Jiao Pei: Frustration and Restructuring: A Study of Left-wing Ideologies in 21st Century South Korea
General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: "A very important characteristic of contemporary world Marxist trends of thought is that many people within them have conducted critical revelations of the structural contradictions of capitalism, as well as contradictions in the modes of production, class contradictions, and social contradictions. They have carried out in-depth analyses of the capitalist crisis, the process of capitalist evolution, and the new forms and essence of capitalism. These perspectives help us correctly understand the trends and fate of capitalist development, accurately grasp the new changes and characteristics of contemporary capitalism, and deepen our understanding of the trends of change in contemporary capitalism." The evolution of South Korean left-wing thought in the 21st century reflects the characteristics and trends of a middle-tier latecomer capitalist country that possesses a Confucian cultural background and initially relied on an export-oriented strategy. From its perspective as a representative case study, it is highly worthy of attention and research.
In 1987, after South Korea initially achieved political democratization, scientific socialism and social democracy became the two major trends of thought influencing the South Korean left-wing movement. Among these, due to the divided state of the Korean Peninsula, the ideology calling for the withdrawal of US troops and North-South unification won the favor of progressive youth and students, forming the National Liberation (NL) [1] camp within the left-wing movement, which was influenced by scientific socialism. Ideologies that criticized the malpractices of South Korean capitalism and were keen on the labor movement and class struggle were welcomed by workers and labor unions, forming the People's Democracy (PD) [2] camp within the left-wing movement, which was influenced by social democracy. However, the subsequent upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe caused scientific socialism to suffer setbacks, and the Asian Financial Crisis further obstructed social democracy. Conversely, neoliberalism became rampant, and left-wing thought was submerged in the "End of History" [3] rhetoric that clamored about the total failure of socialism; some even proposed that "the attempt and failure of socialism are the two great legacies humanity left to the 20th century."
However, since the beginning of the 21st century, neoliberal reforms have reached a dead end. The issues of temporary work and unemployment following the collapse of the lifelong employment system, as well as the problems of super-monopoly and polarization under the dominance of growth-priority, have prompted progressive youth and the working masses to re-examine the directions and methods of struggle. Various left-wing trends of thought have achieved reorganization through their integration with social movements. Among these, the relatively radical ones are Trotskyism and Liquidationism [4]. The former was a socialist revolutionary alternative introduced to South Korea after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the latter is a unique product of South Korea's political ecosystem developed within the Trotskyist lineage. More conservative is the New Left, which advocates using Western Marxist theory to re-analyze the new problems of capitalism. They not only study traditional labor issues but also incorporate emerging social movements such as feminism, environmentalism, anti-nuclear movements, and sexual minority rights under their banner. Basic Income theory, meanwhile, is a new counter-measure theory addressing the US subprime mortgage crisis and belongs to a derivative of the New Left within the context of specific issues. With the emergence of the global "Marxism Fever" in the 21st century, these competing left-wing political trends of thought have been continuously sublated [5] through the practice of social movements.
I. New Characteristics of South Korean Capitalist Development in the 21st Century
Over the past 20 years, South Korean society has experienced the dominance and subsequent disillusionment of neoliberalism. The low ebb of the international socialist movement after the upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, combined with the "pro-capital" reforms following the Asian Financial Crisis, allowed neoliberalism to spread rapidly in South Korea, even becoming the dominant ideology. It was not until 2008, with the outbreak of the global financial crisis and the rise of socialism with Chinese characteristics, that left-wing thought gradually recovered. During this period, the development of South Korean capitalism exhibited new characteristics described as "monopoly under freedom" and "abject poverty under prosperity."
(1) Monopoly under Freedom
Neoliberal reform brought "monopoly under freedom" to South Korea. Rather than eliminating the malpractices of the chaebol [6] economy, South Korea's neoliberal reforms allowed the exercise of capital power to become even more unrestrained. Faced with the Asian Financial Crisis, the Kim Dae-jung government advocated for comprehensive reforms of South Korea's economic structure, covering four major areas: government, finance, corporations, and the labor market. For the government, the goal was to establish a "small but effective service government"; for finance, a "sound and strong financial system"; for corporations, "strong and transparent enterprises"; and for the labor market, a "dynamic market with the joint participation of labor, management, and government." To this end, a series of reform measures involving corporations, finance, chaebols, administration, fiscal policy, and education were introduced. The essence of these reforms pointed directly toward privatization in terms of ownership and liberalization in terms of management systems. Thus, on the surface, government intervention in capital was decreasing, and the traditional government-led development model was abandoned; however, at a deeper level, the already established chaebol enterprises were no longer subject to various constraints, doing as they pleased in a state of free competition.
First, from the perspective of labor-management relations, capital power has continued to strengthen. In 1998, systems for "convenient dismissal" (flexible lay-offs) and labor dispatch (outsourcing) were legalized. This increased the power of management in the labor market, allowing them not only to downsize existing staff but also to reduce the hiring of new employees or increase the proportion of contract and temporary workers. That year, the number of employed persons in South Korea began a downward trend, falling from 21.214 million in 1997 to 19.938 million in 1998. The decline was most pronounced among the 20–29 age group, dropping from 4.964 million in 1997 to 4.401 million in 1998—a decrease of 11.3%. This figure further dropped to 4.062 million in 2007, fell below 4 million in 2008, and by 2018 had decreased to 3.699 million. Conversely, the number of temporary employees working 1–35 hours per week rose from 1.522 million in 1997 to 1.835 million in 1998, an increase of 20.6%. This trend has continued to the present, with the number rising to 3.018 million in 2007 and reaching 5.21 million by 2018. Although the extension of the socialization of individual education and an aging population are also reasons for the decline in employment among 20–29 year-olds, it is undeniable that youth unemployment and temporary employment have become chronic maladies of South Korean society. The introduction of relevant systems and regulations—such as the youth employment subsidy system, online and offline employment promotion centers, employment experience programs for students, youth overseas employment subsidy programs, promotion systems for converting temporary workers to regular employees, and the employment insurance system—provides evidence from the opposite side of the severity of this problem.
Second, from the perspective of capital-capital relations, the phenomenon of "winner-takes-all" has become more apparent. After 1998, the degree of economic concentration in South Korea showed a rapid upward trend. This includes general concentration (the proportion of large enterprises in the total national economy), industrial concentration (the proportion of the top three industries in the national economy), and market concentration (the proportion of the top three enterprises in a specific product market). Although there was a slight fallback between 1999 and 2002, it began to rise again after 2003, climbed even faster between 2008 and 2012, and only leveled off after 2013. Within this, the contrast between chaebols and non-chaebol enterprises is even more striking. South Korea's eight major chaebols (Samsung, Hyundai, LG, SK, Lotte, Hanjin, Hanwha, and Doosan) essentially control the domestic sales market, with the degree of monopoly being most evident among the top four. Furthermore, South Korean chaebols control even more factors of production and management rights through unfair trade practices and circular investment among subsidiaries. For example, in 2017, the chairmen and families of the four major chaebols held less than 2% of the shares, yet they firmly controlled the management rights of the entire enterprises through low-price outsourcing, technical acquisitions of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and mutual circular investments between subsidiaries. In contrast, the survival environment for SMEs is difficult; it is hard for these enterprises to last more than 10 years. Consequently, the South Korean government introduced a "Long-lived SME" certification system, focusing on identifying SMEs that have survived for more than 45 years.
Finally, from the perspective of labor-labor relations, internal divisions continue to deepen. The implementation of flexible dismissal and labor dispatch systems has not only strengthened management's power but also weakened solidarity among workers and the strength of labor union organizations. Workers are divided into two categories: regular and non-regular employment. Non-regular employment is further subdivided into various types such as contract work, dispatched work, and temporary work. Because differences in labor treatment lead to inconsistent positions in collective bargaining, existing corporate unions often do not accept non-regular employees as members. Furthermore, South Korea did not implement a multiple-union system until 2011, meaning only one union could be established per enterprise. This essentially deprived non-regular workers of the right to organize unions. Even after the restrictions on multiple unions were lifted in 2011, the divisions between workers belonging to different unions were not eliminated. In recent years, the scale of non-regular employment has continued to expand, and management continues to shift competitive crises onto the workers. In 2017, among 57 large enterprises in South Korea, the proportion of non-regular workers had reached as high as 40%, with indirect employment accounting for 77%. Chaebol enterprises, in particular, use a large number of dispatched labor and suppress union activities.
(2) Abject Poverty under Prosperity
The characteristic of "monopoly under freedom" in the South Korean economic system has led to a social distribution situation of "abject poverty under prosperity." Since the 1960s, the South Korean economy has grown rapidly—first with the "Miracle on the Han River" from the 1960s to the 1980s, then joining the ranks of the OECD in 1996, followed by GDP per capita exceeding $20,000 in 2006, and recently breaking $30,000 in 2018. It has transformed from a poor and backward country into a developed one. However, South Korean citizens are far from feeling the happiness associated with being a developed nation. Especially after experiencing the Asian Financial Crisis and the US subprime mortgage crisis, increasingly severe polarization is depriving the people at the bottom of a sense of gain.
First, the actual income of the people at the bottom is decreasing. On one hand, there is an imbalance between the economic growth rate and the income growth rate. In 1998, South Korea's GDP fell by 5.5%, while national income fell by 8.2%. Between 1999 and 2008, the growth rate of GDP was consistently higher than that of national income; this situation only reversed after 2009. On the other hand, there is an imbalance between the income growth rate and the inflation rate. In 1998, while national income growth was negative, the consumer price index (CPI) growth rate was as high as 7.5%. In 2008, the national income growth rate was only 0.1%, while CPI growth was 4.7%. Within this, the growth rate of fresh food prices was particularly prominent, reaching 21.3% in 2010. This directly led to an annual increase in South Korean household debt. By the end of 2018, the average South Korean household debt was 75.31 million won, including 20.85 million won in real estate debt and 54.46 million won in financial debt. Furthermore, the average debt for low-income farmer and fisher households was also high, at 26.37 million won and 42.45 million won, respectively. Consequently, "personal bankruptcy" became a new term in the South Korean financial sector. In 2002, South Korea established a personal bankruptcy system, stipulating that when personal debt far exceeds the ability to repay from income, an application can be filed with the court. After verification and liquidation, remaining debts could be discharged, though social rights would be significantly limited afterward. In 2004, this was changed to an "individual rehabilitation" (Sacrifice) system, limiting the total amount of secured debt to be discharged to 1 billion won and unsecured debt to 500 million won. In 2009, this was further changed to a "pre-debt adjustment" system, excluding high-interest loan debts from the scope of bankruptcy while changing debt discharge into debt adjustment.
Second, the phenomena of poverty among special groups and "working poverty" are prominent. The phenomenon of poverty among special groups refers to the fact that socially vulnerable groups in the labor market are the most likely to be targets of discrimination and dismissal during corporate hiring and structural adjustments.
Since 2011, Statistics Korea, in conjunction with the Bank of Korea and the Financial Supervisory Service, has added poverty rate items for different types of groups to the "Survey of Household Finances and Living Conditions." The results show that the individual poverty rate in South Korea hovers around 19%, with particularly prominent rates among women, groups with low levels of education, and the elderly. In the latest data from 2016, the individual poverty rate was 19.5%, the female poverty rate was 21.6%, the poverty rate for those with an education level below elementary school was 30.7%, and the poverty rate for those aged 65 and over was 61.8%. The phenomenon of "working poverty" refers to the situation where people work hard but cannot escape poverty—namely, individuals whose labor income is less than 60% of the median income. Specifically, this manifests as the "working poor" and the "room-bound poor." [7] Most of the working poor are in low-level employment or cycle repeatedly between employment and unemployment, while the room-bound poor are confined to their homes because they have no money for consumption. Data from the Korea Welfare Panel Study (KOWPS) from 2011 to 2015 show that 15.7% of the group with incomes between 30% and 60% of the median experienced poverty in the past year, while the proportion experiencing poverty over the past five years increased to 27.2%, falling into a phenomenon of so-called "recurrent poverty." However, South Korea has not yet established a comprehensive and effective social security system. On one hand, while welfare spending has increased, there remains a large gap compared to the average level of developed countries. In 1997, South Korean welfare spending accounted for only 5.9% of GDP; although this rose to 13.4% in 2016, it is still far from the 20% average level of developed countries. On the other hand, the social security system is incomplete. Regarding unemployment security, South Korea's coverage is low due to complex restrictive conditions; in 2016, the benefit rate among the unemployed was only 37.3%, ranking last among OECD countries. In terms of medical and education security, the National Health Insurance Service has long faced a structural imbalance between revenue and expenditure, and university tuition has long since entered the era of costing 10 million won per year. Regarding retirement security, a Basic Old-Age Pension system equivalent to 5% of the National Pension was only established in 2008; after it was converted into the Basic Pension system in 2014, the payment amount was still only 10% of the National Pension, approximately 200,000 won per month.
II. The New Pattern of Reorganizing Korean Left-Wing Thought in the 21st Century
Faced with the new characteristics of "monopoly under freedom" and "abject poverty under prosperity" emerging from neoliberal reforms, the South Korean left-wing movement began to adjust its struggle strategies. Left-wing thought presented a new pattern in the process of integrating with practical movements. Trotskyism, Liquidationism, the New Left, and Basic Income theory gradually became important schools within this new pattern.
(1) Trotskyism
Trotskyism, marked by the "Theory of Permanent Revolution," was regarded as heresy in the Soviet Union after the victory of the October Revolution, and Trotsky himself was exiled. Subsequently, although the Fourth International was established to oppose the Comintern, internal divisions appeared because the prophecy of an imminent world revolution went unfulfilled. With the end of the Cold War, Trotskyism became active again because it had long predicted the collapse of the Soviet Union. As for South Korea, domestic groups that previously believed in Soviet socialist ideology began to turn toward Trotskyism. After more than 20 years of development, it has become a major trend in left-wing thought.
The representative figure of South Korean Trotskyism is Jeong Seong-jin (丁声镇), the first director of the Institute of Social Sciences at Gyeongsang National University. He is also the editor-in-chief of Marxism Research, South Korea's first professional journal for Marxist studies. He specializes in research on capitalist economic issues, successfully predicted the South Korean economic crisis, and maintains close ties with the practical struggles of left-wing social movement organizations.
Jeong Seong-jin's Trotskyism mainly consists of three core views. First, South Korea cannot avoid economic crises. To begin with, since the 1970s, a trend of declining profit rates has been hidden behind South Korea’s rapid economic growth, making economic crises inevitable. Furthermore, after the 1997 economic crisis, the economic recovery brought by South Korea’s neoliberal reforms did not solve the problems of structural contradictions and financial imbalances. Finally, in the future, within the framework of the capitalist economic system, the possibility of seeking solutions from outside production no longer exists. A way out can only be found by starting from within production and thoroughly overthrowing the capitalist economic system.
Second, the South Korean proletariat must completely break with the bourgeoisie. First of all, the key to inheriting and developing Marxism is to master the Marxist method of critique and use Marxism to critically examine Marxist theories after Marx. Secondly, while Trotskyism is the faithful inheritance and development of Marxism, the thoughts of Lenin and Stalin, as well as other forms of post-Marxism, have all deviated from original Marxism. Finally, according to the requirements of Trotskyism, class-conciliationist social movements do not help solve the evils of neoliberal reform and may even "abet a villain" [8], leading to the division of the working class. Only through a thorough "bottom-up" socialist revolution and the establishment of a "democratically participatory planned economic system" can a bright future be reached.
Third, the era of globalization requires a great alliance of the world proletariat. To begin with, Marx's political economy only completed the first half—"Capital, Landed Property, Wage Labor"—while the second half—"The State, Foreign Trade, World Market"—remains to be supplemented and perfected. Secondly, the core questions that the second half must answer concern the capitalist theory of global value and the theory of global economic crisis, used to explain the division of labor and the phenomenon of polarization in the world economy, rather than using globalization itself to explain the problems globalization brings. Again, from the perspective of the global value theory and global economic crisis theory, the decline in the global rate of profit, global over-accumulation of capital, the contradiction between global production and consumption, and the contradiction between global real capital and financial capital are the causes of the global economic crisis. Finally, the key to solving the global economic crisis is the labor-capital struggle under the alliance of the world proletariat, rather than a struggle between developed and developing countries. In short, South Korean Trotskyism critiques various post-Marxist theories, focuses on analyzing trends in capital profit rates and accumulation rates, explains the inevitability of capitalist economic crises from both domestic and international levels, and advocates for the great alliance of the proletariat and uncompromising struggle.
Left-wing movement groups guided by Trotskyism mainly include "Workers All Together," the "Revolutionary Workers' Group," and the "Bolshevik Group." Most of them claim to be the "vanguard in the class struggle for human liberation," refer to "South Korea" as "South Chosun" [9], and aim for the "establishment of Soviet power" and the "reconstruction of the Fourth International." The guiding ideology of these Trotskyist groups was reflected in action during the 2008 candlelight protests against the easing of restrictions on U.S. beef imports under the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the 2012 protests against presidential candidates, and the 2016 protests against the Park Geun-hye regime. During the 2008 candlelight protests, Trotskyist groups defined the Korea-U.S. FTA as a transfer of interests between imperialist financial capitals, arguing for total opposition rather than partial compromise, and critiquing the bureaucratism and compromise stances shown by groups such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), the Socialist Labor Solidarity, the Democratic Labor Party, and the New Progressive Party. In the 2012 protests against presidential candidates, they viewed both Park Geun-hye and Moon Jae-in as representatives of the bourgeoisie; while Park Geun-hye represented far-right forces, the left-leaning Moon Jae-in was equally "pro-American, pro-capital, and anti-working class," with no essential difference between the two. In the 2016 struggle against the Park Geun-hye regime, they shouted slogans such as "Down with the Park Geun-hye regime" and "Build a workers' regime."
The rise of Trotskyism reflects the complexity of the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the context of globalization; incomplete struggles are often accompanied by an even stronger backlash from capitalism. After experiencing the "Progressive Decade" of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, South Korea instead fell into a situation where Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye turned further to the right, which provided favorable objective conditions for the spread of Trotskyism. However, the struggle goals of Trotskyism are difficult to achieve in the short term because they are overly idealized, leading to the neglect of constructive goals and the intensification of combative goals. It is precisely within this context that Liquidationism developed.
(2) Liquidationism
Liquidationism, whose core viewpoint is the total negation of the histories of the Soviet Union and the CPSU as well as the Soviet system, is a derivative within the Trotskyist lineage. Unlike Trotskyism, Liquidationism not only negates Soviet socialism but also negates the "Theory of Permanent Revolution," falling into a diverse and complex array of post-Marxist and postmodernist perspectives. Because Liquidationism possesses only common ideas of opposition but no common ideas of affirmation, its connotations and extensions are not clear.
The representative scholar of South Korean Liquidationism is Yi Jin-kyung (李真景), a professor of liberal education at Seoul National University. In fact, he is also a leading figure in postmodernism and post-Marxism, with representative works such as Marxism of the Future (2006), Communalism [10] (2010), The Masses and Trends (2012), and Marxism and Modernity (2014). His core views can be summarized in three aspects.
First, he attempts to replace communism with communalism (公社主义). To begin with, all "sentient beings" (both living and non-living) have the right to form a commune; not just humans, but all "existents" are subjects of the commune. This is described as a sublation of original political economy and ecology, termed as an "over-humanist biopolitics." Second, humans are no longer the center of the commune; various "existents" in the commune cannot exist independently of others and can only be interdependent, with no distinction between center and periphery, or subject and object. Third, labor is no longer the sole source of value; humans and other "existents" can all create value, rendering surplus value and capital accumulation irrelevant. Finally, the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are no longer antagonistic classes; class struggle is replaced by a "politics of friendship." The two pillars of the commune are productive forces and democracy, and its two characteristics are commonality and equality.
Second, he attempts to replace the concept of class with the concept of the masses. First, he negates the substantiality of the masses, following the modes of thought of Gabriel Tarde, Wilhelm Reich, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari to interpret the masses as "masses in a flow" rather than "masses united together"—as "liquid" rather than "solid." Second, he emphasizes the externality and spontaneity of the masses; a gathering of individuals who have not stepped out of their accustomed internal environment cannot be called a "mass," nor can a crowd gathered through manipulation and mobilization. Only when individuals leap out of their original internal environments and automatically form a cohesive force by discovering common new goals from the outside can they be called a "mass." Third, he denies that the masses possess any a priori characteristics; they are neither good nor evil, neither peaceful nor violent, but are simply swept along in a trend. He opposes attributing specific phenomena of mass movements to the natural characteristics of the masses, believing that mass actions are merely reactions to environmental conditions. Finally, he views mass revolution as a collective challenge to the existing system, turning "inaudible voices" into "audible voices" and manifesting the power of existence.
Third, he attempts to "liquidate" basic Marxist theories, including dialectical materialism. First, he emphasizes the particularity of things, adopting the philosophical core of Baruch Spinoza while ignoring the connections and changes between things. Second, he believes that the basic theories of Marxism are all products of modern society and possess historical limitations; this applies to the labor theory of value, historical materialism, and scientific socialism. Finally, he claims he wants to thoroughly transform Marxism, absorbing ideas from Kurt Gödel, Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, and Michel Foucault.
...and the thought of Laozi [11] to demonstrate the feasibility of realizing Communalism (Communal-ism). In short, South Korean Liquidationism advocates the critique of Marxism from the perspectives of both methodology and theoretical content, attempting to bridge West and East spatially and connect the modern with the postmodern temporally, proposing a Communalist scheme characterized by utopianism.
There is no group in the South Korean leftist movement that explicitly lists Liquidationism as its guiding ideology, yet the shadow of Liquidationism can be seen in every major street demonstration. First is the Movement to Liquidate Long-standing Evils (积弊清算运动). This movement opposes the long-standing vices formed in South Korean society, such as bureaucratism, corruption, and "hidden rules" (潜规则). Normally existing in the form of associations and advocacy, it transforms into collective demonstrations when stimulated by hot-button social issues. The "Sewol Ferry Disaster" of 2014 and the "Secret Agreement on Comfort Women between South Korea and Japan" of 2016 successively triggered liquidation movements against governmental "long-standing evils." In 2018, the "Seo Ji-hyeon Sexual Harassment Whistleblowing Incident" triggered a liquidation movement against the structural evils of patriarchal culture. Second is the Historical Liquidation Movement. The objects of this movement are historical events and figures related to national betrayal, dictatorship, and human rights violations since the beginning of South Korea’s modern era, centered around various "Committees for Investigating the Truth of History." The movements of bereaved families of victims from the "April 19th" Revolution [12], the "October Struggle" [13], and U.S. military atrocities, as well as the movement against state-mandated history textbooks, fall into this category. Finally, there is the Capital Liquidation Movement. The target is the chaebol [14] monopoly system, which is the result of the socialization of labor union activities. In 2005, Samsung Motors was suspected of falsifying accounts for over 300 billion won in debt; in 2008, Samsung Group Chairman Lee Kun-hee was suspected of evading over 1 trillion won in taxes; and in 2015, the merger process between Samsung C&T and Cheil Industries involved allegations of pressuring the National Pension Service—all of these served as fuses for the capital liquidation movement.
In reality, in South Korea, "Liquidationism" and "liquidation" (清算) are not the same thing. If "Liquidationism" is a leftist trend of thought, then "liquidation" is non-partisan, widely used to topple political opponents and manifesting as various "liquidation slogans" and "liquidation policies." In sum, Liquidationism as a leftist trend is an ideology lacking a dialectical core where negation overwhelms everything; it lacks construction following deconstruction. Conversely, "liquidation slogans" and "liquidation policies" are used by all sides of the political spectrum as means of mutual suppression between political factions, a product of the long-term political fragmentation and confrontation in South Korea.
(3) The New Left
The South Korean New Left is an alternative trend to Marxism following the upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In scope, it transcends the labor movement to include the women’s movement, environmental movement, and human rights movement, emerging as a product of the confluence of the democratization movement and the leftist movement. Unlike the radical characteristics of Trotskyism and Liquidationism, the New Left movement belongs to the conservative category within leftist thought. Conceptually, it advocates for the establishment of a multi-subject, active civil society; in practice, it emulates the methods and experiences of the European "1968 Movement."
The representative scholars of the South Korean New Left include Cho Dae-yop, a professor of sociology at Korea University, and Jung Chul-hee, a professor of sociology at Chonbuk National University. Both were active in the 1990s after South Korea had basically achieved democratization. They advocate for pan-democratization, pushing democratization into all levels of society and focusing on the cultivation of civil society or grassroots society. They have proposed concepts such as micro-democracy, lifestyle democracy, and participatory democracy, which can be summarized in three aspects.
First, civil society is an important driving force for democratization. Primarily, the impetus for democratization lies within civil society. Influenced by the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Ernesto Laclau, and Chantal Mouffe, they analyze the democratic drivers within civil society from a micro perspective. Secondly, internal changes in South Korean civil society are important indicators of the maturity of the democratization movement; the shifts in mobilization and organizational indicators of civil society around the "June Struggle" of 1987 [15] are the fundamental reasons it became a watershed for the democratization movement. Finally, the further vitalization of South Korean civil society provides the drive for democracy to develop in depth; grassroots politics, post-materialist politics, new class politics, and new culture politics are all political changes caused by the further development of civil society.
Second, the reform of civic organizations and social movements is the foundation for continuous social change. Primarily, a tension exists between the degree of organization/institutionalization and the vitality/depth of civil society; the higher the degree of organization and institutionalization, the greater the influence of the social movement and the easier it is to achieve set goals. However, the drawbacks of internal rigidity and clear external boundaries of action also become prominent. Secondly, South Korean social movements have reached a period where reform is necessary. The inauguration of the Roh Moo-hyun government was a result of the further organization and institutionalization of social movements, but it also caused subsequent movements to become stagnant, hindering further social development. Finally, integration and depth are the future directions for the reform of South Korean social movements. Universal values that transcend the left-right divide—such as participation, equality, peace, and ecology—should become the guiding concepts of civil society to achieve the integration rather than fragmentation of civic groups, and consultation rather than confrontation.
Third, the current society with its pluralized interests and values requires democracy to develop toward the micro and the everyday. Primarily, modern society with its pluralized interests and values experiences opposition in various fields, labeled as "disintegrated society," "risk society," "network society," or "conflict society." Secondly, this opposition can be divided into political and non-political opposition. Political opposition refers to traditional ruling-versus-opposition party conflicts and inter-party disputes, while non-political opposition refers to conflicts over human rights, the environment, women's issues, etc. Finally, to eliminate various forms of opposition, civil society must develop in a micro and everyday direction. Only by developing micro-democracy can existing disputes and oppositions be resolved through mutual understanding and dialogue; only by developing lifestyle democracy can a horizontal, network-style structure of political participation be established, promoting social development through the values of autonomy, responsibility, and cooperation.
In short, the South Korean New Left focuses on social movements and no longer employs class analysis. It labels itself as belonging to neither Marxism nor Western liberalism and opposes both universalism and particularism. It is a product of combining post-Marxism, the Western New Left, and East Asian social movement theory. It posits that the routinization, institutionalization, and collaboration of civic groups and social movements are the basis for reform in South Korean society; only by transcending the individual values of groups to form a collaborative situation between different organizations can comprehensive social reform be advanced.
New Left social movement organizations are the most numerous and widely influential in South Korea. In the Seoul and Gyeonggi Province areas alone, there are over 200 such organizations. Representative examples include "Citizens' Group for Corporate Responsibility," "Citizens' Coalition for Democratic Media," "National Unemployment Solution Group Alliance," "Citizens' Coalition for Construction and Transportation," "Citizens' Coalition for Building a Pedestrian-Friendly City," "Citizens' Coalition for Economic Justice," "Civil Society Forum for International Development Cooperation," "Green Future," "Northeast Asia Peace Alliance," "Citizens' Association to Eradicate Corruption," "Seoul Environmental Alliance," and the "Women’s Democratic Alliance for Politics." In the provinces, there are over 100 New Left groups with local characteristics across Incheon, Gangneung, Gyeongsang, Jeolla, Chungcheong, and Jeju, such as the "Donghae Environmental Protection Association," "Gimhae Women’s Association," "Pohang Environmental Movement Alliance," "Jeju Fishermen’s Association," "Mokpo Local Autonomy Citizens' Alliance," and the "Incheon Poor People's Alliance." Most of these groups have focused themes and goals with highly homogenous memberships, covering economics, politics, culture, society, ecology, and international peace. Thus, besides sustained struggles for specific goals, they also form a synergy in social reform movements with universal values, which led to the birth of the "Korea Council of Civic Organizations." Founded in 2001, it currently has over 300 member groups and has exerted collective efforts in movements such as the "Election Law Amendment Movement," the "Movement to Stop Construction of the Jeju Naval Base," the "National Assembly Opening Movement," the "Sewol Truth Investigation Movement," the "Anti-THAAD Movement," and the "Candlelight Struggle" to urge the resignation of Park Geun-hye.
In sum, the South Korean New Left has deconstructed the concept of class struggle, incorporating various social movements and groups and seeking cooperation amidst different struggle goals and interests. As the famous New Left scholar George Katsiaficas noted, South Korean social movements have transcended inherent classes and divisions of labor, and a "community of the people" (民众共同体) is forming. However, due to the difficulty of reconciling different goals and interests, cooperation often remains at the level of joint demonstrations during major social movements and is difficult to sustain deeply, leading to a blurred future and a lack of scientific rigor.
(4) Basic Income Theory
South Korean Basic Income Theory is one of the economic programs for social reform proposed by the New Left, which gained popularity after the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis. This theory argues that the fundamental cause of economic crisis is the relative overproduction brought about by under-consumption, and the cause of under-consumption is low income. Therefore, increasing the income of all members of society can alleviate economic crises. Unlike previous concepts of conditional and differentiated welfare policies, Basic Income Theory holds that no restrictions based on family, employment, property, or ability should be set for the entitlement to basic income; even those who choose not to engage in social labor should enjoy basic income security. Philippe Van Parijs, the founder of Basic Income Theory, argues that every member of society has the right to unconditionally receive basic income from the social community. The amount should be the highest sustainable standard the community can bear, and its purpose is not merely to guarantee a basic standard of living but to liberate freedom from the shackles of material necessity.
The representative scholar of South Korean Basic Income Theory is Kang Nam-hun, a professor of economics at Hanshin University. From an economic perspective, he transformed Basic Income Theory from a normative ideal (应然) into a realistic possibility. Using real-world cases and data, he refuted the stereotype that basic income would "bread idlers." He founded Basic Income Korean Network and pushed for the implementation of the theory through specific projects, such as free school lunches in Gyeonggi Province and the "Youth Allowance" in Seongnam City. Since 2011, South Korea’s Park Jong-cheol Publishing House began planning the "Basic Income Series," which currently consists of four volumes: Basic Income for All (Choi Kwang-eun, 2011), Basic Income Disputes and the Alternative Society (Kim Won-tae et al., 2014), Global Status and Prospects of the Basic Income Movement (Kang Nam-hun et al., 2014), and The Economics of Basic Income (Kang Nam-hun, 2019).
Currently, the main content of South Korean Basic Income Theory focuses on three aspects. First, it is necessary for South Korea to establish a basic income system. Primarily, several countries and regions around the world are trialing or implementing basic income systems. Brazil enacted the world's first basic income law; Namibia promoted an unconditional basic income system; and the Permanent Fund and Alaska Native Corporation fund systems in Alaska, USA, have maintained good status. Secondly, the dominant theories of the real world have triggered various crises. The polarization brought by neoliberalism and the structural crises encountered by welfare states have put pressure on politics, economy, and society; while taxes increase, the people’s "sense of gain" (获得感) is decreasing. Finally, South Korea, facing the same crises, needs to introduce a basic income system. Only by establishing this system can the outdated relationship between labor, income, and welfare be broken, fundamentally solving South Korea’s unemployment problems and constructing a new economic paradigm.
Second, the theory of the basic income system demonstrates progressive social value at multiple levels. Primarily, the establishment of a basic income system will promote the improvement of human rights and civic rights. With social progress, the concept of human rights has shifted from a philosophical perspective to a social one. The increase in poverty, unemployment, and temporary employment has infringed upon social human rights. Implementing a basic income system will not only protect an individual's right to survival but also enhance their right to participation, thereby laying a foundation for deliberative democracy.
Secondly, the establishment of a basic income system would help address the challenges posed by an AI-dominated society toward labor. As artificial intelligence replaces much human labor, the relationship between labor and production is weakened, and the value of "intelligent labor" becomes difficult to evaluate. Implementing a basic income system would make labor more autonomous, allowing exploratory and artistic labor to become more prevalent. Lastly, a basic income system would assist in building a universal social welfare system. The various conditional restrictions attached to public relief and public welfare systems limit their scope in problem-solving and increase the costs of their implementation; a basic income system would save on operating costs while expanding the scope of beneficiaries.
Thirdly, it is possible for South Korea to establish a basic income system. First, the implementation of such a system would not reduce the labor supply; workers' enthusiasm for work is not extinguished simply because they receive a basic income. Relevant experiments in India have also shown that basic income does not induce voluntary unemployment. Second, its implementation would not lower the social wage level. On the basis of a guaranteed basic income, labor is performed in pursuit of meaningful work, which would only lead to an increase, rather than a decrease, in wage levels. Finally, the implementation of basic income has feasible financial support. Through reforms in taxation and related systems, South Korea could ensure a monthly basic income of 300,000 won for all citizens. In short, the theory of basic income in South Korea is a concrete concept within a civic movement; while it may seem eccentric at first glance, it points directly toward human freedom and liberation, striving to return alienated labor [16] to its authentic essence.
The social movement for basic income in South Korea started relatively late. Although a coalition group named the "Basic Income Network" (kibon sodeuk netu-uokeu) was established as early as 1989, it remained little known until it gained a degree of activity in 2009. That year, the Socialist Party included the establishment of a basic income system in its political platform. Simultaneously, the Basic Income Network opened online discussion forums, making basic income a trending topic on the internet. In 2010, South Korea hosted an international academic conference on basic income and issued the "Seoul Declaration on Basic Income." That same year, the Basic Income Federation appeared in local elections, marking the formal start of the basic income social movement in South Korea. Currently, the movement has established branches across the country, covering Incheon, Daejeon, Jeonbuk, Jeonnam, Daegu, and Busan. It is steadily advancing the practical implementation of basic income within the context of local autonomy. Examples of such practices include the free lunch program for primary and secondary schools in Gyeonggi Province, the Youth Allowance program in Seongnam City, and the Farmers' Basic Income program in Yeoju City. On a national level, the South Korean National Assembly passed the Child Allowance Act in February 2018, stipulating that children under the age of six in households within the bottom 90% of income can receive a monthly allowance of 100,000 won. Although children from the top 10% of wealthy families are still excluded, it is close to a universal level and can be seen as South Korea’s first concrete practice of a basic income system.
In summary, basic income theory is a relatively concrete type of program among various Korean leftist struggle strategies. Conceptually, it ensures that the goals of social security are not limited to maintaining basic subsistence or responding to income crises like unemployment; rather, it positions social security as safeguarding the right of every human being to enjoy freedom unrestricted by material conditions. In practice, it gains broader support through the incremental implementation of related systems.
III. New Directions in the Evolution of 21st-Century South Korean Leftist Thought
Just as relatively radical Trotskyist and "Liquidationist" [17] trends alongside relatively conservative New Left and basic income theories became the primary content of leftist thought under the influence of South Korean capitalism's current features—namely, "monopoly under freedom" and "abject poverty under prosperity"—the future of South Korean capitalism will face the conditions of "marginalization of labor under AI" and "shifts in labor-capital dynamics under protectionism." This will prompt leftist thought to manifest new characteristics of individualized deepening across different fields.
First, the relatively radical Trotskyism and Liquidationism will gradually fade. During periods of major capitalist adjustment and transformation, labor movements and other leftist social movements inevitably undergo severe shocks. Advancements in AI technology are pushing industrial production into a "fifth revolution," where simple labor is further marginalized by technological innovation. The reduction of job opportunities prompts fragmentation within the labor camp. The combination of re-industrialization in developed capitalist countries with trade protectionism has fractured the horizontal international division of labor, damaging workers' motivation for international cooperation and hindering the international workers' movement to a certain extent. The differentiation and restructuring of domestic and international labor groups will cause the Trotskyism and Liquidationism that rose through critiques of the Soviet model to gradually lose their luster. Of course, the influence of the unique "liquidation culture" [18] within the South Korean political ecosystem will persist, but because it lacks concrete theoretical support and relies solely on the trait of "opposition for opposition's sake," it is insufficient to be titled a coherent school of thought.
Second, beyond basic income theory, the New Left will deepen research on countermeasures in various fields. Since 2015, with the spread of social movements concerning women, the environment, people with disabilities, and sexual minorities, corresponding theories have begun to take shape. The practice of the "Me Too" anti-sexual harassment movement has pushed feminism toward gender egalitarianism; the movement for the rights of the disabled has led to more detailed research on social service standards; and the green environmental movement has deepened research into environmental rights. All of these have made leftist social movements more concrete and targeted. Specifically, the gender equality movement has united women and sexual minorities, not only seeking paid maternity and parental leave for women but also providing anti-discrimination and anti-bullying support for sexual minorities. The movement for the rights of the disabled has incorporated projects such as income, medical care, employment, housing, nursing, counseling, and development support. Furthermore, the philosophy of the green environmental movement has shifted its focus from resource and energy consumption at the economic level to attitudes and lifestyles at the personal level, as seen in "sustainable fashion" and "minimalist living."
Finally, the theories and methods of scientific socialism [19] will receive renewed attention. In contrast to the fading trend of Trotskyism and Liquidationism, the call to return to and strengthen the study of classical Marxism has begun to resonate with more people. More South Korean leftist scholars recognize that the basic principles of scientific socialism are not obsolete. Futher enriching and developing the content of scientific socialism based on the new characteristics and trends of capitalist development remains an unavoidable task for contemporary Marxists. Since 2012, work has officially begun on the Korean translation of the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), and popular readings of Capital and The Communist Manifesto have been published. Results from analyzing capitalist economic crises and the direction of future society from a Marxist perspective have gradually increased. In this way, the marginalization of Marxism within the South Korean leftist social movement will be ameliorated. "What kind of -ism a country implements depends on whether that -ism can solve the historical tasks facing that country." [20] Only by closely integrating with the solution to the difficult problems of South Korean capitalism will the vitality of scientific socialism flourish.
The 21st century is an era of restructuring for South Korean leftist thought. As the flaws of neoliberalism are continuously exposed, leftist social movements have begun to show a trend of deepening and coalescing. Investigating and developing Marxism innovatively has become an important task for leftist social workers and theorists. Traditional labor movements remain the main tide of the Left; emerging movements for women's rights, environmental protection, anti-nuclear advocacy, and sexual minorities are the waves of leftist development; and the new revolution in industrial technology represented by AI, set against the backdrop of capital monopoly and polarization, is the vortex the Left has encountered. Only by harnessing the power of the waves to move with the current within the vortex can they stand at the forefront of the tide.
(Author’s affiliation: School of Marxism, Shandong University) Web Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Foreign Theoretical Trends (Guowai Lilun Dongtai), Issue 2, 2020.