Yan Yan: Technology in General and Historical Modes—A Critical Analysis of György Márkus's Marxian Theory of Technology
How to view the development of technology and its consequences is a major thesis in Marxist philosophy. Regarding the relationship between technology and human liberation, there is no simple answer as to whether one should celebrate technological progress in a general sense or interrogate technology in a critical sense. Two opposing viewpoints have emerged in the history of Marxist development: the first holds that socialism will inevitably eliminate all constraints and inhuman distortions imposed by capitalism upon the development of technology (productive forces), implying the thorough realization of technology (productive forces) and humanity's comprehensive mastery over nature. The second viewpoint holds that the technological principles of socialism are entirely different from those of capitalism; in the former, the relationships between man and nature, as well as between man and man, undergo a momentous transformation, achieving a reversal from the domination of nature to the liberation of nature. The Budapest School theorist György Márkus [1] argues that these two viewpoints precisely reflect the confrontation between "scientific" Marxism and "critical" Marxism—the former represented by Kautsky, Cunow, Lenin, and Bukharin, and the latter by Benjamin, Bloch, Marcuse, and Adorno. Márkus does not overlook exceptions; for instance, within the critical Marxist camp, the theories of Lukács and Habermas sometimes exhibit positivist characteristics, while the scientistic Marxist Althusser occasionally appears as a supporter of neo-technological romanticism. Márkus does not fully subscribe to the aforementioned views; he offers a new interpretation of Marx’s theory of technology, distinguishing between the general and historical modes within it, and attempts to analyze the internal tensions present in Marx’s thought. However, Márkus misreads Marx’s theory of technology; only by discerning the true from the false can we correctly understand Marx's theoretical framework.
I. Marx’s Theory of Technology from the Perspective of the Content-Form Dichotomy
Márkus’s examination of Marx’s theory of technology proceeds from the perspective of political economy. He focuses more on the theory of technology in the mature Marx, the uniqueness of which lies in the application of the dichotomy between material content and social form. Marx once stated in the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858: "All production is appropriation of nature on the part of an individual within and through a specific form of society." [2] Thus, production is a bidirectional process, "meaning both the action exerted by man upon nature and his interaction with it (the 'material content' of the production process and its results), and the production and reproduction of definite social functions as fixed forms of interaction between men (constituting the 'social form' of production)." [3] Márkus’s analysis of Marx’s theory of technology is built upon this content-form dichotomy. In his view, this dichotomy is presented in Marx’s thought in a structure of "one body and two wings": when Marx analyzes social material life as a whole, it manifests as the contradictory movement between productive forces and relations of production; when Marx analyzes the specific mode of production in capitalist society, it manifests as the unity of the labor process and the valorization process [4]. According to Moishe Postone, two types of Marxist interpretative models are involved here: one is the traditional Marxist model based on a transhistorical understanding of labor; the other is a truly critical model based on an understanding of the specific mode of labor in capitalist society. The fundamental difference between the two is that "the former critically analyzes capitalism as a form of class exploitation and class rule within modern society, whereas the latter is a critical analysis of the form of modern society itself." [5]
Unlike Postone, who emphasizes the specificity of capitalist labor and the mediating role of social relations, Márkus tends to treat labor as a technological process starting from the content-form dichotomy. Márkus first cites a passage from Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861–1863: "Just as the examination of the use-value of commodities as such falls within the study of commodities (Warenkunde), the examination of the actual labor process falls within technology." [6] Márkus then cites a passage from Capital: "The labor process, as we have just described it in its simple and abstract elements, is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values; it is the appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and nature, the everlasting nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human beings live." [7] Márkus attempts to show that Marx tends to view labor as a technological process, which implies that an abstract analysis of labor is legitimate, and that material content (technology) can be separated from social form (relations of production). This understanding of labor and technology ignores the specificity of the capitalist form of labor and mistakenly directs the brunt of critique toward market distribution mechanisms and the system of exploitation. In fact, Márkus misunderstands the specific context of Marx’s relevant discourse; Marx speaks of technology and the study of commodities only in a metaphorical sense. Marx opposed both treating the labor process as mere technology and including use-value within the scope of the study of commodities; what is revealed here is precisely a negative connotation. Marx certainly saw the connection between the labor process and technology, but he opposed emphasizing this connection in isolation. Marx never denied the significance of concrete labor (the technological process), but the center of his analysis was the specific form of labor and the technological development process in capitalist society. This specific type of labor is determined by specific relations of production and, in turn, determines people’s specific modes of practice; one could say that all contradictions in capitalist society originate here. Later, in the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, Marx specifically emphasized that "political economy is not technology," precisely to urge people to note "the relationship of general determinations of production at a certain social stage to particular forms of production." In his view, any abstract discussion of general labor "makes it impossible to understand any real historical stage of production." [8]
Starting from the premise that "labor process = technological process," Márkus derives the following six conclusions:
First, "labor, as a technological activity, is a mode unique to humans; it is an active, practical mode of interaction with nature itself, and this mode must be distinguished from other possible forms of the relationship between humanity and nature—theoretical, aesthetic, religious, and so on." [9] The reason Márkus emphasizes the separation of the technological attributes of labor (material content) from social norms (social form) is related to the negative problems brought about by the rapid development of contemporary science and technology. Expressed in the terminology of social critical theory, this is the eclipse of value rationality by instrumental rationality, and the colonization of the lifeworld by the system. Emphasizing the independence of the technological process and its separation from social norms aims to achieve a balance of rationality and restore the meaning of the lifeworld. Yet Márkus’s view is sometimes riddled with contradictions: if labor is a purely technological activity containing no human-to-human relationships, how can it be distinguished from animal activity? To speak of practice apart from theoretical, aesthetic, and religious forms reduces practice to mere material production. Although this interpretive model can guarantee the materialistic orientation of Marxism, it neglects the value dimension and transcendent attributes of practical activity. In reality, Marx opposed talking about labor, practice, and production in the abstract; it is bourgeois economists who focus solely on the purely technological level of labor.
Second, labor constitutes the effective basic relationship of all social forms. Its structure remains historically invariant and can be defined solely based on social determinations and the level of technological development. Technological labor can be further subdivided into the object of labor, the instruments of labor, and the laborer. All these elements possess transhistorical characteristics and apply to all forms of human society. The view that understands Marx’s theory of technology as a general theory of technology, rather than a specific critical theory of technology, still falls within the cognitive framework of traditional Marxism. When discussing technology, Marx did indeed mention the three elements of labor, but his focus was not on explaining these elements but on elucidating how they are integrated and how they are separated under the capitalist mode of production. Proceeding from the content-form dichotomy, Márkus believes that productive forces and relations of production can be examined separately. The result of doing so can only prove that there is no problem with the productive forces of capitalist society, only that the relations of production are defective. This implies that socialism merely transcends capitalism at the level of the relations of production, while at the level of labor technology, it can only be a relationship of inheritance and realization. This line of analysis is precisely the critical theory based on "labor in general" that Postone critiqued. Because it directs its critique toward the external mechanisms of capitalist society, it inevitably fails to achieve an immanent transcendence of modern society. Although Márkus cites Marx’s own statements, they do not prove the aforementioned view. Marx did not ignore the importance of use-value, concrete labor, and the means of labor; he was well aware that these things existed universally as early as pre-capitalist societies. What must be emphasized is that merely staying at the level of general descriptions of these things is insufficient; they should be placed within specific social relations to reveal their historical limitations and realistic possibilities. Excessive focus on the general attributes of labor, de-historicizing and eternalizing them, fails to gain insight into the essence of capitalist society and is instead a typical bourgeois ideology.
Third, if there are any historical changes in labor and technology, they can only be accumulation in the sense of assimilation. Márkus believes this is Marx’s view because Marx pointed out in Theories of Surplus Value that "what is actually 'accumulated'—but not as a dead thing, but as something living—is the skill of the laborer, the degree of development of labor." [10] In fact, this is not Marx’s own view but that of Thomas Hodgskin; Márkus failed to notice the qualifying phrase "in Hodgskin's view." Marx did not deny the possibility and necessity of the accumulation of workers' skills, but he opposed Hodgskin’s practice of emphasizing only the accumulation of workers' skills, because labor must also consider the objective aspect of material instruments. Marx also drew an analogy between the accumulation of social productive forces and biological hereditary accumulation in Darwin's theory of evolution, emphasizing that "accumulation here is the assimilation, continued preservation, and transformation of what has been received and realized," [11] yet Marx did not equate the two. Biological organisms can be seen as the product of the hereditary accumulation of living subjects, but human society as a complex organism cannot be reduced merely to natural relations. Here, accumulation is not only a natural process but also a socio-historical process. Unlike Darwin's theory of natural evolution, Marx never ignored the accumulation of technology in its purely natural attributes, but he emphasized even more that accumulation is mediated by specific social relations. His exploration of the question of technological accumulation was not abstract but concrete. Márkus’s belief that Marx adhered to a non-historical, general theory of technology is a misreading.
Fourth, technological development possesses not only the characteristic of continuous assimilation and an essentially invariant structure but also a clear and distinct direction—namely, the continuous growth of social material wealth as well as human capacities and needs. It must be pointed out that Marx did not oppose the growth of social material wealth or human capacities and needs, as these are the fundamental guarantees for the realization of socialism. However, he did not remain at the level of a general concern for these elements but focused on the mode of their realization. On the one hand, Marx believed that in the future society, people should engage in creative activities that have no direct connection with the accumulation of material wealth; on the other hand, Marx distinguished social material wealth from value. He focused not only on the production of material wealth in a general sense but even more on the manner in which material wealth is produced. As Postone analyzed, Marx did not oppose material wealth but opposed using value as the measure of social material wealth, because the intervention of value relations gives capitalist society its alienated character. If attention is concentrated solely on the production of material wealth, it masks the specificity of the capitalist mode of production, thereby de-historicizing and eternalizing it.
Markus further analyzed the standard for measuring progress in labor: labor productivity. He argued that Marx shared the basic presuppositions of the labor theory of value, which implies that the only standard for measuring labor productivity, the level of technological development, and material wealth must be labor time (socially necessary labor time). The problem lies in the fact that what Marx acknowledged on a factual level he did not necessarily affirm from a normative standpoint of value. Marx recognized the inherent consistency between labor productivity, the growth of material wealth, and technological progress, viewing them all as linked to the expenditure of labor time. However, if one remains merely at this level of cognition, there is no substantive difference from the ideological position of the national economists. Marx maintained a standpoint of the critique of political economy, focusing on how value relations, as a universal form of mediation, construct and influence society. Markus's emphasis on general labor (the technological process) and the production of material wealth remains at the level of use-value (concrete labor); his arrival at this conclusion is related to his excessive reliance on the dichotomy between content and form. Under this analytical model, the social determination of labor is stripped away, turning it into a pure technological process, whereas in Marx’s view, "capitalist labor and production are socially determined and possess determinacy" [19].
Fifth, Marx's theory of technology implies a single, universal logic of development that applies to both capitalist society and the future society. Marx’s discussion of the relationship between complex and simple labor suggests that technological progress will lead to the simplification of complex labor, thereby providing the practical possibility for the association of free individuals to directly manage the production process. Markus's analysis here still follows a technicist line; proceeding from the dichotomy of content and form, he intentionally weakens the influence of social relations on technological development.
Sixth, technological evolution is closely linked to historical development; the problem of technology can only be elucidated by comparing pre-capitalist, capitalist, and future societies. Markus emphasized that in pre-capitalist societies, labor was essentially enveloped within established social relations; technological efficiency was subordinate to the needs of social integration, and the growth of material wealth was constrained by specific types of communities. In such cases, technology would be suppressed if it overstepped its bounds. Capitalist society shattered all shackles hindering the productive forces and technological development. Humans handle relations with nature and other humans through technological rationality. On the surface, capitalist society achieved the separation of content and form, but in reality, it constrained material content with a new social form. Markus found that capitalist technological rules (content) and social rules (form) fused once again, but unlike in pre-capitalist societies, this new fusion came at the cost of the social form's subjugation to capital, manifesting as the rule of abstract labor (exchange value) over humanity. Furthermore, Markus believed that the future socialist society would truly realize the separation of content and form, for which Marx’s discourse on the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom, as well as Engels’s discussion on the relationship between the administration of things and the government of people, provided the blueprint.
II. The Historical Interpretative Mode in Marx’s Theory of Technology
When Markus applied the content-form dichotomy to analyze Marx’s theory of technology, he tended to view technology in an abstract and isolated manner, exaggerating the opposition between technology and social relations, which led to a series of one-sided conclusions. However, as a theorist proficient in Marxism, Markus was sometimes able to perceive the complexity of Marx’s thought. He discovered that in addition to general discussions on technology—proposing a general theory of technology—Marx also provided critical interpretations of specific technological forms, proposing a specific theory of the critique of technology.
First, according to Marx’s general theory of technology, the growth of labor productivity is the standard for measuring historical progress. Yet, in a historical context, Marx’s critique of technology puts forward a new perspective. Marx frequently used the "pores of labor time" (劳动时间的空隙) [10] to denote the density of labor time. For the same eight-hour workday, the labor intensity in pre-capitalist and capitalist societies differs because the "pores" in the former are larger than in the latter. Marx explained this phenomenon: "An artificer who performs the various partial processes in the production of a finished article one after another, must at one time change his place, at another his tools. The transition from one operation to another interrupts the flow of his labor, and creates, so to say, gaps in his working day" [20]. If the theory of "pores of labor time" holds, it indicates that using labor time to measure productivity is not entirely applicable to pre-capitalist societies. The practice of labor time becoming the standard for productivity is merely a specific law of capitalist society, lacking universality and eternity. Another example is Marx’s definition of the historical development of human society from the perspective of use-value vs. exchange value. Marx noted that "in all forms of society where use-value predominates, labor time is more or less a matter of indifference" [21], because in such societies, surplus labor is merely for increasing the limited, patriarchal wealth of the rulers. At this stage, individual needs and the production of products are both limited; even if exchange exists, it is accidental and incidental, failing to touch the life of the entire community or become the dominant mode of production. With the advent of modern society, material production increasingly shook off direct individual needs, and the purpose of production shifted from specific use-values to exchange value. The "One" (capital) once again ruled the "Many"; the commodity economy aimed at exchange made production itself infinite, making the extension of labor time of decisive significance. Although the pursuit of exchange value created infinite momentum for capitalism, the dominance of the logic of capital cast humanity into the abyss of alienation. Marx found that the drive to extend labor time was stronger in capitalist society; the slave-owner’s whip could never reach the labor intensity provided by the compulsion of capital relations. Thus, Marx did not blindly emphasize the improvement of labor productivity; rather, he opposed the rule of exchange value and abstract labor time under the capitalist system. That is to say, labor productivity becoming the standard for technological development is merely a historical product of capitalist society.
Markus further pointed out that even if we limit the analysis to capitalist society, the concept of labor productivity remains obscure. It is generally believed that growth in labor productivity means a shortening of the necessary labor time required to produce a certain use-value, but this definition fails to strictly reflect the level of technological development. First, it ignores the difference between quality and quantity; measuring social material wealth requires looking not only at the quantity of products but also at the diversity of product types to better satisfy multifaceted needs. Second, the definition is too broad to determine the scope of technological progress. In elucidating the positive role of machinery, Marx emphasized: "It is necessary to distinguish between the greater productivity due to the development of the social process of production and the greater productivity due to the capitalist exploitation of that process" [22]. This indicates that Marx realized the growth of labor productivity achieved through increasing labor intensity and the degree of exploitation is not "growth" in its true sense. Marx did not deny that this is a form of growth, but argued it should not grow this way. Proceeding from the content-form dichotomy, Markus attempted to separate the technological process from social relations and eliminate value judgments, consequently falling into the trap of positivism. Although he occasionally caught a glimpse of the historical dimension in Marx’s critical theory and recognized the coercive role of exchange value, he failed to provide a profound analysis or critique of it.
Second, Markus argued that Marx’s general theory of technology is a tool-centric theory (工具中心论), which regards the instruments of production as the most important standard for measuring technological development. However, when Marx conducted concrete, historical investigations into the instruments of production, this tool-centrism was almost eliminated. As we know, Marx distinguished between the "formal subsumption" and the "real subsumption" of labor under capital. The former corresponds to the production of absolute surplus value, while the latter corresponds to the production of relative surplus value. Marx believed the real subsumption of labor under capital was more lethal; in this process, not only did the technical processes change, but the relationship between the worker and both production and capital also changed: "it is not only a formal relationship that is modified, but the labor process itself is transformed" [23]. Marx intended to show that only with the emergence of the real subsumption of labor does the capitalist mode of production truly become established. This is not to say that early capitalist production did not belong to the capitalist mode of production, but rather that only when it developed to this point did capitalist society create a new mode of material production and construct a new mode of praxis upon this foundation. Only then did the instruments of production (machinery) truly enter the center of the labor process and play a decisive role. Markus’s assertion that Marx was a techno-centrist is incorrect; one only forms such a view by understanding technology in an abstract and isolated manner, whereas Marx always discussed technology historically and specifically. Markus believed Marx had two conflicting theoretical modes of technology, but in fact, there is only a critical theory of technology; a general interpretative mode of technology does not exist.
Third, Markus argued that Marx’s analysis of the elements of the labor process is not applicable to pre-capitalist societies and only applies to the period of manufacture (工场手工业) [11], meaning its universality is untenable. For example, regarding agriculture in traditional societies, land serves as both the object of labor and the condition of labor (tool) within the labor process. It is easy to see that Markus remained confined to a traditional Marxist interpretative model, which failed to recognize Marx’s historical and concrete critical method and continued to perform an abstract analysis of the labor process—believing that these elements are universally applicable across all of human history. In fact, when discussing the factors of production, Marx did not exaggerate their scope of application; on the contrary, he always adhered to the principle of historicity, focusing on the specific historical stage of capitalist society.
Fourth, Markus argued that Marx’s definitions of living labor and simple cooperation cannot provide a universal standard for technological evolution. Starting from the content-form dichotomy, Markus separated the material-technical labor process from the reproduction process of social relations, arguing that living labor as "the bodily activity of an individual (a historically formed individual)" is something that "an abnormal, isolated individual would have to perform even without any social assistance" [24]. Markus’s citation here borders on taking words out of context. Marx long held a negative stance toward the "isolated individual"; the "isolated individual" in the quote refers to the position of classical bourgeois economists. The full context is: "The view which regards only distribution relations as historical, but not production relations, is, on the one hand, solely the view of the initial, still handicapped, critique of bourgeois economy. On the other hand, it rests on a confusion, namely the confusion of the social process of production with the simple labor process, such as might be performed by an abnormally isolated human being without any social assistance. To the extent that the labor process is a simple process between man and nature, its simple elements remain common to all social forms of development. But each specific historical form of this process further develops its material foundations and social forms" [25]. Marx’s discourse here is intended precisely to show that ignoring the historicity and specificity of labor is the habitual practice of bourgeois economists; they de-historicize and eternalize capitalist relations of production on one hand, and view labor as the activity of isolated individuals on the other. Although Markus was sometimes aware of Marx’s historical method, he still tended to see Marx as a technological determinist and viewed production as a purely technological process.
Markus also questioned Marx’s concept of simple cooperation, first citing Marx’s statement: "Simple cooperation, and even its more developed forms... belong to the labor process and not to the valorization process" [26]. Markus believed this sentence showed that Marx, from the perspective of content/ [text ends]
Starting from a dichotomy of form, [Markus] views simple cooperation as a labor process entirely unrelated to social relations. This is likewise a method of taking phrases out of context. The full citation is as follows: "Simple cooperation and its further developed forms—in short, all means of increasing the productive forces of labor—belong to the labor process, not to the process of valorization. They increase the efficiency of labor. But the value of the product of labor depends on the necessary labor-time required for its production. Therefore, the efficiency of labor only reduces, and never increases, the value of a certain product." [29] On the surface, Marx emphasizes that simple cooperation is merely a labor process and not a valorization process, but Marx's primary intention here is to distinguish between the growth of material wealth and the valorization of value. In his view, while simple cooperation can certainly increase labor productivity and social material wealth, it does not necessarily achieve valorization; therefore, simple cooperation cannot be equated with the valorization process.
Fifth, Markus boils all doubts down to the following question: in Marx’s work, can the labor process and the process of reproducing social relations be completely separated, and did Marx endorse such a separation? Markus argues that in analyzing machinery, Marx utilized both a historical mode of technical analysis and a general mode of technical analysis. If technology is viewed generally, machinery, like any other tool, primarily serves to replace human power and promote productivity growth. However, Marx explored machinery more in a critical sense; to this end, he critiqued mathematicians, mechanicians, and English economists for treating tools as simple machines and machines as complex tools. In Marx’s view, this disregard for essential differences lacked the historical element. Marx opposed equating machinery with tools because machinery in capitalist society is not merely a tool; it has already been mediated by specific social relations and has become an abstract power of domination standing above human beings. Marx further revealed that the actual controller behind the machine is not the capitalist but capital: "The machine becomes the form of capital, the power of capital over labor, the means by which capital suppresses all demands for independence by labor." [30] In this sense, we say that Marx focused not only on the role of machinery in promoting labor productivity but even more on the specific social functions exercised by machinery within capitalist society.
According to Markus’s analysis, the difference between tools and machines lies only in that "the productivity of tools and implements depends essentially on the personal skill of the user, whereas the productivity of the machine is essentially independent of personal skill." [31] This leads to a relative devaluation of skills possessing individual characteristics as machinery is widely applied. Regarding the overall development of society, the application of machinery breaks through natural human limitations and expands labor productivity; regarding the individual in society, the application of machinery implies the worker's dependence on the machine and the loss of free will. When Marx discusses machinery, he intends on the one hand to show that its application can increase labor productivity and provide the material foundation for a socialist society; on the other hand, he warns that the transformation of the capitalist mode of production triggered by the application of machinery will bring greater suffering and unfreedom to the workers. Whereas the worker was previously subject to the capitalist primarily due to a lack of the means of production, the application of machinery makes the situation even worse: "He is now subordinated to capitalist production and subject to the command of capital, not only because he lacks the means of labor, but because of his labor-power itself, and the nature and manner of his labor." [32]
In short, Marx always analyzes the technology of capitalist society dialectically. He believes the development of capitalist technology possesses contradictory characteristics: on one hand, the capitalist intends to vigorously develop productive forces and technology; on the other hand, the individual is alienated within technology. The machine is on one hand a means of labor and on the other hand an instrument of exploitation. Markus believes that Marx fell into theoretical confusion, tending toward a technocratic line of analysis when performing a general analysis of machinery, and toward the tradition of critical theory when performing a historical analysis of machinery. Markus's analysis does not accord with reality. Although Marx advocated for the distinction between content and form, he did not sever the two; the general analysis he performed on technology served his historical analysis of technology and his critical theory of capitalism.
III. Conclusion
Markus's analysis of Marx’s thought on technology is based on a dichotomy of content and form, suggesting that Marx "distinguished between what can and should be absorbed and appropriated from past achievements and what can become the object of rational practical critique and social choice: that is, distinguishing between labor and production, between labor-power and relations of production, and between technical aspects and social aspects in the strict sense." [33] Proceeding from this, Markus asserts that Marx possesses two faces (two identities): Marx as a theorist of technology and Marx as a historian. [34] At a shallow level, there are differences in the theoretical perspectives of Marx the technological theorist and Marx the technological historian. For example, use-value is viewed in certain contexts as the objectification of human historical capacity and the materialization of specific forms of social relations, while in other contexts it signifies a physical element satisfying the needs of human life. Simple labor and complex labor are seen in some contexts as essentially identical relations of simple addition related only to human physiology, while in others they are viewed as two essentially different activities related to history. Production and labor signify all human labor in some contexts, while in others they specifically refer to particular production activities under capitalist conditions of production.
Markus attributes the differences in Marx’s methodology to the presence of two souls within him: historical romanticism and political realism. Marx the historian was fully aware of the diversity and complexity of human ways of life, asserting that all societies are temporary and historical, and that all things appearing natural are historical and specific. Human beings must transform the world and endow the human world with meaning and value. Based on this, Marx emphasized cultural rupture, distinguished between the period of truly human history and the period of human pre-history [12], and emphasized that the future society would be a unity of the individual and society. Markus believes this perspective carries a strong romanticist coloring, arguing that such "imaginable things are not necessarily practically possible, nor necessarily suited to our current social action." [35] Yet, as a theorist researching human emancipation, Marx also emphasized that the world in which we live is the premise for all action and the limit of collective action, which is a form of political realism. We do not deny the complexity of Marx’s thought, but we do not agree with Markus's analysis. In Marx's thought, the tension between different viewpoints is usually presented in three ways: first, as a relationship of repudiation, as when Marx was influenced by idealism and bourgeois democratic thought in his early years but later thoroughly repudiated these immature views; second, as a relationship of improvement and elevation, as when the theory of alienation in his early thought was elevated into the theories of reification and fetishism; and third, as a relationship of interlaced fusion, such as the relationship between the historical romanticist views in the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 and the political realist views in Capital. Historical romanticism reflects to a certain extent the dimension of subjective critique in Marx's thought, while political realism reflects the objective dimension of materialism; both dimensions exist simultaneously and together constitute the historical dialectic, though their proportions vary across texts from different periods of Marx’s work.
In summary, by analyzing Markus's interpretation of Marx's theory of technology, we can obtain the following insights: First, Marx's theory of technology is complex; it may be distinguished into a general theory of technology and a critical theory of technology, but the two cannot be set against one another. One cannot unilaterally regard the general theory of technology as the dominant interpretive mode of Marx’s theory, nor can one view Marx as a one-sided production (technological) determinist. Second, Marx's critical theory should be based on a concrete critique of specific technical forms in capitalist society; the socialist transcendence of capitalism implies not only the quantitative accumulation of technology but, more importantly, a qualitative transformation of technical forms determined by the relations of production. Third, the dichotomy of content and form can serve as a tool for analyzing the development of technology in capitalist society, but if it is metaphysicalized and absolutized, it will lead to serious theoretical errors. Only by analyzing Marx's theory of technology dialectically and adhering to historical, holistic, and critical methods can we understand the significance and value of technology for social development.