Lin Yingfeng: The Development Dilemmas of the French Communist Party Since the 2008 Economic Crisis
Since 2008, the economic crisis that began in the United States has swept the globe. As the heartland of capitalism, Europe has suffered deeply; European nations, particularly those in Western and Southern Europe, have successively fallen into the quagmire of debt crises, refugee waves, and unemployment surges. Coupled with the spread of international terrorism and the rise of populist forces, major mainstream governing parties are facing multifaceted challenges. The mutual intensification of economic crisis and social contradictions has triggered political crises in some countries, providing an opening for the broad range of left-wing parties whose mission has always been the critique and transformation of capitalism. As a veteran European left-wing force, the French Communist Party (PCF, hereafter referred to as the "French Communist Party") formed a political alliance at the end of 2008 with the Left Party (PG)—the Left Front (Front de gauche). It absorbed several small left-wing parties, including the "Federation for a Social and Ecological Alternative," "The Alternatives," "Republic and Socialism," "United Left," "Convergence and Alternative," the "Anti-Capitalist Left," and the "Communist Workers' Party of France," in hopes of achieving significant results. However, over the past decade or so, the PCF's performance across various levels has been suboptimal. Why has the PCF struggled despite its aggressive maneuvers? Based on the PCF's performance in major domestic and international elections in recent years, this article intends to analyze the practical dilemmas facing its development from three aspects: the overall environment of European left-wing politics, the PCF's identity and positioning within the political spectrum, and its theoretical development following the proposal of "New Communism," in order to provide a rational interpretation of the PCF’s developmental status following the economic crisis.
I. The Downward Trend of the French Communist Party’s Development Since the 2008 Economic Crisis
Marx once compared the French proletariat to the "politicians" of the European proletariat [1]; as the spokesperson for the French proletariat, the PCF possesses unique political advantages. Following World War II, the PCF was for a time the largest political party in France, but for the subsequent half-century, it has been struggling amidst decline and declining amidst struggle. Currently, the PCF only holds power in the department of Val-de-Marne and in two cities with populations exceeding 100,000, Saint-Denis and Montreuil. From the perspective of political elections, after the outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis, the PCF—along with other left-wing parties—was held in high expectation by domestic and international public opinion. However, whether in the French National Assembly elections, the presidential elections, or the European Parliament elections, the results have run counter to these desires, with some performances being outright dismal.
(1) Declining Discourse Power in the National Assembly
The French National Assembly is a vital platform for political party activity in France; its primary powers lie in legislation and the supervision of the sitting government. In France, only the National Assembly can hold the government accountable—that is, by impeaching the government through a motion of no confidence. Therefore, electoral results for the National Assembly are a direct reference point reflecting the influence of French political parties. In 2007, prior to the outbreak of the economic crisis, the PCF independently secured 1,115,663 votes (a 4.29% share) in the National Assembly elections, winning 15 seats (out of 577 total seats, or 2.6%). However, in 2012, four years after the economic crisis began its sustained impact on France, the PCF—running in an electoral alliance including other parties from the Left Front—secured a total of 1,792,923 votes (a 6.91% share) but won only 10 seats (out of 577 total seats, or 1.73% [sic] [2]). In 2017, the PCF again participated independently in the National Assembly elections, ultimately receiving 615,503 votes (a 2.72% share) and winning 10 seats (out of 577 total seats, or 1.73%). From this, it is easy to see that following the economic crisis, the PCF’s discourse power in the National Assembly has further declined, leaving it in an even more marginalized state.
(2) Facing a Dilemma in Presidential Elections
The President of France is the head of state and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, sharing supreme executive power with the cabinet led by the Prime Minister. For a political party, nominating a candidate to run for president is the most direct and effective way to realize its political will and platform; consequently, every French presidential election receives immense attention. Since first participating in the presidential election in 1969, the PCF has been highly active, either running directly or supporting others indirectly in every election. In 2007, PCF National Secretary Marie-George Buffet ran and received 707,268 votes (a 1.93% share, ranking 7th). In 2012, the PCF supported Jean-Luc Mélenchon, leader of the Left Front, who received 3,985,089 votes (an 11.10% share, ranking 4th). In 2017, the PCF again supported Jean-Luc Mélenchon, now leader of France Unbowed (La France insoumise), who received 7,059,951 votes (a 19.58% share, ranking 4th). Looking at the three most recent elections, the PCF has increasingly tended to join electoral alliances to support candidates from other parties for the presidency, and the resulting vote counts have seen a significant increase compared to when PCF candidates ran independently. However, this also directly reflects the PCF’s own inability to nominate an attractive candidate of its own, highlighting its predicament of only being able to play the "supporting role" or "deputy" in presidential elections.
(3) Slumping Support in the European Parliament
The European Parliament is a major deliberative body since the founding of the European Union and a significant stage for European political parties to exert international influence. Held every five years, it is the only directly elected parliamentary institution of the EU and plays an important role in the EU’s legislative, supervisory, and consultative affairs; its elections are highly valued by parties in all member states. In 2004, the PCF participated independently in the sixth European Parliament elections, receiving 1,009,976 votes (a 5.88% share) and winning 2 seats. In 2009, the PCF participated in the seventh European Parliament elections as a member of the Left Front, receiving 1,115,021 votes (a 6.48% share) and winning 4 seats (of which 3 were held by PCF members). In 2014, still as a member of the Left Front, it participated in the eighth European Parliament elections, receiving 1,252,730 votes (a 6.61% share) and winning 4 seats (of which 1 was held by a PCF member). In 2019, the PCF again participated independently in the ninth European Parliament elections, receiving only 564,949 votes (a 2.49% share) and winning no seats. These election results demonstrate that while the PCF’s support rate rose slightly after joining an electoral alliance, the slump was extremely pronounced once it withdrew from the alliance, showing a large gap even compared to 2004. Furthermore, between 2004 and 2019, the turnout for European Parliament elections among the French public was 42.76%, 40.63%, 42.43%, and 50.12%, respectively, while turnout for the EU public overall was 45.47%, 42.97%, 42.61%, and 50.66%. It is evident that although public participation in European Parliament elections has increased over the last 15 years, the PCF’s support rate has continued to fall. Its series of efforts following the economic crisis failed to achieve the intended results among voters.
In summary, since the 2008 economic crisis, the PCF’s electoral performance has shown an overall downward trend, with some results being even worse than those prior to the crisis. The "good fortune" expected by left-wing parties has clearly not descended upon the PCF. In a situation where center-left and center-right political forces are increasingly converging [3] while far-left and far-right parties are rising as sudden contenders, competition among parties and parliamentary groups in National Assembly, presidential, and European Parliament elections will only become more intense. The electoral space for small and medium-sized parties will be further squeezed. For the PCF, such a situation serves as an alarm bell, prompting a serious reflection on the current "macro-environment" and "micro-climate"—that is, the overall environment of European left-wing politics as well as the problems existing in the PCF’s own identity positioning and theoretical innovation.
II. External Dilemmas of the French Communist Party’s Downward Developmental Trend
As a traditional French left-wing party, the PCF's downward trend is deeply influenced by the development of European left-wing parties as a whole. Since World War II, left-wing parties were once among the most influential political forces in Europe and a vital pole in maintaining European democratic systems; various Social Democratic, Communist, and Workers' parties played major roles in governing or participating in government within their respective countries. Since the 1990s, influenced by the twin impacts of the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and the proliferation of neoliberal ideology, traditional European left-wing values have faced severe challenges. Many left-wing parties began to seek breakthroughs and transformations with greater urgency. While the wave of reforms among left-wing parties achieved certain results in the short term, it did not reverse the overall downward trend. Since the 21st century, and particularly after the global economic crisis, the European political balance has tilted rightward again, and the fortunes of left-wing parties have continued to dwindle.
Taking the European Parliament elections as an example, the Socialist Group in the European Parliament, composed of mainstream European left-wing parties, was still able to win 200 seats (27.32% of the total) in 2004. In 2009, the group was renamed the Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, hoping to achieve great things in the elections held against the backdrop of the economic crisis. However, the facts did not align with these hopes. In that election, the support for the mainstream left-wing group did not increase but actually decreased, winning only 184 seats (25% of the total), while the right-wing group was still able to secure 265 seats (36.01% of the total), nearly the same as in the previous election. Even though some marginal far-left parties made small gains, they could hardly compensate for the losses of the mainstream left. Some scholars have even stated that Europe clearly continues to turn right, appearing as "a right-wing resurgence never before seen in the history of the EU." By 2019, support for the mainstream left-wing group fell again, to only 154 seats (20.51% of the total).
Furthermore, in domestic elections in recent years, with the exception of the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party and the Social Democratic Party of Finland, which have fared relatively well, left-wing parties across European countries have all suffered varying degrees of slumps in support. For example, in the 2017 German federal election, the Social Democratic Party of Germany received only 20.5% of the vote, its lowest record since World War II. In the French presidential election of the same year, due to the poor performance of former leader François Hollande regarding the economy, employment, anti-terrorism, the refugee issue, and his private life, the French Socialist Party suffered its most severe loss of voters in history.
The dilemma of the overall decline in support for left-wing parties naturally profoundly affects the PCF. As a traditional French left-wing party, the PCF once occupied a significant position in French politics for a period after World War II. The PCF has undergone three landmark ideological adjustments...
This has not only had a major impact on the PCF itself but has also, to varying degrees, influenced and driven transformations in other left-wing parties. However, for nearly half a century, the PCF’s situation for survival and development has deteriorated daily, a fact inseparably linked to the broader environment of European left-wing parties. Following the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe [4], some European left-wing parties seemed eager to find an alternative to the concept of "democratic socialism," exhibiting a trend of "proximity" to the social reality of capitalism and "estrangement" from socialist labels. Under this influence, the PCF proposed "New Communism." Although this theory retains the word "communism," its substantive content carries a certain color of capitalist reformism. For example, it posits that revolution in contemporary French society belongs to the "era of the individual"—that is, every citizen faces the pressure of unemployment, corporate exploitation, and inequality between the state and the individual. To solve these problems, one can rely neither on violence nor on war or division, but must instead unite the will of every individual to transform society, thereby achieving social change.
As a prominent member of Eurocommunism [5], the PCF was once called "the last stronghold in Europe against the capitalist system"; today’s PCF, however, advocates for "surpassing capitalism," which entails reforming capitalism on its existing foundations. This move by the PCF actually reflects the embarrassment of the traditional left when faced with a crisis of socialist values, forced to drift toward the "center." To this end, the Committee for a Workers’ International once stated, "Since the 1990s, among the influential parties with a good mass base in various countries, one can no longer find a single party that takes opposition to the capitalist system as its goal of struggle."
This move—failing to take the opposition to the capitalist system as the primary goal and instead turning to find ways to "adapt," "integrate," and "compromise"—has aroused strong dissatisfaction among the broad masses of lower-and-middle-class voters. Against the backdrop of globalization, the turmoil caused by economic crises in capitalist societies has become more violent, and its impact on the daily work and lives of ordinary people more profound. When faced with slow economic growth, rising unemployment, and the influx of refugees, traditional left-wing parties such as the PCF and the Socialist Party (PS) did not target the flaws of the existing system but merely sought reformist and conciliatory actions, which truly left many voters deeply disappointed. Because of this, some people began to turn their attention toward right-wing parties, or even far-left or far-right parties. In today’s world of political pluralism, European politics is likewise undergoing pluralistic transformations. The demands of people from different classes and strata are not identical. It is difficult enough to win stable support in the rapidly changing competition between parties; it is even harder to find a new lease on life among a populace that has lost confidence. European left-wing parties, including the PCF, must now face the reality of declining approval ratings, scientifically analyze the causes, and make adjustments as quickly as possible; otherwise, this predicament will only become increasingly difficult to reverse.
III. The Identity Crisis of the French Communist Party’s Oscillating Political Positioning
Since its founding in 1920, the PCF has enjoyed a lofty status among left-wing parties in France, Europe, and the world, once serving as the largest party representing the interests of the French working class. From the 1960s and 70s, when it began to independently explore the road to socialism alongside other Communist parties in Western Europe, to the period after the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe when it completely shook off the shackles of the Soviet model, the PCF seemed to welcome a liberation, but in fact, it stepped into a state of disorientation. After the start of the 21st century, the new technological revolution has continuously weakened the traditional working-class groups. The new modes of production born out of the information age have broken traditional class boundaries and forced traditional left-wing parties to actively change their image.
In this regard, the French Socialist Party directly influenced the PCF. The Socialist Party attempted in many ways to shape the image of a "party of the whole people," constantly seeking support from middle-of-the-road groups. Under the Socialist Party's persistence, this "centrist road" achieved certain results, particularly laying a solid foundation for François Hollande’s election as President of France in 2012. This move also had negative effects—namely, it indirectly alienated its original lower-middle-class voters, causing certain losses—but generally speaking, the Socialist Party's centrist road achieved a degree of success. Following the example of the Socialist Party, the PCF began exploring a centrist road in the latter half of the 20th century, but the results were far from satisfactory.
In the political spectrum, the PCF has externally remained a left-wing party with its colors nailed to the mast. However, within the PCF, there has always been controversy and disagreement over whether to follow a traditional line—one further left than the Socialist Party—or a center-left line. The PCF’s centrist-leaning "New Communism" of the 1990s was only formally proposed after intense internal party struggle. At various times, at least six factions have existed within the PCF, including the Majority, the Orthodox (Orthodoxes), the Refounders (Refondateurs), the Fightback (La Riposte), the Hueists (Huistes), and the Reconstructionists (Reconstructeurs). Among them, the Majority, centered around Marie-George Buffet and Pierre Laurent, actually held the leadership of the entire party from 2003 to 2018. The Majority advocated for "reinventing the PCF"—that is, expanding the PCF's voter base and increasing its political influence by forming alliances with other left-wing parties and strengthening communication and mutual aid between them. They were the primary force pushing the PCF's centrist road.
In contrast, the Orthodox faction—represented by the PCF Pas-de-Calais Federation and the 15th Arrondissement branch in Paris—opposed cooperation with the Socialist Party. In particular, they opposed the PCF leadership's formation of the Left Front (Front de gauche) and its support for Jean-Luc Mélenchon, advocating instead for a return to a traditional Marxist-Leninist party, and even calling for France to withdraw from the European Union and the Eurozone. Currently, while the strength of the Orthodox faction does not match that of the Majority, it maintains significant influence within PCF organizations in northern France. Furthermore, the Fightback, Hueist, and Reconstructionist factions held varying attitudes toward the centrist road; most members of the Hueist and Reconstructionist factions have since left the party.
The direct objective of the PCF’s centrist road was to adapt to world and national conditions to broaden its voter base—specifically, to realize the transformation from a "vanguard party" to a "mass party." The change in the party flag is a concrete manifestation of this shift. It is well known that the sickle and hammer represent two laboring classes: the hammer for striking, symbolizing workers; and the sickle for harvesting, symbolizing peasants. The combination of the two tools represents the worker-peasant alliance. Communist parties in various countries use the hammer and sickle as their party flag, naturally intending to become the "vanguard" of the working and peasant classes. However, the hammer and sickle that once represented French workers and peasants have long since ceased to appear on the PCF’s party flag. In several recent public designs, the PCF flag basically prints only the full French name or the abbreviation of the party, intentionally erasing the worker and peasant coloring. In 2018, the latest publicly released PCF flag placed a dynamic five-star graphic in a prominent position; its shape resembles the contours of mainland France, symbolizing the whole of France and implying the aim of seeking support from a broader range of French voters. The old PCF flag is now only insisted upon by a portion of the Orthodox party members. Furthermore, in recent years, PCF membership cards and the party’s official newspaper have successively removed the original hammer and sickle logo.
However, the centrist road advocated by the Majority has not been plain sailing, and the PCF has experienced oscillations during this process. In 2008, Socialists Mélenchon and Marc Dolez believed it was necessary to establish a new party that "held fast to the left camp" and "made no compromise with the right"; thus, the two left the Socialist Party to form the more radical Left Party (Parti de Gauche). That same year, the PCF and the Left Party formed the Left Front alliance, participating together in the 2009 European Parliament elections, the 2010 French regional elections, the 2012 French presidential election, and the 2012 French legislative elections. In 2017, Mélenchon founded a new party—France Unbowed (La France insoumise)—to run in the presidential election. The PCF and some small far-left parties quickly expressed support for Mélenchon and cooperated with France Unbowed. However, following the defeat in the presidential election, the PCF withdrew from the alliance to participate independently in the subsequent National Assembly elections.
Whether it was the Left Front or France Unbowed, a clear signal was sent to the outside world: the PCF had taken substantive steps to move from the center-left toward the far-left. Since the economic crisis, far-left parties have effectively captured the public psychological mood, and their approval ratings have increased to a certain extent, making them an emerging force in French and European politics. Yet, compared to center-left parties, they still face significant gaps in party size, governing experience, and organizational capacity; the possibility of them replacing center-left parties in the short term is extremely low. That the PCF turned toward the far-left while halfway down the centrist road illustrates its hesitation and vacillation regarding its own political positioning. This includes both active adjustments made to adapt to changing electoral conditions and passive oscillations caused by long-standing internal disagreements within the PCF. During this process of oscillation, the PCF has already lost many voters.
The predicament encountered by the PCF in elections has both objective reasons—the overall decline of left-wing parties—and subjective reasons—the lack of a clear political identity. Among the various factors leading the PCF into this predicament, the blind pursuit of electoral alliances and the lack of a stable political orientation are key. For instance, once it joins an electoral alliance, the PCF continuously calls on its supporters to vote for other parties in the alliance. However, when other parties pivot or "leave without saying goodbye," original PCF supporters find it difficult to return to the PCF because they cannot know where the PCF will go next. This political uncertainty has led to a loss of PCF votes while indirectly leading to a loss in the number of PCF members. From 2002 to 2008, the number of PCF members remained above 130,000; in 2011, it dropped to 70,000; and in 2016, it dropped to 57,000. By the end of 2019, the PCF had only 47,000 members remaining, roughly one-twentieth of its peak size. One could say that the continuous shrinking of the membership scale has exacerbated the decline in PCF approval ratings and intensified the confusion over whether to move left or right.
IV. The Theoretical Predicament of the Cold Reception of the PCF’s "New Communism" Claims
The PCF has always attached importance to its own theoretical construction. Looking at its development history over the past century, the PCF has successively proposed and formed different theoretical achievements in different historical periods, facing different backgrounds of the era and specific national conditions—such as the "Popular Front" theory, "Eurocommunism," "Socialism with French Colors," and "New Communism," among others. After the 21st century, the PCF insisted on continuously deepening and expanding its views and claims on the basis of "New Communism." After the 2008 economic crisis, when the malaise of the capitalist system became prominent again, traditional left-wing voters and many left-wing parties hoped that "New Communism" could propose a better plan for the current system. However, in reality, the PCF’s explanation and interpretation of its theory failed to effectively convince voters; the "New Communism" it was once proud of seems to have met a "cold reception." Combining the PCF’s expressions of "New Communism" in formal and informal settings over the last decade or so, the cold reception can be attributed to the following two main reasons.
First, "New Communism" has not truly confronted the capitalist system. The critique of the capitalist system is a "mandatory item" for all Communist parties. In the first ten years of the birth of "New Communism," the PCF still mentioned critiquing the profit-seeking nature of capitalism. However, in the last decade or more, the PCF seems to have increasingly downplayed the critique of the capitalist system itself, attributing the causes of many social contradictions to the abuse of neoliberal policies. In 2006, the 33rd Congress of the PCF focused on how to oppose neoliberalism, run for president, and strengthen social movements; regarding the capitalist system, it only proposed further clarifying the connotation of "surpassing capitalism." In 2008, the 34th Congress of the PCF mainly focused on inter-party competition within the left, proposing the establishment of a "Progressive Front for the Defense of Freedom and Democracy" to enhance electoral effectiveness, without mentioning the capitalist system. After experiencing the economic crisis, rather than taking the opportunity to critique the capitalist system, the PCF remained tight-lipped. In 2016...
In [2024], the primary topics of the PCF’s 37th Congress were the establishment of an egalitarian world, the formation of a People’s Citizens’ Front, and the strengthening of Party building; it did not specifically list any issues concerning the capitalist system itself, stating only that it sought to "propose solutions with Communist characteristics for France within the context of the crisis and provide recommendations for the future developmental direction of French society." Even on the current official PCF website, it is difficult to find content critiquing the capitalist system. At most, one sees slogans such as "Communists have always opposed the shackles placed on European development by the interests of capital," "Putting people first, not finance first," and "What we are striving for is a France that is more just, more united, and open to the world." Failing to directly confront the capitalist system itself, expose its fundamental contradictions and exploitative essence, and subsequently propose an alternative makes it difficult to preserve the true character of a Communist Party or "Communist" theory.
Second, "Neo-Communism" is too all-encompassing and lacks a core concept. Since the emergence of "Neo-Communism" in the 1990s, successive leaders of the PCF have inherited and developed it, from the New Project for Communism (1999) to the Prospects for Communism (2006), the 2016 proposal that "the time is ripe for Communist transformation," and the current claim on the PCF website that "ecology is at the heart of the Communist struggle." Although the content of "Neo-Communism" has continuously advanced with the times, it remains difficult to distill a core philosophy from it. Some Western scholars have even suggested that the PCF’s theoretical construction resembles a "stitching together of ideological fragments of vastly different colors, becoming largely identical to other parties."
A close examination of the policy programs proposed by the PCF in recent years reveals both the imprint of the Socialist Party (PS) and the shadow of the Green Party. For instance, on the issue of wealth redistribution, although the PCF has proposed tax assessment standards distinct from those of the French Socialist Party, they share the same distributional logic: both manage social wealth within a Keynesian framework. On the question of "revolution," the PCF—like the Socialist Party—has long advocated achieving "revolutionary" goals through parliamentary elections, no longer considering the complete or violent overthrow of the state, i.e., the revolutionary seizure of power. Regarding green development, the PCF argues that in the face of globalization, productivism and consumerism have accelerated the destruction of ecosystems, indirectly leading to global warming, loss of biodiversity, increased chronic diseases, environmental pollution, and the multiplication of social inequalities. This is quite similar to the mainstream discourse of the Green Party. Furthermore, the PCF touches upon almost every area of concern for left-wing parties, including healthcare reform, pensions and social security, vocational training, anti-racism, gender equality, human rights and the right to housing, the "war against finance," the construction of French democracy, public services, the digital revolution in modes of production, and education reform.
Logically speaking, the PCF’s ability to actively adapt to the broad developmental trends of French and European society, and its initiative to continuously incorporate new viewpoints and integrate the political views of other parties at the theoretical and policy levels, represents a healthy and effective attitude toward party operations. However, as a Communist party, in the process of enriching and perfecting "Neo-Communism," it has focused too much on pursuing all-encompassing solutions in the realm of governance while neglecting the exploration and construction of core concepts. As a result, "Neo-Communism" has not truly played a pioneering role in theoretical transformation. How to build a "Neo-Communism" that can truly adapt to French national conditions, align with the PCF’s left-wing political stance, respond to social development, and attract voters remains an urgent question for the PCF to consider deeply, both now and in the future.
V. Conclusion
To respond to the changes and challenges brought about by the crisis, the PCF has made extensive efforts to enhance the political discourse of the European Left, form strategic party alliances, participate in domestic and international elections, and advance its own theoretical construction. However, judging by the results, it has not escaped the long-term trend of declining support; instead, it has fallen into a new developmental predicament.
Clearly, the predicament facing the PCF today is the result of multiple factors acting in concert. In the future, if the PCF is to achieve new development, it may need to take action in the following three areas from the perspective of its own initiative. First, it must seek international solidarity, particularly cooperation with European Communist and Workers’ parties, to improve the external predicament faced by the European Left as a whole. The Communist and Workers’ parties of various European countries were once a major force in the International Communist Movement; today, however, they have successively weakened, transformed, or faded from the mainstream spotlight, though they still retain some influence in certain regions. Established European Communist and Workers’ parties like the PCF should both strengthen transnational cooperation among traditional industrial trade unions and adapt to the developmental needs of emerging labor groups in the context of industrial restructuring. This would allow for the establishment of more cohesive and militant international workers’ organizations, forcing the focus of European left-wing politics back onto the labor-capital contradiction [9] under the capitalist system.
Second, the PCF must clarify its own political positioning, especially the distinctions and connections between itself and other left-wing parties, to escape its "identity predicament" of vacillating between the left and the right. Among French left-wing parties, the PCF was once the vanguard of anti-capitalism. However, under the dual influence of capitalist self-reform and the low ebb of socialism, it gradually diluted its anti-capitalist color. Since the economic crisis spread globally, the flaws of the capitalist system have been fully exposed, and the French masses have suffered deeply. Therefore, the PCF has reason, confidence, and necessity to once again raise the banner of anti-capitalism, clarify the role of the Communist Party among left-wing parties, and struggle to protect the interests of the French lower and middle classes.
Third, the PCF must strengthen its theoretical construction, particularly by further refining the theoretical system of "Neo-Communism" to break through the current theoretical predicament of having a weak voice. After more than 20 years of development, the theoretical connotations of "Neo-Communism" have been continuously adjusted and enriched, but a relatively complete system has yet to form. The PCF should focus on integrating the current status and trends of capitalist development since the 21st century—especially after the economic crisis—to profoundly expose the exploitative essence behind the veil of capitalist "self-perfection," using this as the core idea for constructing the "Neo-Communism" theoretical system. When faced with the political views and concepts proposed by other parties, the PCF should selectively draw upon them based on the primary viewpoints of "Neo-Communism" rather than following trends blindly.
If the PCF can continuously promote self-revolution [10] in these three areas and effectively push "Neo-Communism" to new historical heights at both the theoretical and practical levels, the developmental predicament it faces today can certainly be effectively reversed.