Shi Fengge: A Critique of Ecocentrism and the Construction of a New Ecological Philosophy
While modern industrial civilization has brought material prosperity and sensory enjoyment, it has also caused the increasing deterioration of the ecological environment, seriously endangering the continued existence of humanity itself. Facing this situation, the Western intelligentsia took the lead in the 1960s by reflecting on the relationship between humanity and nature under traditional industrial civilization, forming various schools of thought such as environmental ethics, wilderness philosophy, and deep ecology—collectively referred to as the nature-centrist ecological outlook. Nature-centrism attempts to repair the actual world of nature destroyed by humans to achieve harmony between humanity and nature. On the surface, this ecological view appears flawless and reasonable; however, it is a Utopian fantasy. Undoubtedly, nature-centrism reflects the public concern over increasingly severe ecological problems. Conversely, however, we have seen no obvious mitigation of current ecological issues, let alone the elimination of the ecological crisis. Where, then, does the crux of the problem lie? This has become a question over which many philosophers and ecologists have brooded. To date, people still hold diverging opinions on how to solve ecological problems, and the ecological issue remains a worldwide conundrum. Slavoj Žižek, the famous contemporary Western leftist scholar, points out through a critique of nature-centrism that the crux of this trend is its ontological Utopia, and he provides his own answer from a psychoanalytic perspective. Below, we provide a brief analysis of this.
I. The Primordial Nature of Perfect Balance: The Utopia of the Nature-Centrist Ecological Outlook
"The mainstream view of contemporary Western ecological philosophy is 'nature-centrism.'" [1] We may also call it a typical ideology regarding ecological issues because it presupposes a primordial nature—that is, a nature that not only exists but is "unpolluted," only to be later destroyed by "Man," the master of nature. Consequently, returning to a primitive, original state of nature becomes the goal of the nature-centrist ecological outlook. Specifically, we can grasp the nature-centrist ecological outlook from the following perspectives.
First, from the perspective of philosophical ontology, nature-centrism has its own ontological foundation: that primordial nature of perfect balance. This is an ontological presupposition of nature characterized by its "Utopian" color. Of course, this natural "Utopia" is essentially a retrospective construction of thought rather than an indubitable reality or fact; it is a deduction of possible causes from results, rather than a normal progression from prior cause to subsequent effect. On one hand, in terms of temporal logic, original primordial nature is always unrepresentable [N]. As a past situation, it has always already passed away; that is to say, it is impossible for us to return to the past to verify what primitive nature actually looked like. Thus, the so-called primordial nature must be a retrospective construction of thought. On the other hand, humanity is essentially an existence of cultural symbols, which requires us to endow our own existence with order and meaning. That is, for humans "to live, to be able to survive, the spirit must relate itself to some kind of order. It must understand reality as an independent whole. The spirit lives in a relationship of trust with reality itself... This relationship of trust was originally and truly always our relationship with nature as a totality, that is, as the reality of the natural world." [2] In other words, to dwell in the world of everyday life, people must conceive of nature as an ordered, balanced, and perfect whole. This means that in the depths of the human spirit, people "find it very difficult to truly accept the fact that the flow of everyday reality will be disrupted." [3] When people face ecological disasters that frequently disrupt the balance of their daily lives, they construct a perfectly balanced primordial nature in their minds to resist this imbalance, and this mental construction also accords with the essential prescriptions of human existence.
Second, building upon the ontological foundation of "primordial nature," the various schools of the nature-centrist ecological outlook differ in their specific views. These include ecological ethics, which extends the scope of ethical relations to natural entities beyond humans; wilderness philosophy, which showcases the original natural environment; and deep ecology, which promotes the mutual "self-realization" of humans and other species.
The first to reflect on environmental issues was ecological ethics, proposed by the French scholar Albert Schweitzer, developed by the American scholar Aldo Leopold, and finally systematized by Holmes Rolston III. The basic tenet of ecological ethics is to extend ethical relations—originally applicable only between humans—to natural entities beyond humans. That is, "a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such." [4] This extends the original ethical concern between humans to other entities in nature. From the perspective of ecological ethics, this expansion of moral concern is grounded in the intrinsic value and inherent rights of nature. The value of nature here is not the instrumental value relative to humans found in the anthropocentric horizon, but a creative value-in-itself determined by the structure of natural objects. This value attribute allows natural objects to adapt perfectly to nature and makes the life of Mother Nature more diverse and exquisite. As for whether nature actually has rights, the famous American ecologist Barry Commoner explained this by proposing the ecological law that "Nature knows best." [5] To illustrate this, he gave the example of a mechanical watch: the precise internal structure of a watch is the accumulation of the skills of countless predecessors—it is the product of careful structuring. "Any random change made in this watch is likely to fall into a high degree of disorder and destructive arrangement." [6] Extending this to nature, we can conclude that the Earth's biosphere is a self-organizing system that has evolved over billions of years and operates excellently. Its internal natural substances have all been preserved through the testing of this system. "Any random change induced in a natural system, primarily by human agency, is likely to be harmful to that system." [7] In other words, in the long evolution of nature, only those things that can be integrated into the self-organizing system and are beneficial to its continued existence are preserved. Having undergone long-term evolution and adaptation, these surviving entities have achieved an optimal state of matching with the ecosystem; therefore, they are entitled to continue existing according to their inherent natural rights. It is precisely based on the intrinsic value and rights of nature that ecological ethics holds that there should be equality between natural entities and humans, and that humans should respect and revere nature.
Wilderness philosophy attempts to provide proof from a scientific perspective for that nature which is free from human intervention and in which ecological laws play the leading role. Wilderness "is a biotic community that displays beauty, integrity, and stability," [8] and "is a living museum, displaying our vital roots." [9] Specifically, it puts forward the following views: First, as the original natural environment, wilderness constitutes an independent self-circulating system with diversity; protecting wilderness will help protect ecological diversity. Second, wilderness has its own overall stability and harmony; it contains the laws of the changing seasons and biological migration. Within it, there also exist interaction mechanisms among various species. These interaction mechanisms include parts beneficial to the organic whole of the wilderness as well as harmful parts, but it is precisely this dialectical unity of benefit and harm that guarantees the healthy development of the wilderness. Third, the essential attribute of wilderness is wildness, which is "the attribute of an organism formed by the interdependence and interaction of internal structural elements and relationships of the wilderness ecosystem." [10] Artificial intervention in this wildness will lead to the loss of the organism's adaptive capacity, rendering it unable to survive. The wilderness is the primordial, and simultaneously it is self-sufficient and perfect; is this not precisely a projection of that primordial natural view of perfect balance?
If the two schools mentioned above only reflect the ontological presupposition of nature-centrism's primordial nature in parts, then Arne Næss’s deep ecology presents it from a holistic perspective. Næss’s deep ecology can be called a "totalizing concept." Its basic principles are "biocentric equality" and "self-realization." It points out that human self-realization should exceed the scope of the species; this "self" should transcend human society and identify with all existing beings. At this point, the self should be the "Great Self"—an ecological self—where the "I" as a human subject is merely a part of a larger whole. Consequently, Næss points out that "maximum self-realization requires maximum diversity and symbiosis. Diversity is a fundamental principle." [11] This is precisely because human "self-realization" depends on the "self-realization" of other entities. Here, we see a more radical manifestation of the ontological presupposition of a perfectly balanced primordial nature—an ecological viewpoint that places humans on an equal footing with other biological entities, merely as a part of primordial nature.
Through the above analysis, we can see that nature-centrism, based on the ontological presupposition of a perfectly balanced primordial nature, has proposed theoretical reflections to deal with the ecological crisis. However, because these theoretical reflections overemphasize the dimensions of natural rights and intrinsic value, they overlook the fact that human value-investment is the proper meaning of our reflection on ecological issues. At the same time, this ontological presupposition of primordial nature, as a retrospective construction of thought, also carries a clear Utopian color. This ecological view's cognition of nature also makes it unable to solve the ecological crisis caused by the disharmony between humanity and nature. An effective solution to the ecological dilemma must be grounded on a foundation of scientific cognition; most importantly, we must clarify what kind of nature it is that we are facing.
II. Critique of the Ontological Presupposition of the Nature-Centrist Ecological Outlook: Nature Does Not Exist
Regarding the nature-centrist ontological presupposition of a perfectly balanced primordial nature, Žižek launched a powerful critique from a psychoanalytic perspective. Starting from the psychoanalytic concept of "trauma," he points out that "Man is a 'wound of nature,' and the balance of nature can never be restored; to live in harmony with the environment, the only thing Man can do is to fully accept this rip, this crack, this structural uprooting, and repair it as much as possible after the fact." [12] Accordingly, Žižek clearly puts forward his own view of nature: that "Nature" does not exist; nature is always already a broken, imbalanced nature. He provides a full demonstration of this from two aspects: the inherent attributes of nature itself and "second nature."
First, Žižek believes that nature, in terms of its inherent attributes, is full of disasters and imbalances. He explains this through a dialectical interpretation of Darwin’s theory of evolution. The usual interpretation of Darwinian evolution is that species are perfectly designed to adapt to nature; Žižek, however, points out that "this reference to Darwin is a profound misunderstanding." [13] He believes that the "evolution" into the current system of species is merely "nature’s clumsy improvisation, where every limited success is accompanied by heavy costs and disasters." [14] Powerful evidence proves this point: "90% of the human genome is 'junk' DNA without clear function." This evidence regarding humans precisely illustrates the ultimate contingency of human existence; that is to say, in the evolutionary history of species, there is basically "no evolution: disasters and the breaking of balance are all part of natural history. At many moments in the past, life could have turned in a completely different direction. Our primary source of energy (oil) is itself the result of an unimaginable catastrophe in the past." [15] Does this not precisely reveal the authentic side of nature to us? It is itself full of unpredictable disasters and crises. Real nature is not as pleasant and harmonious as green shade and drifting clouds; real, primordial nature is just like the scenery of southern Iceland: "a magnificent, vast, misty green coastal plain, scattered with large moss-covered stones, which cannot help but appear as uncontrolled, morbid, cancer-like protrusions." [16] Do these not all reveal to us the truth of the chaos and disorder of natural reality, and thereby negate from within nature the nature-centrist ontological presupposition of a perfectly balanced primordial nature?
Second, Žižek believes that since the birth of humanity, nature has always already been "second nature"—humanized nature—and with the development of biological genetic technology, nature will cease to exist. Starting from the idea that Man is a wound of nature, Žižek believes that the birth of humanity has long since left a deep gash on nature, and "the balance of nature can never be restored." [17]
Human intervention in nature has become so profound that any sudden interruption of large-scale industrial activity would lead to a catastrophic collapse. This suggests that "'nature' on Earth has already 'adapted' to human intervention; human 'pollution' has been thoroughly integrated into the fragile, unstable balance of 'natural' reproduction on Earth." [22]
At the same time, the development of contemporary biotechnological and genetic engineering will lead to the disappearance of nature as we know it. On the one hand, we see more diverse forms of "humanized nature," which includes "monsters of nature, deformed cows and trees, or a more positive dream of organisms improved and genetically controlled to be more suitable for us" [23]; on the other hand, there is "second nature" in the sense of the autonomization of the results of human actions—results that "produce monsters with lives of their own." [24] The cumulative result of these two aspects is that "the second nature in the sense of the automated social process is producing an artificially created nature, a second nature in the sense of natural monsters." [25]
Consequently, the contemporary world fits the definition of second nature more than ever before. The subversive significance of biogenetic technology for the traditional view of nature also lies in the fact that this technological breakthrough brings about the "end of nature." Because of the unique capacity of biotechnology to create entirely new life, the "nature" of life "retrospectively loses its spontaneous-natural character and becomes one among a series of synthetic-artificial plannings" [26]—and an imperfect species at that. This subversive power led Slavoj Žižek to reach an even more radical view of nature: in the contemporary world, we have already lost nature. One could say that Žižek’s view of nature better interprets the "second nature" proposed by Marx. Second nature refers to the world of human creations; it is a spiritualized product of humanity. As Marx pointed out in his critique of Ludwig Feuerbach’s intuitive materialism: "He does not see that the sensuous world around him is not something directly given from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed, in the sense that it is an historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations... even the objects of the simplest 'sensuous certainty' are only given him through social development, industry, and commercial intercourse." [27] This is precisely where Marx's dialectical view of nature transcends the old materialist view: "What distinguishes Marx’s concept of nature from all other views of nature from the very beginning is the socio-historical character of Marx’s concept of nature." [28]
III. A New Ecological Philosophy Facing the Truth of Nature: Future Perfect and Collective Action
Through the above analysis, we have gained a more comprehensive and scientific understanding of the truth of nature—namely, that in the actual world there is no perfectly balanced, original nature. What we directly face is a nature whose balance is broken, a nature where ecological disasters have already occurred, and a "second nature" that has long been humanized. It is on this basis that Žižek proposes a new ecological philosophy that faces the truth of nature.
The primary characteristic of this new ecological philosophy is manifested in its conception of time: it is a "future perfect" (先将来时) [29] view of time. The "future perfect" is a tense distinct to French (and other languages) that expresses an action that will have been completed before another future action takes place; that is, the future is conditional upon an action that has already been completed. Therefore, the "future perfect" is a way of looking at the present from the perspective of the future; it determines our current actions retrospectively through the presupposition of the future. Regarding the "future perfect," Žižek provided a systematic discourse in In Defense of Lost Causes: he points out that the "future perfect" introduces a "projected time" (投射的时间) that differs from the traditional linear view of historical time. In the traditional linear view of history, "possibility precedes choice" [30]; people merely passively choose from various possibilities, and the realization of any one possibility correspondingly cancels out the others. In contrast, the "projected time" relied upon by the "future perfect" points to the "notion of a choice/action that retrospectively opens up its own possibility." [31] This "projected time" is a closed loop between the past and the future, meaning that "causally, the future is produced by our acts in the past, while the way we act is determined by our expectation of the future and our reaction to this expectation." [32]
Under this conception of time, past possibilities are changed retrospectively by this expectation, thereby remaining open. This is precisely the way the "future perfect" view of time deals with ecological problems: we should treat ecological disaster as an inevitable fate. By accepting the perspective of ecological disaster, we actively project ourselves into this destiny. It is precisely through this projection of the ecological disaster dimension into the future that people’s agency is galvanized to act actively to avoid an encounter with said disaster. As Žižek points out, "we should retrospectively insert into its past (the past of the future) a counterfactual possibility ('if we had done this or that, the catastrophe we are living now would not have occurred!')." [33] According to this presupposition, we should actively organize and implement actions that will change fate itself; here, choice or action retrospectively endows the past with new possibilities. In summary, the "future perfect" is a view of time that transcends itself and leans toward the future. Simultaneously, Žižek regards it as the only effective strategy for us to deal with contemporary ecological problems. As he notes, when facing ecological disaster, "one cannot say 'the future is still open, we still have time to act to prevent the worst'; what one should accept is that the catastrophe is inevitable, and then act to retrospectively undo what was already 'written in the stars' as our fate." [34] Žižek points out that we should proceed from the perspective that natural ecological disaster is always already here, use the "future perfect" view of time to face existing ecological problems, and carry out active intervention to avoid a true encounter with a catastrophic conclusion.
Shifting from a traditional linear view of time to a "future perfect" view of time has profound practical significance. It targets the impasse of choice that is covered up by the view of the spontaneity of "objective spirit" in the contemporary social sphere. Objective spirit is the "cunning of reason" (理性的狡计) formed through human interaction; it creates a new "Big Other" [35], allowing the consequences of people's actions to be processed anonymously or systemically. The result of this anonymous processing of ecological problems is that there is no clear agent responsible for them, as they are seen as the results of an objective process. But in fact, we know clearly that we should be responsible for them, yet the "objective spirit" "prevents us from acting on this knowledge and assuming this responsibility." [36] Žižek believes the cause of this situation lies in the "impasse of choice" in contemporary society—"the necessity to decide on matters that will fundamentally affect our lives, while having no adequate basis in knowledge." [37] Žižek, borrowing Donald Rumsfeld's terminology, calls this "unknown unknowns." Regarding ecological disasters, we do not know where the tipping point is, nor do we know exactly what kind of disaster we will face. Consequently, by the time we truly realize an ecological disaster is happening, it is always already too late, because as soon as an ecological disaster appears, it delivers a subversive shock to the existing symbolic order. It is precisely this unpredictability of ecological disaster that places contemporary people in an impasse of choice when dealing with ecological issues. The "future perfect" view of time is aimed exactly at this paradoxical dilemma of choice. From this, we can see that the "future perfect" view of time contains a dimension of action. This action is fundamentally different from the utopian fantasy of attempting to return to original nature; it is based on the actual dialectical relationship between humans and nature—that is, the trauma brought to nature by the appearance of humans and the resulting tension between the two. Based on this, such action expects to ensure the long-term survival and development of humanity as a whole through intervention. That is to say, on ecological issues, the "future perfect" considers the present based on human values.
So, what kind of action is this? The action we must resort to is collective action. Žižek provides a systematic discourse on this, arguing that people must first discard the prejudice that "linear evolutionary time is 'on our side,' that history is 'working for us' in the guise of a mole digging a hole, doing what the 'cunning of reason' requires." [38] The subversive dimension of ecological disaster means we can no longer consider ecological issues according to the "cunning of reason," as this could lead to the destruction of humanity and its history. Accordingly, Žižek believes we must re-assert the concept of collective action and actively assume responsibility for addressing ecological problems. Žižek elucidates his concept of collective action by endowing Alain Badiou’s four moments of the "eternal idea" of revolutionary egalitarian justice with new connotations. First, we must adhere to "strict egalitarian justice" to cope with ecological disaster. Ecological disaster has the destructive power to interrupt human history. Therefore, when sacrifices must be made for environmental protection, everyone should pay the same price. The most typical example is the issue of energy consumption: to better protect the environment, we require that "everyone in the world has the same standard for per capita energy consumption, carbon dioxide emissions, etc." [39] Second, we must instill a sense of "terror" in the subject; that is, we must ruthlessly punish all those who violate imposed environmental protection measures, thereby achieving the goal of everyone actively complying with mandatory environmental measures. Third, we should advocate "voluntarism" (唯意志论) [40]. This thought is contrasted with the rationalism of individualism. Rationalism emphasizes that the "spontaneous" actions of each person pursuing their own maximum interest objectively promote the balanced development of the whole; it emphasizes the maximization of individual interest and its "spontaneous" inherent logic. In contrast, voluntarism emphasizes a non-rational will—a strong will that exceeds human intellectual reasoning. This is exactly the attitude people should have when facing an ecological disaster that impacts the fate of humanity: to be spared from ecological disaster, we are willing to make the necessary sacrifices, which means limiting the spontaneous, blind development of humanity. To achieve this goal, people must resort to large-scale collective action, which precisely reflects the collective willpower of humanity. Finally, we must have full trust in the people. Only in this way can the previous three measures truly take effect. We need to make a wager—to believe that "the majority of the people will support these harsh measures, view these measures as their own, and be ready to participate in their implementation." [41] This is precisely a call for subjectivity in our response to contemporary ecological disasters; we need a decisive acting subject. Žižek believes that to effectively deal with the ecological crisis, we need to go even further: "people should not be afraid to demand the activation of a role in all egalitarian-revolutionary terror—the combination of acts of terror and trust in the people—the 'informer' [42] who reports the perpetrator to the authorities." [43] What Žižek wants to express here is the formation of a "gaze of the Other" simultaneously with the activation of the negative abyss of the people's subjectivity, thereby preventing those who wish to sabotage the strict protective measures.
The "future perfect" and "collective action" together constitute Žižek's new ecological philosophy. The two complement each other, jointly describing the overall logic and practical path of the new ecological philosophy in addressing ecological problems. The "future perfect" is the fundamental attitude we should hold when facing ecological problems and the prerequisite upon which we carry out collective action. At the same time, collective action, which emphasizes the power of human will, is the only way for us to realize the vision of the "future perfect" and avoid ecological disaster.
IV. Conclusion
Ecological issues concern the sustainable development of contemporary human society and are closely related to the interests of every individual, thereby garnering widespread concern. Intellectual circles in developed countries were the first to begin reflecting on the deterioration of the ecological environment. Most of these scholars oppose anthropocentrism and adhere to a nature-centric ecological outlook, emphasizing that we must respect and revere natural entities other than humans. As the ecological crisis deepens daily, the nature-centric ecological outlook increasingly highlights the inherent value and intrinsic rights of nature itself, pre-supposing an ontology by retroactively constructing a perfectly balanced "original nature." Consequently, ecology has gradually developed toward "deep green" positions, increasingly moving toward a comprehensive nature-centrism. It is undeniable that the reflections of the nature-centric ecological outlook have allowed people to deeply recognize the severity of environmental problems and have effectively raised environmental awareness. However, while attending to the theoretical depth of ecological thought, we must also consider its scientificity and practical significance. Furthermore, we must be vigilant against the construction of ecological theories that move toward the extreme of eco-utopianism, because, in the final analysis, our reflection on ecological issues is for the purpose of more effectively solving them to ensure the sustainable development of humanity.
It is precisely based on such realistic considerations that Žižek, proceeding from the perspective of psychoanalysis, provides a powerful critique of the ontological presuppositions constructed by the nature-centric ecological outlook. He develops his argument from two aspects—the inherent attributes of nature and "humanized nature"—pointing out the absurdity of the nature-centric ontological presupposition and proposing a new ecological philosophy. This new philosophical thought contains a dual meaning of the "future perfect tense" and "collective action." The future perfect tense, as our fundamental attitude for dealing with ecological catastrophe, requires us to embed the dimension of catastrophe into our reality, thereby providing a conceptual basis for our decisions. Collective action, meanwhile, is the powerful guarantee by which we retroactively change and reset possibilities to avoid our encounter with ecological catastrophe.
The construction of Žižek's new ecological philosophy is grounded in the psychoanalytic concept of "trauma" [9]. On the surface, it seems to have no relation to the dialectical reflections of Marx and Engels on the relationship between humanity and nature, but after careful comparison, we can discern an internal connection between the two. On one hand, this connection is mainly reflected in their shared view that nature is already "humanized nature." Just as Marx believed that nature is the product of man's objectifying activity, thus endowing nature with social attributes, Žižek also points out through the deep development of science and technology that nature has long since lost its natural attributes. On the other hand, Žižek's dissection of the relationship between humanity and nature through the concept of "trauma" shares a subtle similarity with Engels’s dialectics of nature. Žižek views man as the wound of nature, while simultaneously viewing this rift as a structural protrusion that we can only attempt to repair but can never heal. Engels, meanwhile, pointed out: "Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects, which only too often cancel the first."
That is to say, while man conquers nature, nature also inflicts ruthless revenge upon humanity, and this revenge is characterized by contingency and unpredictability. Therefore, we should no longer expect to restore that harmonious state of "unity of heaven and man" [10] between humanity and nature, but rather strive to maintain the contemporary "fragile balance" between the two. Finally, the concept of collective action proposed by Žižek is also closely related to "practice" (shìjiàn) [11] within the horizon of Marx’s historical materialism. Marx regarded practice as the mediation of the objectifying activity between man and nature; it is precisely based on practice that the ecological outlook we construct possesses practical significance. Žižek’s collective action is itself a form of human practical activity; at the same time, this collective action takes the inherent value of humanity itself as its internal teleological orientation.
In the 21st century today, ecological problems are becoming increasingly prominent and have become a major challenge for the future sustainable development of humanity. Today’s ecological problems also increasingly bring traumatic experiences to people through their hidden nature, unpredictability, and sudden contingency. Žižek’s new ecological philosophy, precisely through the concept of "trauma" from the psychoanalytic perspective, brings us new reflections on ecological issues. It places the rift within the internal structure of the relationship between humanity and nature, allowing people to look directly at the Real [12] of the ecological catastrophe that has already occurred. Furthermore, this new ecological philosophy focuses on the inherent value of humanity itself, proposing a concept of collective action under the future perfect tense as a realistic strategy for dealing with ecological issues. Thereby, ecological issues move from the utopian "beyond" of nature-centrism into the "hither shore" of realistic strategies that focus more on the effective resolution of ecological problems. Although Žižek’s new ecological philosophy is still not perfect, it undoubtedly provides a new perspective for our understanding of ecological issues and provides new paths and methods for our resolution of globalized ecological problems.