Ma Xiaohan: How Did the CPC Central Organs Establish a Foothold in Shanghai After the Failure of the Great Revolution?
After the failure of the Great Revolution in 1927, the organs of the CPC Central Committee relocated from Wuhan back to Shanghai and were forced into a clandestine state. Determining how to safely establish and effectively mask underground organs within an environment of White Terror [1] became an urgent issue to resolve. This article focuses on the CPC Central Committee organs stationed in Shanghai from 1927 to 1933, discussing the selection and evolution of organ establishment and masking methods. In doing so, it reveals the survival skills, organizational resilience, and struggle strategies of the CPC as it assessed the situation within a grim environment.
I. Early Practices of "Masking the Party with Domesticity" and "Masking the Party with Commerce" and the Return of CPC Central Committee Organs to Shanghai after the Failure of the Great Revolution
Following the founding of the Communist Party of China, it was placed under close surveillance by the Beiyang Government [2] and the forces of the Great Powers in China. The Beiyang Government formulated "Special Articles for the Punishment of Radical Party Members," ordering provincial military and police forces to conduct "rigorous reconnaissance" and "handle cases with utmost severity." Against this backdrop, the CPC needed to utilize every "crack" between its enemies "extremely meticulously, attentively, cautiously, and ingeniously" to develop and expand the organization. The urban layout of modern Shanghai—characterized by "three administrations and four boundaries" [3] and the "intermingling of Chinese and foreigners"—objectively provided favorable conditions for the survival and struggle of the early CPC. The early CPC’s establishment and masking of organs in Shanghai generally unfolded along two lines of thought.
First was the high degree of integration between residences and organs: "masking the Party with domesticity" (yi jia yan dang). In the early period after the CPC's founding, many organs were primarily established in members' residences, concentrated in the new urban areas of the French Concession. For instance, Chen Duxiu’s residence (No. 2 Old Yuyang Li) doubled as the editorial office for New Youth [4] and a venue for the Shanghai Communist organization’s activities. Because the concession areas offered convenient locations, low rents, and strong concealment, they facilitated early theoretical propaganda and organizational development.
Second was "disguising" or "borrowing" shops: "masking the Party with commerce" (yi shang yan dang). The concessions had a dense commercial atmosphere, which the CPC actively integrated into and utilized. "Disguising" involved hanging a shingle without conducting actual business. For example, in June 1923, the CPC Central Committee established a secret administrative organ at No. 3 Sanzen Li in the Shanghai French Concession, which outwardly posed as a "Customs Brokerage" providing declaration services for import and export goods. "Borrowing" involved carrying out work through existing commercial firms, thereby quickly obtaining ready-made cover and authentic professional identities, saving the labor of self-construction. For example, from late 1921 to 1926, the CPC Central Committee borrowed the Translation and Compilation Institute of the Commercial Press to set up a secret contact point, where then-editor Shen Yanbing (Mao Dun) forwarded correspondence from Party organizations in various regions. The advantages of these practices lay in their low cost and high flexibility, reflecting the CPC’s wisdom in adapting to its environment and mobilizing resources. The two main lines of "masking the Party with domesticity" and "masking the Party with commerce" reflected both the flexible strategies of early members in complex environments and the fact that CPC activities already possessed a substantial social foundation.
As the center of the revolution shifted to Wuhan, the CPC Central Committee organs moved from Shanghai to Wuhan in early April 1927. During this period, however, the Kuomintang (KMT) implemented a so-called "Party Purge," exemplified by the April 12 Counter-Revolutionary Coup in Shanghai. KMT agents and concession authorities launched joint roundups of Communists, and the revolutionary situation changed abruptly, resulting in catastrophic losses for the CPC. Renowned Party activists and leaders such as Wang Shouhua, Xiao Chunu, and Chen Yannian were martyred, and many Party organizations were destroyed, forcing the entire organizational structure into a clandestine state. The CPC Central Committee further recognized the necessity of establishing professional intelligence and security work; adopting new forms of struggle was imperative.
In May 1927, Zhou Enlai, then-head of the Central Military Department, founded the Special Task Section of the Central Military Commission in Hankou. Its primary functions were to protect the safety of CPC Central Committee organs, guarantee the personal safety of leading comrades, and collect intelligence. Although this institution did not exist for long, it accumulated valuable experience for the subsequent establishment and operation of the Central Social Department (Central Teke). After moving through several locations, the CPC Central Committee organs finally relocated from Wuhan back to Shanghai in early October 1927. Relying on the special status of the concessions, a deep revolutionary foundation, and a vast civil society, Shanghai became the optimal choice for the CPC to rebuild its organization under high-pressure conditions.
Regarding the selection of sites for organs, the CPC Central Committee continued to leverage its strategic flexibility, combining site selection with concealment work by considering the unique governance patterns of the concessions and areas where the enemy’s rule was weak. The CPC Central Committee organs, the Jiangsu Provincial Committee organs, and the Youth League Central Committee organs were scattered across different areas such as Central Shanghai, Zhabei, and the French Concession; different organs did not even work out of the same longtang [5]. Li Weihan recalled: "In October 1927, after the Party Central Committee moved to Shanghai, a considerable number of Central organs were established near Avenue Edward VII." This area was located in the western district of the International Settlement, adjacent to the French Concession, which objectively aided in concealing forces, dispersing risks, and maintaining communication. By then, the political environment had shifted drastically; the collapse of the KMT-CPC cooperation meant the CPC could no longer establish organs through administrative resources and had to rely on renting private houses. However, concession authorities typically required tenants to have clear occupations, stable family relationships, and reliable "shop guarantees" (pubao; guarantees from local businesses required for renting houses), and they were particularly vigilant toward single individuals without fixed occupations or family ties. How to safely establish organs to ensure the survival and development of the CPC Central Committee in Shanghai became an urgent problem.
II. The Exploration of "Domesticating Organs" and "Socializing Organs" and the CPC Central Committee’s Foothold in Shanghai
After the failure of the Great Revolution, the August 7th Conference clearly identified the "creation of robust and capable secret organs" as the top priority of organizational building. In November 1927, the Central Special Branch (Central Teke) was established in Shanghai, under which the General Affairs Section was specifically responsible for site selection, layout, and protection of the Central Committee organs’ headquarters. Concurrently, the operational methods of the organs were adjusted to implement "domesticated organs" (jiguan jiatinghua), employing more rigorous forms of concealment to deal with the harsh political struggle.
"Domesticating organs" meant that Party members lived together in the name of a "family," making it easier to handle rental inspections. Based on size, these were divided into "large families" and "small families." "Large families" were typically used to accommodate more personnel or organs with specific functions; members had to play the roles of "heads of household," "children," "relatives," or even "servants." For example, between 1927 and 1928, No. 700 Baide Li on Tongfu Road was an important contact point for the CPC Central Committee Politburo, guarded and masked by the couple Peng Shuzhi and Chen Bilan, along with Yang Qinglan and Wang Genying, in the identities of landlords and tenants. "Large families" also often served as cover for organizing major meetings. To organize the preparatory meeting for the National Soviet Representative Conference, Li Yimang rented a large mansion and formed a temporary "large family." He posed as the master, while Zhao Yimin and Zhao Yiman posed as his younger siblings, accompanied by a wife and two children. The Central Teke also equipped them with a car, kitchenware, and furniture. During meetings, they used the ground floor to play gramophone records, play mahjong, and have children frolic to mask the meetings occurring upstairs. However, members of "large families" often came from all over the country, and their varying accents made it difficult to appear like a genuine family, easily arousing suspicion.
In contrast, "small families" consisting of one man and one woman were the most natural and feasible. According to a 1930 statistical table of Shanghai Party cadres, young cadres under the age of 30 accounted for 81% of the total. Consequently, "revolutionary couples" became a commonly adopted masking method for organs stationed in Shanghai at this time. "Small families" were further divided into two types: one consisted of actual couples with existing marital relationships, such as the residence of Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao, which served as a headquarters for the CPC Central Committee organs. This type of combination, due to close personal ties, had advantages in work cooperation, coordination of living habits, and identity masking; it also solved the problem of members living apart, generally resulting in high willingness and good effectiveness. The other type consisted of "false couples" temporarily arranged by the organization for work needs. For instance, in 1928, the Central Teke rented a Western-style house on Rue Père Robert [Jin Shenfu Road] in the French Concession, where Hong Yangsheng and a female comrade posed as a couple, occupying the third floor as a secret meeting point. The advantage of false couples lay in their flexible selection, which could be matched according to work needs. However, they were constrained by the shortage of female members—who had to be transferred from various locations—and the high requirements for disguise skills and the difficulty of navigating the boundary between public and private affairs, posing significant challenges to clandestine work.
"Domesticating organs" basically continued the early idea of "integrating organs and residences," but at this stage, it was a systematic practice following the failure of the Great Revolution and the CPC's full transition underground, involving a larger scale and a more severe external environment. As practice deepened, certain problems gradually came to light. The practice of "integrating organs and residences" relied heavily on the cover provided by comrades and the masses. However, against the backdrop of the KMT authorities implementing neighborhood mutual-guarantee systems (the baojia system) and "heavy rewards" to encourage mutual reporting, betrayal incidents occurred frequently. For example, Luo Yinong, then a member of the Standing Committee of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and Director of the Central Organization Bureau, was arrested and martyred on April 15, 1928; those who betrayed him were none other than the couple He Jiaxing and He Zhihua, who were providing him cover. Furthermore, they faced extreme financial difficulties. In the process of organizing underground work, renting houses and furnishing organs required significant funds. However, channels for mass donations and transfers from the Soviet areas were repeatedly blocked, and economic sources were increasingly depleted. The CPC Central Committee had to reiterate multiple times that "living expenses and organ expenses should be reduced to the absolute minimum." Luo Xiaohong, a former cadre of the Central Propaganda Department, recalled that at the time, organ members had no social occupations and relied entirely on organizational stipends, leading to a very hard life.
Under these circumstances, the CPC Central Committee gradually came to view "socializing organs" (jiguan shehuihua) and "professionalizing Party members" (dangyuan zhiyiehua) as the direction for breaking the impasse. On May 1, 1928, in the "Resolution on the Work Policy for Hubei" drafted for the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai pointed out that the reconstruction of organs must adhere to the principle of absolute secrecy: "The socialization of organs and the professionalization of responsible comrades are also very important issues." In November of the same year, the Party Central Committee explicitly stated that only by achieving the "professionalization of Party members" could the "socialization of the Party organization" be promoted. Meanwhile, building on the lessons learned from the previous stage of "domesticating organs," the Central Committee required that the unification of the worker and peasant masses must be closely integrated with the Party’s secret work. In May 1928, "Central Circular No. 47—On the Consolidation, Development, and Secret Work of Party Organizations under White Terror" pointed out: "The Party’s secret work is meaningful only when it enables the Party to lead the struggles of the broad masses." In 1930, the Enlarged Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee established going deep among the masses and opposing "organ-ism" (jiguanzhuyi) as the foundation of secret work, pointing the way for the Party’s subsequent clandestine practices.
Under the Party's leadership, the secret work front, while continuing the "masking the Party with commerce" approach, began to experiment with new operational models such as "independently running businesses." In November 1928, Zhou Enlai dispatched Ke Lin and He Cheng to open the "Dasheng Hospital" in Yanan Li on Sichuan Road, Shanghai, to serve as a venue for the CPC Politburo's regular meetings and for comrades to meet. Later, Hu Yungong was dispatched to establish the "Qiuyang Bookstore" to funnel in funds provided by the Comintern under the guise of ordering books. The Central Teke also opened various shops, such as a furniture store at Nicheng Bridge, the "Fei Guoxi Lawyer’s Correspondent Office," and the "Xinyi Agency" on Tongfu Road. The "Songbaizhai Antique Shop," located at the corner of Avenue Joffre [Xiafei Road] and Rue de la Tour [Songshan Road], was established by Liu Ding and Dong Jianwu; ostensibly dealing in antiques, it was actually used to organize the transmission of intelligence. To enhance the masking effect, Liu and Dong proactively studied cultural relics to improve their professional expertise. Similar cases included several antique shops established in the French Concession, near the Cercle Sportif Français [Xieqiao Zonghui] on Bubbling Well Road [Jing’an Si Road], and at the intersection of Avenue Foch [Aiwenyi Road] and Gordon Road.
The CPC Central Committee also felt its way toward a business model that combined the advantages of "domestication" and "socialization"—the "husband-and-wife shop." This model could satisfy living requirements such as house rentals while serving as a business cover, with the potential to make a profit to supplement organizational funds. In 1928, Deng Xiaoping, then Secretary-General of the CPC Central Committee, rented a residence in Qinghe Fang on Zhejiang Road; the upstairs was the organ, and the downstairs was a shop selling daily necessities like soap and matches. After Deng moved out, Zhang Jien and Zhang Yuexia, staff members of the Central Secretariat, took over as a couple, using their identity as grocery store owners for cover while the upstairs continued to serve as a secret venue for comrades to meet and hold sessions. From the summer of 1929 to the end of 1930, the CPC Central Committee organ at No. 344 South Shanxi Road engaged in securities and stock trading under the "Rongfeng Hang" sign; Gu Yuliang, head of the Internal Communications Section of the Central Secretariat, lived in the back room on the second floor with his wife Shen Enzhen and their young son, undertaking the task of masking the organ. The "Fuxing Commercial Firm" is another highly representative example. In 1928, Xiong Jin Ding was ordered by Zhou Enlai to rent a building on Yunnan Road; on the surface, it dealt in Hunan homespun cloth, but it was actually a meeting and office space for the Central Politburo. Leaders such as Li Weihan, Ren Bishi, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Fuchun all met and held sessions there. The organization sent Zhu Duanshou to run the business with him in the name of a "couple"; later, the two became a real couple, making the firm’s operation more stable and convenient until it was forced to close in 1931 following the betrayal of Gu Shunzhang.
It should be noted that...
"Independent operation" and the earlier strategies of "borrowing business" or "posing as business" were not mutually exclusive; rather, they complemented one another. During this period, the Central Special Branch [6] used the "Sanmin Photo Studio," owned by the non-Party figure Fan Mengju, as a secret base for leadership meetings and weapon storage. However, the limitations of "borrowing" and "posing" became increasingly prominent as the environment deteriorated. The risk of "borrowing" lay in the uncontrollability of external forces; for instance, because Xiang Zhongfa [7] frequently visited the Sanmin Photo Studio, the owner sold him out to Kuomintang (KMT) agents for a bounty. "Posing" also carried heavy risks if executed improperly. In September 1930, Tu Zuochao rented the entire building at No. 12, Lane 391, Julai Road in the French Concession, ostensibly as the "Shanghai Welfare Electrical Appliance Company Factory," while it was actually the CPC’s first radio training class. Gu Shunzhang [8] misjudged the investigative capabilities of the French Concession Police Station and abandoned the principle of "decentralized teaching and single-line contact" in favor of centralized instruction. Ultimately, because the students wore a motley assortment of clothes and no actual business was being conducted, the concession police detected and raided the site, causing severe losses.
Furthermore, the details of secret work were constantly being refined. In May 1928, the Organization Bureau of the CPC Central Committee published a special collection titled "Common Sense of Secret Work" in the Central Committee's internal organ, School Journal (Xiaokan), requiring Party organizations at all levels to study and implement it earnestly. The document emphasized that the selection of office sites "must be among the masses of residents." The building structure had to ensure soundproofing and visual privacy, be equipped with emergency exits, and involve a strict investigation of the landlord's background "to avoid delivering oneself into the hands of detectives or other unfavorable households." Internal decor had to be "secularized," conforming as much as possible to local customs; actions such as worshipping gods and Buddhas, pasting talismans and hanging pictures, or setting off firecrackers during festivals had to follow local habits. Identity camouflage had to be "uniform," meaning dress and speech had to remain consistent with one’s assumed identity. These specific detailed requirements constructed a complete system of norms for setting up underground organs, serving as a summary of the CPC's prior experience in underground struggle and as practical guidance for the strategy of being "secret, socialized, and professionalized."
Against the backdrop of the KMT’s increasing intensity in detection and crackdowns, by 1930, the CPC Central Committee organs in Shanghai had nevertheless grown to "as many as 80 or 90 locations, with over 170 staff members." This fully illustrates the improvement of the Central Committee organs’ concealment capabilities and the maturity of its professional teams. Faced with a grim situation of struggle, the CPC was able to flexibly adjust its organizational forms and working methods, demonstrating extreme adaptability and strategic elasticity. This political capability and spiritual quality—assessing the situation, being adept at struggle, and taking the initiative to seek change—demonstrated extraordinary resilience and wisdom in an extreme environment.
III. The Expansion of "Independent Operation" and the Reconstruction of Central Committee Organs in Shanghai after Gu Shunzhang's Defection
On April 24, 1931, Gu Shunzhang, the head of the Central Special Branch, was arrested in Hankou and defected. The Party Central Committee immediately organized an emergency relocation of organs in Shanghai, basically completing the evacuation of offices and personnel within two or three days. However, because Gu was extremely familiar with the addresses and defense methods of the organs, he provided KMT agents with a vast amount of first-hand intelligence. For a time, the CPC Central Committee organs in Shanghai had "scarcely a place to stand," and Party organizations in Nanjing, Suzhou, Tianjin, Beiping, and Hankou were destroyed one after another. Work in the White areas [9] suffered an unprecedented blow. On June 10, Zhou Enlai presided over a meeting of the CPC Central Committee Politburo to conduct a profound summary of the Gu Shunzhang defection incident, re-stipulating organizational policies and work discipline, and deciding that Chen Yun would serve as Secretary of the Central Special Branch and Chief of the First Section, undertaking the task of reorganizing and restoring the organs.
During this period, the urgent priority was to reorganize the underground organs that had almost fallen into paralysis. A group of shops opened by the Jiangsu Provincial Committee, which were well-operated and had not yet been exposed, were placed directly under the management of the Party Central Committee to ensure the continuation of underground work. For example, the "Xinsheng Printing House" located at No. 17 Zhaoqingli, Shanhaiguan Road, was opened around 1930 by Li Weiji at the request of Chen Yun. After Gu Shunzhang's defection, it was transferred to the Central Committee's management, becoming a central liaison and meeting organ. The printing house purchased two small printing presses and installed a telephone. Li Shiying, a member of the Central Special Branch, worked there as a laborer, while Chen Yun "wore a long gown with a short vest over it and a red hat, looking every bit like an accountant." In the process of "opening a shop and doing business," they skillfully organized many hidden struggles. Another example was the "Yuda Southern Goods Store" opened at the corner of Xinzha Road and Datong Road. On the surface, it sold goods, but in reality, it was used to receive remittances from the Comintern and provide guarantees and funds for renting houses for new organs. The transfer of such mature shops not only saved preparation time for setting up new organs but also used their existing business foundations and social credibility to help the CPC Central Committee quickly restore communication links and funding flows, resolving the urgent crisis.
At the same time, the CPC Central Committee further guided the Central Special Branch to rely on social relations and the professional skills of Party members to open new stores across various districts in Shanghai, actively building a larger-scale network of organs. For example, a newly built coal briquette factory on Wuma Road became the headquarters of the Central Special Branch. It was built by Pan Hannian on a site found on Zhongshan Road, using the purchase of equipment and production of coal briquettes as cover for the Special Branch's work. The "Xu Fajun Second-hand Goods Store" on Hongmiao Road was actually the organ of the Central General Affairs Section, used for storing and trading furniture to facilitate the flexible establishment and dissolution of organs. "When an organ moved, things were brought there; when an organ was to be established, furniture could be moved from there. It was very convenient—it was a warehouse, a shop, and a meeting point." Li Weiji recalled, "There were many cases like this where shops were opened as cover." In order to carry out work around the Nanshi Gaochangmiao Iron Works—a KMT factory for repairing guns and artillery—Chen Yun sent people to "try every possible means to open a tea house nearby" to contact workers and exchange intelligence. To create a secretarial liaison point for the Standing Committee of the Shanghai Provisional Central Politburo, the CPC Central Committee selected a "two-up, two-down" [10] lane house at No. 1 Yunshang Village. Ying Xiuren and his wife lived downstairs, while the upstairs was leased by Ke Qingshi and then sublet to other comrades within the Party. The interior was decorated with mahogany furniture; when Ying Xiuren went out, he wore a fur robe, pretending to be a "young master from a wealthy family." Chen Yun also visited many times, often posing as a "businessman," wearing a skullcap and carrying a briefcase, "magnanimously discussing business and making deals" while actually discussing financial and economic work with Ying Xiuren and others.
Compared to previous underground work, the advantages and effectiveness of "independent operation" were quite obvious. First, it better guaranteed organizational security. Shops operated normally on ordinary days, but in an emergency, personnel could evacuate quickly. Party members used their status as shop employees as cover; even if arrested, it was difficult to directly identify them as "Red elements," and the organization could negotiate for their release in the name of the "employer." It was precisely thanks to the cover of "independent operation" that even under the extremely dangerous situation following Gu Shunzhang's defection, the CPC Central Committee continued to exist in Shanghai for nearly three years, winning precious buffer time for the revolutionary struggle. When the CPC Central Committee evacuated Shanghai in January 1933, the KMT only found out much later. Dai Li [11] called it the greatest failure in the history of the intelligence department. Even KMT agents lamented that the CPC’s new organizational strategy had made the KMT’s "ears deaf and eyes blind." They said: "We only know that the Communist Party's underground organization has changed, but how has it changed? Who is responsible? Where are the organs located? We are completely ignorant of all specific circumstances." In his book The Theory and Practice of Secret Service Work, written after his defection, Gu Shunzhang’s understanding of commercial cover was quite limited. In introducing the functions of the First Section of the Central Special Branch, he placed commercial activities last, holistically explaining them as "establishing shops, connecting commercial relations, and operating as peddlers." Regarding the arrangement of organs, he mentioned that "when many people frequent a liaison organ, it can be set up as a lawyer's correspondence office," which remained at the level of "posing" as a business. This exactly reflects the shift in the CPC's thinking regarding using "business" as cover around 1931, providing indirect evidence of the success achieved after the Central Committee comprehensively promoted "independent operation," effectively safeguarding the security and development of the Party organization in an extremely harsh environment.
Second, it more closely linked mass mobilization with underground work, effectively promoting organizational socialization. These ideas for struggle provided important references for how the Party should conduct underground work in enemy-occupied areas during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. Mao Zedong once pointed out that one should use possible legal forms to establish "purely social professional organs and professional activities (tea houses, restaurants, employment agencies, etc.) that have close ties with the masses, or even utilize factory workshops, schools, and shops. Under the slogan of jointly deceiving and dealing with the enemy and puppets to protect Chinese people, forming a kind of amorphous alliance of all personnel therein is also a very good form of mass organization." In Shanghai, "independent operation" relied on the masses and came from the masses. Chinese Communists used this to penetrate the lives of the masses and carry out mass work, effectively promoting close ties between the underground organization and the people. This was both a distinctive feature of the Party’s underground work in the struggle against the enemy and a reflection of the CPC’s political character of serving the people whole-heartedly.
Third, it simultaneously advanced economic autonomy and underground work, comprehensively enhancing the capacity for struggle. During this stage, the Party faced serious and long-term funding difficulties. "Independent operation" allowed Party members to earn legal income, which promoted the autonomy of organizational funds. This not only reduced dependence on subsidies from higher levels but also opened a stable and continuous source of funding for the organization. Increasingly mature "independent operations" began to undertake broader revolutionary tasks, serving the wider revolutionary struggle. For example, in the process of conducting "Red-White trade," [12] Shanghai firms led by the Party secretly undertook the important task of exchanging goods and trading with the Soviet Areas [13]. Shanghai shops bought tea and other goods from the Soviet Areas at low prices and sold them at high prices in Shanghai. The profits were remitted to the Soviet Areas through secret channels. This not only supplied scarce materials to the Soviet Areas but also completed important tasks such as intelligence transmission and personnel transport, gradually becoming a link between the Soviet and White areas. The leap in the CPC's level of "operating business" around 1931 is evident in CPC internal documents and confirmed in the records of defectors. For instance, Yu Lexing—who left the Party during the April 12th Counter-Revolutionary Coup [14] and later joined the KMT's "Lictors Society" to engage in secret service work—was quite familiar with the concealment methods of the CPC’s Shanghai organs. In his book Secret Work, he subdivided the CPC’s "cover organs or titles" into more than 20 types, including "residences, schools, hospitals, churches, furniture stores, garages, small money exchanges, printing bureaus, tea houses, restaurants, employment agencies, paper shops, photo studios, pharmacies, hardware stores, law firms, banks, pawnshops, traveling traders, newspapers or magazine editorial offices, and small grocery shops." In short, the "independent operation" model took into account both underground and economic work, demonstrating the revolutionary spirit and political capability of Chinese Communists in their firm conviction to struggle to the end.
IV. Conclusion
In the 1920s and 30s, the concealment measures of the CPC Central Committee organs in Shanghai underwent a transition from an early spontaneous model relying on private residences and "borrowing" or "posing" as shops toward a mature state of "independent operation" embedded in society. This built a flexible and efficient system for setting up and covering organs, allowing the CPC Central Committee to establish a foothold in a Shanghai shrouded in White Terror. In particular, "independent operation" served as a key measure; it was not only a realistic choice for the CPC Central Committee to preserve its strength but also a successful exploration of organically combining security protection, economic autonomy, and mass work, enabling the CPC to lead the workers and peasants in revolutionary struggle despite extremely difficult circumstances.
With the relocation of the CPC Central Committee to the Soviet Areas in 1933, the focus of underground work in Shanghai shifted from preserving the command center to long-term "deep cover" and intelligence liaison. Most original organs were closed or moved, but the practice of "operating business" did not stop. It continued to play a role in united front liaison, material transport, and intelligence transmission. More importantly, the experience accumulated during this period—combining open struggle with secret struggle, infiltrating professional covers with social relations, and unifying economic autonomy with the needs of struggle—laid a solid foundation for the development of the Party’s hidden front work during the period of the nation-wide War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the War of Liberation. This political quality and struggle wisdom—judging the situation, being adept at struggle, and taking the initiative to seek change—are also the keys to understanding how our Party was able to survive, develop, and achieve final victory in extreme environments.
Author: Ma Xiaohan, PhD student at the School of Marxism, Tsinghua University. Source: Party Documents (Dang de wenxian), Issue 6, 2025.