Shang Yu: A Review of Academic Research on the European Radical Left in Recent Years
After the major setbacks suffered by socialism in the 20th century, Communist Parties across Europe underwent a grand transformation. Some completely abandoned communist goals to become social democratic parties, while others undertook large-scale internal reforms. Only a small minority retained their radical character, leading most European political scientists to shift their focus toward the right wing of the political spectrum. Entering the 21st century, most European countries were governed by mainstream parties. As the policies of mainstream center-left and center-right parties converged, the outbreak of the financial crisis and the European debt crisis exposed the limited capacity of mainstream parties to respond to such crises. Simultaneously, key issues like the environment increasingly became priorities for voters, bringing a large group of radical parties into the public eye. The success of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece and Podemos [1] in Spain signaled a resurgence of the European radical left. With the emergence and rise of these forces, the academic community began to focus on this issue, conducting extensive and in-depth research.
I. Defining the European Radical Left
The European radical left is currently in a formative stage of development; its essential characteristics have not fully manifested, and its boundaries with other left-wing forces remain blurred. Consequently, some scholars argue that a complete definition of the European radical left does not yet exist. Paolo Chiocchetti points out that the definition cannot be reduced solely to the level of political parties. However, most scholars agree that while not all radical left groups share the same political tradition or follow identical ideological principles, they belong to the same "party family." Scholars have defined the European radical left through several representative perspectives:
(1) The perspective of "radical" nature. The academic community generally believes the European radical left is classified as "left" because it advocates for equality and favors promoting economic equality through collective ownership, economic planning, and redistribution. Luke March and others clarify the meaning of "radical" by contrasting radicalism with extremism. They argue that while extremism rejects democratic values and is anti-democratic, the European radical left only opposes the capitalist form of liberal democracy, not democracy itself. Additionally, some scholars suggest its radicalism is expressed through opposition to the underlying socio-economic structures of contemporary capitalism, advocating for a thorough transformation of capitalism and the seizure of power from current political elites.
(2) The ideological perspective. Babak Amini argues that defining the terms "radical" and "left" involves many problems, as their connotations change over time. Some scholars advocate for an ideological definition, though they differ on specific positioning. Marc Visser and others, proceeding from ideology, position the European radical left to the left of social democratic parties. They believe the radical left has a natural connection with far-left social movements, opposes modern capitalism and neoliberalism, and seeks to promote and construct alternative models of economy and power by reconstructing a social culture centered on redistribution and equality. Paolo Chiocchetti agrees with this approach, noting that the European radical left has undergone a change in its development: in the past, it often used positive qualifiers such as "communist" or "socialist," whereas it now frequently uses negative qualifiers such as "alter-," "anti-neoliberal," or "anti-capitalist." Other scholars argue the radical left sits to the left of both social democrats and Green parties, encompassing communist parties, former communist parties, and radical socialist parties that advocate for fundamental changes to current economic and social systems.
(3) The perspective of inter-party relations. Many scholars believe the boundaries between the radical left and other left-wing forces are blurred and suggest clarifying its meaning by analyzing these relationships. For instance, Li Qiqing divides the political forces of Western European society into five types: far-right, right-wing or conservative, left-wing, radical left, and far-left. Overall, the European radical left is an anti-capitalist force that believes capitalism must undergo drastic change, advocating for the use of legal struggles to oppose it. Lin Deshan categorizes European left-wing parties into three forces based on political consciousness, modes of action, and political influence: the moderate left, the radical left, and the extreme left. He argues the radical left includes communist parties in some countries and political forces that identify more strongly with traditional left-wing political methods. Against the backdrop of social democratic parties increasingly moving toward the "center," the radical left has, to a greater extent, inherited the series of policy positions held by post-war social democrats under the principle of "democratic socialism." Tian Dewen divides European left-wing forces into the center-left, radical left, and emerging left. He believes the radical left adheres to a more ideologically left "democratic socialism" but differs fundamentally from the center-left in its preference for reform over revolution; for a long time, it has found it difficult to enter the political mainstream, primarily exerting influence as a "protest party." Zeng Zhisheng further divides the left political spectrum into the moderate left, radical left, extreme left, and rebel left, defining radical left parties as national Communist Parties that use Marxism-Leninism as their ideological weapon for social transformation. Generally, scholars define the European radical left from the level of party politics, though a few interpret it through a broader lens including non-party organizations and subcultures. These different classifications of European left-wing forces lead to variations in how the concept of the radical left is defined. Some scholars maintain only a vague understanding, using terms like radical left, far-left, and extreme left interchangeably.
The European radical left parties are still in the process of formation. Before the Collapse of the Soviet Union [2] and the Revolutions in Eastern Europe [3], they were represented by Communist Parties. In the 1970s and 80s, some radical leftists began absorbing "new politics" issues, giving rise to a new radical left—for example, the Left Party (PG) in France incorporated eco-socialism into its platform, and the Left Party (V) in Sweden declared itself a feminist party. The 2008 financial crisis spurred the rise of a new wave of anti-establishment parties, such as SYRIZA and Podemos, which attracted public support by waving the flags of anti-austerity and anti-establishment. The connotation of the European radical left changes continuously throughout its development; therefore, defining the concept must be a process of advancing with the times.
II. Typological Classification of the European Radical Left
While the academic community usually interprets the European radical left as political parties, some scholars classify it broadly into three levels: parties, non-party organizations, and subcultures. At the party level, the radical left is subdivided into communist parties, green parties, democratic socialist parties, and social-populist parties. At the level of non-party organizations, supporters are no longer exclusively the working class; the decline in union membership, disagreements among leaders, and diminishing political influence are the most obvious manifestations of the "crisis of Western European communism." At the subcultural level, a new radical left subculture and social movement has emerged since the 1990s, active in countries like Britain, France, and Germany, involving issues such as animal rights, environmental protection, and anti-globalization. Most scholars utilize a party-level classification based on standards like ideology, party origins, and policy choices, commonly using patterns of two, three, or four categories.
(1) Binary Classification. Before the late 1970s, Communist Parties held important positions in the political structures of several Western European nations. After the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, communist forces across Europe underwent varying degrees of transformation. From the perspective of evolutionary trends, one group of Communist Parties transformed into "new radical left" parties—particularly in Nordic countries—combining traditional left-wing issues with new social movements, especially ecology (e.g., the Left Alliance in Finland and the Left Party in Sweden). Another group transformed into democratic socialist parties, filling the vacuum left by mainstream social democrats as they moved rightward by adopting neoliberal programs (e.g., Die Linke in Germany). Raul Gomez and others divide the Western European radical left into traditional anti-capitalist parties loyal to communist positions and modernized "New Left" parties that have absorbed new political issues. Giorgos Charalambous classifies them based on whether they retain a communist identity: parties that keep the communist label (e.g., the Communist Party of Greece (KKE), the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) in Cyprus) and post-communist parties that have discarded the label (e.g., the Left Alliance in Finland, the Left Party in Sweden). Yu Haiqing, in discussing "alternative left" parties and their developmental trends, notes that foreign scholars often do not view alternative left parties as an independent party family, but instead merge them with Communist Parties under the term "radical left."
(2) Three-category Classification. These scholars believe the radical left presents a pluralistic state. Based on political ideology, some divide the radical left into three types: traditional Marxist-Leninist parties, "Red-Green" parties, and democratic socialist parties. Looking at historical origins, some evolved from communist or former communist parties; some branched off from the left-wing of national social democratic parties; and others were formed after the 1980s through alliances between traditional left forces and radical groups developed during new social movements. These different types of parties exert varying levels of influence on national political life. Some scholars consider these factors comprehensively. Li Mingming and others categorize them by ideology and policy orientation into orthodox Communist Parties, reform-communist parties, and Red-Green alliances. Others, based on origin and ideological characteristics, divide them into traditional Marxist-Leninist parties, reformist Communist Parties, and Red-Green parties. Mogens Pedersen proposed a theory of the party life cycle, suggesting party development passes through thresholds of declaration, authorization, representation, and relevance. Wang Congcong uses this standard to classify the radical left: stronger parties have crossed the representation threshold to enter national parliaments (e.g., the French Communist Party, Die Linke in Germany); among those, some have crossed the relevance threshold to enter government and influence policy (e.g., AKEL in Cyprus, SYRIZA in Greece).
(3) Four-category Classification. The classic classification comes from Luke March, who divides the European radical left into four main sub-groups based on ideological stance: communist parties, democratic socialist parties, populist socialist parties, and social-populist parties. While most scholars adopt this classification, some suggest alternatives, such as traditional Communist Parties, radical socialist parties, social-populist parties, and Red-Green parties. Considering origins, ideology, and current development, others divide them into traditional Communist Parties, successor parties to Communist Parties (democratic left parties), party alliances or newly established "New Left" parties, and "Red-Green" parties with strong "new politics" concerns. Overall, while the classifications are diverse, the criteria are concentrated on party origins, ideology, policy positions, or a hybrid of these. Each has its strengths and weaknesses. Most radical left parties evolved from Communist Parties, yet they show significant internal differences following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the financial crisis. Relying solely on party origins risks underestimating the developmental changes within the radical left. Similarly, using only ideology or policy as a standard is insufficient; while these are generally unified, 21st-century party development has shown a decoupling of the two. Some parties may insist on anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal stances in their platforms while adopting relatively moderate measures during actual policy implementation.
III. Ideological Demands and Policy Positions of the European Radical Left
The policies and ideologies of the European radical left showed clear shifts around the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the economic crisis of 2008. After 1991, the radical left’s identification with democracy decreased [4], they abandoned planned economies, and while maintaining a basis in Marxism, they emphasized post-materialism. Following the 2008 economic crisis, they began to emphasize political authority and revisited economic planning policies. Today, the policy positions of the European radical left mainly include the following aspects:
First, in the economic sphere, they support government control over the economy, emphasizing that the state should formulate long-term economic plans. They oppose a free-market economy, advocate for income redistribution, and seek to protect the collective economy and social rights [5]. Furthermore, they oppose austerity policies, arguing that current government policies have rescued the primary culprits of the crisis (financial institutions) while forcing the masses to bear the crisis’s ill effects, thereby exacerbating social inequality and poverty.
Second, in the political sphere, they support direct and participatory democracy, the improvement of administrative efficiency, and an emphasis on decentralization. They advocate for the establishment of a broad progressive united front and the creation of a permanent annual European political forum to promote the integration of European radical left forces on the basis of diversity.
Third, terms of ideology, they critique neoliberalism and oppose the underlying values of capitalism. After the outbreak of the debt crisis, the European radical left strongly criticized capitalism, and their proposals to defend the interests of the masses received significant public attention.
Fourth, in the cultural and social spheres, they oppose welfare cuts and advocate for the establishment of a welfare state. They defend existing social security and healthcare systems, call for the establishment of minimum living standards, the expansion of women’s rights, and the protection of the ecological environment. They oppose the increasing privatization of education, health, and transport, advocate for the equitable distribution of resources, strive for equality, and protect the rights of the excluded—such as migrants and the unemployed. They oppose established political and economic elites as well as racial and gender discrimination, pursuing social justice.
Fifth, regarding globalization, they oppose the neoliberal "Washington Consensus" and the predatory nature of financial capital on a global scale.
Sixth, on the issue of European integration, they question the Treaty of Rome, the Maastricht Treaty, and the Lisbon Treaty [6]. They argue that the EU limits the autonomous rights of individual nations and fosters xenophobia, racism, and fascism. They advocate for the establishment of a peaceful, democratic, and social Europe. Some promote withdrawal from the EU, viewing the financial crisis as a result of imperialist policies and the EU as a representative of those policies. Before the 1960s, the European radical left held a position of unconditional opposition to European integration; since the 1960s, however, some elements of the European radical left moved toward "soft euroscepticism" [7] out of the needs of electoral strategy and the desire to enter government.
Seventh, in foreign policy, they oppose US hegemonism and its series of foreign wars. They oppose NATO and have achieved relative cohesion on international issues, opposing international free trade agreements and advocating for collaborative efforts between nations to resolve issues of common concern in support of internationalism.
Viewed overall, following the massive setbacks suffered by socialism [8], most members of the European radical left family developed a strong interest in other non-socio-economic issues. In the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, the European radical left added many issues related to post-materialism, multiculturalism, peace, and liberty. While most of the European radical left has moderated its stance on classic core issues of the Left-Right divide, it still uses these issues to distinguish itself from other political parties. The shift from "old issues" to "New Left" issues has primarily occurred in the Nordic countries.
IV. A Comparative Analysis of the European Radical Left and the European Radical Right
The European radical left and the European radical right occupy the opposite ends of the political spectrum. In recent years, their electoral support has been rising, and they have become important political forces in many European countries. France’s National Front (Front National), the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), Greece’s SYRIZA, and Spain’s Podemos have all made electoral gains. Research indicates that the European radical left and the European radical right share commonalities but also exhibit differences.
(I) Commonalities
Scholars primarily interpret the commonalities between the European radical left and the European radical right from two perspectives. First, basic attributes: the European radical left and the European radical right share four common basic attributes: euroscepticism, anti-globalization, anti-establishmentarianism, and populism. Although their reasons for possessing these four attributes differ, they are united by their opposition to the forms of European integration and the globalization process, as well as their criticism of the current liberal democratic system and elite structures. Furthermore, nationalism crosses party lines to constitute a common feature of euroscepticism for both the European radical right and the European radical left. Second, their voter bases: in sharp contrast to mainstream European parties, both the European radical left and the European radical right focus on representing socially and economically disadvantaged groups. These groups are disillusioned with mainstream parties, angry at traditional politics and economics, and have developed a strong distrust toward politicians and political institutions.
(II) Differences
The differences between the European radical left and the European radical right are mainly manifested in two aspects. First, from the perspective of basic attributes, Andreas Fagerholm summarized the distinction between the two through the lenses of "core definitions" and "ideal definitions." The ideal, typical European radical right positions itself on the socio-cultural right by emphasizing nativism, authoritarianism, and traditional ethics, while positioning itself in the socio-economic center by accepting the free market and economic intervention. The ideal, typical European radical left positions itself on the socio-economic left by emphasizing opposition to capitalism, and on the socio-cultural left by emphasizing feminism, liberal ethics, multiculturalism, and ecology. Nannou Kyriaki and others emphasize that although both possess nationalist and eurosceptic attributes, their starting points differ. The nationalism of the European radical right—that is, ethnic nationalism—is rooted in ethnic supremacism. They view the EU as a heterogeneous entity composed of several distinct nations; the flow of labor and culture between EU member states runs counter to the mission of the European radical right, whose primary task is to protect the nation from foreign influence. The European radical left upholds civic nationalism and opposes imperialism and its dominance. They view the EU as a tool of the elite classes and powerful interests, operating at the expense of the popular classes. The European radical left offers strong criticism of all other political parties, claiming they are led by corrupt, privileged elites who collaborate with imperialist forces. Second, from the perspective of voter groups, the concerns of their respective bases differ. Supporters of the European radical left are primarily concerned with social equality; they tend to be hostile toward capitalism and advocate for economic intervention to promote economic equality. In contrast, voters supporting the European radical right focus on the issue of immigration. Regarding voter characteristics, supporters of the European radical left generally have higher levels of education compared to those of the European radical right and exhibit altruistic tendencies. From the perspective of political psychology, individuals with altruistic tendencies tend to focus on welfare and solidarity, which drives voting for the European radical left.
V. Factors Influencing the Development of the European Radical Left and its Prospects
Kaare Strøm argues that political parties have different developmental goals; the "ideal type" goals are office-seeking, policy-seeking, or vote-seeking, and these goals may sometimes overlap. The success or failure of a political party is subject to various factors, such as national or regional contexts. In summary, the factors affecting the future development of the European radical left relate to the parties themselves and their voter bases; changes in the external environment also permeate the influence exerted on parties and voters.
(I) Theory of Internal and External Party Factors
The success or failure of the European radical left is related to the external environment the parties face and changes within the parties themselves. External factors are the best explanation for the electoral breakthroughs of the European radical left, while internal factors can more effectively explain the persistence of electoral achievements.
The influence of external factors on political parties. From the perspective of the external environment, parties are influenced by historical-political culture, economic development, and party competition. First, history and political culture influence the importance of specific issues among voters and serve as a "breeding ground" for specific parties. Countries with deep social cleavages and ideological divisions are considered capable of providing space for the European radical left to operate; for example, the persistent socio-economic and ideological divisions and political polarization in France and Italy helped maintain the existence of the strongest Communist parties. Second, the European radical left’s emphasis on economic and job security issues can resonate in countries where general economic conditions are poor, particularly where government performance is lackluster. Historically, Communist parties have flourished in less developed countries with socio-economic problems. Third, Social Democratic parties, Green parties, and the European radical right form a strong competitive relationship with the European radical left; when these competitors are weak, the European radical left tends to be more successful.
Internal party factors. First, past experiences influence the success of the European radical left. Those that once governed former socialist countries have achieved relatively greater success in post-communist environments. If a European radical left party entered parliament during the previous election cycle, it will secure more votes than those that did not, as parliamentary entry grants the party greater exposure and resources. Second, electoral thresholds are a powerful factor hindering the European radical left. Generally, higher electoral thresholds in Eastern Europe are seen as a driving factor in the marginalization of the European radical left. Third, ideological and policy adjustments influence success. In the 20th century, abrupt changes in the "Moscow line" led to the failure of Communism; in the context of 21st-century globalization anxieties and crises of modernization, anti-EU sentiment has become a prominent identity marker for the European radical left used to increase its vote share. Fourth, party leadership affects a party's stability and appeal. If pragmatic party leaders control the party organization and can centralize the party—achieving professionalization or unifying its core values—then these parties can respond flexibly to the external environment without fear of splitting, as seen with the Progressive Party of Working People in Cyprus (AKEL) and the Left Bloc (B.E.) in Portugal. Furthermore, the charisma of a leader can bring appeal and increase votes, though over-reliance on a single populist leader also brings risks, the most obvious case being the Scottish Socialist Party.
(II) Voter Perspective Theory
At the voter level, the basic characteristics of voters and their personal attitudes—especially their attitudes when facing changes in the external environment—influence their support for the party.
The influence of the external environment on voters. Voters are the key factor affecting the electoral success or failure of the European radical left; its future development is inseparable from voter support. Reviewing existing literature, one finds that changes in the external environment influence voter attitudes and, to a certain extent, determine whether they vote for the European radical left. First, the influence of the economic environment: scholars are divided on the role of this factor. Laura Bordone and others hold a "deepening hypothesis," arguing that poor economic conditions are a favorable factor for the success of the European radical left; voters who hold negative evaluations of the economic situation tend to support the European radical left, a phenomenon that becomes more pronounced during economic crises. However, some scholars argue that the electoral support for the European radical left is related to social structure; in countries with high social mobility, voters do not worry excessively about income gaps, and the influence of the economy is smaller. In countries with lower social mobility, support for the European radical left is more prevalent. Matthijs Rooduijn and others hold a "risk aversion hypothesis," arguing that because many European radical left parties lack governing experience, voting for them is a risky strategy. Consequently, less affluent citizens will only vote for the European radical left when the external environment is more favorable. For the European radical left, because it focuses more on economic issues, individuals in poor economic conditions tend to vote for it only when the overall socio-cultural environment is favorable—meaning immigration issues are not prominent—while the socio-economic environment is unfavorable. Second, the influence of historical tradition: some scholars believe that a historical tradition of authoritarianism also influences voters, with those living in countries with such traditions being more likely to support the European radical left. Scholars are divided on this issue: some argue that the "drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe" [9] shattered the illusions of the European masses regarding socialism, and the legacy of communist regimes actually hinders support for the European radical left today.
Internal Factors of the Electorate. The voters supporting the European radical left can be summarized as including the working class, the emerging middle class, low-income earners, the unemployed, trade union members, urban residents, non-locals, young voters, and the non-religious—all of whom possess unique characteristics. However, scholars differ on the issues of manual labor status and educational attainment. Luis Ramiro argues that supporters of the European radical left also include manual laborers in state-owned enterprises, while the impact of education is relatively complex, presenting a non-linear relationship. Marco Visser, on the other hand, points out that being a manual laborer has little impact on electoral support for the European radical left, and the influence of education is linear: individuals with higher education are more likely to support the European radical left. This may reflect that, compared to those with low educational attainment, highly educated people are more inclined to accept more progressive values. The divergence between these two scholars may result from differences in their selected samples; both used data from the European Social Survey (ESS), but selected different years and numbers of political parties. In fact, influenced by the internal typological differences within the European radical left, large variances appear between different countries and even between different radical left parties within the same country, and their voter bases also manifest significant differences. Attitudes toward practical issues also influence voters' support for the European radical left. Dissatisfaction with democracy, opposition to EU membership, and opposition to economic globalization all encourage voters to cast their ballots for the European radical left.
Regarding the development prospects of the European radical left, scholars generally believe that its path will be difficult and tortuous, and some have offered suggestions for its future development. Marcello Musto [10] argues that the European radical left must build its future prospects on the basis of absorbing existing lessons through several aspects: first, formulating policy programs beneficial to laborers; second, establishing basic social security systems; third, reversing the privatization process; fourth, using national referendums to abolish Eurozone agreements; fifth, launching a series of political and transnational movements to win broad support; and sixth, taking root in factories to rebuild links with workers. Babak Amini [11] proposes that the European radical left needs to resist de-radicalization and the shift toward welfarism based on a social-democratic market. It must formulate clear, distinct, and pragmatic policies to combat neoliberalism, and while supporting progressive social movements, it should establish long-term radical goals and simultaneously strengthen the forces of the European radical left.
VI. Evaluation of the Research Status and Further Outlook
Overall, compared to research on the European radical right, the literature on the European radical left is relatively sparse and consists mainly of case studies. Looking at existing literature, one can see that research on the European radical left has mostly concentrated on the period following the 2008 financial crisis, reaching two peaks in research specifically after the 2009 and 2014 European Parliament elections. In recent years, with the rise of radicalized parties, comparative studies between the European radical left and the European radical right, as well as research on the developmental state of the European radical left, have continuously increased.
(1) Achievements of Existing Research
First, research is no longer limited to case studies and has begun to focus on holistic studies. Academic circles have come to view the European radical left as a party family, while also realizing the existence of large internal differences. From the perspectives of party origins, policy positions, and ideology, the European radical left can be further divided into different sub-types. These sub-types maintain different positions on issues such as European integration and attitudes toward capitalism. Analyzing the European radical left as a whole represents a shift in research direction following changes in the European situation; it is conducive to exploring the radical characteristics of European party politics from a macro-level and analyzing the future developmental trends of European party politics.
Second, research no longer analyzes the European radical left in isolation but has begun to focus on understanding it from the perspective of its relationship with other types of political parties. The European radical left exists within the broad context of European party politics, and the strategic changes of other types of parties are important factors affecting the elections of the European radical left. Against the backdrop of the rise of radicalized parties, existing research results focus on analyzing the relationship between the European radical left and the European radical right. The main focus lies in the similarities and differences between the two, including their characteristics, policy propositions, ideological positions, voter group traits, and the impact produced by changes in the external environment.
Third, accurate judgments and predictions have been made regarding the actual situation and future development of the European radical left. Existing research insights identify the current dilemmas faced by the European radical left; under the influence of populism, the European radical left faces a dilemma between participating in government and maintaining its radical characteristics. Furthermore, internal heterogeneity hinders the unification of European radical left forces. Regarding the future development prospects of the European radical left, scholars have made precise predictions. In the future, the European radical left faces an even more difficult and tortuous path of development. This prediction is consistent with reality; the 2019 European Parliament election results showed that the influence of the European radical left has declined. The European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) [12], which represents them, actually lost 11 seats, with Spain’s "Podemos" alone losing 5 seats. European politics is moving along a rightward-leaning trend, which presents a huge challenge to the European radical left.
Fourth, there is an emphasis on combined qualitative and quantitative methods. Domestic [Chinese] research concentrates on qualitative research, drawing conclusions by analyzing the party programs, constitutions, and historical election results of the European radical left. International research primarily utilizes quantitative methods, mainly by using data from the European Election Studies (EES), European Social Survey (ESS), Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), Manifesto Project Database (MPD), Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP), Eurobarometer, European Manifesto Project (EMP), and the Manifesto Research Group (MRG).
(2) Deficiencies in Existing Research
Although significant progress has been made in the study of the European radical left in recent years, deficiencies remain, mainly manifested in the following:
Basic concepts have not yet been clarified. Currently, academic circles define the connotation of the European radical left from multiple perspectives, and a unified view has not yet formed. Moreover, due to different classification criteria, the internal sub-types of the European radical left have been divided in various ways, leading to deviations in the scope of research. Some scholars equate the European radical left with the "far left" or the "alternative left," and some even include Green parties within the scope of the radical left.
Research content needs to be deepened. Among existing research results, there are few systematic reviews of the historical evolution of the European radical left. This issue leads to a lack of systematic grasp of the European radical left in academia, affecting the understanding of its connotation and classification. Scholars tend to focus on interpreting certain periodic issues and characteristics, such as the European radical left’s attitude toward European integration. Discussing a specific problem in isolation from the historical evolution of the European radical left easily leads to insufficient analysis and explanation. On one hand, regarding relationships with other parties, academia focuses on the relationship between the European radical left and the European radical right, neglecting research into relationships with other types of parties. On the other hand, there is a lack of regional comparative analysis. The radical left in Western and Eastern Europe faces starkly different developmental situations; academia focuses on analyzing the Western European radical left and lacks introductions to the Eastern European radical left, with very little literature performing comparative research on the two.
Furthermore, the research horizon is relatively narrow. Existing academic research is confined to political science analysis; the research perspective is not diverse enough, and there is still great room for exploration. For example, regarding the question of "factors affecting the development of the European radical left," academia concentrates on the political science perspective, analyzing impacts through the three factors of parties, voters, and the external environment. This analytical perspective is relatively singular and lacks historical, psychological, and mass communication angles, resulting in a relatively insufficient analysis of the problem.
(3) Further Reflections on the European Radical Left
The research foundation of the European radical left needs to be solidified on the basis of clarifying basic concepts. Currently, definitions of the European radical left vary; from the perspective of further deepening research, there is an urgent need to form some consensus-based definitions of its concepts, clarify internal connections, and solidify the theoretical foundation of research.
Research content needs to be enriched and deepened, and the scope of research expanded. First, focusing on a systematic review of the evolution of the European radical left will help academia strengthen its holistic understanding and provide support for scholars to predict the future development direction of parties. Second, further attention should be paid to the relationship between the European radical left and mainstream parties, Green parties, and traditional Communist Parties, especially the impact of these parties on the elections of the European radical left. Regarding mainstream parties: some scholars believe that votes for the European radical left can be seen as a bellwether for voter intent; when there is dissatisfaction with mainstream parties, votes for the European radical left increase—a view confirmed by the 2014 European Parliament elections. Regarding Green parties: judging from the 2019 election results, pro-European centrist liberal parties and ecological Green party organizations performed more prominently, reflecting an intensification of fragmentation in European party politics; mainstream parties are no longer the most important factor affecting the European radical left. In view of these election results, future research should focus on Green parties and their relationship with the European radical left. Regarding traditional Communist Parties: Communist Parties are the main force and source of the European radical left. With the development of European society, other forces have filled the European radical left party family, but generally speaking, the historical development of the European radical left and the development process of Communist Parties are integrated and inseparable. In the future, research on the relationship between the two should be strengthened to explore the role of the European radical left in developing socialism and realizing communism. Third, comparative research between Eastern and Western European radical leftists should be strengthened, including typological classification, organizational evolution, policies, current status, and developmental trends.
The research perspective should be further expanded. Future research on the European radical left should integrate multi-disciplinary research concepts, comprehensively using perspectives and methods from political science, history, sociology, psychology, communication studies, and other disciplines. For example, from the perspective of mass communication, one could focus on the influence of the internet and other communication media on the policies and voting of the European radical left; or from the perspective of psychology, focus on the impact of psychological changes in voters on European radical left voting.
(Author's Unit: School of Politics and International Relations, Central China Normal University) Online Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Social Science Dynamics, Issue 8, 2020