Liu Yudi: An Analysis of the Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System in Vietnam Since Doi Moi
Since the start of Reform and Opening-up (Đổi Mới) [1] in 1986, the Vietnamese National Assembly has consistently adopted a problem-oriented approach to strengthen its supervision of state organs and their personnel. This evolution of the supervisory system aims to prevent the spread of bourgeois liberalization [2] within Party and state organs, curb corruption, ensure the implementation of major resolutions and strategic deployments of the Party Central Committee and the spirit of the General Secretary’s important instructions, and enhance the overall effectiveness of National Assembly oversight. In Vietnam, "National Assembly supervision" (giám sát của Quốc hội) has a specific connotation: it refers to a series of tracking, reviewing, assessing, disposing, and sanctioning activities conducted by the National Assembly, its Standing Committee, the Ethnic Council, various specialized committees, National Assembly delegations, and individual deputies. These activities are carried out in accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws through methods such as questioning (interpellation), reviewing documents, thematic supervision, confidence assessments, and confidence votes against supervised agencies, organizations, and individuals. What specific supervisory measures, then, has the Vietnamese National Assembly adopted to address the aforementioned issues? And what insights do they offer? This article will sort through and analyze these questions.
I. Preventing the Spread of Bourgeois Liberalization and the Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, socialist countries in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe embarked on the path of capitalism one after another. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe delivered a massive shock to the ideology of Vietnamese Party cadres and the public. Vietnam experienced a crisis of faith in Marxism and a "deviation from the socialist direction." Phenomena such as "self-evolution" [3] and "self-transformation" [4], alongside bourgeois liberalization, began to emerge within the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and state organs. In 1989, liberal elements represented by Trần Xuân Bách—a former member of the CPV Central Committee Political Bureau and Secretariat—publicly published articles in newspapers and periodicals advocating for Vietnam to follow the Soviet and East European model by abolishing the guiding status of Marxism and implementing a multi-party system and political pluralism. Around 1998, liberal elements represented by Trần Độ, another former Politburo member, again agitated for political liberalization and a multi-party system, challenging the CPV through a "Ten-Thousand Word Petition" [5] and sparking a wave of bourgeois liberalization. In recent years, domestic liberals in Vietnam have colluded with those in exile to continue their vigorous push for "liberalization." They exploit existing problems in Vietnam to attack the current political system, advocating for, exaggerating, and romanticizing the doctrine of "separation of powers." They demand the abandonment of the CPV’s leadership and brazenly promote Western-style political democratization and multi-party systems. Under these circumstances, responding to the ideological shock caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and preventing cadres from ideologically abandoning Marxism and the socialist path became a primary task of National Assembly supervision.
To prevent the diffusion of bourgeois liberalization, the Vietnamese National Assembly first dismissed and revoked the positions and deputy statuses of individuals like Trần Xuân Bách and Trần Độ. Subsequently, it clarified its comprehensive supervisory power over all state organs and public officials elected or approved by the National Assembly. It mandated that all such personnel must accept questioning by National Assembly deputies and report their work during regular sessions. Furthermore, the legal documents and project proposals they deliberated upon and passed had to be submitted to the National Assembly for review. Before the 1986 reforms, only the Council of Ministers (renamed the Government in 1992) and its members, the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court, and the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy were subject to questioning. Only the Council of State (renamed the National Assembly Standing Committee in 1992), the Government, the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Procuracy reported their work to the National Assembly, and only their legal documents and project proposals required its review.
Since the 1986 reforms, as the number of state organs responsible to and reporting to the National Assembly has grown, and its power over personnel appointments and removals has expanded, an increasing number of state organs and public officials has come under its supervision. In April 1992, the National Assembly included the State President and the Chairperson of the National Assembly as subjects for questioning and mandated the review of the President's work reports. In May 2005, during an institutional restructuring, the State Audit Office of Vietnam (SAV) was placed under the National Assembly’s leadership; subsequently, the Auditor General was included as a subject for questioning and required to report to the National Assembly. By November 2013, the National Assembly had brought all state organs and public officials elected or approved by it under the scope of its supervision. Beyond this, it intensified its oversight. At the end of 2005, due to management failures by then-Prime Minister Phan Văn Khải, the Ministry of Transport misappropriated public funds for gambling on football matches. In September 2006, deputies conducted a concentrated questioning of Phan Văn Khải. Under pressure from the deputies, he was forced to resign, becoming the first Prime Minister in Vietnamese history to resign due to the pressure of National Assembly questioning. In June 2010, the National Assembly voted by a large margin to reject the proposal for the North-South Express Railway project led by the Government. Although the National Assembly had rejected government proposals before, this was the first time it had rejected a high-speed rail project led by the Prime Minister, the Standing Deputy Prime Minister, and several ministers.
II. Curbing Corruption and the Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System
Since the 1986 reforms, Vietnam has introduced market mechanisms into the economic sphere to stimulate vitality and increase the social productive forces. Influenced by marketization factors and compounded by the low salaries of public officials, phenomena such as "rent-seeking" and the "buying and selling of offices" appeared within the CPV and state organs. Although the CPV and the Government introduced many tough measures, corruption remained an effectively unresolved issue, becoming a "national disaster" and one of the "four dangers" [6] plaguing Vietnam's development. At the turn of the 21st century, a Deputy Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy and 19 members of the government were implicated in the "Năm Cam" (Trương Văn Cam) organized crime case, the most significant criminal case in Vietnam's history, causing massive shock to both the CPV leadership and the public. To demonstrate its determination to fight corruption to the people, the CPV formulated an anti-corruption strategy focusing on "hitting tigers" [7]. In response to the domestic anti-corruption situation, the National Assembly also began to formulate and implement supervisory measures specifically targeting high-ranking senior cadres. It gradually shifted its focus to the "few among the key few" [8] among senior leadership, intensifying oversight to "strike the mountain to shake the tiger" (achieve a deterrent effect) [9].
In December 2001, the National Assembly decided for the first time to conduct confidence votes on all senior officials it elected or approved, with the results determining whether those officials should be dismissed. However, due to various complex factors, the National Assembly failed to organize these votes at that time. In 2010, poor government management led to massive losses at the Vietnam Shipbuilding Industry Group (Vinashin), the country's largest state-owned shipbuilding enterprise, causing enormous economic damage to the state. After the 11th National Congress of the CPV in January 2011, calls from National Assembly deputies to hold a confidence vote on then-Prime Minister Nguyễn Tấn Dũng intensified. Ultimately, due to his status as a member of the CPV Central Committee Politburo and other factors, the National Assembly was unable to conduct the vote. To reduce resistance, the National Assembly promulgated Vietnam's first "Resolution on Confidence Assessments and Confidence Votes for Persons Holding Positions Elected or Approved by the National Assembly or People's Councils" in November 2012, providing a legal basis for the process. This resolution limited the subjects of confidence votes to the State President and Vice President, the National Assembly Chairperson and Vice Chairpersons, the Chairperson of the Ethnic Council and Directors of specialized committees, other members of the National Assembly Standing Committee, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers, ministers and other members of the Government, the Chief Justice of the Supreme People’s Court, the Prosecutor General of the Supreme People’s Procuracy, and the Auditor General. Subsequently, the National Assembly adopted a gradualist strategy: first conducting "confidence assessments" ( lấy phiếu tín nhiệm) for all these officials, and then deciding whether to proceed to "confidence votes" (bỏ phiếu tín nhiệm) based on those results. The National Assembly conducted these assessments in June 2013 and November 2014. Since no senior official's assessment met the criteria for a formal confidence vote, no votes were held, and no senior official was dismissed.
To achieve the desired oversight of senior leadership and improve efficiency, the National Assembly amended the 2012 resolution and the "Law on Oversight Activities of the National Assembly" in November 2014 and November 2015. Specifically, "other members of the National Assembly Standing Committee" and "ministers and other members of the Government" were changed to "members of the National Assembly Standing Committee" and "heads of ministerial-level agencies of the Government." Consequently, the positions subject to confidence assessments and votes were reduced to about 50, further concentrating the focus on the core senior leadership.
III. Implementing the Strategic Decisions of the CPV Central Committee and the Reform of the National Assembly Supervision System
As the leading force and core of Vietnamese state and society, the CPV emphasizes the need to resolutely uphold the core position of the General Secretary in the Central Committee and the whole Party, and to safeguard the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Central Committee. It aims to integrate the Party and State’s major resolutions, strategic deployments, and the spirit of the General Secretary’s instructions into the construction of a modern socialist industrial nation. In practice, however, some regions, departments, and units in Vietnam have failed to align themselves properly with the Central Committee. Lacking political awareness, awareness of the big picture, core awareness, and responsibility awareness [10], they have implemented decisions in ways that are inconsistent with reality, hesitant, incomplete, or diluted. Therefore, beginning with the Ninth National Assembly, the body intensified its thematic supervision (giám sát chuyên đề) over the implementation efforts of relevant regions, departments, and units.
To effectively implement thematic supervision, the National Assembly stipulated that, with the exception of activities conducted by individual deputies, most thematic supervision by the National Assembly, its Standing Committee, the Ethnic Council, specialized committees, and deputy delegations must be carried out by specifically established "thematic supervision teams." To realize the democratization and scientific rigor of these activities and ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, the National Assembly further mandated that these teams must comprise members from the aforementioned bodies as well as representatives of the public.
For a long time, the National Assembly's special oversight teams [11] have primarily implemented special oversight activities through the following forms. First, by deliberating on the work reports of oversight subjects to evaluate their achievements, existing problems, and underlying causes in implementing the important resolutions, major strategic decisions, and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State, as well as the important instructions and comments of the Party General Secretary. For example, to inspect Kon Tum Province’s implementation of policies and laws supporting education development in ethnic minority and mountainous areas from 2010 to 2017, the National Assembly’s Council on Ethnic Minorities dispatched a special oversight team in March 2018. They held a special oversight meeting in Kon Tum, deliberated on the provincial People’s Committee’s implementation report, comprehensively evaluated achievements and deficiencies, and proposed specific recommendations. Second, field investigations. To conduct in-depth oversight of the activities of oversight subjects, special oversight teams frequently dispatch oversight subgroups to the departments, agencies, or localities where the subjects are located to conduct field research and inspections. For instance, to obtain information on the nationwide implementation of policies and laws regarding school establishment, investment, and ensuring the quality of higher education training, the National Assembly Standing Committee’s special oversight team conducted three field surveys in Northern, Central-Highland, and Southern Vietnam during the first five months of 2010; they also dispatched three oversight subgroups to conduct in-depth investigations of 51 higher education institutions nationwide. Third, organizing seminars and discussion forums. To solicit more suggestions and opinions from relevant organizations and individuals, special oversight teams often organize seminars involving scientists, experts, National Assembly delegates, and relevant organizations. For example, between October 2014 and October 2015, during a special oversight process regarding land management in state-owned agricultural and forestry farms nationwide from 2004 to 2014, the National Assembly Standing Committee’s special oversight team organized seminars on forestry and agricultural land in Yen Bai City and Buon Ma Thuot City, respectively.
In implementing special oversight activities, the National Assembly's special oversight teams frequently cooperate with relevant organizations to obtain information and documents related to the subjects and content of the oversight. For example, from June 2016 to May 2017, during the special oversight of the nationwide implementation of food safety policies and laws (2011–2016), the National Assembly and its special oversight teams collaborated with 21 provinces and centrally-governed municipalities representing the Northern, Central-Highland, and Southern regions, 210 surveyed food production and processing enterprises, and the Ministries of Health, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Industry and Trade responsible for food safety management. They required these entities to provide documents and reports on the implementation of food safety policies across the country. Additionally, to clarify issues related to oversight content, special oversight teams actively organize "explanation meetings" involving other relevant organizations. For instance, during the special oversight of land management in state-owned farms (2004–2014), the National Assembly Standing Committee and its special oversight team organized an explanation meeting in August 2015 attended by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the Ministry of Finance, and the Government Inspectorate. At this meeting, representatives from these departments explained and clarified the State's responsibilities in guiding and implementing land management policies, as well as responsibilities in the effective management and use of land by farms and forestry management boards. In practice, cooperation between special oversight teams and relevant organizations has both improved the efficiency of oversight activities and provided important information and technical support for the teams to scientifically deliberate on and evaluate the activities of oversight subjects.
IV. Ineffective Oversight and Reform of the National Assembly Oversight System
Prior to the 1986 Doi Moi [12] (Renovation and Opening-up), although the Vietnamese National Assembly possessed statutory oversight powers, these powers lacked effective operational mechanisms and were essentially a mere formality. The 6th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam in December 1986 pointed out these issues incisively, emphasizing the need to separate the Party from the government, elevate the status and role of the National Assembly, and strengthen the effectiveness of its oversight. Since the 21st century, while the National Assembly's status has continuously risen, its oversight effectiveness remains suboptimal, and it lacks powerful measures when performing oversight functions. For example, regarding the deliberation of work reports, the National Assembly focuses excessively on the achievements of specialized committees and the "One Government and Two Courts" [13] (and other state organs) while neglecting their problems and deficiencies. Regarding inquiries and responses, inquiry sessions are relatively short; many delegates who register to ask questions are unable to do so, and the responses from those questioned are often insufficiently deep to provide concrete, feasible measures for resolving the issues. Regarding special oversight, the Council on Ethnic Minorities and specialized committees face heavy workloads, and the "post-oversight" mechanism remains imperfect. In terms of confidence evaluations [14], the procedures are cumbersome and the tasks are heavy. In practice, to improve oversight effectiveness, the Vietnamese National Assembly has primarily adopted the following measures.
First, actively promoting flexible and efficient "interactive" forms of oversight. Regarding inquiries, in November 2010, the National Assembly shifted from its previous practice of asking isolated questions to categorizing questions by nature and conducting inquiries in thematic groups. In November 2016, a debate format was introduced into inquiry activities, allowing delegates to engage in live debate with the personnel being questioned. In June 2018, a "quick-fire question and answer" format was implemented, emphasizing that "asking" is a form of prodding and focusing on the quality of questions, while the "answer" represents the commitment, accountability, and responsibility of leading officials; it was stipulated that each delegate’s question must not exceed one minute, and the respondent’s answer is limited to three minutes. In 2019, speech-to-text software was introduced during inquiries to rapidly summarize results. In the deliberation of work reports, the National Assembly changed the traditional format in 2009—where delegates merely discussed reports and offered suggestions—to allowing delegates to engage in direct debate and dialogue with the heads of relevant state organs. For example, on the morning of May 28, 2020, during the deliberation of a work report, 14 delegates offered opinions on the Economic Committee's report regarding the draft Law on Investment; the Minister of Planning and Investment explained relevant issues, and seven delegates engaged in live debate. Regarding special oversight, as matters become increasingly complex, the National Assembly actively dispatches special oversight teams for field research and in-depth inspections at the local level to "seek policy advice from the people" [15], listening to the evaluations of grassroots public officials and citizens from multiple perspectives. In practice, the use of interactive oversight forms such as discussion, debate, dialogue, and field research has created an open, democratic, and innovative atmosphere, helping the National Assembly to "prescribe the right medicine for the disease" and thus reach comprehensive, scientific, and realistic oversight conclusions.
Second, continuously specifying and refining the operational procedures of oversight activities to fill gaps and improve flaws in the oversight mechanism. In terms of National Assembly inquiries, the basic procedure has long been for delegates to ask and the questioned to answer. To enhance the sense of responsibility within the government and its agencies and to thoroughly clarify issues raised by delegates, in November 2009, the National Assembly for the first time arranged for the Prime Minister to explain questions and accept inquiries after all other respondents had finished. In November 2010, a new link was added allowing heads of relevant government departments and agencies to further explain questions and participate in responding. In October 2018, another link was added for the Chairperson of the National Assembly to accept inquiries from delegates after the Prime Minister's session ended. Regarding confidence evaluations, to clarify issues and enable delegates to express confidence levels more objectively and fairly, the National Assembly in November 2014 arranged a link for delegate groups to discuss issues with the persons being evaluated after the list of names is approved but before the voting takes place. In practice, these Vietnamese practices have made oversight procedures and mechanisms increasingly specific, scientific, democratic, and standardized, significantly improving the effectiveness and quality of oversight activities.
V. Inspirations from the Reform of Vietnam’s National Assembly Oversight System
After more than 30 years of reform, although the aforementioned issues have not been completely resolved, Vietnamese National Assembly oversight has played a very important role, and the oversight system has become increasingly sophisticated, becoming an indispensable part of the power oversight system of the Vietnamese Party and State. As an important component of the world socialist movement, Vietnam's practice in reforming the National Assembly oversight system demonstrates that under current complex international and domestic situations, socialist countries should—on the premise of adhering to the Marxist theory of the state and based on following the general and specific laws of socialist democratic politics—gradually reform the oversight systems of state organs of power. Specifically, the following points should be achieved.
(1) Stress and tap into the role of people's representatives, giving full play to their initiative, proactivity, and creativity in the oversight activities of state organs of power. As members of the state organs of power, the participation of people's representatives directly determines the effectiveness of oversight. Furthermore, as a bridge between the masses and state organs such as the government, courts, and procuratorates, representatives can promptly identify problems in the performance of duties through the masses and then conduct targeted oversight to urge rapid resolution. Therefore, representatives hold a vital position, and their agency must be fully leveraged. In its oversight activities, the Vietnamese National Assembly encourages and supports delegates in engaging in dialogue, discussion, and debate with oversight subjects. For example, during the 7th and 8th sessions of the 14th National Assembly in June and October 2019, the number of inquiries reached 230 and 250 person-times respectively, accounting for half of the total number of delegates. Vietnam's approach has greatly enhanced the democratic, open, and professional nature of oversight activities. Deputies to China's People's Congresses can also play a greater role in oversight activities, giving better play to their initiative, proactivity, and creativity where conditions permit.
(2) Focus on and strengthen the coordination and synergy between various oversight subjects and mechanisms to form a "joint force of oversight"...
The interconnectedness of all things makes the entire world a dynamic and complex macro-system, in which various elements within the system are organically linked to promote the realization of systemic functions. The supervisory system of the state power organ is an organic and open system composed of multiple elements—such as supervisory bodies, people's representatives, and supervisory mechanisms—which are relatively independent yet mutually influential. Therefore, the maximized realization of the supervisory function of the state power organ's system depends not only on relatively independent and diversified supervisory subjects and mechanisms but also on the mutual coordination and cooperation between them. In the process of implementing supervisory activities, the National Assembly of Vietnam places great emphasis on the synergistic cooperation between various congressional supervisory bodies, deputies, and mechanisms. For example, during the National Assembly's review of work reports, the reports of relevant state organs must first undergo vetting by the Ethnic Council or relevant specialized committees, then be deliberated upon by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly, and finally be reviewed by the full National Assembly. Furthermore, to facilitate communication and coordination in supervisory work, the various specialized committees of the National Assembly have established networks for sharing supervisory information and resources. At present, we should adhere to the principle of "combining unity and division" [16] to promote the reform of the supervisory system of the National People's Congress (NPC). On one hand, it is necessary to clarify the power-responsibility relationships and functional division of labor among supervisory subjects such as the Standing Committee of the NPC and various specialized committees, so as to avoid instances of redundant supervision or supervisory gaps. On the other hand, we must strengthen the collaborative governance, integration, and mutual embedding among various supervisory subjects, while enhancing the organic interaction and coordination between different supervisory mechanisms. This will allow for complementary advantages and synergistic linkage, forming a normalized and multi-layered supervisory network to improve the supervisory effectiveness of the NPC.
(3) Optimize and improve supervisory systems and mechanisms to ensure the state power organ's supervisory system becomes a true "sharp sword" in the anti-corruption struggle.
Based on its significant function in purifying the political ecosystem, the supervisory system of the state power organ serves as an important tool for socialist countries to prevent and combat corruption. Consequently, an authoritative and complete supervisory system and mechanism provide an important guarantee for the state power organ to improve the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts. In practice, state power organs should observe and summarize new changes in corrupt phenomena in real-time. Based on the developmental characteristics of corruption at different stages, they should continuously optimize and improve preventive mechanisms—such as ex-ante review and investigative mechanisms; corrective mechanisms—such as mid-process supervision and criticism mechanisms; and punitive mechanisms—such as ex-post accountability and recall mechanisms. By patching the loopholes and defects in the supervisory system, they can raise the levels of procedural, standardized, and institutionalized combat against corruption by the state power organ. As previously mentioned, the National Assembly of Vietnam has continuously improved its inquiry mechanisms and special thematic supervision mechanisms during its supervisory activities, making the National Assembly’s supervisory system increasingly scientific.
At present, China has provided comprehensive institutional protection for the NPC to combat corruption through fundamental, basic, and important systems. However, in response to complex situations such as major cases and corruption where political and economic issues are intertwined, we need to build upon our institutional strengths to "construct a system and mechanism where officials do not dare, cannot, and have no desire to be corrupt" [17]. We must continue to improve the procedures and operating mechanisms of the NPC’s supervisory systems—including the system of inquiries, the review of work reports, and punitive systems—to ultimately enhance the efficacy of the NPC’s supervisory system in the anti-corruption struggle.
In summary, after more than 30 years of reform, the supervisory effectiveness of the National Assembly of Vietnam has steadily improved, and its supervisory system has become increasingly refined. It has played an increasingly important role in preventing the spread of the trend of bourgeois liberalization [18], curbing corruption, and implementing the important resolutions, major strategic decisions, and deployments of the Party Central Committee and the State, as well as the spirit of the General Secretary’s important instructions and comments. As a fellow socialist country, the primary measures of the National Assembly of Vietnam's supervisory system reform are worthy of our reflection and study.