Wu Huiping: The Historical Evolution and Practical Dilemmas of the Social Democratic Party of Germany

The Social Democratic Party of Germany (hereafter referred to as the "SPD") emerged from the workers' movement and was the first working-class party established in Germany. It is the oldest extant political party in the Federal Republic of Germany and one of the longest-governing social democratic parties in Europe. Over nearly 160 years of historical development, the SPD has gradually transformed from a representative of proletarian interests into a "center-left catch-all party" ^[1]. At its peak, its membership exceeded one million, and it remains the political party with the largest membership in the Federal Republic. Entering the 21st century, the party fell into hardship under the influence of multiple factors and adopted a series of reform measures in response. Its basic situation serves as a microcosm of the current state of Western left-wing parties, particularly European center-left parties.

I. Historical Development and Programmatic Evolution of the SPD

(1) Key Stages of Development

To date, the SPD has traversed four periods of turbulent change. It was suppressed by Bismarck during the German Empire, briefly held power during the Weimar Republic, faced party bans and persecution during the Nazi era, and has participated in or led the government several times during the period of the Federal Republic, promoting the construction of the welfare state and the protection of labor rights based on the concept of social justice. Throughout its long-term development, the SPD witnessed the formation and growth of the German working class and the restructuring of the social order, while completing several shifts in its own political line.

The predecessor of the SPD was the General German Workers' Association (ADAV), founded in Leipzig in 1863 by the social democratic activist Lassalle; this was the first working-class party in Germany. In 1869, Bebel and Liebknecht founded the Social Democratic Workers' Party (SDAP) in Eisenach. In 1875, the two parties formally merged at a congress in Gotha to form the Socialist Workers' Party (SAP), which subsequently became a primary target of Bismarck’s suppression. In 1890, after the repeal of the Anti-Socialist Laws ^[2], the party changed its name to the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), which it has used ever since. At the party congress the following year, the SPD adopted the Erfurt Program, establishing Marxism as its guiding ideology. Thereafter, the SPD entered a stage of steadily rising support and expanding membership, becoming the largest political force prior to World War I. Even today, differing opinions persist within the party regarding its founding year, reflecting internal factional divides: pragmatists view the 1863 founding of the ADAV as the party’s origin, while factions supporting the Marxist tradition are more aligned with the SPD of 1869 (Eisenach) or 1891 (Erfurt).

Toward the end of World War I, the workers' movement showed signs of splitting. In 1917, internal disagreements arose over the issue of war credits. Some radical forces advocating for the subversion of the system withdrew, eventually forming the basis for the Communist Party of Germany (KPD), which weakened the SPD accordingly. During the Weimar Republic, the SPD played a pivotal role in establishing the democratic republic, producing its first president, Friedrich Ebert. It maintained a membership of one million during the 1920s and remained the largest political force until 1932, though it held power only briefly. In June 1933, the SPD was dissolved by the Nazis; it was rebuilt in October 1945.

Following the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, the SPD held a monopoly on the left-wing camp for a long time. The Communist Party of Germany was banned in 1956 and later reorganized in 1968 as the German Communist Party (DKP), but it remained on the political margins and could not rival the SPD. Nevertheless, the SPD’s development in the early years of the Federal Republic was not smooth. Because its main right-wing rival, the CDU ^[3], achieved great success by implementing the concept of the social market economy, the SPD's left-wing programmatic features failed to show a significant advantage, and its influence remained limited. It was not until the formulation of the Godesberg Program in November 1959, which realized a political alliance between the "enlightened bourgeoisie and the working class" (in the words of Willy Brandt) and adopted a path of political pragmatism, that the party experienced a period of ascent in the 1960s and 70s. From 1966 to 1969, the SPD first joined a CDU cabinet as a junior partner; from 1969 to 1982, it served as the senior governing party for the first time, leading a coalition with the FDP ^[4] under Brandt and Schmidt. In the 1972 federal election, its vote share exceeded that of the CDU for the first time.

During this period of governance, the SPD left a profound imprint on the Federal Republic’s domestic and foreign policies. In economic policy, the party reconciled with the market economy while advocating for increased state macro-control and intervention, using Keynesian-style state regulation to mitigate economic risks—thereby gaining ground against the CDU in terms of economic competence. In social policy, the party focused on expanding the welfare state, increasing educational opportunities for ordinary citizens, granting unions more co-determination rights, and advocating for cultural pluralism and equal rights for minorities. In foreign policy, the party accepted Adenauer’s pro-Western stance while simultaneously implementing the "New Ostpolitik" designed and promoted by Brandt and his aide Egon Bahr. Under the principle of "change through rapprochement" (Wandel durch Annäherung), this policy significantly eased relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.

In 1982, the SPD lost the election to the CDU led by Kohl and entered a period of stagnation in the 1980s and 90s. It was not until 1998, under the leadership of Gerhard Schröder, that Kohl’s long reign was ended and a coalition government was formed with the Green Party until 2005. During this tenure, the economic and social policies adopted by Schröder failed to immediately reverse high unemployment and public debt; only in foreign policy, through its stance on the Iraq War, did the party gain substantial public support. Since 2005, although the SPD has thrice participated as a junior partner in "Grand Coalitions," it has struggled to hide its declining trend and symptoms of crisis, as its status as the second-largest party and a "catch-all party" has been simultaneously threatened by both left-wing and right-wing camps.

(2) Inheritance and Evolution of the Programmatic Line

Since its founding, the SPD has formulated eight party programs: the 1869 Eisenach Program, the 1875 Gotha Program, the 1891 Erfurt Program, the 1921 Görlitz Program, the 1925 Heidelberg Program, the 1959 Godesberg Program, the 1989 Berlin Program, and the 2007 Hamburg Program. Historically, internal struggles within the SPD over its program and line have led to party splits and the creation of new political parties on several occasions.

In its early years, the party underwent a fierce struggle between Marxism and realpolitik. The revolutionary faction, represented by Kautsky, defended the orthodox status of Marxism, continuing Marx and Engels’ critique of capitalism and the theory of class struggle, demanding the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement with a socialist system. The revisionist faction, represented by Bernstein, advocated for the gradual improvement of the working class's social condition through social reform. The 1875 Gotha Program leaned toward realpolitik and eclectic compromise, whereas the 1891 Erfurt Program—though co-authored by Kautsky and Bernstein—clearly established the guiding status of Marxist ideology. During the Weimar Republic, although the SPD attempted to maintain national stability and act as a mediator between the left and right camps, the left-wing camp lacked cohesion and was unable to unite democratic progressive forces or win over the bourgeoisie, ultimately failing to prevent the rise of the Nazi Party.

The introduction of the 1959 Godesberg Program was a landmark event in the SPD’s history, marking the end of the party’s oscillation between Marxism and realpolitik. It achieved de-ideologization and a shift in its ideological line, transforming from a working-class party into a center-left catch-all party. In this program, the SPD explicitly established democratic socialism as its guiding ideology, set the expansion of the welfare state and the improvement of social security and employment levels as its primary policy goals, and positioned itself as a party representing the interests of all the people, including the working class and all democratic progressive forces. By thus opening itself to the bourgeoisie, it became a pragmatic reformist party. Following this transformation into a catch-all party, the SPD recruited a large number of intellectuals, freelancers, and upwardly mobile middle-class members beyond traditional industrial workers, leading to continued growth in its membership and support base.

In 1989, the SPD formulated the Berlin Program, which was revised in 1998. This new program targeted the new characteristics of voter demand in a post-industrial society, moving away from old growth-oriented thinking and emphasizing post-materialist values such as democracy, self-determination, gender equality, and economic and social sustainability, incorporating contemporary issues in ecological and social fields. In 2007, the party launched the Hamburg Program, which remains in use today. This program fully absorbed the lessons of the labor market and social security reforms during the Schröder era, attempting to find a compromise between reformers and traditionalists while emphasizing the need to adapt basic values to the changes of a globalized world. In the three subsequent Grand Coalitions, the SPD’s participation in government has reflected this eclectic approach.

The Godesberg, Berlin, and Hamburg programs introduced after World War II all continued the historical tradition of democratic socialism but simultaneously reinterpreted this guiding ideology, establishing the core values of freedom, justice, and solidarity. Some scholars argue that, given that the concept of "democratic socialism" is also used by the Left Party and communist parties, creating a risk of confusion, the SPD has—since the Godesberg Program—replaced it with the more precise concept of "social democracy." However, this view has not gained widespread support; in all three programs, both "democratic socialism" and "social democracy" coexist, while the positioning as a center-left catch-all party and the principles of social democratic action established in the Godesberg Program have been maintained to this day.

(3) Social Base and Organizational Structure

In terms of its social base, the SPD exhibits several characteristics.

First, from the perspective of social composition, industrial workers and the "new middle class" have become its backbone. In its early years, the SPD long positioned itself as a working-class party, and its membership was predominantly composed of pro-union industrial workers. However, party researcher Frank Decker argues that the SPD was never a purely workers' party; even prior to the Godesberg Program, the party did not rely solely on the support of the working class but had already opened itself to the upwardly mobile white-collar class. This is explained by two factors: on the one hand, the SPD always struggled to win the support of the Catholic working class; on the other hand, the party only performs well when it simultaneously secures the support of both the working class and the new middle class. Currently, 42% of SPD members are employed in the public service sector.

Second, regarding the educational background of members, the overall level of education has risen steadily. Although the average educational level of its members was once lower than that of other parties, since the late 1960s, it has attracted a large number of left-progressive forces from the upwardly mobile, well-educated middle class. In recent years, the educational level of members has risen further; in 2017, the proportion of members with a university degree or vocational college entrance qualification reached 54%, far higher than the German average of 33%.

Third, in terms of regional distribution, development is unbalanced between the East and West. The party has a broad voter base and traditional "ballot strongholds" in Western regions with high industrial density and Protestant majorities (such as North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate). However, its membership and voter base in eastern Germany are very weak; in three eastern states, it has fallen to the fourth-largest political force, trailing behind the CDU, the Left Party, and the AfD ^[5].

Regarding organizational structure, the SPD’s Federal Party Congress, held every two years, is its highest organ of power. Leadership consists of a professional Executive Board and a Presidium, with organizational structures established at the federal, state, and local levels. Its basic organizational model is a committee system based on membership, with professional working groups and committees established for fields such as youth, women, and employee issues. In its early days, the SPD could be classified as a mass party, with a large membership and a relatively tight organizational structure; it built a dense network of associations, trade unions, and party schools, and created its own official organs and other local newspapers and magazines. For example, Vorwärts, founded in 1876 and still in circulation today, serves as a bond to strengthen the link with members. However, since the Weimar Republic, the party has transformed into a "professional electoral party," continuously increasing the degree of professionalization within its organization. It increasingly utilizes existing state apparatuses to realize its ideals, and its links with trade unions have gradually loosened. Internal management has moved toward pluralism; compared to other parties, the SPD places greater emphasis on grassroots democracy, striving to strike a balance between top-down leadership and bottom-up democratic supervision.

II. Symptoms of Crisis in Current Real-World Politics

Since losing its status as the primary governing party in 2005, although the SPD has participated in government several times, its developmental momentum in real-world politics and party competition has been unsatisfactory. It exhibits clear symptoms of crisis, specifically manifested in a sustained slump in electoral vote shares, an overall decline in polling support, a long-term contraction of its membership base, and a trend toward an aging demographic structure.

(1) Electoral vote shares remain in a sustained slump In fact, the SPD’s experience leading the government in the Federal Republic of Germany was originally far less than that of the center-right CDU/CSU ^[6] camp; to date, its total time as the primary governing party amounts to 20 years. In 1969, the SPD led the government at the federal level for the first time, and in the 1972 general election, it achieved a historic peak vote share of 45.8%. When Gerhard Schröder took office in 1998, the party’s support still exceeded 40%. However, since 2005, the SPD has slid downward in successive general elections and fallen into crisis. In 2009, it received only 23% of the vote, its worst performance since the founding of the Federal Republic, losing over ten million voters compared to a decade prior. Among these former supporters, more than one-fifth turned to vote for the Left Party (Die Linke). Notably, a significant portion of the labor class shifted their support to the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD).

In the 2017 general election, the SPD obtained only 20.5% of the electoral support, hitting a new historical low. During this election, the SPD lost a massive number of votes, and its voter base could be described as crumbling. The net loss of SPD voters to the left and right camps was roughly equal: a loss of 430,000 votes to the Left Party, 380,000 to the Greens, 20,000 to the CDU/CSU, 450,000 to the FDP (Free Democratic Party), and 470,000 to the AfD.

Furthermore, the SPD’s performance in state-level elections in recent years has been equally disappointing. Out of a total of 20 state parliament and European Parliament elections held since 2016, the SPD managed a slight increase in vote share in only three state elections, while continuing its downward trend in the others. Particularly in states such as Saxony, Thuringia, and Bavaria, the party’s vote share did not even reach 10%.

(2) Polling support shows an overall downward trend The symptoms of the SPD’s crisis in recent years are also concentrated in the developmental trajectory of its polling support. Since German reunification, the party’s polling support rose briefly around the time Schröder took office and experienced sharp fluctuations, but the overall trend has headed downward, falling from a peak of 44% in 1998–1999 to a low of 13% in 2019. The sole exception occurred in early 2017, when Martin Schulz was elected party chairman with 100% popularity and ran as the candidate for Chancellor. This triggered the "Schulz effect," attracting a large number of new members to the party in the short term and causing a surge in polling support that briefly returned to a high of 32%, even surpassing the CDU/CSU for a time. However, following several defeats in state elections and the SPD’s crushing loss in the 2017 federal election, the "Schulz effect" proved to be a mere flash in the pan. Since 2020, the SPD’s polling support has hovered at a low of 15%–17%, a drop of more than half compared to its heyday. Unable to break out of this long-term trough, it has not only failed to contend with the CDU/CSU as an equal but has also been consistently overtaken by the Greens. Consequently, its status as a Volkspartei ^[7] (catch-all party) is increasingly being called into question.

(3) Long-term contraction of membership size As a mass-based party, the SPD has experienced several peak periods of membership development over its century-long history and held the status of the party with the most members in the Federal Republic for a long time—an advantage it is currently barely maintaining. In 1914, the party's membership exceeded the one million mark for the first time. It reached a post-WWII peak of 875,000 in 1947, after which it steadily declined, hitting a low of 586,000 in 1954. From the late 1960s, membership recovered steadily, reaching a historic high of 1.02 million in 1976. At the time of reunification in 1990, the party still possessed 943,000 members.

However, from the 1990s to the present, the momentum for recruiting new members has significantly waned, and the membership ranks have been halved. The contraction has accelerated particularly since taking office in 1998; by 2019, the party had only 419,000 members. Simultaneously, from 2006 to 2014, the number of local SPD party organizations decreased from 12,000 back to 9,000. The sharp reduction in membership is a common trend among Germany’s traditional large parties; the CDU’s membership has similarly decreased by half over thirty years. The membership sizes of these two great Volksparteien have been roughly equal since 2005, with the CDU even surpassing the SPD at one point; currently, the SPD holds only a narrow lead of approximately 14,000 members.

(4) Severe phenomenon of an aging membership In cross-party comparisons, the aging trend of SPD members is more severe than that of other mainstream parties. On one hand, the proportion of elderly members continues to rise. From 1974 to 2019, the proportion of members over 60 years old surged from 17.6% to 56.4%—representing more than half. This is the highest proportion among all mainstream parties in the Bundestag; the average age of an SPD member is currently 60. On the other hand, the proportion of young members continues to fall. Since reunification, the proportion of members under 30 has declined annually, from 10.2% in 1990 to 5.8% in 2005. In terms of developing a youthful reserve force, the SPD lags behind the Greens and the FDP. Despite subsequent measures to increase its appeal to young people, it continues to underperform compared to other parties. In 2019, the Left Party’s under-30 membership stood at 19.3% and the Greens at 17.8%, while the SPD’s was only 7.8%. The aging demographic structure of the membership fully reflects that the SPD’s mobilization capacity and incentive mechanisms for attracting "new blood" remain inferior to other parties. At the same time, this implies a serious shortage in the talent pool for supplying public officials to various levels of public institutions, which to some extent weakens the SPD’s influence and developmental stamina in real-world politics.

III. Roots of the Crisis: An Explanation Based on the Framework of Party Competition

The SPD’s current predicament stems both from the party’s own internal reasons and from the severe challenges posed by changes in the overall environment, such as the development of the era and social transformation. Here, the author utilizes the analytical framework for party competition research developed by German party scholar Oskar Niedermayer, focusing primarily on the relationship between supply and demand to analyze the series of problems and challenges the SPD faces in the competition of the "political market." The aim is to reveal the primary causes of the SPD’s current crisis, proceeding from three aspects: first, framework conditions, including overarching factors such as the external environment, major historical processes, or political and legal systems; second, the supply side, including party-related factors such as the organizational mobilization capacity of the party and its rivals, their positioning within social processes, and their resources; and third, the demand side, including voter-related factors such as social structure, value orientations, and party identification.

(1) Development of the Overall Internal and External Environment

1. The structural transformation of Western democratic politics weakens the role of political parties The SPD’s situation is a microcosm of the current state of traditional Western parties. Studies on "party decline" have accordingly become a prominent field of political science since the 1970s. Currently, the revolution in information technology and the popularization of social media have driven the continuous emergence of new political mobilization methods and channels. The function of political parties as political spokespeople in public life has weakened, and public trust in them is declining. Party action is increasingly being replaced by relatively loose social movements or temporary, issue-specific initiatives. In emerging social movements, "amateurs" are becoming political leaders, with core figures accumulating popularity through "fan power" rather than through the organizational work of a party. In European countries such as France and Italy, this trend is particularly evident, leading directly to the near-collapse of the traditional party system.

By comparison, Germany’s party system appears to remain stable and robust, with parties still playing a primary role in political mobilization and the formation of public opinion. However, the influence of parties is likewise declining; public trust in political parties has dropped from 50% in the 1980s to 29% in 2010. Meanwhile, various social movements have become important channels for leading and representing public opinion—for example, the youth environmental movement "Fridays for Future," the right-wing populist "PEGIDA" (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident), and the "Querdenken" (Lateral Thinking) movement against government COVID-19 prevention measures. All have attracted large numbers of supporters and generated lasting social impact. Regarding this, political scientist Henrik Müller points out that Western democracy is undergoing a fundamental structural transformation: competition in the "political market" is intensifying, barriers to entry are lowering, and there is no longer a need for complex organizational structures or long-term bonds. This favors the mobilization of social movements, and Germany is not exempt from this transformation process.

As a result of the transformation of Western democratic politics, the status and role of parties in political life have declined, their organizational mobilization capacity has weakened, and their social foundations are increasingly loose. According to statistics, in 1980, 4% of the German population of party-joining age belonged to a political party, whereas today this proportion is only 1.7%. Simultaneously, the total number of members of all parties in the Bundestag was halved between 1990 and 2019, from 2.4 million to 1.22 million.

2. Important historical processes intensify party competition For the SPD, a series of important political, economic, and historical events since WWII have had a direct impact, primarily including the environmental movement, German reunification, and the refugee crisis. First, the rise of the green/environmental movement in Germany since the 1970s led to the formal founding of the Green Party in 1980. The SPD was no longer the sole influential political force in the left-wing camp and found it difficult to compete with the Greens on environmental issues. In recent years, the Greens have risen strongly again on the issue of climate protection, showing a tendency to replace the SPD's Volkspartei status. Second, at the time of reunification, the SPD failed to promptly seize the historical opportunity to expand its influence and build its grassroots organizational structure in the East, failing to prevent the Left Party from developing into a Volkspartei in the eastern regions. Currently, the total number of SPD members in the five new federal states is a mere 22,000, and its polling support in Saxony, Thuringia, and Saxony-Anhalt is below 10%. Third, since the 1990s, globalization has entered a new phase of development. The global economic crisis exposed the negative consequences of hyper-globalization, driving a cleavage in political party alignments and the formation of new social divisions. Right-wing populist forces have gradually grown by leveraging the anxiety and panic of some citizens; the refugee crisis, in particular, accelerated the rise of the AfD, and establishment parties have been generally impacted. The SPD has not provided a clear answer to new trends in the socio-cultural field, and the positions of its members and supporters on these matters are split. Many supporters reject the cosmopolitan ideology promoted by political elites and are deeply worried about the influx of refugees and immigrants, especially competition from foreign low-wage labor. This has led to a massive loss of party supporters to the AfD.

The landscape of German political parties continues to undergo intense mutation. New parties constantly emerge and enter parliaments at all levels, and the party landscape has evolved from "two large and one small" ^[8] into a "fluid multi-party system." The state of party competition is day by day becoming more intense, and the SPD faces competition from parties in both the left and right camps simultaneously.

(2) Shifts in the Social Foundation of Voters

1. Changes in social structure lead to diverse social backgrounds among voters

After the end of World War II, the developed Western countries achieved economic recovery and growth, shifting their industrial center of gravity toward the tertiary sector (services) and gradually entering a post-industrial society. According to data from the Federal Statistical Office of Germany, the proportion of industrial workers in the employed population gradually fell from 42.9% to 24% between 1950 and 2020; conversely, the population employed in service industries surged from 32.5% to 74.7%. As the social welfare system continuously improved and the general education level of the populace rose, social goals shifted from reform to "improvement" ^[9]. Socioeconomic conditions and social structures in Germany changed accordingly: the individual socioeconomic circumstances of a large number of people continued to improve, and upward mobility became the mainstay of the emerging middle class and society. Consequently, the ranks of the middle class grew daily, class antagonism tended to ease, and old class and social confrontations were broken down. Voters, as the demand side of the political market, possess increasingly complex and diverse social backgrounds. The Sinus Institute (Sinus-Institut) has conducted long-term qualitative and quantitative analysis of the German social environment. It posits that German society can be divided into ten types of social environments with distinct characteristics based on cultural lifestyles and values, including the "civic middle class," "conservative-established," "traditional," "socio-ecological," and "liberal-intellectual." Currently, each social environment accounts for between 7% and 15% of the total. This result fully confirms that the current German social environment as a whole exhibits a trend of diversification and fragmentation.

2. Changes in values lead to increasingly complex electoral behavior. Changes in social structure drive changes in values. Long-term political ties among voters—such as the natural bond between the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the laboring classes or trade unions—have long since loosened, and traditional social cleavages are increasingly supplemented by new ones. Social lifestyles and cultural value orientations exhibit salient characteristics of individualization, pluralization, fragmentation, and post-materialism. Many scholars believe that after the Cold War, the cleavage between labor and capital on the socioeconomic dimension is no longer the decisive cleavage reflecting the primary contradictions of Western European society. On the socio-cultural dimension, a new social cleavage based on cultural values has emerged in Western European society: integration versus demarcation. This is specifically manifested as the opposition between cosmopolitan openness and inclusion and communitarian closed demarcation. Changes in values have shaken the social foundations upon which political parties depend for survival, making it difficult for voters' political preferences, core demands, and forms of participation to be fixed into immutable patterns.

Value changes have brought several specific consequences for traditional parties. First, more and more citizens are no longer participating in general elections. Over several decades, turnout in elections at all levels has declined; taking the German federal election as an example, turnout fell from a high of 91.1% in 1972 to a record low of 70.8% in 2009. Second, voters' identification with and loyalty to political parties have declined. Voter mobility and the uncertainty of electoral behavior have increased; loyal voters who vote for the same party in two consecutive general elections have become a minority. Cross-party or even cross-camp voting has become commonplace—a center-left SPD voter might support the right-wing populist AfD ^[10] in the next election. Between 1972 and 2009, the proportion of "die-hard" voters among all voters fell from 55% to 32%, while the proportion of swing voters increased from 20% to 38%. This has a particularly large impact on traditional major parties that historically relied on the vote banks of die-hard supporters. Third, it is increasingly difficult for traditional major parties to attract large numbers of voters through political programs. Unlike small parties that focus on acting as the representative for the interests of a specific group, the goal of a traditional major party is to win over as many voters as possible. However, as the German social environment becomes increasingly complex and diverse, the political programs and policy positions of "catch-all parties" (Volkspartei) ^[11] either fail to cover the demands of all parties or their domestic and foreign policies gradually converge with those of other parties, increasingly losing their distinct programmatic character.

(3) Evolution of the Party itself

1. Centrist positioning is unfavorable for highlighting programmatic characteristics. Compared with the CDU (Christian Democratic Union of Germany), the Greens, or the Left Party, the SPD has long lacked irreplaceable programmatic features and core competencies with exclusive representative rights. In the early years of the Federal Republic of Germany, the CDU successfully implemented the concept of the Social Market Economy, weakening the SPD's characteristic advantage in social justice. During the reign of SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the importance of environmental issues was neglected, leading to the rise of the Green Party. The introduction of the "Godesberg Program" pushed the party to transform into a center-left party. In the Schröder era, the "Schröder-Blair Paper" was published, attempting to push the party toward a "Third Way" between socialism and capitalism at the turn of the century, shifting further toward the "political center." To reduce long-term unemployment, Schröder carried out drastic reforms of the welfare state from 2003 onward, successively launching market-liberal social reform measures in the labor market and social security sectors centered on the "Hartz reforms" and "Agenda 2010." These weakened the traditional image the SPD had established on the issue of social justice, leading to disappointment and rejection by workers and the lower strata of society. Since the 21st century, during the international financial crisis and the European debt crisis, the SPD, as a governing partner, supported the CDU’s neoliberal line and fiscal austerity policies. This was similarly seen as a departure from social democratic principles and a compromise with neoliberalism. Although the SPD's strategy of moving toward the center granted it strong advantages for political alliances, it also led to its political positions becoming increasingly close to those of the center-right parties. Its programmatic identity was no longer clear, and it also left a representational vacuum on the political fringes, providing space for the development of marginal small parties.

2. The conciliatory line has dragged the party into a dilemma of participation. As the political representative of broad social strata, the SPD consciously acts as a "political stability anchor," assuming collective responsibility. It is accustomed to supporting "consensus politics," playing a role in public communication, compromise, and political reconciliation to seek the formation of social consensus. The SPD has participated in government many times as a junior partner, and the "Grand Coalition" (Große Koalition) has precisely become a dilemma and "curse" that the SPD finds difficult to break: the more it participates in governing and exercises political influence, the worse its polling and election results become, and the greater the damage to the party itself. Within a Grand Coalition, the SPD is consistently unable to step out from the shadow of the CDU; public perception of the SPD is low, with credit for governance achievements being attributed more to the CDU or diverted to support opposition parties. Consequently, whether to participate in a Grand Coalition has triggered persistent controversy within the party. In fact, during several Grand Coalitions, the SPD successfully promoted a series of social policies protecting labor rights, such as the statutory minimum wage, but failed to translate these achievements into its own political capital. After the defeat in the 2017 general election, although the SPD immediately announced it would no longer participate in a Grand Coalition, it eventually joined the government again for the sake of stabilizing the German political situation, after the CDU fell into a stalemate in cabinet formation and made significant concessions regarding the SPD's policy demands and ministerial appointments.

3. Factional power struggles affect internal unity. Judging from past experiences, the SPD has always struggled to effectively restrain centrifugal forces, factional strife, and critical disputes. Situations like those in the 1960s and 70s, where SPD Chancellor Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and parliamentary group chairman Herbert Wehner cooperated with tacit understanding, have been rare in the party’s history. Leadership often falls publicly into personal conflicts, leading to frequent turnover in high-level personnel, which has a significant negative impact on the party. During the Schröder period, the "traditionalists" represented by party chairman Oskar Lafontaine and the "reformers" centered on Chancellor Schröder engaged in factional struggles over social reform. This directly led to internal division; after some high-level leftists and members left the party, they founded the WASG (Electoral Alternative for Labor and Social Justice) and, driven by Lafontaine, merged with the eastern PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) in 2007 to form the nationwide Left Party (Die Linke), becoming a powerful competitor in the left-wing camp. In 2018, the internal struggle between Martin Schulz and Sigmar Gabriel similarly resulted in losses for both sides.

Furthermore, in addition to the committees and working groups stipulated in the party statutes, there have traditionally been informal factional groups within the SPD. The most influential factions include the right-leaning conservative "Seeheim Circle" (Seeheimer Kreis), the left-leaning "Parliamentary Left" (Parlamentarische Linke) composed of MPs, the "Networkers" (Netzwerker) composed of young MPs advocating a reformist path, and the "Democratic Left 21 Forum" (DL21), mainly composed of members outside parliament. Members within these groups often form consistent positions on major party issues, and their existence has, to some extent, deepened internal exhaustion.

4. Leadership lacks political prestige and stability. During the 20 years the SPD has led the federal government, it has produced a total of three Chancellors, whereas the CDU, in its 52 years leading the government, has had only five. The latter were mostly "evergreens" of the political arena who possessed high political prestige and influence within the party; their average duration in power has been among the longest in European countries. Among them, Adenauer governed for 14 years and served as party chairman for 16; Kohl governed for 16 years and served as party chairman for 25; Merkel governed for 16 years and served as party chairman for 18. In contrast, although charismatic leaders like August Bebel and Willy Brandt appeared in the SPD, few leaders have been able to maintain lasting influence within the party. During Kohl's tenure as CDU chairman, the SPD saw five party chairmen and multiple Chancellor candidates; during Merkel's tenure as CDU chairman, the SPD changed party chairmen nine times. The CDU mostly combines the positions of party chairman and Chancellor candidate in one person to demonstrate internal unity, whereas in the SPD, these two roles are often separate, and high-level personnel lack stability. For example, the 2021 Chancellor candidate Olaf Scholz lost the 2019 party leadership election and has principled differences on fiscal and economic policy with the current co-chairs. Furthermore, the trends of professionalization, elitism, and high educational attainment in party politics have led to the SPD's middle and high-level politicians, advisors, and cadres losing "touch with the ground," having less contact with the grassroots masses, and becoming detached from the practice of production and daily life.

IV. The SPD's Response Measures Facing criticism from inside and outside the party regarding the loss of programmatic direction, the SPD has focused on implementing reforms in terms of its core identity, programmatic content, organizational structure, and social participation since its loss in the 2009 general election. After the defeat in the 2017 general election, the SPD accelerated its reflection on its line and direction and its policy responses. The leadership change in 2019 reflected this adjustment process, and in the 2021 election manifesto, it further refined its related proposals and ideas, striving to highlight the differences between itself and other parties—especially the CDU—hoping thereby to improve its political mobilization capacity and enhance public recognition and acceptance of the party.

(1) Reclaiming core issues and strengthening the tradition of social justice. As a left-wing party, the SPD's traditional core issue is to "tame" capitalism through labor rights, distributive justice, and sustainability in the social sphere. For more than a decade, the party has committed to strengthening its traditional characteristics, establishing social justice issues as its priority political agenda to regain the trust of low- and middle-income strata and repair the subsequent negative effects of the labor market reforms of the Schröder era. In policy areas such as social welfare, pensions, the labor market, taxation, education, and nursing care, the party has continuously introduced and implemented policies for vulnerable groups aimed at achieving new demands for equal rights. It was precisely due to the strong promotion by the SPD that Germany introduced a statutory minimum wage and a basic pension system. In the 2021 election manifesto, the party proposed numerous social rights demands, including raising the minimum wage to 12 euros per hour, changing "Hartz IV" unemployment benefits to "Citizen's Allowance" (Bürgergeld) to provide a higher level of basic security, expanding infrastructure such as free daycare and all-day primary and secondary schools, strengthening policy regulation of contract workers, and increasing child benefits.

(2) Enriching programmatic content and seeking opportunities of the times...

The SPD hopes to adapt to the new economic and social situation and the demands of the times by adjusting its existing programmatic content. This line of thinking was already clear in the Hamburg Program, and the 2021 election manifesto placed even greater emphasis on integrating contemporary issues, explicitly highlighting tasks and challenges such as digitalization, society, and carbon neutrality. Currently, the SPD focuses on three major issue areas to propose its innovative policy positions. First, the critique of capitalism and alternative solutions. Faced with the crisis symptoms of capitalism and the problem of wealth polarization, the SPD has proposed various critiques, innovations, and alternatives in policy areas such as ownership and social welfare, putting forward concrete policy propositions. For example, the Berlin SPD during its term in government introduced regulations on rent caps to curb the rising momentum of rents in major cities; Kevin Kühnert, the former chairman of the SPD's youth organization, advocated for the nationalization of large corporate groups like BMW and major real estate enterprises. Second, digital transformation. The SPD continues to conduct in-depth discussions on "digital capitalism" and "Labor 4.0," exploring their impact on the party's core issues—such as the world of work and the protection of labor rights—and proposing specific response recommendations. For instance, they demand that employees' co-determination rights be guaranteed during the digital construction of enterprises. Third, climate protection. The party hopes to compensate for its shortcomings on environmental issues, and the 2021 election manifesto put forward many specific requirements. For example, it advocated for at least 15 million electric vehicles to be on the road by 2030, for renewable energy to cover all of Germany's energy needs by 2040, and a speed limit of 130 km/h on motorways.

(3) Strengthening Intra-Party Democratic Participation and Innovating Organizational Forms

In recent years, the SPD has emphasized innovating organizational forms in its party building, increasing direct democratic procedures for member participation in decision-making, and granting ordinary members more rights in important intra-party personnel and political affairs. The main goals are, on the one hand, to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of high-level decision-making and resolve internal party disputes over relevant decisions, and on the other hand, to create a cultural atmosphere of democratic participation, mobilize grassroots enthusiasm, and enhance cohesion. Specific innovative measures include: First, adopting intra-party primaries for important personnel decisions. In the nomination of important figures such as the party chairpersons and the candidate for Chancellor, candidates must receive support from several grassroots and federal state party organizations to be nominated. They must also appear at regional conventions held across the country to solicit votes and engage in full discussion with members, after which the final candidate is produced through a primary procedure involving all party members. In 2019, for the first time in the party's history, dual chairpersons with gender equality were established; after months of campaigning, they were ultimately elected by ordinary members through a primary ballot. Second, consulting ordinary members on major policy decisions. In 2013 and 2017, the SPD twice utilized member consultations to let grassroots members collectively decide whether to form a coalition government with the CDU/CSU ^[12], achieving favorable results. In the 2013 member consultation, nearly 78% of members participated, with nearly 76% voting in favor of the grand coalition, effectively quieting internal party controversy on the matter. Third, promoting digital construction within the party. The party applies digital means to all areas of party work, from electoral procedures to opinion consultations, thereby improving the efficiency and transparency of relevant decision-making.

(4) Promoting Social Participation and Increasing Public Acceptance

In recent years, the SPD has increasingly sought to extend the principle of direct democracy from within the party to the general public, achieving a sense of openness to non-party members. Party organizations at all levels, especially local and grassroots organizations, actively cultivate channels for citizen dialogue. They carefully design target groups across all sectors of society and organize regular or ad hoc, online or offline citizen dialogues, forums, and discussion meetings to deliberate on issues of public concern. They also "seek counsel from the people" ^[13] by inviting non-party members to offer suggestions for the party's election manifesto or municipal construction. They have even established specialized coordination bodies for this purpose, hoping to consolidate their social base, participate more actively in social processes, promote public understanding and acceptance of the party, increase the party's public recognition and attractiveness to non-members, and compete for dominance in public opinion with various political forces, including populist parties and social movements.

V. Conclusion

Faced with a long-term downturn, the SPD has for some time adopted various crisis-response measures which have yielded certain results. 2021 was Germany's "super election year"; excluding Thuringia, which ultimately cancelled its state election plans, Germany held one Bundestag election and five state parliament elections. In the Rhineland-Palatinate state election on March 14, the SPD led the CDU by eight percentage points with 35.7% of the vote. In the month leading up to the federal election in September, the SPD suddenly reversed its decline and surged ahead, ultimately emerging as the party with the highest share of the vote by a narrow margin of 1.6%. This performance was largely related to the blunders of the Union (CDU/CSU) and Green Party candidates, as well as the steady performance of the SPD candidate, Olaf Scholz. However, the SPD still faces two structural problems. On the one hand, regarding the directional question of programmatic development, there remain significant internal differences over whether to fully return to the traditional core identity of social justice or to continue the line of "consensus politics" and political compromise. There is also substantial controversy within the party regarding several new propositions, including the nationalization of large enterprises, a wealth tax, and universal basic income. On the other hand, the increase in forms of intra-party democratic participation has not rapidly led to more direct engagement; participation in many intra-party primaries has been insufficient, and the enthusiasm of ordinary members for participating in major affairs has yet to be fully mobilized.

Currently, Western capitalist society is entering the post-industrial, globalized, and information age at an accelerated pace, facing brand-new challenges and difficulties. These include the intensification of distribution conflicts in the welfare state, the structural transformation of the world of labor, data protection, cybersecurity, the regulation of large internet enterprises, and the pressure to achieve climate protection goals. All these urgently require major political parties to produce adjustment and response plans. How to find the appropriate positioning and balance between tradition and reform, freedom and security, and openness and closure—preserving its heritage on characteristic issues while seizing the opportunities of the times, responding to the changes of the era, exploring and enriching its programmatic substance, and demonstrating its unique value in fierce inter-party competition—is the "challenge of the century" facing a century-old party like the SPD.

(Author's affiliation: Institute for German Studies, Tongji University) Online Editor: Tong Xin Source: Contemporary World and Socialism, 2021, No. 5.