Zhou Tianyu: From Domestic Conflict to International Debut: The CCP and the Issue of Representation at the San Francisco Conference
As 1945 and the end of the Second World War drew near, the postwar peaceful order became the focus of the international community, led by the four great powers—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. The United Nations emerged in response to this need. Existing research on the Nationalist (Kuomintang) government’s active preparations for the founding of the UN is already quite extensive. Scholarly discussions centering on the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), however, have primarily focused on the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference (also known as the United Nations Conference on International Organization), the CPC's struggle to secure participation, the significance of Dong Biwu’s attendance, and the itinerary of his activities in the United States. Nevertheless, compared to diplomatic analyses of the CPC sending representatives to San Francisco, there is currently little research exploring changes in its propaganda strategies in connection with its domestic and international political goals. In particular, insufficient attention has been paid to the interaction between the "coalition government" negotiations and the composition of the Chinese delegation, as well as the CPC's propaganda strategy regarding Dong Biwu's visit abroad. In fact, the issue of the Chinese delegation's membership at the San Francisco Conference witnessed the CPC's growth from a party lacking international experience into a mature political party possessing both international and domestic perspectives. This article intends to utilize relevant archival documents to reconstruct, to the greatest extent possible, the intricate internal and external situations faced by the CPC around the time of the San Francisco Conference, thereby exploring the CPC's early views on international society on the eve of the UN's founding and the corresponding changes in its propaganda strategy.
I. "Coalition Government": The Historical Background of the CPC’s Struggle for Seats at the San Francisco Conference
The determination of the core principles of the "United Nations" began with the Atlantic Charter reached by the leaders of the US and Britain in 1941 and the Declaration by United Nations signed on New Year's Day 1942 by 22 nations, including the US, USSR, UK, and China, after the outbreak of the Pacific War. As the situation in WWII gradually favored the Allies, US President Roosevelt began planning the establishment of a postwar peaceful institutional entity. After the "Four-Nation Declaration" in Moscow at the end of 1943 and the Tehran Conference twice confirmed the vision of the four great powers as the center of the emerging international organization, representatives of the US and Britain met successively with Soviet and Chinese representatives at Dumbarton Oaks in the autumn of 1944. They determined the "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization," which became the embryonic form of the United Nations Charter. Throughout this process, the government of the Republic of China participated actively. The CPC side primarily used newspapers as a forum for public opinion to actively support the relevant meetings, but in reality, they failed to obtain a fair opportunity to participate in the various negotiations. Taking the Dumbarton Oaks Conference from August to October 1944 as an example, although the CPC’s two major party newspapers (Liberation Daily and Xinhua Daily) [1] actively reprinted the "Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization," the CPC lacked channels to fully understand the specific process of the negotiations due to various bans and restrictions by the Kuomintang (KMT).
Despite this, the CPC continued to closely monitor the international situation and, especially from 1944 onward, actively carried out external work. An important context for this change was the KMT military’s ineffective resistance against Japan on the frontal battlefield. As KMT rule became increasingly corrupt, it suffered a massive retreat in Henan, Hunan, and Guangxi while responding to the Japanese military’s "Operation Ichigo." Meanwhile, the CPC-led battlefields behind enemy lines, after a long and arduous war of resistance, began to gradually reverse the difficult situation starting in 1943, launching offensive operations against Japanese and puppet forces in some areas. One was retreating while the other was advancing, forming a sharp contrast. Against this backdrop, the US government attached increasing importance to the strategic value of the CPC’s anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines. Between July and August 1944, the Headquarters of the US Forces in the China-Burma-India Theater dispatched the United States Army Observer Group (the "Dixie Mission") [2] in two groups of 18 people to Yan'an. CPC leaders attached great importance to this, meeting with them many times in hopes of facilitating communication between the CPC and the outside world and more broadly propagating the Party’s propositions. To assess subsequent diplomatic activities, the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee [3], which possessed rich experience in foreign contact, suggested to the Central Committee on August 16: "We must pay constant attention to researching international activities (such as the Post-War Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the international movement to aid China, postwar peace plans, etc.), and prepare to propose our own opinions." The "postwar peace plans" primarily referred to the "United Nations" then under deliberation. On August 18, the CPC Central Committee issued the "Directive on Foreign Affairs Work," viewing the visits of foreign journalists and the US Army Observer Group to the Border Region [4] as the "development of the international united front" and "the beginning of our diplomatic work." Furthermore, the Central Committee proposed that an international united front centered on "joint resistance against Japan and democratic cooperation" was "not only a necessity during the War of Resistance, but also a possibility after the war." This demonstrated the CPC's natural support for and endorsement of the future UN entity.
From September 1944, the KMT-CPC negotiations entered a new stage. At that time, on the eve of the third session of the Third People’s Political Council [5], the CPC Central Committee believed that "the timing is now ripe for our Party to propose a government reorganization to the KMT and to domestic and foreign audiences." On September 15, the CPC representative Lin Boqu publicly proposed for the first time at the People’s Political Council: "It is hoped that the KMT will immediately end the period of one-party rule," convene a National Affairs Conference, and "organize a coalition government of all anti-Japanese parties." On September 27, in a letter drafted by Mao Zedong for Lin Boqu to KMT representatives Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong, this proposition was reiterated. This letter was delivered on October 13, but never received a positive response from the KMT.
Internationally, the US government was particularly concerned about China’s domestic political situation. As the war neared victory, the US government hoped "to have Chiang Kai-shek unify China’s military forces and make some reforms to establish a government in China that could effectively adapt to the interests of the American ruling class." Under these circumstances, Roosevelt sent former US Secretary of War Patrick J. Hurley to China as a presidential special envoy. In the early period of Hurley’s arrival in China, US policy was to prevent the collapse of the KMT regime and have Hurley mediate KMT-CPC relations. In November 1944, Hurley flew to Yan'an and expressed agreement with the CPC’s proposition to abolish the KMT’s one-party dictatorship and establish a coalition government. After three days of negotiations, Hurley and the CPC leaders jointly drafted the "Agreement between the National Government of China, the Kuomintang of China, and the Communist Party of China (Draft)." However, Chiang Kai-shek believed the democratic reforms stipulated in this agreement would threaten KMT rule and refused to accept it. Hurley also abandoned his support for the establishment of a democratic coalition government that he had expressed in Yan'an and publicly sided with Chiang Kai-shek. It became difficult for negotiations to continue. Nevertheless, the CPC Central Committee still believed that for the moment "the negotiations have no result, but the door to negotiation has not been closed." On January 7, 1945, Hurley wrote to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, proposing a meeting between the KMT and CPC in Yan'an with his participation. On the 11th, Mao Zedong replied: "I fear such a meeting would yield no result," and the CPC proposed instead "convening a preparatory meeting for a National Affairs Conference in Chongqing; this preparatory meeting should have representatives from three parties—the KMT, the CPC, and the China Democratic League—and guarantee that the meeting be held publicly, with representatives of all parties having equal status and freedom of movement."
Although the CPC’s plan to first convene a party conference and then form a "coalition government" did not receive support from the KMT or the US in late January 1945, at the end of the month, Wang Shijie and Zhang Zhizhong changed their attitude during negotiations, "verbally admitting that one-party rule should be ended" and "tending toward convening a party conference." On February 1, Wang Shijie also strongly urged Chiang Kai-shek of the necessity of seeking a "political solution" to the CPC problem. On February 2, after negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Wang Shijie, both sides felt their views were converging. Zhou Enlai reported to Yan'an that night, "It is possible for Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Shijie to accept a party conference." On the same day, Wang Shijie also mentioned in his diary, "Regarding the matter of convening certain persons outside the KMT and non-partisan personages for consultative negotiations, both sides have generally agreed."
Mao Zedong closely monitored the progress of the negotiations and remained highly vigilant regarding the change in the KMT's attitude. On February 3, 1945, after analyzing several reports from Zhou Enlai, Mao sent two consecutive telegrams in response. In the first telegram, he sharply analyzed the reasons for the KMT's significant compromise toward the CPC in the context of the global situation. Mao believed that, on the one hand, the results of the Yalta Conference were about to be made public ("Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin are already meeting, and the results will be seen in a few days"); on the other hand, the European theater was nearing its end, and "the possibility of the Soviet Union participating in Eastern affairs is increasing." Thus, "both the Americans and Chiang are anxious to seek a political compromise with us." Based on this, in the second telegram, Mao decisively instructed Zhou Enlai that, in addition to insisting on the abolition of party rule, he should emphasize four points: the suppression of secret agents, giving the people real freedom, the release of political prisoners, and the withdrawal of the encirclement of the Border Regions. He asked Zhou to tell Hurley, Soong Tse-ven (T.V. Soong), Wang Shijie, and Zhang Zhizhong directly: "If these four points are not achieved first, it cannot be proven that the abolition of party rule and the implementation of democracy are not a hoax, and it will be extremely difficult for us to join the government." This shows that in early February, when the international situation was unclear, Mao decided to stand firm on the negotiation conditions. On February 13, accompanied by Hurley, Zhou Enlai met with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang refused to accept the proposition of establishing a coalition government, declaring that "organizing a coalition government is tantamount to overthrowing the government, and a party conference is equivalent to a meeting for dividing the spoils." Under these circumstances, KMT-CPC negotiations could not continue.
II. The Clash Between the KMT and CPC over the Composition of the Chinese Delegation to the San Francisco Conference
The two issues—the KMT-CPC negotiations and the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference—intersected in mid-February 1945. In response to a statement made by Wang Shijie at a press conference for foreign journalists on February 14 that distorted the truth of the negotiations, Zhou Enlai issued a statement on behalf of the CPC Central Committee the following day. He explained that because the KMT government insisted during negotiations that the CPC hand over its army, refused to end the one-party dictatorship, and opposed a democratic coalition government, the negotiations had yielded no result. This statement was published in the Liberation Daily on February 17. On the same page of the same day, the newspaper published a special editorial praising the Crimea Conference (i.e., the Yalta Conference) for "resolving the important disagreement regarding the voting procedures of the Security Council in the international peace and security organization, making the rapid convening of a United Nations conference possible." The editorial also highlighted the news from the Yalta Conference "announcing the convening of a United Nations conference in San Francisco on April 25 of this year and inviting our country to participate as a co-convener." The CPC, which previously had no opportunity to participate in any meetings regarding the preparation of the UN, put forward a brand-new demand: "The San Francisco International Conference opening on April 25 should permit the KMT dictatorial government to appoint at most one-third of the representatives; the other two-thirds should be appointed by the CPC, the China Democratic League, and prominent non-partisan personages as representatives of the Chinese Liberated Areas, the occupied areas, and the vast population of the Great Rear Area." [6]
Combined with the situation where KMT-CPC negotiations were on the verge of breakdown due to the propositions of a "party conference" and "coalition government," the CPC's demand regarding the proportion of personnel in the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference highlighted its desire to push the "coalition government" theory into the international community. This was intended to expose the fact of the KMT's dictatorship and win the support of international public opinion. On February 17, the English-language broadcast from Yan'an explicitly linked the joint statement of the Yalta Conference with the two issues of "coalition government" and the "one-party dictatorial (KMT) fascists." The broadcast pointed out: "The joint statement of the leaders of the three great powers has strengthened our confidence in democracy and promoted the formation of a coalition government. This is a heavy blow to those fascist followers obsessed with one-party dictatorship." By linking domestic KMT-CPC negotiations with the international San Francisco Conference, the CPC achieved a linked propaganda effect between domestic and international situations. This broadcast immediately drew the attention of the United States; George Atcheson, the US Chargé d’Affaires in China, promptly reported the transcript of the broadcast to Secretary of State Stettinius.
Also on February 17, Xinhua Daily reported speeches by China Democratic League leaders Zuo Shunsheng, Shen Junru, and Zhang Bojun, emphasizing that the democratic principles of the Yalta Treaty "also apply to the Far East." They called for the following: "For China to achieve success and obtain its proper status at the San Francisco Conference, it must appear before the people of the world as a democratic and unified China. The issue of party unity and the issue of a democratic coalition government must be resolved quickly." On the same day, an editorial in that paper also emphasized: "The decisions of the Crimea Conference show that the tide of world democracy is irresistible. The problem of China's internal unification must also find a fair and reasonable solution through democratic channels."
On February 18, Zhou Enlai cabled Patrick J. Hurley, formally presenting the CPC's demands regarding the composition of the Chinese delegation. However, Hurley refused, insisting that only the Republic of China could "represent China." He further emphasized that "the San Francisco Conference is an international conference, not a conference of various domestic political parties." In light of this, on the 25th, the CPC Central Committee instructed Wang Ruofei, Secretary of the Southern Bureau Work Committee: "The San Francisco Conference can only serve to promote the domestic democratic movement; it cannot yet be said that Chiang [Kai-shek] will necessarily make concessions before this conference. The conditions to truly force Chiang into making concessions are not yet fully ripe." The instruction continued, "Since all parties currently advocate that the selection of representatives should include all anti-Japanese democratic forces, we hope to launch a movement based on our Party’s position to prove that the Kuomintang (KMT) cannot represent the public will of the entire nation." This clearly demonstrates that when objective conditions were restricted, the CPC actively shifted its strategy, preparing to use the issue of delegation seats as a pretext to proactively launch a domestic public opinion campaign against the KMT's dictatorship.
At this time, Chiang Kai-shek was also facing pressure from both within and outside the KMT. On February 20, 1945, Chiang recorded: "After the declaration of the Black Sea Three-Power Conference (i.e., the Yalta Conference), the Communist bandits [7] used the word 'democracy' therein for fierce propaganda, threatening to weaken the international status of my government by demanding representation at the San Francisco Conference. Nearly everyone inside and outside the Party is intimidated by them, feeling as though a great disaster is again imminent for my government." That same day, KMT veteran Zou Lu also urged Chiang: "If no compromise can be reached with the CPC before the San Francisco Conference, our international status cannot be preserved." The following day, Chiang received a suggestion from Patrick Hurley, relayed by the Chinese Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Fu Bingchang, stating: "(Ambassador Hurley believes) the reorganization of my government to include the Communists should also be realized at an early date, preferably before the end of the war in Europe."
Despite these circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek maintained a hardline stance. On March 1, 1945, Chiang delivered a speech reiterating that the government could only return power to a "National Assembly" rather than a "conference of various parties and factions or a coalition government," and he unilaterally set a date for convening this so-called "National Assembly." This move undoubtedly proved that Chiang had abandoned further peace talks. On March 2, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the CPC Central Committee to Wang Ruofei, noting that Chiang's speech proved that Wang Shijie’s claims about accepting a multi-party conference, that "ending party tutelage [8] can be discussed," and that "the government can be reorganized" were all "deceptions."
As the KMT-CPC peace talks were about to collapse, a telegram sent by Wang Ruofei to Mao Zedong on March 6, 1945, mentioned rumors that Chiang Kai-shek might appoint a CPC representative to the San Francisco Conference. This new intelligence led the CPC to reconsider the possibility and candidates for sending a representative. On March 7, Mao Zedong issued an instruction: "Propose our candidates to Wang Shijie to prevent Chiang from making arbitrary appointments." That same day, Zhou Enlai wrote to Wang Shijie. In addition to continuing to emphasize the proportions of the delegation, he designated the CPC’s preliminary list: "Central Committee members Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, and Qin Bangxian." Furthermore, Zhou cited the inclusiveness of the American and British delegations toward different political parties, sternly pointing out that if the KMT intended to "monopolize" the delegation list, it would be "not only unfair and unreasonable, but also representative of a secessionist stance." On March 9, Zhou Enlai informed Hurley, who had returned to the United States, of the contents of this letter and asked him to relay it to Roosevelt.
Under these conditions, the CPC did not relax its leadership over the domestic democratic movement. On March 8, 1945, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the CPC Central Committee, ordering Wang Ruofei to focus on persuading the China Democratic League (CDL) [9] to coordinate with the CPC in a counter-strike, and to secretly print and distribute the Libertion Daily (Jiefang Ribao) article critiquing Chiang Kai-shek's speech. He also reiterated the need to integrate the advocacy for a "conference of parties" and "coalition government" with the propaganda campaign for the San Francisco Conference: "After Chiang’s speech, we must insist everywhere on a series of propositions: a conference of parties, the end of party tutelage, a coalition government, and unrestrained post-war National Assembly elections, so as to dampen Chiang’s arrogance. Even if the San Francisco Conference refuses to allow figures from the CPC or CDL to attend, we should still propose it to 'lay the groundwork' (作伏笔)."
To "lay the groundwork" meant that the CPC intended to use Chiang Kai-shek's refusal to include CPC and CDL representatives in the Chinese delegation as a new weapon to "dampen Chiang's arrogance." In other words, the CPC framed the composition of the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference as a new focal point for domestic public opinion to attack Chiang's dictatorial rule.
To this end, the CPC carried out large-scale propaganda and reporting. In the twenty days before the KMT government officially announced the delegation list at the end of March 1945, the Liberation Daily continuously reported that the military, government, and civilians in various anti-Japanese base areas were actively responding to the paper's previous editorial suggestion: that the proportion of CPC and CDL representatives should comprise two-thirds of the Chinese delegation. As always, the reporting emphasized the link between "the participation of CPC and CDL representatives in the San Francisco Conference" and the "establishment of a coalition government" to drive the domestic democratic movement. On March 21, Zuo Shunsheng, Secretary-General of the CDL, wrote to Chiang Kai-shek, urging him to accommodate CPC representatives in the Chinese delegation. This shows that the democratic movement initiated by the CPC not only created domestic public opinion pressure but also influenced the delegation list by affecting the leaders of democratic parties. This was one of the key reasons why Chiang Kai-shek eventually agreed to accept a CPC representative in the Chinese delegation.
In addition, the "American factor" was a variable that contributed to the CPC obtaining representation. On March 15, 1945, Roosevelt cabled Chiang Kai-shek, following Zhou Enlai's logic regarding the multi-party inclusivity of the U.S. and British delegations, and tactfully suggested that the Chinese delegation "include Communists or other political combinations or parties." However, this telegram did not reach the U.S. Embassy in China until the 22nd. On the 23rd, after detailed discussions with Wellington Koo (Gu Weijun), Chiang "decided to appoint one person from the CPC to the San Francisco Conference delegation." On the 26th, at a National Defense Council meeting, Chiang "decided to appoint Dong Biwu." That same day, Chiang replied to Roosevelt, introducing the party affiliations of the Chinese delegation: "The Chinese government has today appointed ten representatives, six of whom are members of the People's Political Council [10], including one each from the Communist Party and two other opposition parties outside the KMT, as well as three non-party personages, including the manager of the Ta Kung Pao." On the 27th, the Executive Yuan of the KMT government officially went public with the delegation list.
Although the number of representatives did not meet the CPC’s initial demands, the CPC Central Committee accepted it for the sake of the overall interest, considering the importance of the post-war peace conference and the expectations of people at home and abroad for peace. On March 27, Zhou Enlai drafted a telegram for the CPC Central Committee to Wang Ruofei: "Since the list of representatives for the San Francisco Conference has been announced, out of a desire to accommodate the situation for the sake of the whole (委曲求全), we agree to Old Dong's [11] participation, but Wang Shijie and Shao Lizi must be informed of our dissatisfaction with only one representative being given to the CPC." Dong Biwu later stated: "Our Party Central Committee is extremely dissatisfied with the decision on the representatives for this San Francisco Conference. Given the role played by the CPC and the Liberated Areas behind enemy lines in China’s politics and the War of Resistance today... it is inappropriate to occupy only one out of ten representative seats. Our reason for attending is entirely to demonstrate our love for peace and our spirit of compromising for the sake of the whole in the pursuit of democracy and unity, and to strive for international peace."
Regarding the selection of Dong Biwu, the United States harbored suspicions about Chiang Kai-shek's intentions: "By appointing Dong Biwu, the Central Government has actually placed the CPC in a position where they must agree to this appointment, otherwise they would face international criticism for their unwillingness to cooperate with the government in any field." In other words, the U.S. believed that Chiang's appointment was a "retreat for the sake of advance" (以退为进). Specifically, Chiang hoped that this move would deprive the CPC of an opportunity for external propaganda while forcing them to "agree to this appointment" for the sake of democratic unity.
Although Dong Biwu was only one of the ten representatives, he represented the Chinese Communist Party and the vast areas and people under its leadership—19 Liberated Areas, 100 million people, 970,000 regular troops, and 2.2 million militia. To represent the Chinese people for the first time at an international conference of such great significance and to solemnly sign the United Nations Charter was unprecedented in Chinese history. The CPC Central Committee actively seized the favorable opportunity of Dong Biwu's participation in the San Francisco Conference as a CPC representative to strengthen propaganda and reiterate its full support for the United Nations. Mao Zedong specifically stated in On Coalition Government: "The Communist Party of China fully agrees with the proposals made at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference and the decisions made at the Crimea [Yalta] Conference regarding the establishment of an organization to safeguard international peace and security after the war. The Communist Party of China welcomes the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. The Communist Party of China has already dispatched its own representative to join the Chinese delegation to the San Francisco Conference, as a means of expressing the will of the Chinese people."
III. Dong Biwu’s Trip to San Francisco: Actively Seizing External Propaganda Opportunities
Shortly after the CPC decided to send Dong Biwu to San Francisco, the CPC Central Committee formulated corresponding domestic and international propaganda strategies. On April 1, 1945, the Presidium of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee decided that Dong Biwu's primary tasks in the U.S. were to "win over foreign friends, raise our Party's international status, and strive as much as possible to stay and work in the United States to expand the international influence of the Chinese Communist Party." This meant that in the arena of the San Francisco Conference, the CPC’s primary propaganda target shifted from internal to external—that is, the focus shifted from promoting the domestic democratic movement to enhancing the CPC’s international influence. John S. Service, Second Secretary at the U.S. Embassy in China, reported to the State Department that "Yan'an expects the Chinese government delegation to prevent Dong Biwu from expressing his views at the conference or in public. Therefore, the Communists' efforts in San Francisco will focus mainly on informal contacts with the press and other delegations."
En route to San Francisco, Dong Biwu and his entourage proactively sought opportunities to disseminate the advocacy for a "coalition government" and the actual situation of the Liberated Areas. After flying from Yan'an to Chongqing, Dong attended a farewell party held by the China Democratic League, where he actively promoted the "coalition government" proposal. He pointed out: "Only with a democratic coalition government can the various free rights of the people be realized, and the Chinese people be able to demonstrate their own strength and role in the War of Resistance. Only then can we meet the demands of the whole people internally and fulfill international expectations externally; otherwise, there is a danger of civil war when victory in the War of Resistance is imminent or achieved." Chongqing's women's circles also held a tea party to see off Dong Biwu. At the meeting, Dong introduced the recent military, political, and economic situations in the Liberated Areas and the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region. Notably, according to the Central Committee's decision, one of Dong Biwu's assistants was Zhang Hanfu, editor-in-chief of the Xinhua Daily (新华日报), and thus that paper undertook the main reporting tasks during Dong's attendance at the conference. Choosing the Chongqing-based Xinhua Daily as the propaganda medium also reflected, from another angle, that the CPC Central Committee set the domestic propaganda focus of Dong's visit on the KMT-controlled areas, thereby demonstrating to the democratic parties and left-wing masses sympathetic to the CPC the attitude and performance of the CPC representative in the San Francisco delegation.
Upon arrival in San Francisco, Dong Biwu and his party faced a more complex public opinion field. The KMT’s systematic blockade of public opinion greatly compressed the operational space for the CPC’s external propaganda. As early as the delegation's formation stage, Wang Shijie, Minister of Propaganda of the KMT government, was ordered to formulate "three measures for propaganda at the San Francisco Conference," specifically mentioning the need to prevent the CPC from "using the San Francisco Conference in an attempt to undermine the government's prestige and issuing declarations against the government delegation." On Wang Shijie's suggestion, Chiang Kai-shek further issued secret orders to responsible personnel in overseas embassies and consulates to take necessary measures to ensure that overseas Chinese and their newspapers "support the Central Government and see through the CPC’s treacherous schemes," and "prevent them from showing any signs of responding to the Communist Party before or after the conference." Zhang Hanfu also recalled that the KMT government "secretly appointed special agents to disrupt and sabotage Dong Biwu's activities outside the conference."
Despite the numerous obstacles during his first appearance on the international stage, Dong Biwu broke through the KMT's strict defense and made full use of every available opportunity to promote the Chinese Communist Party to the international community. Following the Central Committee's instructions and acting in the interest of the whole, Dong Biwu adhered to the consensus reached within the delegation: that they represented China abroad regardless of party affiliation. Wellington Koo, a fellow delegation member, recalled that he and representatives including Dong Biwu reached an "understanding on guidelines for the delegation's actions," and "Dong Biwu indeed adhered to it consistently." Dong also assured reporters during an interview that "the Chinese delegation is harmonious and consistent regarding matters of the United Nations International Organization Conference and conducts discussions and makes decisions in accordance with democratic methods." This demonstrates the responsibility and broad-mindedness of Chinese Communists, represented by Dong Biwu, in prioritizing the national interest.
The primary audience for Dong Biwu and his party’s propaganda was the English-speaking press and political circles, centered on the United States.
Upon arriving in the United States in late April 1945, Dong Biwu unequivocally stated to a reporter from the New York Daily Worker that there were four major reasons for the Communist Party of China (CPC) to send representatives to the San Francisco Conference: "First, to assist the organization of democratic nations as drafted at the Teheran Conference; second, to deliver a final blow to the Nazis; third, to further isolate Japan; and fourth, to strike a blow against fascists worldwide." He also provided a specific explanation regarding the issue of "establishing a Chinese coalition government." He stated: "In order to mobilize all the Chinese people and their strength to expel the Japanese invaders, we must establish a democratic coalition government. Only by mobilizing the strength of the entire nation can we drive out the invaders." Furthermore, when asked whether "Chinese Communists are Chinese first and Communists second," Dong Biwu replied publicly: "This is not a question of which comes first and which comes second; the primary objective of the Communist Party of China is how to save China during the war and how to revitalize China from its economic backwardness." Dong Biwu linked the proposal for a "coalition government" with the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, intending to demonstrate the CPC’s persistence in the anti-Japanese and anti-fascist struggle to European and American public opinion, thereby shaping an international image of the CPC as an enlightened, resilient party pursuing peace and development.
Regarding specific issues in the relationship between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CPC, Dong Biwu and his delegation also took the initiative to express the CPC's position on multiple occasions. For instance, Chen Jiakang, a member of his staff, explained to reporters why Zhou Enlai had refused to accept the Chongqing government's proposal to "establish a reorganization committee consisting of one member each from the KMT, the CPC, and the United States to reorganize the CPC’s armed forces" and to "appoint a U.S. military officer as commander-in-chief of the CPC forces." He noted this was "because it was intended solely to reorganize the CPC forces, and the American commander of the CPC forces would have been under Chiang Kai-shek's command." Regarding the so-called "National Assembly," Dong Biwu also clearly stated that "not only the CPC, but even the various parties of the Democratic League [12] oppose the November National Assembly." He argued that "if the National Assembly is convened according to the KMT’s plan, it will be a legalization of the one-party dictatorship under the cover of a constitution; therefore, its convocation is not to achieve unity, but actually to divide China." This demonstrates that the CPC actively pushed the negotiations between the two parties and the dispute over a "coalition government" into the international arena to seek understanding and support from European and American society.
Notably, Dong Biwu and his staff also compiled and distributed an English-language introductory booklet titled Memorandum on the Chinese Liberated Areas, with a total of 5,000 copies printed. On May 18, 1945, Dong Biwu officially released this booklet to the public. Based on reliable charts and data, the booklet provided a comprehensive and clear introduction to the CPC's achievements in the political, military, and other spheres within the Liberated Areas [13] across seven aspects: a general overview, military achievements, democratic government, a combat-oriented people’s economy, education, trade unions, and the program for realizing the people’s urgent demands.
In addition, Dong Biwu and his delegation paid close attention to winning the support of overseas compatriots. On June 5, 1945, at a lecture meeting in San Francisco organized by the Chinese Constitutional Party and the Zhi Gong Party [14], Dong Biwu delivered a lengthy speech entitled "The Fundamental Policies of the Communist Party of China." He "comprehensively expounded on the CPC's fundamental policies of persisting in the war of resistance, persisting in unity, and persisting in democratic progress. He introduced the great achievements in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and in the construction of the Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia Border Region and the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines. He pointed out that all the policies of the Communist Party of China were aimed at establishing an independent, democratic, free, united, strong, and prosperous New China." Subsequently, this speech was "serialized in the China Daily News (Huaqiao Ribao) from the 16th to the 20th of that month." Dong Biwu’s public lecture received a warm response, "allowing my compatriots who care about the situation of the motherland to hear things they had never heard before."
In summary, during his stay in the United States, Dong Biwu publicized the heroic deeds of the Chinese people in the resistance against Japan and the CPC’s propositions to the broad masses of overseas Chinese and the American people, which elicited a significant response. Dong Biwu’s visit fulfilled the primary objective set by the Central Committee to "expand the international influence of the Communist Party of China." By having Dong Biwu represent the people of the Liberated Areas as part of the Chinese delegation, the CPC’s policies and the great achievements made in the Liberated Areas under its leadership were introduced to the whole world for the first time. This broke the KMT’s multi-year blockade of information regarding the CPC’s political and military record and laid a favorable foundation for the subsequent contact between New China and the United Nations.
IV. Conclusion
The political practice of the CPC in sending a representative to the San Francisco Conference reflects the process of the CPC’s efforts to win over international forces and its evolving perception of international mechanisms on the eve of the victory in the War of Resistance. Overall, the CPC’s practice exhibited distinct stage-specific characteristics.
From mid-February to late March 1945, the CPC viewed the issue of the Chinese delegation list for the San Francisco Conference more as a tool for political maneuvering—that is, as new evidence for criticizing the KMT's dictatorial rule to promote the domestic propaganda campaigns for a "conference of all parties" and a "coalition government." After the KMT government publically named Dong Biwu as a member of the delegation in late March 1945, the CPC instructed Dong Biwu’s group to actively engage in foreign propaganda to shape its own international image. This marked a growing realization within the CPC, through continuous interaction with the international community, of the significant strategic value of the United Nations.
It can be said that during the golden window for CPC diplomacy—triggered by the KMT military’s total collapse during the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi campaign [15] and the stationing of the Dixie Mission [16] in Yan'an—the CPC utilized Dong Biwu's participation to complete its debut on the international stage, enhance its understanding of post-war international organizations, and achieve a narrative shift from "exposing the KMT" to "constructing the image of the Liberated Areas." This transformation provided critical experience for the CPC’s subsequent handling of international affairs. The "linkage between international and domestic issues" reflected in its external propaganda strategy provided even more valuable experience for the political struggle against the KMT reactionaries during the Liberation War period.