Kong Ming'an and Tan Yong: Alienated Substance and Subjective Substance — Zizek's New Exploration of Marx's Philosophical Thought on Capital
Because commodities serve as the concrete manifestation of material wealth in capitalist society, they play an irreplaceable foundational role in the capitalist mode of production; consequently, any analysis of capitalism must necessarily begin with the commodity. Similarly, as the inexhaustible drive pushing the continuous development of the capitalist mode of production, capital remains a subject that can never be bypassed in our study of said mode of production, its internal contradictions, and the pursuit of capitalism as a temporary, transitional stage in the development of human history. In Capital, Marx provided an all-encompassing discourse on capital, involving an exceptionally rich array of content: the definition of capital, capital accumulation, the valorization of capital, money capital, productive capital, commodity capital, fixed capital, circulating capital, interest-bearing capital, banking capital, virtual capital, real capital, capital relations, and total social capital. On one hand, Marx’s detailed analysis and research provide us with a systematic and comprehensive body of knowledge and methodology for grasping contemporary capitalism; on the other hand, his profound focus on capital alerts us to the fact that capital remains the core of any study of contemporary capitalism. Therefore, as long as capitalist society actually exists, the study of capital remains both important and necessary.
Drawing upon the philosophies of Hegel and Kant, the contemporary Western leftist scholar Slavoj Žižek has offered a critique of Marx's understanding of capital. He argues that when Marx utilized Hegelian logical categories to outline the holistic history of capitalist development, he vacillated between two possibilities: first, viewing capital as an alienated substance within the historical process; and second, viewing capital as a "substance that is already in itself a subject." These two understandings of capital are directly related to the role played by the proletariat in the process of human historical development, and thus to the choice of path for the transition from capitalism to communism. Is Marx truly in a state of confusion regarding his understanding of capital, as Žižek claims? If not, does Marx ultimately view capital as an alienated substance or as a substance-as-subject? If Marx views capital as an alienated substance, what is the connection between such capital and the proletarian revolution? Or conversely, if Marx actually views capital as a substance-as-subject, how does it then relate to the proletarian revolution? With these questions in mind, we shall further explore the concept of capital in Capital.
I. Žižek’s Misreading: The Ambiguity in Marx’s Understanding of Capital
It is well known that Marx absorbed a great deal from Hegel when constructing his own theoretical system. In Capital, Marx employed Hegelian logical categories to outline the movement and laws of capital. However, it is precisely here that Žižek points out an ambiguity in Marx’s understanding: on the one hand, Marx regards capital as an alienated substance within a certain historical process; on the other hand, he regards capital as a substance that is already in itself a subject.
Through what kind of analysis does Žižek arrive at this conclusion? This must begin with his understanding and analysis of non-equivalent exchange. Žižek first examines Hegel’s infinite judgment [1] and negative judgment. Contained within the infinite judgment is non-equivalent exchange—that is, "the loss is pure; in the exchange, we gain nothing." [1] But in the negative judgment, matters are not so simple. On the surface, the negative judgment seems to contain the logic of "equivalent exchange," appearing to be the direct opposite of the infinite judgment. Žižek points out that in the negative judgment proposition "a thing is an object of non-sensuous intuition," "we gain another definite realm of non-sensuous intuition by losing the realm of sensuous intuition." [2] In this way, we gain something in the act of relinquishing, and thus the negative judgment possesses the appearance of equivalent exchange. However, when Žižek further points out that "it is precisely the infinite judgment of abstract, indeterminate negation that brings 'truth' to the negative judgment," [3] the appearance of equivalent exchange possessed by the negative judgment is shattered. To demonstrate this conclusion, he introduces Hegel’s dialectic of "culture" (Bildung) [2]. In this dialectic, the opposition between the noble consciousness and the state is the result of a certain implicit exchange: the subject’s self-consciousness "uses this total alienation (because he surrenders his own substantial content to the other, the state) in exchange for a kind of glory (the glory of serving the common good embodied by the state)." [4] What is followed here is clearly still the principle of equivalent exchange. However, when we reach the limit of this dialectic—"absolute freedom"—the subject pays everything and gains nothing. That is, the alienation of the subject becomes an abstract negation, and "this negation cannot provide any positive, definite content in the exchange." [4] Of course, this moment of absolute freedom does not merely exist in the imagination; it has a prominent representative in reality: the specific period ruled by the Jacobins. During this period, for no particular reason, anyone could be declared a traitor at any time and sent to the guillotine. This interpretation should be said to accord with Hegel’s original intention, for Hegel once noted: "The negation of self-consciousness is a content-filled negation—it is either honor or wealth, both of which are acquired in exchange by the self-alienated self," and so on, but "all these determinations are lost through the loss experienced by the self in absolute freedom; its negation is a meaningless death." [5] Therefore, both the infinite judgment and the negative judgment actually contain non-equivalent exchange. In Žižek's view, the subject in this non-equivalent exchange ultimately pays everything and gains nothing.
In this light, Žižek naturally cannot agree with those who accuse Hegel's dialectic of being a "closed economy" in which all losses are compensated in advance. On the contrary, he believes that Marx’s conception of the proletarian revolution possesses this "closed economy" mechanism. This is because the proletarian subject, as the pinnacle of history, although deprived of all property, ultimately gains liberation from all substantialized organizations and gains control over the production and reproduction processes of the entire society. Marx "takes the grand concept of the proletariat as the pinnacle of the 'alienated' historical process, the pinnacle of the gradual liberation of labor power from the 'organic' rule of the substantial conditions of the production process (the proletariat gains a double freedom: he represents the abstract subjectivity liberated from all organic links of substance, but at the same time he is deprived of all property, and therefore must sell his labor power in the market to survive)." [4] That is, "the proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains" [6] in this revolution; they will win the whole world. Thereby, Marx "conceived the proletarian revolution as a 'materialist' version of the reconciliation of Hegel’s subject and substance: it reconstructs the unity of the subject (labor power) and the objective conditions of the production process, but this unity is not under the dominance of objective conditions (where the individual is merely an appendage of the social whole), but rather collective subjectivity serves as the mediating force of this unity. In socialism, the collective subject must become transparent and capable of controlling the production process and the entire social reproduction." [4] Thus, the proletariat, as the subject of this historical process, does not pay everything to gain nothing; therefore, in Žižek’s view, Marx’s conception carries a "closed economy." One could say that the reconciliation of subject and substance envisioned by Marx is achieved through the "re-appropriation of the entire content of substance by the subject." But Žižek believes that this solution proposed by Marx was already excluded by Hegel. He points out: "In Hegel’s philosophy, 'reconciliation' does not mean the moment when 'substance becomes subject'—that is, the moment when absolute subjectivity is elevated to the generative basis of all substance—but rather means that the dimension of subjectivity intervenes in the very heart of substance in the form of an irreducible lack, a lack that forever prevents the subject from achieving full self-identity." [4] Therefore, in Žižek's view, the reconciliation of subject and substance in Hegel is not achieved through the subject re-appropriating the entire content of substance, but through the dimension of subjectivity intervening in the very core of substance—that is, becoming the "substance-as-subject." "'Substance-as-subject' ultimately signifies a certain ontological 'rupture,' forever indicting every 'worldview' and every cosmological view as the mere appearance of the entire 'Great Chain of Being.'" [4] Furthermore, Hegel here "elevates the idea of self-mediation to the foundation and substance of the universe," [4] rather than absolute subjectivity. Consequently, Žižek believes that under the guise of polemicizing with Hegel, Marx retreated back to Hegel the philosopher: "the object of Marx’s struggle was ultimately nothing more than the idealistic shadow of his own ontological premises." [4] The best proof of this conclusion, Žižek argues, is that when Marx attempted to use Hegelian logical categories to describe the capitalist world, he "constantly and systematically vacillated between two possibilities": [4] one is viewing capital as an alienated substance within a certain historical process "ruling over atomized subjects"; [4] the other is viewing capital as a substance that is already in itself a subject—"a substance that is no longer an empty, abstract universality, but a universality capable of reproducing itself through its self-mediating and self-positing circular process." [4] Thus, according to Žižek’s analysis, Marx’s understanding of capital possesses a certain degree of ambiguity.
What, then, is the difference between viewing capital as an alienated substance within a historical process and viewing capital as a substance that is already in itself a subject? First, from the perspective of their basic connotations, viewing capital as an alienated substance refers to the fact that in capitalist society, capital—as a product of human-to-human relations—turns back to enslave and constrain humans; capital is alienated. Yet, in this understanding, humans, as the subjects of the historical process, will always re-appropriate the alienated substantial content by subating [3] the already alienated capital. Conversely, viewing capital as a substance-as-subject means that in capitalist society, capital possesses the capacity for self-valorization; it uses itself as a medium and humans as tools to realize its own frenzied expansion. In this understanding, capital has become the subject, and humans have been de-subjectified. Second, from the perspective of the logic of exchange, viewing capital as an alienated substance still contains the logic of equivalent exchange: what the subject loses in the process of alienation is eventually repaid through the re-appropriation of the substantial content. In contrast, viewing capital as a substance-as-subject contains the logic of non-equivalent exchange: capital reproduces itself by taking itself as the medium and the end, and the subject as the tool; that is, humans become the tools for capital’s self-valorization, and humans, as the subjects of history, lose everything in this process and ultimately gain nothing. Third, the former implies that the proletariat, as the historical subject, can eventually regain control over capital through collective power, and thereby control the entire process of social production and reproduction. That is to say, the state of alienation—wherein capital stands opposed to humans as their own product—is merely temporary, and the proletariat will ultimately subate the alienated state of capital through revolution. The latter, however, implies that the proletariat is no longer the subject of the historical process; to some extent, it could be said that humans are no longer the subjects of history at all, because capital is the substance-as-subject.
It is capable of utilizing human beings to achieve its own self-production. This state is much like the "cunning of reason," where "individuals pursuing specific goals become, without being aware of it, tools through which a divine plan is realized" [10]. In the process of the self-production of capital as the subject-turned-substance, people may appear to be pursuing their own specific individual ends, but in reality, they are tools for the self-valorization of capital. Furthermore, the power of capital has become so extraordinarily formidable that it has become impossible for people to unite intentionally against it. "The fusion of capital and knowledge produces a new type of proletariat, for it is the absolute proletariat that has lost the last bit of private resistance; everything, even the most inner memories, are implanted, so that what remains now is only the real void of pure non-substantial subjectivity" [11]. That is to say, the fusion of capital and knowledge will mold the proletariat just as robots are molded in films, ultimately ensuring that the most authentic memories and the core of the proletariat’s existence are shaped by capital. Of course, this molding differs from the way people mold robots; it is accomplished through ideological infiltration. Consequently, when the core of the proletariat's existence as a subject is controlled by capital, the subjectivity of the proletariat vanishes entirely, and it becomes impossible for the proletariat to resist the rule of capital as a united force.
According to the above analysis, the former [interpretation] implies that the alienated substance of capital can be sublated in a revolutionary manner through the proletariat acting as a subject. The latter, however, implies that capital has already completely transcended the subject, and its sublation can only be left to so-called contingency.
In short, after analyzing the logic of non-equivalent exchange contained in Hegel's infinite judgment and negative judgment, Žižek argues that Hegelian dialectics is not a "closed mechanism." On the contrary, he believes that Marx, when conceptualizing the proletarian revolution, was trapped within a "closed mechanism." He further points out an ambiguity in Marx's application of Hegelian logical categories to outline the operation and laws of capital in the capitalist world: at times treating capital as an alienated substance, and at other times as a substance that has already become the subject. Is Marx truly as Žižek critiques him to be? Let us first look at Lukács’s analysis of this issue, and then examine Marx's actual views in detail.
II. From Reification to Class Consciousness: The Proletariat as the Appropriator of the Alienated Substance
Lukács is hailed as the progenitor of Western Marxism. In History and Class Consciousness, he profoundly revealed the phenomenon of reification existing in capitalist society, which constituted a powerful critique of capitalism. Furthermore, his in-depth discourse on the birth of proletarian consciousness and the proletariat as the "identical subject-object of history" that breaks the reified structure serves as an important reference for the proletarian revolution. Žižek argues that, unlike Marx, Lukács in History and Class Consciousness is a typical alienation theorist; he expounds upon the central theme that the proletariat, as the subject of history, must necessarily appropriate the alienated substantial content through revolutionary action [12]. Lukács proposed the concepts of "reification" and "class consciousness" and pointed out the historical mission of the proletariat without having seen Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. On this point, Lukács differs from Marx. Marx exhibits "ambiguous" characteristics on this issue and lacks clarity. What, then, is the actual situation? Let us begin with Lukács's analysis before entering the horizon of Marx’s critique of capital. In History and Class Consciousness, Lukács primarily uses the following logic to argue that the proletariat, as the historical subject, will inevitably appropriate the alienated substantial content.
First, Lukács examines in detail the phenomenon of reification in capitalist society, proposing a definition of reification across two dimensions and six levels. On the one hand, in the objective dimension, reification has three layers of meaning: First, the qualitative and material nature of the objects in the objective world—that is, their immediate "thingness"—is obscured. "When all use-values appear as commodities without exception, they acquire a new objectivity, a new kind of thingness... which destroys their original, authentic thingness" [13]. For example, once land becomes a commodity, it acquires the characteristic of being able to "yield" ground rent, and this new characteristic masks the inherent fertility, soil quality, and other traits of the land. Moreover, the existence and degree of this new characteristic of land are determined by social relations; as an individual landowner, one cannot make any changes to this. Second, the relationship between things masks the relationship between people. This means that commodity relations and the commodity form were originally created by relations between people, but now, because commodity relations and the commodity form have developed to occupy a dominant position in society, they exist independently of human beings. The entire path of genesis is reversed, such that these commodity relations are regarded as the natural attributes of these things, thereby masking the relationships between people. "Reification means that the relationship between people in commodities appears as a relationship between things" [7]. Third, the objective world generates movement among commodity relations that is not recognized by people; it becomes a relationship that constrains and enslaves them, forming a so-called "second nature" [4] that greatly restricts human freedom. "On the objective side, a world of ready-made things and relations between things is produced (...), the laws of which, although gradually recognized by people, nevertheless confront them as uncontrollable, self-acting forces" [7]. Facing such a relationship, individuals feel as powerless as they do when facing nature. Although people can understand and utilize these laws, as individuals they still cannot change this situation through their own activities.
On the other hand, in the subjective dimension, reification also has three layers of meaning: First, human attributes are reified into commodities. "The worker must perceive himself as a commodity, as the 'owner' of his labor-power. His unique position lies in the fact that this labor-power is his only possession... this self-objectification, i.e., the fact that human functions become commodities, precisely reveals the dehumanized and dehumanizing nature of the commodity relationship" [14]. The fact that workers perceive themselves as commodities and human functions become commodities reveals that human attributes have been reified into commodities. Human characteristics and abilities have been separated from the organic unity of the person, "appearing as 'things' that are 'possessed' and 'sold,' just like various objects in the external world" [7]. Second, the reification of human attributes into commodities further dictates that humans must submit to the laws of the commodity economy just like commodities. "On the subjective side... human activity is objectified in opposition to man himself, becoming a commodity that is subject to the human-alienated objectivity of the natural laws of society, which, just like any consumer good that has become a commodity, must carry out its own movement independent of man" [14]. The law of value, the law of supply and demand, and other economic laws are the natural laws to which commodities must submit. Once human attributes are reified into commodities, humans, like commodities, must submit to these economic laws. A typical phenomenon is the influence of the law of supply and demand: when the number of workers needed by capitalists decreases—that is, when the demand for workers in capitalist society decreases—many workers face unemployment, and the wages of those who can find work will also decrease. Third, in the subjective dimension, human consciousness is also being reified. This primarily refers to people taking the properties of commodities—abstract, quantitative, calculable forms—as well as forms like merchant capital and money capital as the true forms of immediacy, and further adhering to these forms by "scientifically reinforcing" such regularities. From the perspective of reified consciousness, the abstract, quantitative, and calculable form of the commodity "necessarily becomes the true immediate form of expression of this commodity nature—as reified consciousness—and does not seek to transcend this form at all" [7]. To broaden this reification of consciousness slightly, it means that people in capitalist society do not look at capitalist relations from a perspective that transcends the various relations within capitalist society, but instead seek various laws to reinforce those relations. "The formation of reified consciousness is the most concentrated and extreme expression of human reification" [7].
Next, Lukács points out that when bourgeois thought is faced with the aforementioned phenomena of reification, it cannot clarify "their genesis and disappearance, their true essence and basis" [7], and thus cannot find a path to sublate reification. The reason for this lies in the antinomies of bourgeois thought. "The bourgeoisie, by virtue of its social existence, must think the world using these forms of thought" [7]; that is, it relies on some very abstract, predictive, partial systems to grasp the content of various highly specialized fields, rather than grasping the knowable whole in a unified way. Even bourgeois philosophy cannot achieve a holistic grasp of the knowable totality, because philosophy neither interferes with nor corrects the various disciplines, such that "the problems neglected by these disciplines cannot find answers in philosophy either" [7]. Lukács cites the entirely different understandings of the role of machinery held by bourgeois economics and Marx to illustrate the opposition between the bourgeois approach of examining various historical phenomena in isolation and the holistic (totalizing) viewpoint. As is well known, machinery in itself is devoid of contradictions. The bourgeois economist’s understanding of the role of machinery remains at the level of isolating the individual machine; therefore, the contradictions inherent in the capitalist application of machinery—for instance, the contradiction that "machinery in itself shortens labor time, while its capitalist application lengthens the working day" [14]—are, from the perspective of bourgeois economics, "theoretically speaking, simply non-existent" [7]. Conversely, the Marxist understanding of the role of machinery grasps it from the perspective of the whole, focusing precisely on the various contradictions brought about by the capitalist application of machinery. Furthermore, bourgeois thought cannot see through to the fact that "the tendencies of historical development constitute a higher reality than empirical facts" [7]. This is because, on the one hand, the meaning revealed by this historical development tendency implies the inevitable demise of capitalism; thus, for the bourgeoisie, "to become aware of this problem is equivalent to spiritual suicide" [14]. On the other hand, the bourgeoisie inevitably lives in a reified reality, which is determined by the capitalist mode of production and is the basis upon which the bourgeoisie depends for its existence. Therefore, while both face their own reification, the bourgeoisie remains uncritical of it and even feels satisfied, whereas the proletariat sees its own dehumanization within it and thus strives to break it.
Finally, Lukács discusses how proletarian class consciousness will be born within the structure of reification. As the historical subject that is the unity of subject and object, the proletariat will inevitably break the reified structure and transcend capitalism through revolutionary movements. Proletarian consciousness and the subject-object unity of the proletariat are both confirmed within the immediacy of the reified structure of capitalist society. Regarding the confirmation of the subject-object unity of the proletariat, Lukács points out that within the proletariat's own reified structure, the worker "is forced to become the object of the process, enduring his commodification and reduction to a pure quantity" [15]. This reified existence of the proletariat cannot leave any space for him to imagine himself as the subject of social events. In a word, within the reified structure of capitalist society, the proletariat confirms its own objectification very clearly. At the same time, the proletariat can confirm its own subjectivity as history within the reified structure. "If the reification of capital is dissolved into the incessant process of its production and reproduction...
From this standpoint, the proletariat can realize itself as the true—though constrained and for the time being unconscious—subject of this process."[17] When the proletariat recognizes its own subject-object unity within the structure of reification and realizes the necessity of transcending that reification, the birth of proletarian consciousness begins. Furthermore, for proletarian consciousness to transform reality and break the structure of reification, the proletariat must engage in praxis. This requires the proletariat to always recognize the "inherent significance for the total development"[18] of the contradictions within the process, to always aim for the totality, to always judge the correctness of an action within the whole of development, and to avoid ignoring the course of history by "imposing its own desires and knowledge upon history."[19] Therefore, "only the class consciousness of the proletariat which has become practical has this function of changing things,"[20] and can truly break the structure of reification. Although transforming reality and breaking the reified structure appears exceedingly difficult, only the proletariat can accomplish this historical task. While the bourgeoisie possesses more resources than the proletariat, it does not naturally possess subject-object unity; in the structure of reification, the bourgeoisie does not see its own objectification, but rather a false subjectivity. Moreover, due to its class position, the bourgeoisie does not act to break this reified structure but rather to rationalize it. Furthermore, "the erroneous views of bourgeois economics regarding the capitalist economic process"[21] are themselves the result of a lack of mediation; therefore, bourgeois thought lacks the necessary mediation to gain a sufficient understanding of the historical totality. Thus, it is impossible for the bourgeoisie to become the subject of history and propel history toward a higher stage. Conversely, the proletariat can start from the direct relationship between labor and capital, employ the categories of mediation to link "those forms which are far removed from the production process with these forms themselves, and recognize them within the dialectical totality."[22] Consequently, only the proletariat can understand history as a totality.
In summary, Lukács actually grounded the emergence of proletarian consciousness and the confirmation of the proletariat as the unity of the historical subject-object within the universal structure of reification existing in capitalist society. He argued that only through conscious praxis—namely, the revolutionary movement—can the proletariat break this reification and drive history toward a higher stage. Here, when we observe the high degree of similarity between the reification pointed out by Lukács and the alienation revealed by Marx, we might consider that Lukács followed Marx’s lead in viewing capital as an alienated substance. He explored the necessary connection between the problem of alienation in capitalist society and the proletarian revolution, arguing that the proletariat must necessarily act as the subject of history and can, through conscious praxis, transform reality and thereby re-appropriate the content of the alienated substance. Thus, Lukács can be seen as interpreting Marx along the dimension of capital as an alienated substance. The insight we might gain here is this: perhaps Marx primarily viewed capital as an alienated substance.
III. Marx’s Vision: Capital as an Alienated Substance in the Historical Process
As a philosopher of the materialist dialectic and an heir to Hegelian speculative philosophy, Marx could not be a simple "affirmationist" or "negationist," but was rather a dialectical negationist. This is typically manifested in his classic masterwork, Capital. Contrary to Žižek’s accusations, in Marx’s vision, capital is like a runaway horse—difficult to tame and hard for humanity to harness; yet, at the same time, capital can be tamed. Just as commodities possess the dual attributes of use-value and exchange-value, and labor possesses the dual attributes of concrete labor and abstract labor, capital also possesses dual attributes. Why? Because in Marx’s view, the taming of capital as a substance is subject to strict conditions: the demise of the capitalist system and the birth of socialism must coexist. Thus, capital is both an alienated substance and a substance-as-subject. It must be noted, however, that Marx fundamentally viewed capital as an alienated substance, which is closely linked to his vision of the proletarian revolution and the realization of communism. Marx's specific arguments are as follows:
On the one hand, in Capital, Marx describes capital as an alienated substance. In the chapter "The Transformation of Money into Capital" in Volume I of Capital, he lifts the veil on capital. First, Marx defines capital. He points out: "The value originally advanced, therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation, but adds to itself a surplus-value or expands itself. It is this movement that converts it into capital."[23] It can be seen that after value passes through the process of circulation, it realizes self-expansion (Verwertung); it is precisely in this movement that capital appears: it is transformed from value. Marx further notes: "Value becomes value in process, money in process, and, as such, capital."[24] Here, money is the form taken by value, through which money is transformed into capital. Money appearing as capital is a form we are very familiar with today; without Marx’s analysis, we might not even perceive how money is transformed into capital. Second, Marx describes capital as a substance. He points out: "The value of commodities suddenly presents itself as a self-moving substance in process, in which money and commodities are mere forms."[25] Clearly, the "substance" mentioned here refers to value. As previously noted, value transforms into capital after realizing self-expansion in the circulation process; therefore, value and capital here are basically equivalent. Thus, it can be argued that Marx views capital here as a substance that has two forms: commodities and money. If this remains somewhat abstract, we can deepen our understanding with the example Marx provides of butyric acid and propyl formate. Marx notes: "By equating propyl formate with butyric acid, the chemical substance of butyric acid as distinct from its physical form is expressed."[26] Butyric acid and propyl formate are substances with very different properties, but they share the same chemical formula, $C_4H_8O_2$. That is, the chemical elements and their proportions that constitute them are identical. Thus, $C_4H_8O_2$ is actually the chemical substance shared by both butyric acid and propyl formate; conversely, butyric acid and propyl formate are different manifestations of the chemical substance $C_4H_8O_2$. Value is equivalent to $C_4H_8O_2$, while butyric acid and propyl formate correspond to commodities and money. Linking this back to the transformation between value and capital, one can conclude that capital is that self-moving substance. Finally, Marx views capital as an alienated substance. He points out: "Capital is dead labor, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labor."[27] To realize its goal of expansion, capital ultimately relies on extracting surplus-value during the production process. For capital to enter the production process, it must purchase a special commodity: labor-power. Thus, profit-seeking capital necessarily stands opposed to the worker as an independent, dominating force. Because capital blindly chases surplus labor without limit, it encroaches upon the time required for the body’s growth, development, and maintenance of health; it "takes no account of the health and length of life of the worker."[28] "Under the rule of capital, the worker can only preserve himself by alienating and selling his own labor-power,"[29] "constantly producing objective wealth as capital, as an alien power that dominates and exploits him."[30] Therefore, in Marx’s view, capital is an entirely alienated existence for the worker. Furthermore, in the form of interest-bearing capital, capital assumes another alienated form in which its origin is masked; people not only fail to think of its origin but instead think of a form "entirely opposite"[31] to its true origin. As Marx points out: "The alienated character of capital, its antithesis to labor, is shifted outside the actual process of exploitation, namely to interest-bearing capital,"[32] and in this form, capital "assumes its most alienated and peculiar form."[33] Thus, Marx does indeed view capital here as an alienated substance.
On the other hand, Marx does indeed mention in Capital that capital is a substance-as-subject, which can self-expand through its relationship with itself. On this, Marx points out that in the $M—C—M'$ circulation process, "Value is here the subject of a process, in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and commodities, it at the same time changes in magnitude, differentiates itself from itself as original value by producing surplus-value, and self-expands."[34] We already know that value which realizes expansion through the circulation process is capital; therefore, capital is actually the subject of this process. Moreover, in the form of interest-bearing capital, Marx further points out: "Capital assumes its pure fetish form, $M—M'$, a subject, a saleable thing."[35] Here, Marx's view of capital as a substance-as-subject receives its most powerful illustration. Initially, when the power of capital was still weak, "it still sought crutches in previous modes of production or those vanishing with the emergence of capitalism,"[36] but as capital grew strong with the maturation of capitalism, it cast aside these crutches and "moved according to its own laws."[37] Thus, in the $M—M'$ form, capital relates to itself and realizes its own expansion; capital has seemingly become the subject of the process. Capital as a substance-as-subject means that the object—capital—originally created by human subjects has, through the deep development of capitalism, acquired subjectivity. This in turn renders the human subject, who was once its creator, into an object. Consequently, humans stand before capital just as workers stand before great machinery in the capitalist production process: "as conscious organs alongside the unconscious organs of the automaton."[38] In other words, the great development of capitalism "is a process in which human subjectivity is replaced by capital subjectivity."[39] Before capital as a substance-as-subject, humans are merely tools for the self-expansion of capital—this applies to both the worker and the capitalist. To a certain extent, it can be said that Marx, by viewing capital as a substance-as-subject, offered an exceptionally profound critique of the objectified state of human existence in capitalist society. From this dimension alone, capitalist society is by no means a satisfactory or humane social form.
Therefore, on the surface, Marx indeed seems to view capital as both an alienated substance and a substance-as-subject, thereby falling into the ambiguity criticized by Žižek. However, a careful analysis reveals that viewing capital as both an alienated substance and a substance-as-subject is Marx’s dialectical understanding of capital, and Marx fundamentally views capital as an alienated substance. There are three main reasons for this: First, when Marx treats capital as a substance-as-subject, there is a prerequisite—namely, that this only occurs within capitalist society...
Only under these conditions is it possible for capital to appear as the subject-substance. According to Žižek’s critique of Marx, when Marx views capital as the subject-substance, it implies that it has become impossible for the proletariat, as the historical subject, to regain control over the entire production process. However, Marx had no such intention. Although Marx noted that under the conditions of capitalist production, capital develops into a subject-substance capable of self-relation and self-valorization, its appearance as a subject-substance exists only within capitalist society. Marx and Engels demonstrated that capitalist society is merely a transitory historical stage in human history; as human society develops, it will inevitably be replaced by a higher social form. Consequently, capital as the subject-substance will not exist forever—that is to say, capital cannot be the subject eternally, and humanity will not be its object eternally.
Therefore, Marx’s treatment of capital as the subject-substance is predicated on a specific prerequisite: the existence of the capitalist mode of production. This excludes the possibility of capital ever reigning over humanity as some kind of eternal historical subject, while simultaneously opening up the space for the proletariat, as the historical subject, to master the entire production process in the form of an association of free individuals. Second, in Capital, Marx thoroughly pointed out the multiple internal contradictions inherent in the capitalist mode of production and argued that capitalist society would perish due to the insolubility of these contradictions. In other words, the self-valorization of capital is not eternal. First, this is the inevitable result of the development of capital's own internal contradictions: "The real barrier of capitalist production is capital itself." [17] That is to say, in the capitalist mode of production, production is merely production for capital, "instead of the instruments of production being simply means for an ever-expanding system of life for the society of producers." [18] Thus, the self-preservation and valorization of capital are only possible within certain limits, while the means used by capital to achieve the goal of continuous valorization—the "unconditional development of the social productive forces" [19]—constantly break through these limits.
Next is the result of the contradiction between the anarchy of production in capitalist society and the organized operation within enterprises. Through organized management, enterprises expect to obtain maximum benefits, but the anarchy of capitalist production itself makes it impossible for an enterprise to ever master the entire capitalist production process; thus, the organized operation of the enterprise always faces the risk of bankruptcy. Furthermore, it is the result of the development of the contradiction between the productivity of labor and the law of the falling rate of profit. The productivity of labor greatly increases with the development of capitalism, but when it develops to a certain point, it inevitably causes the profit rate to decline. This leads to capital overproduction, speculation, and crises, making it so that "too many means of labor and subsistence are produced periodically." [20] This, in turn, prevents the further development of labor productivity, causing capitalist production to come to a standstill when its profit falls. Finally, it is the result of the development of the fundamental contradiction of capitalist society—the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. The periodic crises of capitalism demonstrate that the "productive forces at the disposal of society no longer tend to further the development of the conditions of bourgeois property" [21]; that is to say, capitalist relations of production have become fetters on the productive forces. Although capitalism attempts to alleviate this contradiction by destroying a mass of productive forces, conquering new markets, and exploiting old ones more thoroughly through constant expansion, it remains to no avail because it does not fundamentally change the inner nature of the capitalist system.
Therefore, it is the existence of these contradictions that makes the capitalist mode of production fundamentally a historical and transitional form. Consequently, the valorization of capital developed from the capitalist mode of production is likewise historical. Third, Marx repeatedly pointed out that the proletariat—the impoverished class exploited by the bourgeoisie, the tragic class that pays with blood and sweat for capital's self-valorization—will eventually, through revolutionary action, overthrow all existing social systems and win freedom and the whole world. That is to say, the "instruments" of capital's self-valorization—the workers—will change back from "instruments" into human beings, and capital's self-valorization will thus conclude its history; the so-called capital as subject-substance will cease to exist. The anarchy of capitalist production and the alien dominating power that the capitalist mode of production brings to the agents of production will only be sublated [22] when it is "as the product of freely associated men, and is under their conscious and planned control." [23] To place the entire production process under the control of a community composed of freely associated individuals requires the proletariat to act as the historical subject, overthrow all existing social systems, and achieve communism.
Marx conducted a detailed discourse on this. He pointed out: "The bourgeoisie has not only forged the weapons that bring death to itself; it has also called into existence the men who are to wield those weapons—the modern working class—the proletarians." [24] Thus, the proletariat is born and develops alongside the formation and development of capitalism. At the same time, only the proletariat can serve as the historical subject; only the proletariat can, through revolutionary action, re-place the entire production process under the conscious control of people and re-appropriate capital as an alienated substance. This is because, on the one hand, only the proletariat is a thoroughly revolutionary class. The bourgeoisie, of course, cannot be thoroughly revolutionary; on the contrary, it is counter-revolutionary because it must maintain the various foundations of the capitalist mode of production, otherwise the soil upon which it exists would disappear. Other classes decay and finally disappear in the face of the progressive development of capitalism, leaving at last only the opposition between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. Furthermore, with the intensification of the exploitation of labor, the proletarian "sinks deeper and deeper below the conditions of existence of his own class" [25]—that is, the proletariat eventually reaches a point where there is no way out but revolution. Additionally, the proletariat can become conscious within its unfair treatment—"this consciousness is at once the product of the mode of production based on capital, and at the same time the knell of its doom." [26] At first it is individual workers, then the workers of a factory, then the workers of a locality, slowly transforming into a struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. On the other hand, this revolution by the proletariat to overthrow all existing social systems represents the interests of the vast majority of people; it is the "independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority." [27] Therefore, in Marx’s view, the proletariat will inevitably unite and, as the subject of the historical process, realize communism through conscious revolutionary action. Consequently, the workers—the necessary "instruments" of capital's self-valorization—will ultimately become the subject of the revolution, achieving the re-appropriation and control over capital as an alienated substance.
In summary, Žižek’s view that there is an ambiguity in Marx’s understanding of capital—viewing capital as an alienated substance on the one hand and as a subject-substance on the other—is clearly a misreading. Marx fundamentally views capital as an alienated substance. Moreover, Marx’s understanding of capital is linked to the idea that capitalism, due to its inherent internal contradictions, must manifest as a temporary and transitional stage in the historical process. That is to say, the proletariat as the historical subject will inevitably transform capitalist society and realize communism through revolutionary action, thereby re-appropriating the alienated substantial content.
IV. Conclusion
Viewing capital both as an alienated substance and as a subject-substance is, in fact, Marx’s dialectical understanding of capital, just as a commodity possesses both use-value and exchange-value, and just as labor in a commodity-economy society is both concrete labor and abstract labor. Furthermore, it must be recognized that Marx fundamentally views capital as an alienated substance. This can be illustrated on the one hand through Lukács’s argument on the proletariat as the historical subject breaking through the reified structures existing in capitalist society, and on the other hand through Marx’s discourse on the inevitable demise of capitalism due to the insolubility of multiple internal contradictions and the proletariat’s inevitable realization of communism as the historical subject through revolutionary movement, thereby regaining control over the entire process of social production and reproduction. Therefore, the so-called ambiguity in Marx’s understanding of capital alleged by Žižek is actually nothing more than a misreading.
"A Brief Analysis of Lukács’s Concept of Reification," Social Scientist (Shèhuì kēxuéjiā), 2005, Issue S1. 12(13)(14) Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), pp. 153, 160, 170, 153, 161, 182, 196, 196, 278, 278. 13 Nie Wenjun, "Lukács’s Thought on Reification and Its Ethical Significance," Journal of Social Science of Hunan Normal University (Húnán Shīfàn Dàxué Shèhuì Kēxué Xuébào), 2011, Issue 3. 14(12) Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), pp. 508, 508. 15 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 258. 16 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 277. 17 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 300. 18 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 273. 19 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 310. 20 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 245. 21 Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Du Zhangzhi et al. (Beijing: Commercial Press, 2014), p. 283. 22 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 176. 23 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 181. 24 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 181. 25 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 64. 26 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 269. 27 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 311. 28 Bai Gang, "From 'Capital Justice' to 'Labor Justice': The Justice Turn in Capital," Journal of Guizhou Normal University (Social Sciences) (Guìzhōu Shīfàn Dàxué Xuébào Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn), 2018, Issue 5. 29 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 659. 30 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 939. 31 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 430. 32 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 939. 33 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 180. 34 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 442. 35 Collected Works of Marx and Engels (Mǎkèsī Ēngéīsī Wénjí), Vol. 8 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 180. [28] 36 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 8 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 180. 37 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 483. 38 Qiao Yuqiang, "From Capital to a Community with a Shared Future for Humanity: Reflections, Critiques, and Transcendence of Global Governance," Journal of Henan University (Social Science) (Hénán Dàxué Xuébào Shèhuì Kēxué Bǎn), 2019, Issue 5. 39 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 278. 40 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 278. 41 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 279. 42 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 3 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 287. 43 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 37. 44 Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2004), p. 97. 45 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 38. 46 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 43. 47 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 8 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 112. 48 Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2 (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 2009), p. 42.
(Author Affiliation: School of Marxism, Nankai University) Web Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Shandong Social Sciences (Shāndōng Shèhuì Kēxué), 2020, Issue 7