Luo Pinghan and Gao Anyi: A Great Expedition Opening New Horizons: The Red Army's Long March Towards a Strategic Shift and Its Historical Significance
The Long March of the Red Army was not only a great feat that preserved the seeds of revolution, but also a strategic transfer that profoundly changed the destiny of China. It was the key to the Chinese revolution turning danger into safety, realizing a grand strategic transfer of the Red Army and laying an important foundation for the subsequent victory of the Chinese revolution.
I
The northward policy of the Red Army's Long March was not achieved overnight, but underwent a process of evolution and development from "unconscious" to "conscious," and from "seeking survival" to "planning for the overall situation." It was a great achievement of the Communist Party of China (CPC) persisting in seeking truth from facts [1] through the ordeal of blood and fire.
At the beginning of the Long March, the main force of the Central Red Army planned to advance west into western Hunan, intending to join forces with the Third Red Army (later restored to the designation of the Second Army Group) and the Sixth Army Group, which were active or transferring there. This decision carried a clear coloring of "moving house" [2], attempting to establish a new base area in the Hunan-Hubei-Sichuan-Guizhou border region adjacent to the Central Soviet Area. However, the Kuomintang (KMT) had deployed heavy troops in southwestern Hunan; if the Central Red Army had insisted on proceeding, it would have faced the danger of total destruction. At this critical juncture, Comrade Mao Zedong strongly advocated for turning the troops toward Guizhou at the Tongdao Meeting, gaining majority support. The subsequent Liping Meeting officially decided to establish a new base area in the Sichuan-Guizhou border region centered on Zunyi. The Zunyi Meeting further adopted the suggestions of Comrades Liu Bocheng, Nie Rongzhen, and others, establishing the strategic concept of crossing the Yangtze River to establish a base area in western or northwestern Sichuan.
Shortly after the Zunyi Meeting, due to setbacks in the Tucheng Campaign, the plan to cross the river was temporarily shelved. However, the CPC Central Committee did not rigidly adhere to old conventions but adjusted flexibly, deciding to create a base area in the Sichuan-Yunnan-Guizhou border region. Subsequently, Comrade Mao Zedong commanded the Central Red Army to cross the Chishui River four times, cross the Jinsha River by strategy, and force a crossing of the Dadu River, arriving in northwestern Sichuan in June 1935 to victoriously join forces with the Fourth Front Army. On the eve of the merger, the CPC Central Committee analyzed the domestic situation and the human and geographical environment of northwestern Sichuan at that time, proposing that "in order to place the development of the Soviet movement on a more solid and powerful foundation, the general policy of our First and Fourth Front Armies hereafter should be to occupy the three provinces of Sichuan, Shaanxi, and Gansu, and establish Soviet political power in these three provinces" (CPC Central Committee Literature Research Office and Central Archives: Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949), Vol. 12, Central Literature Publishing House, 2011 edition, p. 212). At the Lianghekou Meeting—a meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held after the two armies joined forces—the "Decision on the Strategic Policy After the Meeting of the First and Fourth Front Armies" was made. It clearly stipulated that after the merger, the "strategic policy is to concentrate the main force for a northward offensive, wipe out the enemy in large numbers through mobile warfare, and first secure southern Gansu to create a Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu Soviet base area" (Selected Important Documents Since the Founding of the Party (1921–1949), Vol. 12, p. 226), thus officially clarifying the northward strategic policy.
In response to the delay in moving north caused by Zhang Guotao's splittist errors, the CPC Central Committee reaffirmed the historical task of creating the Sichuan-Shaanxi-Gansu base area at the Shawo Meeting. It profoundly pointed out that the reactionary rule and imperialist power in the Northwest were weak and that the region was close to the Soviet Union, which was conducive to the development of the Soviet movement. In September, the Central Committee decisively resolved to move north first. At the subsequent Erjie Meeting, a vision was proposed to "establish contact with the [Communist] International through guerrilla warfare, reorganize and rest the troops, expand the ranks of the Red Army, first create a base area in a place close to the Soviet Union, and develop Eastward in the future" (CPC Central Committee Institute of Party History and Literature: Chronicle of Mao Zedong's Life, Vol. 1, Central Literature Publishing House, 2023 edition, p. 471).
In September of the same year, the CPC Central Committee arrived at Hadapu in Min County, Gansu. By reading newspapers published in the KMT-controlled areas, Comrade Mao Zedong and other central leaders learned that not only was the original Northern Shaanxi Red Army persisting in its struggle, but the Twenty-Fifth Red Army led by Xu Haidong and others had already arrived in Northern Shaanxi. This indicated that there was still an intact revolutionary base area in Northern Shaanxi, and it was decided that the Shaanxi-Gansu Branch would head there. At a meeting of cadres at the regimental level and above held on September 22, Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "Currently, Japanese imperialism is invading China; we must go north to resist Japan. First, we must go to Northern Shaanxi, where Liu Zhidan's Red Army is located. Our line is correct." On September 27, the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee held a meeting in Bangluo Town, Tongwei County, officially determining Northern Shaanxi as the destination for the Long March and a forward position for the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression. On October 19, the CPC Central Committee reached Wuqi Town in the Shaanxi-Gansu base area, declaring the victorious conclusion of the Central Red Army's Long March, which had lasted one year, traversed eleven provinces, and covered 25,000 li.
II
From the beginning of the strategic transfer to settling in Northern Shaanxi, the destination of the Red Army's Long March changed several times. Although settling in Northern Shaanxi was not a conscious choice at the outset, in the later stages of the Long March, the CPC Central Committee made the decision to go north based on changes in the situation and closely integrated going north with resisting Japan. This transfer was vital to the subsequent development of the Chinese revolution.
In modern times, the aggression of Western powers against China first occurred in the south; therefore, the semi-colonial and semi-feudal transformation of the south preceded that of the north. Precisely because of this, the center of gravity of China's New Democratic Revolution since the May Fourth Movement [3] was initially in the south. Most early organizations of the CPC were established in southern provinces, most early Party members were of southern origin, and the Party's founding congress was held in Shanghai. At that time, the KMT's forces were also mainly active in the south. The gravity of the National Revolution [4] launched after the realization of the first KMT-CPC cooperation was also in the south, and the Northern Expedition was naturally carried out from south to north. After the failure of the Great Revolution, the primary areas where the CPC carried out the Land Revolution and established revolutionary base areas were the southern provinces where the worker-peasant movement had been most active during the height of the Great Revolution.
By the time the Red Army’s Long March began, the domestic situation had begun to undergo major changes. In 1931, Japan launched the September 18th Incident to occupy the Northeast and subsequently continued to penetrate inside the Great Wall. In 1935, Japan took advantage of Chiang Kai-shek's full efforts to "pursue and wipe out" the Red Army on the Long March to launch the North China Incident, attempting to turn North China into a second "Manchukuo" and further turn the whole of China into a colony. Under such circumstances, how to organize and lead the resistance against Japan became the most urgent and critical issue for the Chinese revolution. Undoubtedly, at this time, the front line of the resistance was North China. If the CPC and the armed forces under its leadership remained active mainly in the southern regions, even if their advocacy for resistance was the most thorough and their slogans the loudest, it would have been difficult to gain the widespread sympathy, response, and support of all sectors of society.
The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region, centered on Northern Shaanxi, certainly had many disadvantageous conditions as a base for the Chinese revolution: the land was barren and the people poor, products were not abundant, transportation was inconvenient, the economy and culture were backward, and the influence of the Great Revolution had been small. However, it also had many advantageous conditions. The region was vast and had great strategic depth, which could provide room for the Red Army and the base area to develop; although poor and backward, this also made it difficult for Chiang Kai-shek to transport and deploy troops on a large scale. The Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia region was far from China's political and economic centers, and the KMT's ruling power was relatively weak. Local power in Northern Shaanxi was small, while the main leaders of the more powerful Northeast Army and Northwest Army—Zhang Xueliang and Yang Huchun—had demands for resisting Japan. It was easier for our Party to reach a consensus and form a united front with them on the issue of resistance. Furthermore, there was an existing base area and a certain number of Red Army troops there. All these factors made Northern Shaanxi an ideal destination for the Red Army's Long March.
More importantly, as the Japanese invasion deepened, the ethnic contradiction between China and Japan intensified and rose to become the primary contradiction in society. After the North China Incident, North China became the front line of the resistance. At this time, the most fundamental demand of people across the country for any political force was to resist Japan. For any political force in China to gain public support, it had to truly hold high the banner of resistance. Northern Shaanxi was adjacent to North China, and settling there created the conditions for the Red Army to quickly send troops to the North China front in the next step.
The failure of the Fifth Counter-Encirclement Campaign in the Central Soviet Area and the low ebb of the Land Revolution had many causes, but the most fundamental was the deviation in the line, principles, and policies at that time. As ethnic contradictions replaced class contradictions as the primary social contradiction, to win widespread support from all classes and strata, it was necessary to use the resistance against Japan as a rallying cry and take practical action. The Red Army also had to be able to move to the front lines of the resistance at the fastest possible speed.
After the main force of the Red Army settled in Shaanxi, Gansu, and Ningxia, and following a short period of rest and recuperation, it was quickly reorganized and sent to the front after the outbreak of the Full National War of Resistance. This made Shaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia an ideal starting point for subsequent outward development. As Edgar Snow [5] said after visiting Comrade Mao Zedong in 1936: "History subsequently showed that they were undoubtedly correct in emphasizing the second basic reason for the Long March—to advance to the strategically significant Northwest. They correctly foresaw that this region would play a decisive role in the current fate of China, Japan, and Soviet Russia" (Mao Zedong's 1936 Conversations with Snow, People's Publishing House, 1979 edition, p. 105). In this sense, the Long March was undoubtedly a great expedition that opened up a new situation.
III
After the northward policy was officially determined, the purpose of the Long March was not only to find a place for the Red Army to survive, but more importantly, to lead the great cause of the Chinese nation's resistance against Japan. As soon as the CPC Central Committee arrived in Northern Shaanxi, it held a Political Bureau meeting at Wayaobu. In response to changes in the situation, it lost no time in formulating the policy for the Anti-Japanese National United Front, began implementing the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, and carried out a series of policy adjustments. The purpose of doing so was to organize and mobilize all people willing to resist Japan to unite and jointly save the nation from its crisis of survival.
After the failure of the Great Revolution, Communists and the revolutionary masses were cruelly suppressed by the KMT reactionaries and had to engage in armed struggle. Even the Long March was a strategic transfer that the Red Army was forced to undertake after the failure of the counter-encirclement campaigns. Comrade Mao Zedong later said, "A person like me did not know how to fight before, and I never even thought about fighting, but the running dogs of imperialism forced me to take up arms" (Selected Diplomatic Works of Mao Zedong, Central Literature Publishing House and World Knowledge Press, 1994 edition, pp. 564–565). However, in the face of Japanese imperialism's massive invasion and at the critical moment of national survival, the CPC took the initiative to propose stopping the civil war and uniting against foreign aggression. It moved its troops north to the vicinity of the front lines, demonstrating a stance that valued the interests of the state, the nation, and the people above all else, thereby establishing a positive image among the masses.
Before the Long March began, the KMT reactionaries had engaged in large-scale stigmatizing propaganda against the CPC and the Red Army. For the vast majority of the masses who had never come into contact with the CPC or the Red Army, their understanding of the Party was extremely limited, and most held only a kind of sympathetic attitude. However, with the CPC Central Committee settling in Northern Shaanxi and the proposal of the Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Party led the Chinese people to fight strong enemies with unyielding character and build a Great Wall with their flesh and blood, achieving the first complete victory against foreign invasion in modern history. From this, the masses realized that the CPC was not only a force fighting for the interests of the poor, but also a force seeking survival and development for the Chinese nation. This led more and more people to consciously identify with and accept the Party's advocacy and sincerely support the Party's leadership.
The Long March changed the strategic layout of the Chinese revolution, created conditions for the main force of the Red Army to quickly advance to the front lines after the outbreak of the Full National War of Resistance, and enabled the people's army to develop its strength over a broader region. It achieved the transition from a domestic revolutionary war to an ethnic war of resistance, laying a solid foundation for winning the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and subsequently the victory of the New Democratic Revolution. Therefore, the Long March was not only a movement "from south to north" geographically, but it also realized a transition "from narrow to wide" politically and "from passive to active" strategically.