Yang Jianmin: The Current Development Status and Prospects of the Latin American Left
Starting from Hugo Chávez's accession to power in Venezuela in 1999, Latin American leftist parties rose one after another, winning successive general elections and setting off a "pink tide." At the 2005 World Social Forum, Hugo Chávez announced the final miscarriage of the US-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) plan. At one point, the land area of countries governed by Latin American leftist parties reached 71.8% of the region, with a population accounting for 53.8% of the regional total. Since 2015, the Latin American political landscape has rapidly transitioned from a "leftist retreat and rightist advance" to a stage of "mutual advances and retreats for both left and right" and "co-governance of the left and right." As Brazil is still governed by the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro, the right wing still maintains an advantage in the region's political landscape; however, the left has taken power in Mexico for the first time in 40 years, expanding into a space that was never reached even at the height of the "pink tide." The COVID-19 pandemic since 2020 has prompted the Latin American public to reflect on neoliberal policies, which is conducive to the left gathering strength and expanding its space. Yet currently, Latin American leftist forces are severely fragmented and face major issues such as strengthening unity and continuing to explore alternatives to neoliberalism after taking office.
I. The Latin American Political Landscape: From "Leftist Retreat and Rightist Advance" to "Co-governance of the Left and Right"
Even during the surging development period of the "pink tide" before 2015, the struggle between the Latin American left and right never ceased; rather, it ran through the entire process of the tide’s rise, development, and decline, and continues to this day. Even at the height of leftist development, the right wing continuously launched offensives against the left, forming a tug-of-war in some countries. In 2001, traditional right-wing forces in Venezuela launched massive demonstrations against the reform plans of the Chávez government, causing social unrest, a serious decline in oil production, and economic recession. On April 12, 2002, the Venezuelan opposition also instigated a coup, kidnapping Chávez to a small island. The United States participated in and promoted the occurrence of the coup; it was only with the support of the Venezuelan Air Force that Chávez returned to the presidential palace three days later to continue governing. In 2009, the government of the Honduran leftist José Manuel Zelaya sought re-election and promoted a national referendum, but the Supreme Court—influenced by US-promoted judicial reforms—ruled the referendum invalid. Right-wing military personnel supported the Supreme Court's decision, and Zelaya was forced into exile. In 2012, the Paraguayan right wing launched a "parliamentary coup," accusing the leftist president Fernando Lugo—who had helped landless peasants acquire land—of mishandling an illegal land occupation case involving peasants. Lugo was impeached and removed from office, and the right-wing Colorado Party, which had previously ruled for 61 consecutive years, returned to power and remains there today.
With the defeat of Argentina's leftist Front for Victory (Justice Party) in the general election and the loss of the Venezuelan leftist governing party—the United Socialist Party of Venezuela—in parliamentary elections in 2015, the Latin American political landscape began to show a trend of "leftist retreat and rightist advance." In 2016, President Dilma Rousseff of the Brazilian Workers' Party was impeached and removed from office, and a new cabinet dominated by the center-right was formed; in December 2017, the Chilean leftist coalition lost the election, and the center-right Sebastián Piñera was elected president. By this point, the right wing occupied a dominant position in the Latin American political landscape. In August 2017, the Lima Group—composed of Canada and Latin American countries governed by the right, such as Peru and Brazil—exerted pressure on Venezuela. After Nicolás Maduro was re-elected president of Venezuela in 2018, the United States and the Lima Group did not recognize the election results and demanded new elections. Mercosur, dominated by right-wing countries such as Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, suspended Venezuela's membership citing "democracy clauses," and only due to the insistence of Uruguay (then governed by the left) was the effective date of the resolution postponed by three months. At that time, the five largest economies in Latin America—Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile—were all under right-wing rule. The Latin American political pendulum shifted rapidly to the right, and Cuba and Venezuela faced unprecedented pressure in the international environment. Jorge Castañeda, the former Foreign Minister of Mexico, published an article claiming that "the Latin American left is dead."
However, the "leftist retreat and rightist advance" situation in the Latin American political landscape lasted only three years (2015–2018) before new changes favorable to the left began to occur. The Latin American right, which had only just risen after 2015, soon encountered new failures; in particular, right-wing presidents such as Sebastián Piñera of Chile, Iván Duque Márquez of Colombia, and Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil are undergoing the tests of social protests and election campaigns. In May 2018, the center-left Carlos Alvarado won the general election in Costa Rica. In July of the same year, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the candidate of the Mexican leftist National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), was elected president. The party leaped to become the largest political party in Mexico, breaking the long-standing political landscape of the "tripartite confrontation" between the left, center, and right represented by the Party of the Democratic Revolution, the Institutional Revolutionary Party, and the National Action Party; it also marked the first time a leftist party governed Mexico in 40 years. In October 2019, the Argentine leftist Justice Party candidate Alberto Fernández won the general election, bringing the left back to power after a four-year hiatus. In October 2020, only one year after former Bolivian President Evo Morales went into exile due to allegations of election manipulation by the Organization of American States and others, the "Movement for Socialism" (MAS) made a strong comeback, securing victory in the first round of a "transparent general election." Its candidates, Luis Arce (Minister of Economy and Public Finance during the Morales government) and David Choquehuanca (Minister of Foreign Affairs), were elected president and vice president respectively. The left resumed governance in Bolivia, and Morales returned from Argentina to continue serving as the chairman of the governing party. While serving as Minister of Economy, Arce had organized and implemented the nation's land distribution and nationalization policies. After taking office on November 8, 2020, Arce pledged to make poverty reduction a major task. In the October 2020 Chilean national referendum, 78% of the public voted in favor of amending the Pinochet-era constitution to include contents such as increasing health guarantees, improving education, and promoting equality. In December 2020, the Venezuelan leftist governing party also won a majority of more than two-thirds in the parliamentary elections, while the opposition was in a state of disintegration. All of these indicate that the strength of the left is further rebounding and expanding.
II. The COVID-19 Pandemic is Conducive to the Continued Expansion of Leftist Forces
First, as the COVID-19 pandemic continued to spread in Latin America in 2021, it intensified public concerns over issues such as economic recession, poverty, corruption, insecurity, and the lack of job opportunities. Latin American governments not only failed to respond effectively to these issues, but right-wing policies—including the reduction of health sector spending—demonstrated their full negative impact in the context of the pandemic, exacerbating social inequality. At the same time, hit by the pandemic, Latin American countries' fiscal and tax revenues decreased significantly, and they faced risks of high inflation; yet they still had to implement proactive fiscal policies, resulting in a simultaneous rise in public and external debt. The public debt ratio rose from 57% in 2019 to 67% in 2020, with Brazil, Argentina, and El Salvador reaching as high as 101.4%, 96.7%, and 89%, respectively. Argentina experienced its ninth sovereign debt default in history in May 2020. Risks of debt crises are accumulating and may be released in a concentrated manner over the next two years. Under these circumstances, for the Latin American economy to achieve restorative growth in the post-pandemic era, it must achieve large-scale vaccination. However, as of May 2021, Latin American countries had not yet developed any vaccine, and vaccines remained a scarce commodity. (As of July 2021, among Latin American countries, only Cuba's vaccine development had reached Phase III clinical trials and begun inoculation, but its severe pandemic situation and limited production capacity made it difficult to provide vaccines to other countries.) Therefore, how to obtain vaccines and achieve equitable vaccine distribution has become an important task facing Latin American countries. Due to insufficient medical infrastructure, many governments mobilized armed forces to guarantee vaccine delivery, and every country in the region sought deals with pharmaceutical developers to obtain vaccine allocations and joined the "COVAX" program created by the World Health Organization (which seeks to provide sufficient doses for 20% of the global population and currently includes 190 participating countries). According to data from the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the number of poor and extremely poor people in Latin American countries increased by 45.4 million and 28.5 million respectively in 2020, with the total number of poor people reaching 231 million, or 37.7% of the total population.
Second, in the next two years, many Latin American countries will hold elections, and the left may continue to expand its space. The pandemic in 2020 intensified this trend; the Latin American public began to reflect on the various drawbacks of right-wing neoliberalism and once again sought a role for the government and society in economic development and distribution, which is conducive to the development and further expansion of leftist forces. In 2021, general elections were held in countries such as Ecuador (February), Peru (April), and Chile (November); in 2022, general elections will be held in Colombia, Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries. Given the performance of President Bolsonaro of Brazil, President Duque of Colombia, and President Piñera of Chile before and after the pandemic, it is expected to be difficult for them to continue seeking the presidency or win in the general elections, which objectively creates conditions for the breakthrough of the left in these countries.
In Ecuador, the first round of the presidential election was held on February 7, 2021. The candidate of the leftist "Union for Hope," Andrés Arauz, won 32.7% of the vote, while the candidate of the conservative "Creating Opportunities" (CREO) movement, Guillermo Lasso, received 19.7%, ranking second. Yaku Pérez, the candidate of the radical leftist indigenous organization—the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement—and Xavier Hervas, the candidate of the Democratic Left party, ranked third and fourth, both receiving over 15% of the vote. In the second round of elections held on April 11, 2021, Lasso eventually achieved a reversal and was elected president with a 5.08% margin. It is noteworthy that among the top four candidates in the first round of Ecuador's presidential election, three were from the left, but in the end, it was the right-wing Lasso who achieved the reversal and was elected president.
In Brazil, on March 8, 2021, Supreme Federal Court Justice Edson Fachin ruled that the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba, which had rendered the verdict in the corruption case against former President Lula da Silva in 2018, lacked jurisdiction and that the case should be transferred to a court in Brasília. In mid-April, the Supreme Court voted to uphold Fachin's ruling. Thus, Lula's political rights were restored, and he gained eligibility to participate in the October 2022 presidential election. Although the Brazilian left does not lack excellent young candidates, Lula's political legacy is irreplaceable; his charismatic leadership, political integrative power, and pragmatic policies still possess a strong appeal. Under the shadow of the current Bolsonaro government's sustained economic downturn and the out-of-control COVID-19 pandemic, Lula's candidacy is more likely to evoke voters' memories of economic prosperity during his term. This is clearly conducive to the Workers' Party and the entire Brazilian left making a comeback and regaining their governing status.
In Peru, the Left achieved a historic victory in the presidential election. On April 11, 2021, presidential and congressional elections were held, in which the presidential race produced a major upset. Pedro Castillo—a 52-year-old primary school teacher, a leader of the teachers' union, and candidate for the leftist Free Peru (Perú Libre) party who had initially trailed in the polls—and Keiko Fujimori, candidate for the right-wing Popular Force (Fuerza Popular) party, secured the top two spots with 18.92% and 13.25% of the vote respectively, advancing to the second round on June 6. Hernando de Soto, a renowned economist and candidate for the right-wing Go on Country (Avanza País) party, received 11.9% of the vote. Verónika Mendoza, who enjoyed high popularity and had been re-nominated as the presidential candidate for the leftist Together for Peru (Juntos por el Perú) during a period of severe institutional crisis, failed to advance past the first round. In the second round held on June 6, Castillo ultimately triumphed over Keiko Fujimori by a margin of 0.25% to be elected president.
In Chile, elections for the Constitutional Convention and local offices were held in May 2021. In the Constitutional Convention elections, the right-wing governing coalition "Let's Go for Chile" (Chile Vamos) won only 38 out of 155 seats, accounting for 21%; independents won 54 seats (34.97%); "Approve Dignity" (Apruebo Dignity) took 18.04%; "The List of the People" (Lista del Pueblo) took 15.1%; and indigenous peoples were allocated 17 seats. In the local elections, Irací Hassler of the Communist Party of Chile was elected Mayor of Santiago, the capital city—the first time in history a member of the Communist Party has held this position. Chile will hold general elections in November 2021, alongside the approval of a new constitution drafted by the Convention and a new National Congress. Since the large-scale popular protests of 2019 [10], Chile's market-oriented economic model, in place since the Pinochet era, has been under challenge, with the public demanding the state play a larger role in guaranteeing healthcare, education, and pensions. As the right-wing President Sebastián Piñera cannot seek re-election, leftist forces enjoy an advantage in the general election. The outcome of this election will be critical for the direction of Chilean policy.
In Mexico, the leftist President Andrés Manuel López Obrador continues to maintain high approval ratings. Of the 32 state governors, 7 are from the ruling party, and the ruling party holds majorities in 19 state legislatures—the threshold required to amend the federal constitution. In the midterm elections held on June 6, 2021, although the ruling National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) lost its two-thirds supermajority, it maintained a majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. It can pass legislation by forming coalitions with small parties without needing support from the major opposition parties—the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)—meaning the governing environment remains favorable.
Third, the 2020 U.S. presidential election was also a significant event affecting the political landscape of Latin America. Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump weakened the international environment of "maximum pressure" exerted by the Trump administration against leftist regimes, favoring a shift in the regional political pendulum back to the left.
III. Left-wing parties have strengthened international solidarity and coordination, yet remain severely fragmented domestically
After more than a decade of governing, participating in government, and campaigning, the Latin American Left has transitioned from a period of united struggle to one of gradual fragmentation. Faced with offensives from domestic and international right-wing forces, leftist parties must unite once again as they did before to meet these challenges. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe [11], both the world socialist movement and the Latin American leftist movement sank into a low ebb. However, Latin American leftist parties, including communist parties, successively launched the São Paulo Forum and the World Social Forum to criticize capitalism and neoliberalism, explore alternatives to the neoliberal development model, and assert that "another world is possible." [12] This allowed the Latin American leftist movement to quickly escape the shadow of the Soviet collapse, support one another, and win a string of elections, launching a magnificent "pink tide." In domestic policy, the Left advocated for a state role in the economy or even nationalization; externally, they opposed U.S. hegemony and its proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), championing regional integration. They established regional organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC)—the latter notably excluding the United States and Canada while including all Latin American nations. This cycle of leftist governance greatly advanced the process of regional solidarity and self-reliance and promoted relations between Latin America and both Asia and Africa.
Internationally, in the face of the new situation characterized by right-wing offensives and alliances, leftist unity and coordination have made new progress. The electoral observation missions of the Organization of American States (OAS) have long been a primary means for the Right to accuse leftist parties and candidates of impropriety in the name of democracy. In the October 2019 Bolivian elections, the OAS claimed that the ruling Movement for Socialism (MAS) had committed fraud. Amid a wave of large-scale domestic protests and the defection of the military and police to the Right, President Evo Morales, who had already declared victory, was forced to resign and go into exile. Following the inauguration of the new leftist President Luis Arce in November 2020, Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela—which had been severed by the interim right-wing government of Jeanine Áñez—and called on the OAS to correct its errors and re-audit the 2019 election. MAS is one of the most active parties in the Puebla Group [13], a regional coordination organization for leftist parties from 14 Latin American countries. This group established a specialized electoral observation department, hoping to counter and replace the functions of the OAS in this regard. One of the first tasks for Arce and MAS upon taking power was to provide financial and ideological support to the Puebla Group and assist leftist parties in the 2021 elections in Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. Should a leftist party win the November 2021 Chilean election, Bolivia expects to renew relations between the two countries.
Under the direction of the United States, the right-wing Lima Group [14] has intensified its interference in the leftist Venezuelan regime, demanding the release of political prisoners and the "holding of fair elections to restore constitutional order." In August 2017, Mercosur suspended Venezuela's membership, citing a violation of the democratic commitment clause. This suspension was only delayed by three months at the request of Uruguay’s then-ruling Broad Front (Frente Amplio). The rise of the Mexican Left in 2018 changed the stance toward Nicolás Maduro’s administration, causing the Lima Group to lose a key pillar in its international encirclement of Venezuela. In October 2019, Alberto Fernández, the candidate for Argentina's leftist Justicialist Party, won the general election, creating a counterweight to Brazil within Mercosur. In March 2021, the Argentine government announced its withdrawal from the Lima Group [15]. In July 2021, the election of the leftist Castillo in Peru led the new Foreign Minister Héctor Béjar Rivera to announce a shift in the country's position on Venezuela to promote bilateral relations. This may signal the official dissolution of the Lima Group.
Meanwhile, Latin American leftist forces remain severely fragmented within their respective countries.
First, new leftist forces have emerged or risen, yet they have become competitors to the traditional Left. In Chile, the student movement of 2011, sparked by protests against high higher education costs, led to the formation of a New Left. Its most famous leader, Camila Vallejo, was absorbed into the leftist "New Majority" coalition in 2014. However, two other prominent leaders of the movement, Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric, remained outside the broad leftist coalition. The Democratic Revolution party led by Jackson and other student organizations have existed as an opposition force. In the 2017 elections, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) continued to consolidate its relations with extra-parliamentary leftist movements and parties, achieving a decisive victory in Valparaíso by absorbing the Autonomous Movement led by former student leader Jorge Sharp. Sharp won 53.8% of the vote in that city, while the "New Majority" and the right-wing coalition received only 22.4% and 22.6% respectively. However, on the national level, the leftist majority failed to form a union, leading to defeat in the December 2017 general election.
In the 2021 Ecuadorian elections, Yaku Pérez, the candidate for the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement—a leftist indigenous organization—emerged as a dark horse. He received 19.4% of the vote in the first round, and his party’s seats increased from 4 to 27. He placed third, missing the second round by a razor-thin margin of 0.35 percentage points. However, due to policy disagreements with Rafael Correa over environmental protection and other issues, Pérez supported neither the candidate of the right-wing "Creating Opportunities" (CREO) and Social Christian Party coalition, the banker Guillermo Lasso, nor Andrés Arauz, the follower of Correa and candidate for the leftist Union for Hope (UNES). He even called on voters to spoil their ballots or cast null votes. In five provinces, the number of spoiled ballots exceeded the votes received by Arauz. This was a major reason why Arauz, despite holding a significant lead in the first round, was overtaken by Lasso in the second.
Second, the Left faces internal policy divisions when confronting harsh governance realities. In Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, who was hailed as Rafael Correa's successor, underwent a radical shift in style after taking office, turning toward more market-oriented economic policies. This represented a rightward turn in policy even as the leftist party remained in power. The ruling PAIS Alliance split over whether to support Correa; Vice President Jorge Glas, a Correa supporter, was removed from office and placed in preventative detention on corruption charges. In the 2021 election, the PAIS Alliance lost all 74 of its seats, failing to win a single one.
Third, political fragmentation and ideological polarization have intensified. In the 2021 Peruvian election, the candidate with the highest vote share received only 16%. The ruling party and the traditional leftist party, "Together for Peru," only won 42 of the 130 congressional seats, creating a bottleneck for leftist governance. In Ecuador, as many as 15 parties secured seats in parliament, with the largest bloc, the Union for Hope, holding only 49. In recent years, particularly since the pandemic, ideological polarization in Latin American countries has intensified, seeing the rise of both the Far Right and the Far Left. Examples of the former include Brazil's Bolsonaro, while the latter include Peru’s Castillo and Ecuador’s Yaku Pérez. While the emergence of the Far Left has expanded the leftist camp, its radical policy propositions also pose new challenges to the unity and strengthening of the Latin American Left.
IV. Whether a new cycle of leftist governance can begin remains to be seen, but the Left will remain a long-term presence in Latin America
In the coming years, the Latin American left will undergo a momentous period, in which it must prove its capacity to serve as a social engine. Whether a new leftist cycle can be initiated will depend on at least the following factors.
First, in addition to quelling public dissatisfaction regarding the functioning of the state and demands for political innovation, the Latin American left must form a new social consensus through political renewal and restore and improve the living conditions of the people. Second, the "New Left" must demonstrate sufficient political management capabilities to secure institutional spaces of power, while simultaneously maintaining ties with social movements to gain the momentum necessary to win elections. In particular, whether leftist leaders can respond to the pandemic with efficiency and transparency will be of great significance in strengthening public trust in the government. Third, it is of vital importance whether the Latin American left, after taking office, can correctly define the role of the state and complete the exploration of a new development model. In the governing cycle that just passed, although the left won high prestige among the masses, it did not attach sufficient importance to the shaping of the state—especially failing to carry out necessary reforms in the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary. Rather than achieving the goal of replacing neoliberalism, they fell into governing dilemmas and ultimately lost power. Now, as a second cycle may be about to begin, we shall wait and see what new strategies leftist forces will adopt to effectively redefine the presence of the state.
Following the "Pink Tide" [16] of the early 21st century, a series of major trend-based changes have emerged in Latin American politics, providing the conditions for the long-term political presence and development of the left. At present, the leftist regimes existing in various countries can still contend with the right on equal terms. In 2021, the Peruvian left achieved a historic victory; the Bolivian left will govern until 2025; the Venezuelan and Mexican left will both govern until 2024; and the Argentine left will govern until 2023. Furthermore, there is a possibility that the left in Nicaragua and Chile will win their 2021 elections. The left remains a political force that cannot be ignored in the Latin American political landscape. The foundation for its resilient existence and development persists, manifested primarily in the following aspects:
First, countries in the Latin American region are continuously carrying out reforms in political, economic, and diplomatic spheres to resolve issues left behind by neoliberal policies—such as social polarization between the rich and the poor and economic stagflation—under the premise of enhancing the legitimacy of the political system and consolidating democracy. While developing the economy, they focus on solving political and social problems, striving to seek a more just, reasonable, and sustainable mode of development, and enhancing the degree of political inclusion and integration. The achievements gained therein will lay the foundation for the next round of the modernization process in Latin American countries.
Second, changes in the political environment and institutional conditions have accelerated the evolution of Latin American parties and party systems, which are constantly adapting to the new political demands brought about by democratic consolidation. Party politics is nurturing a greater and higher degree of modernity. Through transformations in guiding ideologies, organizational methods, and mobilization techniques, leftist parties are actively responding to the trends of mass politics and grassroots politics, demonstrating new characteristics in their governing styles and capacities.
Third, with economic growth and the deepening of democratic systems, the social base of the political systems in Latin American countries is continuously expanding, and the degree of political integration has reached an unprecedented level. Countries in the region are paying increasing attention to the social and political rights of the lower classes, their political participation, and their role in the formation of political, economic, and social policies. At the same time, the growing middle class and its political demands are posing new challenges to traditional political systems.
Furthermore, the long-standing wealth gap and inequality in Latin American countries provide a supportive foundation for the existence of the Latin American left. Following the implementation of neoliberalism in the 1990s, the proportion of the poor population in the Latin American region was as high as nearly 50%. Even today, after the "Pink Tide," it remains above 30% (the poverty rate in the Latin American region was 37.7% in 2020; see ECLAC [17]). Under democratic political conditions, this segment of the population will support a left that advocates for social equality, and this situation will persist in Latin America for a long time.
In conclusion, the existence and development of leftist political forces in Latin American countries have political, economic, social, and even demographic foundations. The left and socialist trends of thought that advocate for social equality have broad space for existence. This is also an important reason why the Latin American left has maintained resilient development for over 100 years.