Shi Fengge: A Critique of the Ecocentric View of Nature and the Construction of a New Ecological Philosophy
Modern industrial civilization, while bringing material prosperity and sensory enjoyment to humanity, has also caused the increasing deterioration of the ecological environment, seriously jeopardizing the very survival of the human race. Faced with this situation, the Western intelligentsia took the lead in the 1960s in reflecting on the relationship between humanity and nature under traditional industrial civilization. This gave rise to various schools of thought such as environmental ethics, wilderness philosophy, and deep ecology, which are generally referred to as the nature-centric ecological outlook. Nature-centrism attempts to repair the actual natural world damaged by humans to achieve harmony between humanity and nature. On the surface, this ecological outlook appears flawless and reasonable; however, it is a utopian fantasy. Undoubtedly, nature-centrism reflects the concern people have for increasingly serious ecological problems. Yet, contrary to expectations, we have not seen a significant alleviation of current ecological issues, let alone the elimination of the ecological crisis. Where, then, does the crux of the problem lie? This has become a question over which many philosophers and ecologists have puzzled. To date, people remain divided on how to solve ecological problems, and the ecological issue remains a worldwide challenge. Through a reflection on nature-centrism, the renowned contemporary Western leftist scholar Slavoj Žižek points out that the crux of this trend of thought is its ontological utopia, and he offers his own answer from a psychoanalytic perspective. Below, we provide a brief analysis of this.
I. The Primordial Nature of Perfect Balance: The Utopia of the Nature-Centric Ecological Outlook
"The mainstream view of contemporary Western ecological philosophy is 'nature-centrism.'" We can also call it a typical ideology regarding ecological issues because it presupposes a primordial nature—a nature that not only exists but is "unpolluted," only to be later destroyed by "man," the master of nature. Thus, returning to primeval, proto-nature becomes the goal of the nature-centric ecological outlook. Specifically, we can understand the nature-centric ecological outlook through the following aspects.
First, from the perspective of philosophical ontology, nature-centrism has its ontological foundation, namely that primordial nature of perfect balance. This is an ontological presupposition of nature characterized by a "utopian" color. Of course, this natural "utopia" is essentially a retrospective construction of thought [1], rather than an indubitable reality or fact; it infers a possible cause from an effect rather than following the normal sequence of cause preceding effect. On the one hand, in terms of temporal logic, proto-primordial nature is always unrepeatable. As a past situation, it has always already vanished; that is, we cannot return to the past to confirm what original nature actually looked like. Thus, so-called primordial nature must be a retrospective construction of thought. On the other hand, humans are essentially beings of cultural symbols, which requires them to endow their own existence with order and meaning. That is, for a person "to live, to be able to survive, the spirit must relate itself to some kind of order. It must understand reality as an independent whole. The spirit lives in a relationship of trust with reality itself... this relationship of trust was originally and indeed always is our relationship with nature as a totality, that is, as the reality of the natural world." In other words, to inhabit the world of everyday life, people must imagine nature as an ordered, balanced, and perfect whole. This means that in the depths of the human spirit, people "find it hard to truly accept the fact that the flow of everyday reality will be disrupted." When faced with ecological disasters that frequently disrupt the balance of their daily lives, people mentally construct a primordial nature of perfect balance to resist this imbalance. This mental construction also accords with the essential requirements of human survival.
Second, based on the ontological foundation of "primordial nature," the various schools of the nature-centric ecological outlook hold differing views. These include ecological ethics, which extends the scope of ethical relations to natural beings beyond humans; wilderness philosophy, which showcases the original natural environment; and deep ecology, which advocates for the "self-realization" of humans alongside other species.
The initial reflection on environmental issues came from ecological ethics, proposed by the French scholar Albert Schweitzer, developed by the American scholar Aldo Leopold, and finally systematized by Holmes Rolston III. The basic tenet of ecological ethics is to extend the ethical relations originally applicable between humans to natural beings beyond humans. That is, "a land ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members, and also respect for the community as such." This extends the original ethical concern between humans to other beings in the natural world. From the perspective of ecological ethics, this expansion of moral concern is grounded in the intrinsic value and inherent rights of nature. The value of nature here is not the instrumental value relative to humans within the anthropocentric horizon, but a creative value-in-itself determined by the structure of natural objects. This value attribute allows natural objects to adapt perfectly to nature and makes the life of Mother Nature more diverse and exquisite. As for whether nature actually possesses rights, the famous American ecologist Barry Commoner explained this by proposing the ecological law "nature knows best." To illustrate this, he used the example of a mechanical watch: the precise internal structure of a watch is the accumulation of the skills of countless predecessors—it is the product of careful engineering. "Any random change made in such a regulated system is likely to cause it to malfunction." Extending this to nature, we can conclude that the Earth's biosphere is a self-organizing system that has functioned excellently through hundreds of millions of years of evolution. Its internal natural substances have all been tested and retained by this system. "Any major man-made change in a natural system is likely to be detrimental to that system." That is to say, in the long-term evolution of nature, only those things that could be integrated into the self-organizing system and were conducive to its persistence could be retained. These surviving beings, through long-term evolution and adaptation, have achieved an optimal state of matching with the ecosystem; therefore, they are entitled to continue existing according to their natural rights-in-themselves. It is precisely based on the intrinsic value and rights of nature that ecological ethics holds that natural beings and humans should be equal, and that humans should respect and revere nature.
Wilderness philosophy attempts to provide proof from a scientific perspective for a nature where there is no human intervention and where ecological laws play a dominant role. Wilderness "is a community of life that presents beauty, integrity, and stability," and "is a living museum that displays our roots of life." Specifically, it puts forward the following views: First, as the original natural environment, wilderness constitutes an independent self-circulating system with diversity; protecting the wilderness will help protect ecological diversity. Second, wilderness has its overall homeostasis and harmony, encompassing the laws of the changing seasons and biological migration. Within it, there are also mechanisms of interaction between species. These interaction mechanisms include parts that are beneficial to the organic whole of the wilderness as well as harmful parts, but it is precisely this dialectical unity of benefit and harm that guarantees the healthy development of the wilderness. Third, the essential attribute of wilderness is wildness, which is "the property of an organism formed by the interdependence and interaction of the internal structural elements and relationships of the wilderness ecosystem." Artificial intervention in this wildness will lead to the loss of the organism's ability to adapt, rendering it unable to survive. The wilderness is the primordial, and simultaneously it is self-sufficient and perfect; is this not precisely the projection of the primordial natural view of perfect balance?
If the above two schools only reflect the ontological presupposition of primordial nature in nature-centrism from a partial perspective, then Arne Næss’s deep ecology displays it from a holistic perspective. Næss’s deep ecology can be called a "totalizing concept"; its basic principles are "biocentric equality" and "self-realization." It points out that human self-realization should exceed the scope of the species; this "self" should surpass human society and identify with all beings. At this point, the self should be the "Great Self"—an ecological self—where the "I" as a human subject is merely a part of a larger whole. Consequently, Næss points out that "maximum self-realization requires maximum diversity and symbiosis. Diversity is a fundamental principle." The reason for this is precisely that human "self-realization" depends on the "self-realization" of other beings. Here, we see a more radical manifestation of the ontological presupposition of a primordial nature of perfect balance—an ecological viewpoint that places humans on an equal footing with other organisms as merely a part of primordial nature.
Through the above analysis, we can see that nature-centrism, based on the ontological presupposition of a primordial nature of perfect balance, has proposed theoretical reflections to deal with the ecological crisis. However, because these theoretical reflections overemphasize the dimensions of natural rights and intrinsic value, they overlook the fact that the injection of human values is the proper meaning of our reflection on ecological problems. At the same time, this ontological presupposition of primordial nature, as a retrospective construction of thought, also carries a clear utopian color. The perception of nature in this ecological outlook also makes it impossible for them to resolve the ecological crisis caused by the disharmony between humanity and nature. An effective solution to the ecological dilemma must be grounded in a scientific cognitive foundation; the most primary task is to clarify exactly what kind of nature we are facing.
II. Critique of the Ontological Presuppositions of the Nature-Centric Ecological Outlook: Nature Does Not Exist
Regarding the nature-centric ontological presupposition of a primordial nature of perfect balance, Žižek, proceeding from a psychoanalytic perspective, has produced a powerful critique. Starting from the psychoanalytic concept of "trauma," he points out that "man is a 'wound of nature,' and the balance of nature can never be restored; the only thing man can do to live in harmony with the environment is to fully accept this rift, this crack, to accept this structural uprooting, and to repair it as much as possible afterward." Based on this, Žižek clearly puts forward his own view of nature: that "Nature" does not exist; nature is always already a broken, imbalanced nature. He provides full substantiation for this from both the inherent attributes of nature itself and "second nature."
First, Žižek believes that nature, in terms of its inherent attributes, is full of catastrophes and imbalances. He explains this through a dialectical reading of Darwin's theory of evolution. The usual reading of Darwinian evolution is that species are perfectly designed to adapt to nature; Žižek, however, points out that "this reference to Darwin is a profound misunderstanding." He believes that the "evolution" into the current system of species is merely "nature's clumsy improvisation, where every limited success is accompanied by heavy costs and catastrophes." A clear piece of evidence proves this: "90% of the human genome is 'junk' DNA with no clear function." This evidence regarding humans also precisely illustrates the ultimate contingency of human existence. That is to say, in the evolutionary history of species, there is "no evolution: catastrophes and breaks in balance are part of natural history. At many moments in the past, life could have turned in a completely different direction. Our main source of energy (oil) is itself the result of unimaginable past catastrophes." Does this not precisely reveal to us the true face of nature? It is itself full of unpredictable disasters and crises. Real nature is not as pleasant and harmonious as green shade and drifting clouds; real, proto-nature is like the scenery of southern Iceland: "Magnificent, vast, green-misted coastal plains, scattered with large stones covered in moss, which cannot help but appear as uncontrolled, pathological, cancer-like protrusions." Do these not all show us the truth of the chaos and disorder of natural reality, and thus negate from within nature the nature-centric ontological presupposition of a primordial nature of perfect balance?
Second, Žižek argues that the nature existing since the birth of humanity has always already been a "second nature" or a "humanized nature" [2]; furthermore, with the development of biogenetic technology, nature itself will cease to exist. Starting from the premise that "man is a wound of nature" [3], Žižek contends that the emergence of the human race has long since carved deep gashes into nature, such that the "balance of nature is gone forever." Human intervention in nature is so profound that any sudden disruption of large-scale industrial activity would lead to a catastrophic collapse. This means that "'nature' on Earth has already 'adapted' to human interventions; human 'pollution' has been thoroughly internalized into the fragile, unstable balance of 'natural' reproduction on Earth." At the same time, the development of contemporary biogenetic technology will lead to the disappearance of nature. On one hand, we see more diverse forms of humanized nature, including "natural monsters, freakish cows and trees, or the more positive dream of organisms genetically manipulated to be better suited to our needs." On the other hand, there is a "second nature" in the sense of the autonomization of the results of human activity—results that "produce monsters with a life of their own." The cumulative effect of these two aspects is that "a second nature in the sense of an automated social process is producing a second nature in the sense of artificially created nature and natural monsters." Thus, the contemporary world fits the definition of second nature more than ever before. The subversive significance of biogenetic technology for the traditional view of nature also lies in the fact that this technological breakthrough brings about the "end of nature." Because of the unique capacity of biogenetic technology to create entirely new life, the "nature" of life "retrospectively loses its spontaneous-natural character and becomes one among a series of artificial-synthetic programs," and an imperfect species at that. This subversive power leads Žižek to a more radical view of nature: in the contemporary world, we have already lost nature. One could say that Žižek’s view of nature provides a better interpretation of the "second nature" proposed by Marx. Second nature refers to the world of human creations, the product of human spirituality. As Marx pointed out in his critique of Ludwig Feuerbach’s intuitive materialism: "He does not see that the sensuous world around him is, not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society; and, indeed [it is] an historical product, the result of the activities of a whole succession of generations... even the objects of the simplest 'sensuous certainty' are given to him only through social development, industry, and commercial intercourse." This is the fundamental point where Marx’s dialectical view of nature transcends the old materialist view: "What distinguishes Marx's concept of nature from all other views of nature from the very beginning is its socio-historical character."
III. A New Ecological Philosophy Facing the Truth of Nature: The Future Perfect and Collective Action
Through the above analysis, we have gained a more comprehensive and scientific understanding of the truth of nature—namely, that in the real world there is no perfectly balanced primordial nature. What we directly face is a nature whose balance is broken, a nature already beset by ecological catastrophe, and a second nature that has long been humanized. It is on this basis that Žižek proposes a new ecological philosophy that faces the truth of nature head-on.
The primary characteristic of this new ecological philosophy is manifested in its conception of time: it is a "future perfect" (先将来时) [4] view of time. The future perfect is a tense specific to French (and other languages) that expresses an action to be completed before another future action occurs—that is, the future is conditioned upon an action already completed. Therefore, the "future perfect" is a view of time that looks at the present from the perspective of the future; it retrospectively determines our current actions through a presupposition of the future. Regarding the "future perfect," Žižek provides a systematic exposition in In Defense of Lost Causes. He points out that the future perfect introduces a "projected time" (投射的时间) that differs from the traditional linear view of historical time. In the traditional linear view of history, "possibility precedes choice"; people merely passively choose among various possibilities, and the realization of any one possibility correspondingly cancels out the others. In contrast, the "projected time" relied upon by the future perfect points to the "notion of a choice/action that retrospectively opens up its own possibility." This "projected time" is a closed-loop time between the past and the future, meaning that "causally, the future is produced by our acts in the past, while the way we act is determined by our anticipation of the future and our reaction to this anticipation." Under this view of time, the possibilities of the past are retrospectively altered by this anticipation, thereby remaining open. This is precisely how the "future perfect" temporal view deals with ecological issues: we should treat ecological catastrophe as an inevitable fate. By accepting the perspective of ecological catastrophe, we actively project ourselves into this fate. It is precisely through this projection of the ecological catastrophe dimension into the future that people’s agency is galvanized to take active measures to avoid the encounter with catastrophe. As Žižek notes, "one should retrospectively insert into its past (the past of the future) a counterfactual possibility ('if we had done this or that, the catastrophe we are living now would not have occurred!')." According to this presupposition, we should actively organize and implement actions that will change fate itself; here, choice or action retrospectively endows the past with new possibilities. In summary, the "future perfect" is a view of time that transcends itself and leans toward the future. At the same time, Žižek regards it as the only effective strategy for us to deal with ecological issues today. As he points out, when facing ecological catastrophe, "one cannot say 'the future is still open, we still have time to act and prevent the worst'; one should rather accept that the catastrophe is inevitable and then act to retrospectively undo what is already 'written in the stars' as our fate." Žižek argues that we should start from the perspective that natural ecological catastrophe is "always already" here, use the future perfect view of time to face existing ecological problems, and implement active intervention to avoid a real encounter with a catastrophic conclusion.
The shift from a traditional linear view of time to a future perfect view has profound practical significance. It specifically addresses the "deadlock of choice" concealed by the spontaneity of "objective spirit" in the contemporary social sphere. Objective spirit is the "cunning of reason" (理性的狡计) formed through human interaction; it creates a new "Big Other" [5], which allows for the anonymization or systematization of the consequences of people’s actions. The result of this anonymization in ecological matters is that no clear agent is held responsible for ecological problems, as they are seen as the result of an objective process. However, in reality, we clearly know we should be responsible, but the "objective spirit" "allows us not to act on this knowledge, not to assume this responsibility." Žižek believes the cause of this situation lies in the "deadlock of choice" in contemporary society—"the need to decide about things that will fundamentally affect our life, but without a proper basis in knowledge." To describe this, Žižek borrows Donald Rumsfeld's terminology, calling it the "unknown knowns" (不知道的非知) [6]. Regarding ecological catastrophe, we do not know where the tipping point lies, nor do we know exactly what kind of catastrophe we will face. Consequently, regarding ecological catastrophe, by the time we truly realize it, it is always already "too late," because the emergence of ecological catastrophe brings a subversive impact to the existing symbolic order. It is precisely this unpredictability of ecological catastrophe that makes contemporary people face a deadlock of choice when dealing with ecological problems that affect us. The "future perfect" view of time is specifically aimed at this paradoxical dilemma of choice. From this, we can see that the future perfect view of time contains a dimension of action. This action is fundamentally different from the utopian fantasy of attempting to return to "pristine" nature; it is grounded in the real dialectical relationship between humans and nature—namely, the trauma brought to nature by the emergence of humans and the resulting tension between the two. Based on this, such action seeks to ensure the long-term survival and development of humanity as a whole through intervention. That is to say, on ecological issues, the future perfect considers the present from the standpoint of human values.
So, what kind of action is this? The action we must resort to is collective action. Žižek discusses this systematically, arguing that people must first discard the following prejudice: "the idea that linear evolutionary time is 'on our side,' that history 'works for us' in its mole-like burrowing, doing what the 'cunning of reason' is supposed to do." The subversive dimension of ecological catastrophe means we can no longer consider ecological issues according to the "cunning of reason," as doing so could lead to the destruction of humanity and its history. Accordingly, Žižek believes we must re-assert the concept of collective action and actively assume responsibility for addressing ecological issues. Žižek elaborates on his view of collective action by endowing the four moments of Alain Badiou's "eternal idea" of revolutionary egalitarian justice with new content. First, we must uphold "strict egalitarian justice" to deal with ecological catastrophe. Ecological catastrophe has the destructive power to interrupt human history. Therefore, when sacrifices are required for environmental protection, everyone should pay the same price. The most typical example involves energy consumption: to better protect the environment, we demand that "everyone in the world has the same standard of per capita energy consumption, CO2 emissions, etc." Second, we must instill a sense of "terror" (恐怖) into the subject—that is, ruthless punishment for all who violate imposed environmental protection measures, thereby achieving the goal of everyone actively complying with mandatory environmental measures. Third, we must advocate "voluntarism" (唯意志论), a concept contrasted with individual-centered rationalism. Rationalism emphasizes that the "spontaneous" behavior of individuals pursuing their own maximum interest objectively promotes the balanced development of the whole; it emphasizes the maximization of individual interest and a "spontaneous" inherent logic. In contrast, voluntarism emphasizes an irrational will, a strong will that exceeds human rational intellect. This is precisely the attitude people should have when facing ecological catastrophes involving the fate of humanity: to be saved from ecological catastrophe, we are willing to make the necessary sacrifices, which means limiting the spontaneous, blind development of humanity. To achieve this goal, people must resort to large-scale collective action, which precisely moves the collective willpower of humanity. Finally, we must have full "trust in the people" (信任人民). Only then can the first three measures truly take effect. We need to make a wager—trusting that "the majority of the people will support these harsh measures, view them as their own, and be ready to participate in their implementation." This is precisely a call for subjectivity in our response to contemporary ecological catastrophe; we need a decisive acting subject. Žižek believes that to effectively respond to the ecological crisis, we need to go a step further: "one should not be afraid to require the activation of one of the roles in all egalitarian-revolutionary terror—the combination of terror and trust in the people—the 'informer' [告密者], who reports perpetrators to the authorities." What Žižek wants to express here is the formation of a "gaze of the Other" while activating the "abyss of negativity" [7] of the people's subjectivity, thereby deterring those who wish to undermine strict protection measures.
The future perfect and collective action together constitute Žižek’s new ecological philosophy. The two complement each other, jointly describing the overall logic and practical path of the new ecological philosophy in dealing with ecological problems. The future perfect is the fundamental attitude we should hold when facing ecological problems and the premise upon which we carry out collective action. Meanwhile, collective action, which emphasizes the willpower of humanity, is also the only way for us to realize the future perfect goal of avoiding ecological catastrophe.
IV. Conclusion
Ecological issues concern the sustainable development of contemporary human society and are closely related to the interests of every individual, thereby garnering widespread public concern. Intellectual circles in developed countries took the lead in reflecting upon the deterioration of the ecological environment. Most of these scholars oppose anthropocentrism, adhere to a nature-centric ecological outlook, and emphasize the need to respect and hold in awe natural entities other than human beings. As the ecological crisis has deepened, the nature-centric ecological outlook has increasingly highlighted the inherent value and intrinsic rights of nature itself, employing the retrospective construction of a perfectly balanced "primordial nature" as its ontological presupposition. Consequently, ecology has progressively developed toward "Deep Green" [8] positions, moving toward a comprehensive nature-centrism. It is undeniable that the reflections offered by the nature-centric ecological outlook have allowed people to deeply recognize the severity of environmental problems and have effectively raised environmental awareness. However, while attending to the theoretical depth of ecological thought, we must also consider its scientific rigor and practical significance. Furthermore, we must be vigilant against the construction of ecological theories drifting toward the extreme of ecological utopia; for, in the final analysis, our reflection on ecological problems is for the purpose of solving them more effectively to guarantee the sustainable development of humanity. It is precisely based on such realistic considerations that Slavoj Žižek, proceeding from a psychoanalytic perspective, has offered a powerful critique of the ontological presuppositions constructed by the nature-centric ecological outlook. By arguing from the two aspects of nature's inherent attributes and "humanized nature" [9], he points out the absurdity of the nature-centric ontological presupposition and proposes a "new ecological philosophy." This new philosophical thought contains the dual implications of the "future anterior" [10] and collective action. The future anterior, as our fundamental attitude for dealing with ecological disasters, requires us to embed the dimension of disaster into our present reality, thereby providing a conceptual basis for our decision-making. Collective action, meanwhile, is the powerful guarantee by which we retrospectively change and reset possibilities to avoid our encounter with ecological catastrophe.
The construction of Žižek's new ecological philosophy is grounded in the psychoanalytic concept of "trauma." On the surface, it appears to have no connection to the dialectical reflections of Marx and Engels on the relationship between humanity and nature, but upon close comparison, we can discern an internal link between them. On one hand, this link is primarily reflected in their shared view that nature is already "humanized nature." Just as Marx believed that nature is the product of man's objectifying activity [11]—thereby endowing nature with social attributes—Žižek also points out, from the perspective of the deep development of science and technology, that nature has long since lost its "natural" attributes. On the other hand, Žižek’s dissection of the relationship between humanity and nature through the concept of "trauma" shares a subtle commonality with Engels’s Dialectics of Nature. Žižek regards humanity as the "wound" of nature, while simultaneously viewing this rift as a structural protrusion that we can only attempt to repair but never fully close. Engels, meanwhile, pointed out: "Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third places it has quite different, unforeseen effects, which only too often cancel the first." That is to say, while man conquers nature, nature also exacts ruthless revenge upon humanity—a revenge characterized by contingency and unpredictability. Therefore, we should no longer expect to restore that harmonious state of "unity of heaven and man" [12] (tianren heyi) between humanity and nature, but rather strive to maintain the current "fragile balance" between the two. Finally, the concept of collective action proposed by Žižek is also closely related to "practice" (shixian) [13] within the horizon of Marxist historical materialism. Marx regarded practice as the mediation of the objectifying activity between humanity and nature; it is precisely based on practice that the ecological outlook we construct gains practical significance. Žižek’s "collective action" is itself a form of human practical activity, and at the same time, this collective action takes the inherent values of humanity itself as its internal teleological goal.
In the 21st century, ecological problems have become increasingly prominent and constitute a major challenge for the future sustainable development of humanity. Today’s ecological problems also increasingly bring traumatic experiences to people through their character of concealment, unknowability, and sudden contingency. Žižek’s new ecological philosophy, precisely through the psychoanalytic concept of "trauma," brings us new reflections on ecological issues. It places the rift within the internal structure of the relationship between humanity and nature, enabling people to look directly at the Real [14] of the ecological disasters that have already occurred. Furthermore, this new ecological philosophy focuses on the inherent value of humanity itself and proposes a concept of collective action under the "future anterior" as a realistic strategy for dealing with ecological problems. Thus, ecological issues move from the "other shore" [15] of nature-centric utopia to the "this shore" of realistic strategies that focus more on the effective resolution of ecological problems. Although Žižek’s new ecological philosophy is still not perfect, it undoubtedly provides a new perspective for our understanding of ecological issues and offers new paths and methods for solving the ecological problems of globalization.