar Snow to wonder whether the Red Army soldiers "were men, or madmen, or gods." The marching speed during the Long March can also be glimpsed from the diary of Xiao Feng, Director of the Touring Inspection Team of the Political Department of the 1st Division, First Army Group. Xiao Feng’s diary covers about 200 days of the march, but fewer than 200 days have recorded distances. Based on the actual recorded days and distances, the First Army Group's average daily marching speed during the Long March could reach 80 li, and sometimes the daily speed exceeded 100 li. For example, when the First Army Group was racing to cross the Jiaoping Ferry, it was required that they "must cover more than 130 to 140 li a day" and "the time limit must not be delayed," traveling day and night to reach Jiaoping Ferry and complete the crossing mission. After arriving at Wuqi Town in Northern Shaanxi, Mao Zedong once spoke with Xiao Feng about the Long March route. According to Mao Zedong, not counting night marches, the Red Army marched for about 267 days, with the longest distance covered being 25,000 li. Calculated this way, the Red Army's average daily speed could reach 93 li; if night march mileage is included, the Red Army's daily marching speed was no less than 100 li. According to Dong Biwu, under conditions of Nationalist pursuit and interception and extremely complex terrain, the Red Army could march 60 to 80 li a day—and even faster if they had straw sandals. Even when marching through the Great Grasslands, they could average about 35 to 40 li per day.
(2) Prerequisites and Guarantees for Rapid Marching
The reason the Red Army could defeat the strong as the weak and overcome the enemy was its reliance on a rapid and flexible marching style. The formation of this style was backed by firm faith, a strong will, and endurance beyond that of ordinary people. The cultivation of these excellent qualities required meticulous political work and strict organizational discipline as guarantees.
Political work is the lifeline for cultivating the Red Army’s formidable marching capabilities. During long-duration, high-intensity marches, physical and mental exhaustion are inevitable, and grievances often arise. Red Army political cadres remained constantly attentive to fluctuations in soldier morale; following any major battle or arduous long-distance movement, they would foster a positive political atmosphere through political propaganda. Singing was a powerful weapon for mobilization and propaganda. Whenever traversing difficult terrain, "propagandists from the propaganda teams would sing a few verses of the songs everyone loved, encouraging the soldiers to press forward and bravely kill the enemy." Even during rests lasting only a dozen minutes, "comrades from the Soldiers' Committee [14] would perform agitation work, putting on a small show or singing folk songs. The valleys and forests were filled with a joyous atmosphere; everyone forgot their fatigue and the scorching heat." The Red Army sang while on the march and while resting; even on the battlefield, singing was sometimes used to "restore the combatants' courage." For a Red Army soldier, singing a good song during a march or battle was worth as much as a formal political lecture.
Strict organizational discipline was an equally vital guarantee for the Red Army’s rapid marching. The fundamental reason why the Red Army could create such miracles of rapid marching lay in the "excellent political quality" of the troops. This was the key factor that allowed rapid marching to become a specialized advantage of the Red Army—one that other armies could neither emulate nor achieve. Since its inception, the Red Army placed the exemplary observance of organizational discipline in a prominent position; only a force that strictly follows discipline can be called an "Iron Red Army." While marching, Red Army soldiers strictly adhered to discipline: "They could not speak, cough, or leave footprints. To erase their tracks, they had to straighten the grass they had stepped on. When walking on rainy days, they would walk forward and then back up, or simply walk in the riverbeds; furthermore, they could not lose anything, lest the items float downstream for the enemy to discover and track them." When encountering geographic bottlenecks that threatened marching speed, the Red Army’s strict adherence to organizational discipline ensured smooth and orderly movement; the most typical example is river crossings. The most striking challenge of a river crossing is the convergence of a large force onto a single point; without rigorous organization and discipline, conflict, congestion, and blockages would inevitably occur, severely impacting marching speed. However, the Red Army was able to cross rivers smoothly under extremely tense and perilous conditions many times. The key lay in meticulous organizational management. For instance, when the First Army Group crossed the Gan River from Zhangshu Town, extremely detailed regulations were made regarding the crossing sequence, security, dock routes, dock allocation, number of personnel per boat, issues with horses and luggage, night illumination, and rest areas after crossing—accounting for almost every possible contingency. To ensure a smooth crossing, the Red Army established a specialized River Crossing Command, and all crossing units were subject to its orders. Upon receiving orders, units had to strictly follow crossing discipline and advance according to bugle calls. Each boat was numbered, the capacity was fixed, and seating orders were clearly marked. Several people were not allowed to board at once; they could only board in a single-file column. Even when "the Army Group Commander or Division Commander crossed, they had to board in sequence and obey the River Crossing Command without the slightest deviation."
IV. Conclusion
The exploration of the Red Army's marching issues from a micro-technical perspective demonstrates that the goal of their marching was to "strive for victory with certainty." They moved "sometimes to the east and sometimes to the west, sometimes on main roads and sometimes on footpaths, sometimes on old routes and sometimes on new ones"—all to seek favorable timing and geography to "achieve victory in battle under advantageous conditions." Therefore, the Red Army’s unique marching and combat style was not a simple matter of hiding or evading; rather, it was about disrupting the enemy through unpredictable movements, seeking opportunities for battle, and annihilating the enemy with swift and decisive combat. Objectively speaking, this unique marching style was a necessity born of the reality where the enemy was strong and we were weak. Compared to a powerful enemy, the Red Army’s victory depended both on superior strategic positioning and on precise tactical innovation. After the Autumn Harvest Uprising [15], the majority of the CCP’s armed forces retreated to the Jinggang Mountains [16]. The Kuomintang general Chen Cheng immediately concluded that after a series of military setbacks, the "remnant forces [of the CCP] were negligible and unable to attempt any large-scale actions. To prolong their dying breath, they have taken to the Jinggang Mountains in western Jiangxi like outlaws [17]; this is likely only a temporary measure of desperation. As for any grand plan to build a base area, it is probably out of the question at this point." However, much to the opponent's surprise, Red Army leaders represented by Mao Zedong and Zhu De [18] proactively adjusted their strategic thinking and changed their methods of regular warfare. They quickly established a foothold and took root in the mountainous regions, adjusting specific marching techniques according to the characteristics of mountain guerrilla warfare, eventually turning "a single spark into a prairie fire" [19].
The Red Army’s excellent techniques for rapid marching on mountain roads at night were an important characteristic of its tactical level. This practice of marching and combat essentially established the military style of the CCP’s armed forces and was inherited and developed in subsequent historical periods. For example, an American veteran who participated in the Korean War mentioned in his memoirs: "No one has studied just how excellent and rapid the Chinese marching was." American commanders "never expected the Chinese to launch an attack in this manner—not primarily through frontal assaults, but by flanking the enemy on foot at night and striking the weakest link." Even during the day, the Chinese could rely on their superior marching ability to "disappear into the high mountains of Korea." In fact, the Chinese had "transformed the greatest American advantage—the need for good road conditions due to reliance on heavy weaponry—into a weakness." The tactical innovation of the Red Army in difficult environments, and the "wisdom of struggle" contained within—creating initiative in adversity and seeking adaptability in a predicament—is a significant force that cannot be ignored in its influence on the CCP's revolutionary practice and historical trajectory.