Wang Jinfen and Yang Xiuqin: The Theoretical Essence of Lenin's New Economic Policy and Its Contemporary Value
In March 1921, Lenin led the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [RKP(b)] to decisively terminate the policy of War Communism and begin implementing the New Economic Policy (NEP). This transition had far-reaching impact in the history of the development of Marxism and the international communist movement. It not only enabled the Soviet regime led by the RKP(b) to overcome unprecedentedly severe economic difficulties and political crises, but also served as a vivid teaching manual for Communists reflecting on "what socialism is and how to build it." As the chief architect of Reform and Opening-up, Deng Xiaoping, while contemplating the major theoretical and practical issues of "what socialism is and how to build it" in the 1980s, explicitly pointed out that "perhaps Lenin had a better train of thought when he launched the New Economic Policy." In January 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping highly affirmed the New Economic Policy as the crystallization of Lenin’s arduous exploration of how to build socialism in the absence of previous experience to draw upon. Although a full century has passed since the NEP, and the practical content of socialism with Chinese characteristics has far surpassed the NEP of Lenin’s era in both depth and breadth, grasping the theoretical essence of Lenin’s New Economic Policy remains of vital practical significance for building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era. This essence includes: taking the people’s satisfaction as the basis for the Party’s policy-making and the criterion for judging the success or failure of the Party’s work; the necessity of starting from practice rather than books to continuously open up new frontiers for socialism; being adept at viewing issues from a political perspective and ensuring no political dangers or errors occur; and utilizing capitalism to build socialism so that "NEP Russia" becomes "Socialist Russia."
I. Whether the people are satisfied is the basis for the Party's policy-making and the criterion for judging the success or failure of the Party’s work.
At the Tenth Congress of the RKP(b) held in the spring of 1921, Lenin led the entire Party in the decision to end War Communism and begin the NEP. The direct catalyst for this shift was the Kronstadt sailors' armed rebellion. The sailors of Kronstadt (essentially peasants in uniform) were a force that had once supported the RKP(b) and held the honor of being called the "glory and pride of the Russian Revolution." Yet, such a force actually launched a rebellion against the RKP(b), shouting the slogan "Soviets without Communists." In fact, it was far more than just the Kronstadt rebellion; between the end of 1920 and the beginning of 1921 alone, over 50 large-scale peasant uprisings broke out across Russia. In the cities, numerous labor strikes also occurred, directed at the Bolsheviks. This was undoubtedly a severe political crisis for the RKP(b). Regarding this, Lenin said: "We encountered a very great—I think the greatest—internal political crisis in Soviet Russia. This internal crisis revealed dissatisfaction not only among a significant part of the peasantry but also among the workers. At that time, the broad masses of peasants were against us, not consciously, but instinctively in their mood." Why did a people's regime fail to gain the people's recognition? Why were the people willing to endure hunger and follow the Bolsheviks during the arduous years of war, yet grew dissatisfied with the Party during the period of peaceful construction? Specifically, why did the sailors who once supported the Bolsheviks suddenly stand in opposition to the Party? This dealt a powerful shock to Lenin and the leadership of the RKP(b), prompting Lenin’s deep reflection.
As a great realist politician, Lenin soberly realized that while there were indeed hostile forces such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks, and anarchists stirring up trouble behind the continuous peasant uprisings and worker strikes across Russia (especially the Kronstadt sailors' anti-Party slogans), the root cause was the continued implementation of War Communism after the domestic war had ended. This had caused intense dissatisfaction among the broad masses, and the reason for this dissatisfaction was that "the economic policy formulated at the top became decoupled from the bottom." The "economic policy formulated at the top" referred to the War Communism measures implemented by the Soviet regime during the Civil War, which included: the surplus-appropriation system [1] in the countryside; the nationalization of all industrial and commercial enterprises, with all mining and industry managed through unified government arrangements; and in the commercial sphere, a state monopoly that prohibited private trade, abolished markets, and implemented a rationing system for major consumer goods. It must be said that this policy was instrumental in effectively concentrating the country’s limited manpower and material resources to repel the attacks of powerful enemies and consolidate the nascent Soviet regime. However, these were, after all, nearly extreme temporary emergency measures carried out at the cost of sacrificing the fundamental interests of the peasantry. In Lenin’s words, "We actually took from the peasants all their surplus grain, and sometimes even not just the surplus, but a part of the grain essential for the peasant." Furthermore, because the state had no industrial goods to exchange with the peasants and no money to give them, it the state gave them "promissory notes" [2]. In the face of a powerful enemy and at an urgent moment of national survival, the peasants were willing to go hungry and provide their own rations to support the state out of trust in the Soviet regime. But when the enemy retreated and peace arrived, yet there was still no sign of an end to this policy, their repressed dissatisfaction erupted uncontrollably. Regarding this, Lenin said: "The peasants are dissatisfied with the form of the relationship established between us and them; they do not want this form of relationship and do not wish to live this way anymore. This is indisputable. Their will has been expressed quite clearly. This is the will of the broad masses of laborers. We must take this into account. We are sober enough politicians to say straight out: let us revise our policy toward the peasants." He added, "A worker-peasant regime acts first of all by considering the interests of the broad masses of the people." Thus, Lenin clarified beyond any doubt that the reason for implementing the NEP was that the masses could no longer tolerate War Communism; ending that policy was the heartfelt wish of the people. Whether a policy conforms to the will and interests of the people is the fundamental basis for the Party’s policy-making; the Communists hold power precisely to realize the interests of the people.
It must be emphasized that in order to ensure the practical effectiveness of the NEP and fundamentally improve the people's lives, Lenin repeatedly stressed that Communists must honestly learn how to do economic work and engage in less armchair talk and empty rhetoric. He said: "Our slogan is: Down with the windbags!" and "What we need is not empty words, but practical work." Lenin compared the ability of Party members to learn economic work to an "examination" the whole Party must undergo, believing that the grade for this exam would be judged by the masses. The criterion for the people's judgment would not be listening to your propaganda, but rather "showing them with facts what benefits the proletarian state power has actually brought," so that "the majority of the laboring masses—peasants and workers—say: 'It is not you who praise yourselves, but we who praise you, saying you have achieved the best results.'" These discourses by Lenin were essentially emphasizing that the people’s satisfaction is the yardstick for measuring the success or failure of the Party's work. The key to the people's satisfaction lies in demonstrating through the practical results of the NEP that the Party is capable of satisfying the people’s aspirations, realizing their interests, and delivering a result that satisfies the people.
From the above, it can be seen that whether it was the decisive end of War Communism or the requirement for Communists to refrain from empty talk and effectively improve their ability to handle economic work during the implementation of the NEP, all were aimed at satisfying the aspirations of the masses and realizing their interests. He took satisfying the people's hearts and safeguarding their interests as the highest value orientation for Communists, listened earnestly to the voice of the people, respected their wishes, and treated the people's satisfaction as the basis for policy-making and the criterion for judging success or failure. Standing at a new historical starting point, our revisiting of the NEP in Lenin’s time is intended to help us learn from Lenin's sincere and profound feelings for the people, keep in mind the original aspiration and founding mission of Communists to do everything for the people, and take the realization of the fundamental interests of the broadest masses as the fundamental starting point and ultimate goal of all Party work. We must constantly "take whether the people support, approve, are happy with, and agree to something as the fundamental standard for measuring the success or failure of all work," consciously adapt to the people's longing for a better life, and continuously and effectively enhance the people's sense of fulfillment, happiness, and security.
II. We must proceed from practice rather than from books, advance with the times, and continuously open up new frontiers for socialism.
After the victory of the October Revolution, how to build socialism was placed before the Lenin-led RKP(b) as a brand-new historical task. The only references available to them were some basic ideas proposed by Marx and Engels—who likewise had no practical experience in building socialism—such as the social ownership of the means of production, distribution according to work, the regulation of economic activity by a plan, and the absence of commodities and money. However, as is well known, these ideas were based on the premise of highly developed productive forces, whereas Russia was a small-peasant country with a relatively backward economy and culture, far removed from the premise envisioned by Marx and Engels. Lenin’s greatness lay in the fact that he did not understand or build socialism from books, but from the practice of socialist construction in Russia. At the beginning of the establishment of the Soviet regime, Lenin emphasized: "The time for debating socialist programs based on books has passed," and "Today one can only speak of socialism based on experience." In the article "On Cooperation," written shortly before his death, Lenin summarized: "We have to admit that our entire view of socialism has fundamentally changed." It can be said that the NEP was a vivid portrayal of Lenin proceeding from practice and exploring how to build socialism according to the development of the times. Specifically, one of the crucial reasons why the Lenin-led RKP(b) continued to implement War Communism after the end of the Civil War—and even tended to normalize it—was that the policy’s emphasis on nationalization, planned economy, and the elimination of commodity-money relations was consistent with the main aspects of Marx and Engels' vision of socialism. This led Russian Communists, including Lenin, to believe at one point that they could transition more quickly to socialism through this policy. Regarding this, Lenin candidly admitted: "At that time, we assumed that the peasants would deliver the required quantity of grain according to the surplus-appropriation system, and we would distribute this grain to the factories; in this way, we would be implementing communist production and distribution." But things did not turn out as intended; the result of this approach was that the RKP(b) faced a severe economic and political crisis. This cruel reality made Lenin realize that "when the situation has changed and we must complete another kind of task, we cannot look backward and attempt to solve problems using yesterday’s methods." Here, Lenin proposed an extremely important principle: Communists must advance with the times and be adept at determining the lines, principles, and policies that adapt to the new requirements of the situation and the new expectations of the masses, based on the development of the times and the new circumstances and tasks facing the Party.
Based on a profound reflection on the policy of wartime communism, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) began to implement the New Economic Policy (NEP). In Lenin's mind, implementing the NEP was a correction of past erroneous practices regarding the construction of socialism, and a new exploration and attempt at how socialism should be built. He stated: "We are now correcting many of our mistakes with the 'New Economic Policy'; we are learning how to continue building the socialist edifice in a small-peasant country without making these mistakes." From the primary content of the NEP—including the implementation of the tax in kind, the development of state capitalism through forms such as concessions and leasing, and the restoration of currency and commodity exchange—it is evident that both the development of state capitalism and the allowance of free trade and commodity-money relations constituted major theoretical breakthroughs and practical innovations achieved by Lenin in solving the practical difficulties of socialist construction in Russia. After all, according to Marxist theory, the historical mission of Communists is to abolish capitalism and realize socialism. Future socialism was envisioned as a society devoid of commodity-money relations; thus, the NEP's allowance for the development of capitalism and commodity exchange was undoubtedly unprecedented. Precisely because of traditional conceptions of socialism, the NEP encountered considerable ideological resistance and theoretical challenges both inside and outside the Party. Many held attitudes of strong skepticism, worry, or even fierce opposition toward the NEP’s allowance of capitalism and commodity exchange. Some old Bolsheviks, out of simple socialist sentiments, wept bitterly, believing that implementing the NEP meant practicing capitalism. Others expressed severe lack of understanding regarding allowing foreign capital into Soviet Russia, asking: "We drove out our own exploiters, and now we are inviting foreign exploiters back in—how can this be?" Still others said, "Is it not dangerous to invite capitalists to Russia? Does this not mean developing capitalism?" and "Capitalism is a bane, socialism is a blessing," and so forth. Furthermore, political factions that treated Marxism with dogmatism accused Lenin of heterodoxy and of betraying Marxism by implementing the NEP. What was truly commendable is that Lenin was not shackled by these misunderstandings or even reproaches, nor was he confined to the formulas found in books. Instead, proceeding from practice, he had the courage to admit his past cognitive errors and, with immense theoretical courage and a high sense of historical responsibility, decisively implemented the New Economic Policy. It can be said with full certainty that the implementation and advancement of the NEP were the results of Lenin’s continuous liberation of the mind and innovation of socialist theory regarding the questions of "what is socialism" and "how to build socialism." Regarding this, Lenin also remarked: "This situation is unprecedented in history... it has not been explored in any theory or any work... not a single book has been written about state capitalism under the communist system. Even Marx did not think to write a single word on this subject."
Faced with the realistic difficulties in the practice of socialist construction in Soviet Russia, Lenin did not confine himself to certain ideological viewpoints and dictates of the founders of scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, nor was he hemmed in by traditional socialist concepts. Rather, starting from the socialist practice of Soviet Russia, he achieved major breakthroughs in socialist theory and practice, continuously pushing the socialist construction of Soviet Russia to new heights and domains. In other words, it was the concrete practice of socialist construction in Soviet Russia that brought about Lenin's new breakthroughs in the understanding of socialism and innovations in Marxist theory; in turn, these breakthroughs in socialist concepts and theoretical innovations further promoted the in-depth development of practice. This remains of great significance for advancing the construction of Chinese-path socialism in the New Era. Because the breadth and depth of the social changes and developments in the present age have far exceeded the expectations of the classical Marxist writers, we must not be confined to the templates of socialist blueprints envisioned by them when conducting socialist construction. General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly pointed out: "Marxism must develop continuously along with the development of the times, practice, and science; it cannot remain stagnant. Socialism has always advanced through pioneering." This means that in building Chinese-path socialism, we must also learn from Lenin's innovative spirit of proceeding from practice rather than from books. As General Secretary Xi Jinping demanded, we "must have a developmental perspective, must center on the practical problems of our country's reform, opening up, and modernization and on the things we are currently doing, focusing on the application of Marxist theory, the theoretical reflection on practical problems, and on new practices and new developments."
III. To be adept at viewing problems from a political perspective, one must ensure that no political dangers or political errors occur
Being adept at viewing problems from a political perspective was a distinctive trait of Lenin as a great statesman. As early as the initial period of Party building, Lenin emphasized that Social Democrats must view problems politically and exert the Party's role in providing political leadership to the workers' movement. The transition of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) from wartime communism to the New Economic Policy concentratedly reflected his high degree of political sensitivity, keen political judgment, and his ability to view problems from a political perspective and grasp the overall political situation. At the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B), while the Kronstadt [3] rebellion was underway, Lenin clearly pointed out that while there was no doubt the incident would soon be suppressed, "we must link this situation to various crises, consider it cautiously from a political perspective, and analyze it carefully." Through a comprehensive assessment of the many slogans shouted by the sailors—such as "freedom of trade," "Soviets without Bolsheviks," and getting rid of the "Party dictatorship"—Lenin keenly realized that this rebellion was a concentrated explosion of the peasants' severe dissatisfaction with the policy of wartime communism. Lenin warned the whole Party: hostile forces were using the hardships this policy caused in the peasants' lives to incite them against the RCP(B). The suffering peasants, under the relentless agitation of the bourgeoisie, had already developed centrifugal tendencies toward the Party. "All this will lead directly to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is to say, to the restoration of capitalism and the old regime of landlords and capitalists. This political danger now exists." Based on this recognition of the political danger facing the Party, Lenin made a swift and accurate judgment of the political situation: "In the spring of 1921, a political situation took shape that demanded immediate, rapid, most resolute, and most urgent measures to improve the living conditions of the peasants and increase their productive forces."
On the basis of correctly judging the political situation facing the Party, Lenin led the Soviet government to decisively begin the transition from wartime communism to the NEP, emphasizing that this transition was "first and foremost a political issue, because the essence of this issue lies in how the working class treats the peasantry." In Lenin’s view, for the RCP(B) governing a country where peasants constituted the majority of the population, the most fundamental problem was how to correctly handle the relationship between the working class and the peasant class and win the political support of the peasants. He said: "Our Party relies on two classes; therefore, if these two classes cannot harmonize, the Party may become unstable, and its collapse would be inevitable." Yet Lenin also soberly realized that the interests of the peasantry and the working class were different. As small private owners, peasants were not naturally inclined toward socialism. Therefore, to win the firm political support of the peasants for the proletarian ruling party, it was necessary to establish a combination [4] of economic interests between the working class and the peasant class. Regarding this, Lenin pointed out at the very beginning of the Soviet government that the consolidation of Soviet power "must be implemented through the sincere union of workers and peasants on the basis of common interests." In fact, it was precisely because the RCP(B) led by Lenin implemented the policy of distributing land to the peasants after the victory of the October Revolution that the peasants provided their own rations to support the RCP(B) during the Civil War; they did not want the Soviet government led by the RCP(B) to be defeated, which would result in losing the land they had gained. This means that the relationship between the peasants and the proletariat and its party, the RCP(B), during the Civil War was actually a political-military alliance with land as the bond. However, because this political-military alliance came at the expense of the peasants' interests, it was also limited. Lenin remarked: "They have been hungry for three years, but they cannot go on being hungry for four or five years. When hungry, political activism is naturally greatly affected." Lenin was emphasizing here that if the RCP(B) could not satisfy the peasants' economic interests and establish an economic bond with them, it would be impossible to obtain their firm political support. In Lenin's eyes, "the entire significance of the New Economic Policy lies in one thing and one thing only: finding the bond between the new economy we have built with great effort and the peasant economy." This bond directly determined the peasants' political attitude toward the Party: "Either we can prove this, or we will be driven away by the peasants." It is in this sense that Lenin said: "Politics is the relationship between classes—this determines the fate of the Republic." Based on this, Lenin emphasized: "The proletariat, as a leading class and a ruling class, should be adept at guiding politics so as to first solve the most urgent and 'troublesome' tasks. The most urgent task now is to adopt measures that can immediately increase the economic productive forces of the peasants. Only through such measures can we improve the living conditions of the workers while consolidating the worker-peasant alliance and the dictatorship of the proletariat."
On the other hand, during the implementation of the NEP, Lenin also clearly put forward the important thesis that "political dangers and political errors must not occur." At the end of 1920, as the Soviet government shifted from military war to economic construction, Lenin proposed that the militarized leadership methods must be changed and workers' democracy implemented. However, this was met with strong opposition from Trotsky [5] and others. Trotsky and his faction advocated for the rapid nationalization of trade unions and provoked fierce debate within the whole Party on this issue, leading to the formation of eight political factions and developing into serious factional activities. Lenin believed that if this situation were allowed to continue, it would "develop into a serious split sufficient to shake and destroy the entire political edifice," and "then this disagreement would be politically dangerous." Trotsky not only turned a deaf ear to Lenin's criticism but also accused Lenin of viewing problems only politically and not economically. He quoted words Lenin had once said to attack him, claiming that at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, Lenin had said "we should engage in less politics and more economics, yet on the trade union issue, he puts the political aspect of the problem first."
Lenin believed that Trotsky's accusation seriously severed and opposed economics and politics, emphasizing: "Politics is a concentrated expression of economics," and "A class cannot maintain its rule, and therefore cannot fulfill its production tasks, if it does not view problems correctly from a political perspective." In response to Trotsky's attack, Lenin pointed out sharply: "I wished in the past, wish now, and shall wish in the future that we engage in less politics and more economics. But it is not difficult to understand that to realize this wish, political dangers and political errors must not occur." "If we make political mistakes, the entire economic construction will suffer setbacks, and we will then have to argue about correcting errors and determining the course." In Lenin's view, the syndicalist [6] and anarchist tendencies exposed by Trotsky and the "Workers' Opposition" were "a clear departure from the Party and from communism," and were therefore "major political errors and a direct political danger threatening the very existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat." At the Party's Tenth Congress, Lenin further pointed out that if the syndicalist and anarchist tendencies exacerbated by Trotsky and the "Workers' Opposition" were allowed to run wild, they would inevitably weaken the unity of will of the proletarian vanguard and deepen the Party split. This would inevitably lead to the situation where "the leading, educational, and organizational role of the Party toward the proletarian trade unions, as well as the role of the proletariat toward the semi-petty-bourgeois and even petty-bourgeois laboring masses, would be set aside and abolished." "As long as the unity, strength, and influence of the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat are even slightly weakened, the result of such vacillation can only be the restoration (recovery) of the power of capitalists and landlords and of private ownership." Based on this political judgment, at the Tenth Congress, while making the decision to implement the NEP, Lenin also passed a resolution strictly prohibiting factional activities within the Party. The purpose was to ensure that the Party "leads the proletariat politically, and through the proletariat leads the entire laboring masses. Without this, the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be realized."
Practice has shown that because Lenin led the RCP(B) to exert a correct role of political leadership during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period, factional activities triggered by fierce internal party debates over issues such as trade unions were effectively curtailed, achieving a unity of will within the Party regarding the NEP. With the implementation of the NEP, industrial and agricultural production grew rapidly, the people's standard of living significantly improved, and the severe crisis of identity facing the Party was fundamentally overcome. Regarding this, Lenin remarked: "The state of affairs today is such that we need not fear any activity on their part against us." This powerfully demonstrates that political initiative is the most advantageous form of initiative, while political passivity is the most dangerous form of passivity. Currently, the world is undergoing great changes unseen in a century, and the nation is at a critical period for realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. The various internal and external risks and challenges facing our country's development are unprecedented. This requires, more than ever, that leading cadres at all levels of the Party take "stressing politics" as a fundamental requirement, earnestly improving their ability to grasp the overall political situation, analyze problems from a political perspective, and prevent or resolve political risks. It is undeniable that some Party members and cadres have not yet transformed "stressing politics" from an external requirement into an internal initiative; their political consciousness still needs further strengthening, and their political acumen and ability to observe and handle problems from a political standpoint require further improvement. It is precisely based on this background that General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized that political issues are major issues concerning orientation, the overall situation, strategy, and fundamentals. We must strengthen the Party's political leadership and comprehensively enhance the Party's political leadership capacity. This requires the whole Party to consciously respond to General Secretary Xi Jinping's call, transform the clear-cut stance of "stressing politics" into an internal initiative, strive to enhance political consciousness, become adept at looking at problems from a political perspective, grasp the overall political situation, and continuously improve their capacity for political judgment, political understanding, and political execution.
IV. Utilizing Capitalism to Build Socialism: Making the Russia of the NEP into a Socialist Russia
Implementing the NEP meant allowing the existence of capitalist elements within Soviet Russian socialist construction. Many people, both inside and outside the Party, could not wrap their minds around this and found it emotionally difficult to accept. The reason they could not understand it was not a question of whether these measures were conducive to the development of productive forces and the improvement of the lives of the workers and peasants—for these were easily demonstrated by visible and tangible facts. The crux of the problem was whether capitalism should be developed under the conditions of Communist Party rule, and whether allowing capitalism to develop would harm the socialism pursued by Communists. Faced with these misgivings, how to reach a consensus inside and outside the Party on the necessity of allowing capitalist elements within a socialist regime, and how to prevent the concerns of the vast number of Party members and cadres from becoming a reality in practice, were the dual challenges—theoretical and practical—facing the RCP(B) led by Lenin.
Regarding this, Lenin first provided a large amount of targeted theoretical explanation in documents such as The Tax in Kind, justifying the NEP’s allowance for capitalist development. Addressing the sentiment that best represented people's psychological hang-up—that "capitalism is an evil and socialism is a blessing"—Lenin argued that this merely extracted capitalism and socialism as two structures from the sum total of all existing socio-economic structures in Russia and opposed them abstractly, without considering the objective reality that Russia was primarily a small-peasant economy. In Lenin’s view, capitalism compared to socialism is of course an evil, but relative to the vast ocean of small-scale production [7] existing in Russia, it was a blessing. This was because without utilizing capitalism as an "intermediary link," it would be impossible to change Russia's backward state of productive forces, let alone move toward socialism. Based on this, Lenin emphasized: "We must utilize capitalism (particularly by directing it into the channels of state capitalism) as the intermediary link between small production and socialism, as a means, a path, and a method of increasing the productive forces." He further argued that "to attempt to completely prohibit or block the development of all private, non-state exchange, i.e., the development of trade, i.e., the development of capitalism... would be a folly and suicide. It would be a folly because such a policy is economically impossible, and it would be suicide because the party that tries to implement such a policy would inevitably meet with failure." Addressing the "evil" side of capitalism and people’s worries and misgivings about its development, Lenin pointed out: "If it is said to be ugly or bad, we can transform it, because the state power is in our hands and we have nothing to fear."
On the other hand, it should also be noted that Lenin did not turn a deaf ear to the concerns of some within the Party that allowing capitalist elements under the NEP might harm the future of socialism; rather, he took these concerns quite seriously. After all, even political forces opposed to the RCP(B), such as the "Smena Vekh" [8] group, believed that the Bolsheviks' NEP was "not a tactic but an evolution, an internal degeneration; they will certainly move toward an ordinary bourgeois state, and we should support them. History leads to the same goal by different paths." In response to the views of the "Smena Vekh" group, Lenin responded: "Is it 'Thermidor' [9]? Looking at it soberly, perhaps it is? Will it happen? We shall see. Don't brag when going to the battlefield!" This shows that Lenin was not unaware of the potential political risks posed to the Communist Party by allowing the development of capitalism. However, he was not intimidated by the potential dangers; rather, he "went toward the mountain knowing there were tigers there" [10]. His pursuit was simply how to avoid being eaten by the tiger and how to emerge victorious when the outcome was decided. Regarding this, as Lenin stated in The Tax in Kind: "The whole problem, both theoretical and practical, is to find the correct methods of how to direct the inevitable (to a certain degree and for a certain period) development of capitalism into the channels of state capitalism; what conditions to establish for this, and how to ensure the transformation of state capitalism into socialism in the near future." Here, Lenin expressed very clearly that developing capitalism at a certain stage and to a certain extent was to prepare for the ultimate realization of socialism. Communists should master the methods and skills of managing capitalism, so that state capitalism would ultimately lead toward the struggle objective of socialism.
It must be emphasized that the reason Lenin so strongly stressed the socialist direction of development for the NEP was certainly because socialism was the goal diligently pursued by Communists, but it was also because he was well aware that capital has its own logic and nature—such as profit-seeking, blindness, and spontaneity. Developing capitalism would inevitably pose potential dangers to socialism. Lenin said: "It goes without saying that the strengthening of capitalist relations is in itself a strengthening of the danger." In fact, with the implementation of the NEP and the rapid growth of capitalist elements, the contradiction between the Communists and the bourgeoisie over "utilization and counter-utilization" became very obvious: the RCP(B) hoped the NEP would serve the realization of socialism in Soviet Russia, while the bourgeoisie wanted to use the NEP to develop capitalism and realize their goal of amassing wealth. In The New Economic Policy and the Tasks of the Political Education Departments, Lenin likened the contradiction between the RCP(B) and the capitalists formed by the implementation of the NEP to a contest more dangerous than military war. He said: "The whole question is: who will take the lead? If the capitalists organize first, they will kick out the Communists, and then there will be nothing left to talk about." This indicates that Lenin realized soberly that if Communists could not manage capitalist elements, they might lose in the contest with capitalism, and the prospects for socialism would vanish into thin air. Based precisely on this understanding, Lenin emphasized: "We must compel the bourgeoisie to work for us with their own hands, instead of letting responsible Communists occupy leadership positions with official titles but drifting along with the tide of the bourgeoisie. That is the whole essence of the matter."
The question was: did the RCP(B) possess the skill to manage state capitalism? At the Eleventh Party Congress, a year after the implementation of the NEP, Lenin noted with no small amount of anxiety: "State capitalism is the capitalism that we must confine within certain limits, but up to now we have not had the skill to confine it within those limits." He continued: "The vanguard of the working class that has been put forward does not have enough skill to directly manage, to determine the limits, to draw the boundaries, to make others submit to themselves instead of submitting to others. What is needed here is simply skill, but we lack this skill." On this basis, Lenin further pointed out that because Communists lacked the skill to manage, in terms of the NEP, "it is like an unmanageable car; someone seems to be sitting in it and driving, but the car is not going where it is being steered, but where someone else is steering it." Lenin used the vivid metaphor of an unmanageable car to show that if Communists lacked the capacity to manage the developed capitalism, they not only could not guarantee its development in the direction they desired, but would instead be led by the nose by it. In view of this, Lenin called upon the whole Party to work hard at learning economic work and engaging in economic competition with the capitalists, emphasizing that they "must do it no worse than the capitalists; otherwise, the people will not tolerate such management. That is the whole key to the issue." On November 20, 1922, in his last public speech—at the Plenary Meeting of the Moscow Soviet—Lenin again emphasized: "We must move toward socialism, but not as if it were a holy icon painted in solemn colors." Instead, it must be made so that the masses feel "this is better than the old system." We "must be adept at overcoming all the negative aspects of the NEP and reducing them to a minimum," so that "the Russia of the NEP will become socialist Russia." These discourses of Lenin undoubtedly emphasize that Communists can only win the initiative in the fierce contest with capitalists by mastering skills and capacities superior to theirs. Only then can they truly realize the goal of utilizing capitalism rather than being utilized by it, and let the people, through comparison, choose the Communist Party and socialism, thereby achieving the goal of turning "the Russia of the NEP into a socialist Russia."
The above demonstrates that the spiritual essence of Lenin’s thought on utilizing capitalism lies in serving the realization of socialism through its utilization, while remaining vigilant against the dangers of developing capitalism and ultimately transcending it. Allowing capitalist development was the path to raising the level of Soviet Russia’s backward social productive forces and ultimately realizing socialism; realizing socialism was the fundamental purpose for which the NEP allowed capitalist elements to exist. This still holds great practical significance for China today. Currently, to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation and promote the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, we still need to mobilize the enthusiasm of all factors of production. Under the current global situation where two social systems coexist, we should, on the one hand, recognize that "for a considerably long period, socialism in its primary stage must still coexist in cooperation and struggle with more developed capitalism, and must earnestly learn from and draw upon the beneficial fruits of civilization created by capitalism." On the other hand, we must maintain a clear understanding of the inevitable opposition and contradiction between capitalism and socialism as two social systems of completely different natures. We must clearly recognize capital's profit-seeking nature and also see that some Western countries are absolutely unwilling to see a socialist China grow increasingly strong, and will inevitably rack their brains and use all means to contain China’s development. Especially now, as the unprecedented great changes in the world and the COVID-19 pandemic are intertwined and overlapping, we are facing an unprecedentedly severe external environment and arduous tasks for domestic reform, development, and stability. We need more than ever to maintain strong strategic focus, "unswervingly follow the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, neither taking the old path of closed-off stagnation nor taking the evil path of changing banners" [11], so as to enable socialism with Chinese characteristics to develop better and faster on the basis of learning from, absorbing, and utilizing all the fruits of civilization created by capitalism. This will make the nation more prosperous and the people happier, continuously winning us the initiative and the advantage, and continuously building a socialism that possesses superiority over capitalism.