Marxism Research Network
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Wang Xian, Pham Van Duc: Corruption Governance of the Communist Party of Vietnam in the Reform Period: Stages, Main Achievements and Basic Experience

Marxism Abroad

Since the mid-1980s, driven by the wave of economic globalization, countries worldwide have actively adjusted their development strategies and accelerated the pace of opening their economies to the outside world. Amidst this tide, Vietnam—long regarded as one of the underdeveloped nations in Southeast Asia—precisely seized this opportunity, took bold steps toward "Doi Moi" [1], and gradually explored a development path suited to its own conditions. Since entering the period of Doi Moi, Vietnam’s economy has achieved unprecedentedly rapid and stable growth, attracting global attention. However, alongside this rapid economic development, Vietnam has also faced various internal crises and challenges. One of the "four major crises," which the Vietnamese people refer to as a "national calamity," is the serious problem of graft and corruption. Consequently, the history of Vietnam's development under Doi Moi is also a history of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the government constantly struggling against corruption; the achievements made in corruption governance have likewise drawn international focus. Both China and Vietnam are socialist countries, and throughout decades of reform and development, both sides have faced significant pressures and problems regarding economic growth and corruption governance. Currently, China is fully advancing corruption governance. In this process, strengthening research into the CPV’s history and experience in governing corruption can not only deepen our understanding of Vietnam but also provide references for our own corruption governance.

I. Stages in the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Corruption Governance

Since 1986, the CPV has continuously carried out corruption governance for several decades. Based on the primary content of governance, the major measures and methods adopted, and the core characteristics displayed, we can roughly divide this process into three distinct stages.

(1) The Stage of Campaign-style Anti-Corruption (1986–2005): Conducting multiple Party rectification movements and continuously strengthening ideological education and the purification of the Party ranks

In December 1986, the Sixth National Congress of the CPV made the decision to implement comprehensive Doi Moi, marking Vietnam’s entry into a new period of socialist modernization. However, the further development of Doi Moi also brought increasingly serious governance issues to Vietnam: corruption among Party members and cadres became widespread, embezzlement reached shocking levels, and phenomena such as extravagance, waste, and bureaucratism grew severe, creating a negative impact among the masses. Regarding corruption, Ho Chi Minh once pointed out incisively: "Embezzlement, corruption, and bureaucratism are extremely dangerous enemies hidden within the people, the army, and the government." [2] In his view, for the Party ranks to maintain their advanced nature, they must eliminate "decayed and obsolete things" and maintain the Party’s purity and combat effectiveness; the fundamental method for this was the comprehensive implementation of Party rectification movements. To this end, after the Sixth Party Congress, the CPV launched a vigorous and large-scale movement for Party rectification and anti-corruption. Its primary purpose was to further purify the Party ranks, strengthen anti-corruption education, and eliminate various negative and corrupt behaviors. This movement was carried out in two phases. The main task of the first phase (late December 1986 to September 1987) was to strengthen ideological education for Party members and remove unqualified grassroots members and Party organizations; in just nine months, a total of 190,000 Party members were purged. The primary objective of the second phase (October 1987 to the end of 1990) was to review and evaluate leading cadres and remove from the Party organization those deemed "corrupt, degenerate," or "guilty of misconduct." [3] According to incomplete statistics, approximately 50,000 members were purged during the second phase.

After the conclusion of the first large-scale movement, to further consolidate the results, the CPV launched another large-scale Party rectification and anti-corruption movement in 1993, during which approximately 23,000 members—about 1.1% of the total CPV membership—were investigated and purged. [4] In 1998, the National Assembly of Vietnam issued several laws and regulations related to corruption governance, such as the Law on Cadres and Civil Servants, the Law on Practicing Thrift and Opposing Waste, and the Anti-Corruption Law, aiming to further punish corruption and consolidate anti-corruption effects. [5] Starting in May 1999, the CPV launched a two-year large-scale Party rectification and anti-corruption movement. This stage also saw the punishment of a group of high-ranking officials, including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Governor of the State Bank, and the Director-General of Customs. However, in 2000, a large-scale sample survey conducted by relevant Vietnamese agencies involving 160,000 Party members and 2,000 Party organizations found that approximately 43% of members and one-third of Party organizations were still suspected of or involved in corruption. [6] It is evident that these vigorous anti-corruption movements did not achieve their expected results; many corruption issues were shelved because they touched upon the interests of high-ranking officials. Given this, at the Fourth Plenary Session of its Ninth Central Committee, the CPV seriously summarized the experience of the Party rectification and reorganization movements and studied how to carry out anti-corruption work more effectively. Following the Ninth Party Congress, the CPV continued its rectification and anti-corruption efforts for several years, during which approximately 1% of members were disciplined; by 2004, 8,800 corruption cases had been investigated involving over 12,000 personnel, of whom more than 2,370 received severe legal punishment. [7]

(2) The Stage of Rule-of-Law Anti-Corruption (2006–2015): Constructing systematic anti-corruption laws and specialized agencies, with a focus on cracking down on high-level corruption and economic graft

Before the Tenth CPV National Congress, although Vietnam’s campaign-style anti-corruption efforts achieved phased results, the work suffered from issues such as "much thunder but little rain, treating symptoms rather than root causes, and swatting flies while ignoring tigers" [8], which caused significant public dissatisfaction. After the Tenth Congress, the corruption problem remained very severe. Based on a summary of experiences and an analysis of the current situation, the CPV realized the importance of strengthening anti-corruption legislation. Consequently, in November 2005, the Eighth Session of the Eleventh National Assembly passed the Law on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, achieving specialized anti-corruption legislation for the first time. [9] The introduction of this specialized law marked Vietnam's transition toward a rule-of-law approach to anti-corruption. In 2006, centering on this law, the Vietnamese government also issued implementation rules for relevant articles and decrees on the anti-corruption responsibilities of leadership. Subsequently, in 2007, 2012, and 2017, Vietnam repeatedly revised and improved this specialized anti-corruption law.

Another major action by Vietnam in corruption governance after the Tenth Congress was strengthening the establishment of professional anti-corruption agencies. First, in August 2006, the National Assembly decided to establish the "Central Steering Committee for Anti-Corruption" as the nation’s highest anti-corruption body to strengthen unified leadership, top-level design, and guidance for anti-corruption work in subordinate departments. The committee was headed by the Prime Minister and specifically managed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, falling directly under the Politburo; its core members included nearly all the top leaders of major government ministries. [10] Second, to better coordinate with the Steering Committee, Vietnam established a new anti-corruption law enforcement agency, the "Anti-Corruption Police Department," in February 2007. Third, in May 2012, the Vietnamese government restored the Central Internal Affairs Commission as the permanent office of the Steering Committee to assist the committee in its work.

In addition to strengthening legislation and professional agencies, the focus of anti-corruption during this period was on cracking down on high-level corruption and economic graft. After 2006, Vietnam decided to adopt a strategy focusing on major and serious cases, shifting away from the previous methods of "selective arrests" and "lenient investigations" toward a policy of "strict punishment without exception" for anyone regardless of their position. During this period, typical major cases investigated included the Minister of Transport case involving over 200 officials [11] and the corruption and dereliction of duty case of Vinalines (Vietnam's largest state-owned shipping company), which involved multiple executives and caused losses of over $2 billion. [12] Furthermore, statistics indicate that in the five years following the implementation of the Law on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, Vietnam intensified its investigation of high-level corruption; senior officials investigated during this period included four members of the Central Committee, 17 provincial- or ministerial-level secretaries or deputy secretaries, and two chairmen or presidents of large state-owned enterprises. Meanwhile, incomplete statistics show that inspection departments investigated 62,994 corruption cases, resulting in administrative sanctions for 1,619 units and 11,973 individuals, while judicial authorities tried 1,455 corruption cases involving 3,387 defendants. [13] It is clear that while significant progress was made during this period, the phenomenon of graft was not fundamentally altered.

(3) The Stage of Comprehensive Anti-Corruption (2016–Present): Thoroughly advancing institutional anti-corruption and strictly investigating major cases across all fields with "no forbidden zones"

After the Twelfth CPV National Congress in 2016, Vietnam entered a stage of large-scale, comprehensive, and in-depth anti-corruption. During this period, Vietnam further perfected relevant laws and regulations and endeavored to advance the construction of systems for anti-corruption and clean governance. Regarding legislation, in 2017, Vietnam significantly revised the Law on Preventing and Combatting Corruption, passing a new version in November 2018. Compared to the old version, the new version added a property declaration system for public officials and regulations for reviewing the property and income of public servants, while expanding the scope of inspection to all civil servants, employees of enterprises and public institutions, and Party members. Statistics show that in 2018, "a total of 1,136,900 property declarations were completed, accounting for 99.8% of the people who should declare." [14] Regarding property declarations, in addition to general items, it stipulated that civil servants must declare real estate, such as houses and construction projects. [15] Furthermore, to improve enforcement effectiveness, the National Assembly issued a series of relevant decrees and resolutions, such as the Law on Judicial Expertise, the Law on Inspection, the Law on Public Employees, the Law on Denunciation, and the Law on Access to Information. Through these decrees and institutional constraints, Vietnam has further restricted the development of self-seeking through power and unhealthy tendencies, while better protecting "good officials" who are willing to take responsibility and seek welfare for the people. [16] Additionally, Vietnam established steering committees for the implementation of the National Strategy for Preventing and Combating Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Corruption [17], pushing anti-corruption work to a higher level.

While advancing institutional anti-corruption, Vietnam has also actively promoted the severe crackdown on major and serious corruption cases in various fields, striving to practice the fundamental assertion that the Party and state's anti-corruption has "no forbidden zones and no exceptions." Driven by the "no forbidden zones" policy, fields where investigation efforts were previously relatively insufficient—particularly the military system—began to face severe crackdowns. In a speech at the "2020 Military Delegate Meeting," President and CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong demanded that the military be active and resolute in fighting corruption and internal "negative phenomena" (tiêu cực). In particular, efforts must be made to solve illegalities and corruption in the management and use of national defense land, military commercial activities, and the management of troops and soldiers. Furthermore, since the start of large-scale anti-corruption in 2016, Vietnam’s "tiger-hunting" actions have moved into sectors vital to the national economic lifeline, such as energy and finance. The embezzlement case of Trinh Xuan Thanh, former chairman of PetroVietnam Construction JSC [18], is a typical example. Of course, the most significant case during this period was that of Dinh La Thang, a former member of the CPV Politburo and former Secretary of the Ho Chi Minh City Party Committee, who was sentenced to 30 years in prison. In a series of major cases, several "high-ranking and powerful" "big tigers" have fallen, further demonstrating that the CPV’s anti-corruption struggle is no longer a superficial "skirmish" but a substantive, "to-the-bone" strike.

II. Major Achievements of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Corruption Governance

Since Doi Moi, the CPV has continuously strengthened its corruption governance, increasingly forming a strategy and path with its own characteristics. From a macro level, the main achievements include at least the following three aspects.

(1) Improving institutional construction and establishing professional agencies, enhancing the results and level of the anti-corruption struggle

In the process of corruption governance, the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has continuously improved relevant laws and systems, established multiple professional anti-corruption agencies, and steadily raised the level of the anti-corruption struggle, achieving results that have attracted worldwide attention. Regarding anti-corruption legislation, the Party has moved from almost nothing to formalized standards, and from an unsystematic approach to the construction of an increasingly comprehensive and perfected system of anti-corruption laws, regulations, and associated supporting institutions. Currently, a legal anti-corruption system has taken shape, centered on the fundamental Anti-Corruption Law and supported by the Law on Judicial Expertise, the Inspection Law, the Law on Cadres and Civil Servants, and the Law on Denunciations. This is further assisted by an institutional system comprising numerous detailed implementation rules, operational guidelines, and related decrees and government orders. Simultaneously, over the past few decades, the CPV has established several professional anti-corruption agencies and departments. These include the Central and local Inspection Commissions of the CPV, the Government Inspectorate and corresponding inspection organs at various levels of government, the Anti-Corruption Police Bureau, the Central Steering Committee on Anti-Corruption, and the CPV Central Internal Affairs Section. These professional organs leverage their respective strengths and collaborate with one another, greatly enhancing the efficacy of corruption governance.

On the foundation of perfecting relevant legal systems and establishing professional agencies, Vietnam’s anti-corruption struggle has achieved prominent successes through several stages of governance. First, through Party rectification and "style rectification" [9] movements, the Party has not only strengthened ideological education on integrity for members but has also expelled a large number of unqualified members from the Party organization, further purifying the ranks. Second, the Party has strengthened the inspection and supervision of members and increased the scale and intensity of punishments. For example, from 2014 to 2018, a total of 2,720 Party members received disciplinary action due to corruption. [26] Third, the Party has strictly targeted major and significant cases involving large sums of money and high-ranking cadres. For instance, from 2013 to 2015, functional departments investigated and handled 16 major cases of serious corruption. [27] Fourth, a significant amount of corrupt funds has been recovered, substantially reducing Vietnam’s economic losses. For example, in the first half of 2009 alone, Vietnam recovered as much as 430.5 billion Vietnamese dong in corrupt funds and over six million hectares of land involved in corruption. [28]

(II) Curbing the atmosphere of corruption, purifying the political ecosystem, and consolidating the CPV's foundation of governance

As the ruling party, if the CPV is to consolidate its foundation of governance, it must obtain the trust of the broad masses of the people, maintain close ties with them, and consider and handle problems from the perspective of safeguarding their interests. However, the once-prevalent corruption issue ran counter to this goal, drifting further away from it and greatly worsening the relationship between the Party and the masses. This even triggered mass incidents [10] and violated the fundamental purpose for which the CPV was founded. For example, relevant statistics show that in January 2007 alone, more than 100 strike incidents occurred consecutively in 14 provinces and cities in Vietnam, involving over 60,000 participants, with extremely serious consequences. [29] Such unrest caused by public demonstrations further highlighted the extremely low level of public trust in the Party and government. This "fire and water" [11] relationship between the Party and the masses would inevitably deal a severe blow to the authority of the CPV and the government, potentially triggering a crisis of legitimacy for the CPV's rule.

To this end, since the beginning of Doi Moi [12], the CPV has continuously increased the intensity of corruption governance. The scale, strength, and duration of its punishment of corruption are relatively rare in the anti-corruption efforts of other countries. As an increasing number of "problematic" Party members are expelled, more cadre-level members are punished, and more formerly "supercilious" high-ranking officials fall from grace, the phenomenon of corruption in Vietnam has been suppressed to a certain extent. The murky domestic political ecosystem has been further purified, the relationship between the Party and the masses has increasingly eased, and the Party has increasingly gained the trust and support of the people. Simultaneously, as the anti-corruption struggle deepens, the internal situation of the CPV is undergoing positive changes; more people are willing to join the Party, and the organization continues to grow in strength. For example, data shows that from the 1990s to 2008, the number of CPV members increased by 55%. [30] Meanwhile, the great progress in the anti-corruption struggle has further stimulated the enthusiasm of the public to participate in anti-corruption efforts, and "the roles of social organizations, news media, and the masses in anti-corruption work have been further strengthened." [31] Under this trend, the CPV’s foundation of governance has become increasingly secure.

(III) Promoting economic development, attracting foreign investment, and providing a favorable environment for the cause of Doi Moi

Since the start of the 21st century, Vietnam has been consistently rated by Transparency International as a "country with serious corruption." This label seriously affected Vietnam’s international image, causing foreign investors to "keep a respectful distance." This is because foreign investors consider not only investment returns but also factors related to integrity, such as "impartiality, convenient services, efficient administration, clean officials, and institutional stability." [32] In reality, the troubles brought about by corruption were the most frequent complaints foreign investors had about Vietnam. For example, when investing in Vietnam, foreign investors often had to pay significant "public relations" fees during key investment stages or administrative approvals. This "industry norm" was a major headache for Western investors. [33] Over the past decade or so, as Vietnam’s anti-corruption efforts have intensified and their effectiveness has become more apparent, Vietnam’s sincerity in fighting corruption has increasingly won the recognition of the international community, and its open policies have attracted more and more foreign investors.

Relevant data indicates that since 2008, Vietnam’s per capita GDP has surpassed the $1,000 mark, placing it among lower-middle-income countries. Simultaneously, Vietnam’s economic development was not significantly impacted by the economic crisis, and its inflation rate has remained relatively low. Statistics estimate that the inflation rate was 18.58% in 2011, dropped to 9.21% in 2012, and was only 4.09% by 2014. [34] Furthermore, anti-corruption achievements have further improved Vietnam’s international investment environment, with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) maintaining high growth over the last decade. For example, "in 2014, Vietnam attracted a total of $20.2309 billion in FDI, exceeding the set target by 19%." [35] In 2015, Vietnam had a total of 2,012 FDI projects, with new contracted investment amounting to $22.76 billion, a 12.5% increase over 2014. [36] Secondly, Official Development Assistance (ODA) from Japan, the EU, and other countries, as well as overseas remittances, have maintained a steady growth momentum. For example, in 2014, Vietnam’s remittance income was $11 billion, making it one of the top ten remittance-receiving countries in the world. [37] These positive economic trends have paved a solid road for the expansion of Vietnam’s cause of Doi Moi.

III. Basic Experiences of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Corruption Governance

Since Doi Moi, through the long-term anti-corruption struggle, Vietnam has continuously refined its understanding of corruption governance. Some valuable experiences from its anti-corruption practices can serve as an important reference for our country’s [13] current corruption governance.

(I) Continuously strengthening the Party's unified leadership and the construction of integrity mechanisms

  1. Always upholding the central leadership position of the CPV and actively carrying out the struggle to "resist corruption and prevent degeneration." During the long period of the war of resistance, the advanced nature demonstrated by the CPV won it the support and love of the people. Since transitioning from a revolutionary party to a ruling party, the CPV has placed even greater emphasis on building its advanced nature. Since the implementation of Doi Moi, under increasingly complex domestic and international environments, the CPV has continuously strengthened its governing capacity and level. Simultaneously, the drastic changes in Eastern Europe [14] in the 1990s made the CPV profoundly aware of the importance and critical nature of opposing "peaceful evolution." [15] In this context, the CPV actively carried out the struggle to "resist corruption and prevent degeneration," which integrated corruption prevention with the prevention of ideological shifts. It worked hard to thwart multiple peaceful evolution riots by domestic anti-government personnel and successfully exposed the "ugly faces" of Western hostile elements interfering in internal affairs under the guise of "human rights" and "democracy." Meanwhile, it required Party members to improve their cognitive levels and strengthen their internal ideological self-construction, thereby building a solid line of defense from within the entire Party.

  2. Implementing cadre rotation, suspension, and periodic assessment systems. A series of corruption scandals triggered during the decades of Doi Moi made the Vietnamese Party and government acutely aware that the longer a leading cadre serves in the same location or position, the easier it is for them to form complex networks of relationships. This breeds the "local emperor" [16] phenomenon, as well as corrupt atmospheres and behaviors like "relationship networks," "small circles," and the selling of official posts. To this end, in July 2002, the CPV decided to implement a cadre rotation system throughout the Party and the country. It stipulated that leaders at the county level and above, including the General Secretary of the CPV, cannot serve in the same position for more than two consecutive terms. At the same time, the "Decree on Rotation of Government Officials" stipulated that officials in departments related to 22 categories of corruption-prone fields must be rotated every 2–3 years. [38] Furthermore, the CPV implemented a system of temporary suspension or reassignment for state public servants suspected of corruption, which further removed obstacles to investigating and handling relevant corrupt officials.

  3. Reforming the salary and property declaration systems for public servants. The long-term low wages of civil servants, which triggered a trend of bribery and solicitation, drew the attention of the CPV leadership. To reduce and eliminate this phenomenon, since 1993, the Vietnamese government has proposed adjusting civil servant salaries every three years. Since then, in 2008, 2012, 2016, and 2020, Vietnam has raised the minimum wage for civil servants and implemented a performance-based salary incentive system for outstanding public servants. [39] After 2018, the General Secretary of the CPV also signed a resolution on the reform of the public servant salary system, the fundamental goal of which is to ensure that by 2030, the minimum wage of national public servants is equal to or higher than the minimum wage in the highest-paid regions of the commercial sector. [40] Of course, for the insatiably greedy, these raises are but a "cup of water to put out a fire of a cartload of wood." [17] Therefore, to better suppress corrupt behavior, Vietnam simultaneously implemented a property declaration system for public servants and made the results public to increase property transparency.

(II) Actively promoting democratic voting and power check-and-balance mechanism reforms

  1. Implementing the intra-Party democracy system. As early as before the 9th National Congress, the CPV implemented a multi-candidate election system within the Party. The 10th National Congress in 2006 further expanded the margin and, for the first time, adopted a new democratic election method for the General Secretary that combined "majority veto" with multi-candidate elections. [41] Furthermore, the CPV required the implementation of direct election systems for grassroots Party committee standing committees, deputy secretaries, and secretaries. In May 2014, the 9th Plenary Session of the 11th CPV Central Committee passed the "Rules on Intra-Party Elections," [42] which clearly stipulated the candidates for the Central Committee, the Secretariat, and committees at all levels, as well as methods for multi-candidate elections. Secondly, to enhance the democratic and scientific nature of decision-making, the CPV adopts a method of consultation with various sectors outside the Party for major internal decisions. Thirdly, the CPV actively promotes a system of collective leadership and individual responsibility. Its Party Constitution stipulates that major resolutions of the Party and state are decided by the Party leadership collective through democratic discussion and voting, and individuals must obey the collective's decision. [43] Finally, the CPV resolutely implements a "publicity of Party affairs" system, requiring that important Party work, such as the financial budgets and final accounts of grassroots Party organizations, must be made public.

  2. Adopting the "Four Pillars" [18] check-and-balance mechanism. The "Four Pillars" power check-and-balance mechanism refers to the four central power offices of the state being held by four different politicians: the CPV General Secretary, the Prime Minister, the President, and the Chairperson of the National Assembly; these positions may not be held concurrently. [44] Meanwhile, as the significant leadership force in Vietnam, the CPV Central Committee does not have a Politburo Standing Committee; [19] important Party decisions are typically made by Politburo members through voting. [45] Furthermore, the high-level power structure in Vietnam features a special arrangement based on regional divides. One of its basic modes and characteristics is the North-South balance or the so-called "North-South Party" phenomenon: "conservative" politicians from the North typically serve as the Party General Secretary, while the Prime Minister position is mainly held by "Southern faction" politicians who are skilled in economic management and reform. The National Assembly has the power to hold votes of confidence on national leaders: "If more than 1/5 of the National Assembly deputies request it, the National Assembly can initiate a no-confidence vote procedure against high-level officials such as the President or Prime Minister; if more than 2/3 of the deputies cast a no-confidence vote, the relevant leader is dismissed." [46]

  3. Changing the phenomenon of the National Assembly as a "voting machine." The Constitution of Vietnam stipulates that the National Assembly is the highest representative organ of the people and exercises the highest power of supervision over the activities of the state. However, prior to the implementation of Doi Moi [20], the voting behavior of the National Assembly was often a matter of completing legal procedures according to predetermined results; consequently, it was frequently referred to by the outside world as a "voting machine" and a "rubber stamp." Therefore, reform of the National Assembly's exercise of power became imperative. The priority of this reform was highlighted in two major areas: first, reforming the electoral system for National Assembly deputies, whereby both national and local deputies are produced through direct elections; second, implementing a system of National Assembly interpellations [21] [58]. The Constitution grants the National Assembly the power of interpellation. Interpellations of leaders in key national positions are scheduled during the annual sessions [22], and the process must be broadcast live via radio or television and made open to society. Officials under interpellation must answer the questioners’ inquiries truthfully or respond via written replies [59]. This interpellation system has further curbed corrupt behavior, as some inactive or corrupt high-ranking officials have been removed or forced to resign following these sessions.

(III) Efforts to Improve Anti-Corruption Legislation, Institutional Sets, and the Construction of Party Discipline

  1. Issuing and repeatedly improving the "Law on Preventing and Combatting Corruption." Since the promulgation of the "Law on Preventing and Combatting Corruption" in 2005, Vietnam’s work in the rule-of-law-based anti-corruption effort has increasingly gained public support. Following its issuance, Vietnam conducted multiple revisions in 2007, 2012, and 2017. Among these, the 2012 and 2017 revisions were significant in scope, with added and modified content reaching nearly half of the original text. The CPV’s experience demonstrates that strengthening anti-corruption legislative work is an important guarantee for the success of corruption governance.

  2. Systematically constructing laws and regulations related to corruption governance. In 1998, the National Assembly of Vietnam promulgated the "Ordinance on the Recruitment, Employment, and Management of Civil Servants," the "Law on Practicing Thrift and Fighting Waste," the "Regulations on Disciplinary Action Against Civil Servants," and the "Law on Cadres and Civil Servants." After 2008, it also promulgated the "Law on Public Officials and Cadres of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," the "Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Leading Cadres," and the "Law on Complaints and Denunciations." In addition, some of the most recently passed relevant decrees in Vietnam include the "Law on the Election of Deputies to the National Assembly and People's Councils of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam," the "Law on Handling Administrative Violations," and the "Regulations of the Vietnamese Government on Transparency of Property and Income." Furthermore, Vietnam attaches great importance to the revision and improvement of the legal system; for instance, after the 1998 "Law on Cadres and Civil Servants" was issued, it underwent five revisions in 2000, 2003, 2008, 2010, and 2019.

  3. Continuously improving the construction of the anti-corruption system within Party discipline and regulations. In addition to strengthening anti-corruption legislation and the system of laws and regulations, the CPV also attaches great importance to the construction of Party discipline and regulations. The Statutes of the Communist Party of Vietnam [23] make clear provisions regarding different erroneous behaviors of Party members and their handling. Penalties for probationary members include "reproach" and "warning," while penalties for full members include "reproach," "warning," "removal from office," and "expulsion," with standardized procedures for expulsion clearly defined. Beyond the Party Statutes, the CPV has also promulgated other internal Party regulations, such as "Things Party Members Are Not Allowed to Do" issued in 2011, which uses a list format to specify behaviors that Party members must not engage in or permit to exist.

(IV) Extensively Implementing Multi-Dimensional Governance Combining Intra-Party Supervision, Mass Reporting, and Media Exposure

  1. Constructing and improving the system of intra-Party interpellation and accountability supervision. The intra-Party interpellation system is primarily modeled after the interpellation system in the National Assembly and began with the 5th Plenary Session of the 9th CPV Central Committee. Since then, the CPV has set aside a certain amount of time during its annual national congresses [24] to conduct intra-Party interpellation work. According to policy regulations, the subject of interpellation can be an individual or a collective; the General Secretary of the Party is also included within the scope of personnel who can be interpellated.

  2. Broadly mobilizing the masses for supervision and heavily rewarding reports of corruption. The Vietnamese government requires all localities and departments to generally establish reporting and petition-reception agencies or units and to strengthen the protection and rewarding of whistleblowers [60]. In addition, to obtain more information on corruption, Vietnam implements a "heavy rewards for reporting corruption" system. A 2015 document issued by the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam stipulates that, depending on the value of the information provided by the whistleblower and the amount of stolen funds they help recover, 10% of the illicit funds can be awarded to the whistleblower as a bonus, up to a maximum of 3,000 times the minimum wage. Simultaneously, based on the whistleblower's performance, they may be granted various levels of government awards equivalent to 60, 40, or 20 times the monthly minimum wage [61]. Driven by various policy incentives, anti-corruption reports in Vietnam have climbed to unprecedented levels; for example, relevant statistics indicate that in 2017, the inspection departments received 415,383 visits and handled 306,519 petition cases [62].

  3. Actively encouraging media participation in corruption exposure and supervision. To increase media motivation, Vietnam encourages newspapers and journalists to report information reflecting incidents of graft and corruption as well as anti-corruption efforts [63], and requires the units and departments involved in cases to cooperate with the media's information acquisition. Currently, Vietnam’s more than 700 newspaper offices, 70-plus television and radio stations, 80 electronic newspapers, and thousands of websites have become important tools for indirect participation in the anti-corruption struggle [64]. In recent years, many major and significant corruption cases punished in Vietnam were triggered by media exposure. At the same time, to strengthen online anti-corruption work, the Anti-Corruption Bureau of Vietnam launched the "Anti-Corruption Database" website in June 2007, opening a direct channel for the masses to participate in the anti-corruption struggle; building on this, in May 2014, the Office of the CPV Central Steering Committee on Anti-Corruption also launched the "Comprehensive Information Network for Preventing and Combatting Corruption" [65]. This series of measures has not only significantly boosted the enthusiasm of the media and the public for participating in corruption governance but has also further demonstrated the CPV’s determination to resolutely carry out the anti-corruption struggle.

(The authors are: a doctoral student at the School of Public Administration, Guangxi University; member of the Theoretical Council of the CPV Central Committee and Professor at the Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences) Online Editor: Tong Xin Source: Theoretical Vision, No. 9, 2021