Yang Jianmin: Current Situation and Prospects of the Latin American Left
Beginning with Hugo Chávez’s ascension to power in Venezuela in 1999, left-wing parties in Latin America rose to prominence and won successive general elections, setting off a "Pink Tide" [1]. At the 2005 World Social Forum, Hugo Chávez announced the final collapse of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) plan proposed by the United States. At one point, the territory governed by left-wing parties reached 71.8% of Latin America, with a population accounting for 53.8% of the region's total. Since 2015, the political landscape in Latin America has rapidly transitioned from a stage of "leftist retreat and rightist advance" to one of "mutual gains and losses" and "joint governance by left and right." Since Brazil is still governed by the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro, the right still maintains an advantage in the regional political landscape; however, the left is governing in Mexico for the first time in 40 years, expanding into a space that was not even reached during the height of the "Pink Tide." The COVID-19 pandemic since 2020 has prompted Latin Americans to reflect on neoliberal policies, favoring the left in accumulating strength and expanding its influence. Yet, currently, Latin American leftist forces are severely fragmented and face significant issues, such as strengthening unity and continuing to explore alternatives to neoliberalism after taking office.
I. The Latin American Political Landscape: From "Leftist Retreat/Rightist Advance" to "Joint Governance"
Even during the surging development of the "Pink Tide" before 2015, the struggle between the Latin American left and right never ceased; rather, it ran through the entire process of the tide's rise, development, and decline, and continues to this day. Even at the peak of leftist development, the right continuously launched offensives against the left, creating a tug-of-war in several countries. In 2001, traditional right-wing forces in Venezuela launched massive demonstrations against the Chávez government's reform plans, causing social unrest, a severe decline in oil production, and economic recession. On April 12, 2002, the Venezuelan opposition also instigated a coup, kidnapping Chávez to an island. The United States participated in and promoted the occurrence of the coup; it was only with the support of the Venezuelan Air Force that Chávez returned to the presidential palace three days later to continue governing. In 2009, the left-wing government of José Manuel Zelaya in Honduras sought re-election and promoted a national referendum, but the Supreme Court—influenced by U.S.-promoted judicial reforms—ruled the referendum invalid. Right-wing military personnel supported the Supreme Court's decision, and Zelaya was forced into exile. In 2012, the Paraguayan right launched a "parliamentary coup," accusing left-wing President Fernando Lugo (who had helped landless peasants acquire land) of malfeasance in a case involving illegal land occupation by peasants. Lugo was impeached and removed from office, and the right-wing Colorado Party, which had previously held power for 61 consecutive years, returned to office and remains there today.
With the defeat of the left-wing Front for Victory (part of the Justicialist Party) in the 2015 Argentine general election and the loss of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela—the left-wing ruling party—in parliamentary elections, the Latin American political landscape began to show a trend of "leftist retreat and rightist advance." In 2016, President Dilma Rousseff of the Brazilian Workers' Party was impeached and removed from office, leading to the formation of a new cabinet dominated by the center-right. In December 2017, the Chilean left-wing alliance lost the election, and center-right Sebastián Piñera was elected president. By this point, the right held a dominant position in the Latin American political landscape. In August 2017, the Lima Group—composed of Canada and Latin American countries governed by the right, such as Peru and Brazil—was formed to pressure Venezuela. After Nicolás Maduro was re-elected president of Venezuela in 2018, the United States and the Lima Group refused to recognize the election results and demanded new elections. Mercosur (Southern Common Market), dominated by right-wing nations like Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay, suspended Venezuela’s membership citing "democracy clauses," and only because of the persistence of Uruguay—then governed by the left—was the effective date of the resolution delayed by three months. At that time, the top five economies in Latin America—Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and Chile—were all governed by the right. The political pendulum in Latin America swung rapidly to the right, and Cuba and Venezuela faced unprecedented international pressure. Jorge Castañeda, former Mexican Foreign Minister, published an article claiming that "the Latin American left is dead."
However, the situation of "leftist retreat and rightist advance" only lasted for three years (2015–2018) before new changes favorable to the left began to occur. The Latin American right, which had only just risen after 2015, soon encountered new failures. In particular, right-wing presidents such as Sebastián Piñera in Chile, Iván Duque Márquez in Colombia, and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil were tested by social protests and election campaigns. In May 2018, center-left Carlos Alvarado won the general election in Costa Rica. In July of the same year, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the candidate of the Mexican left-wing National Regeneration Movement (MORENA), was elected president. The party jumped to become the largest political party in Mexico, breaking the long-standing political structure of "three-way confrontation" between the left, center, and right (the PRD, PRI, and PAN) [2], and marking the first time a left-wing party had governed Mexico in 40 years. In October 2019, Alberto Fernández, the candidate of the Argentine left-wing Justicialist Party, won the general election, returning the left to power after a four-year hiatus. In October 2020, just one year after former Bolivian President Evo Morales went into exile following allegations of election manipulation by the Organization of American States (OAS) and others, the Movement for Socialism (MAS) made a strong comeback, securing victory in the first round of a "transparent general election." Its candidates, Luis Arce (Minister of Economy and Public Finance during the Morales administration) and David Choquehuanca (Minister of Foreign Affairs), were elected President and Vice President respectively. The left resumed governance in Bolivia, and Morales returned from Argentina to continue serving as chairman of the ruling party. During his tenure as Economy Minister, Arce had organized and implemented national land distribution and nationalization policies. After taking office on November 8, 2020, Arce pledged to make poverty reduction a major task. In the October 2020 national referendum in Chile, 78% of the public voted in favor of amending the Pinochet-era constitution to include provisions for health guarantees, educational improvement, and the promotion of equality. In December 2020, Venezuela's left-wing ruling party also won a more than two-thirds majority in parliamentary elections, while the opposition was in a state of collapse. All these indicators suggest that the strength of the left is further resurging and expanding.
II. The COVID-19 Pandemic Favors the Continued Expansion of Leftist Forces
First, the continued spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in Latin America in 2021 exacerbated public concerns over economic recession, poverty, corruption, insecurity, and the lack of job opportunities. Not only were Latin American governments unable to effectively respond to these issues, but the negative effects of right-wing policies—including reduced spending in the health sector—became fully apparent against the backdrop of the pandemic, intensifying social inequality. Meanwhile, hit by the pandemic, Latin American countries saw a sharp decrease in fiscal and tax revenues and faced risks of significant inflation. Yet they still had to implement proactive fiscal policies, resulting in a dual rise in public and foreign debt. The public debt ratio rose from 57% in 2019 to 67% in 2020, with Brazil, Argentina, and El Salvador reaching as high as 101.4%, 96.7%, and 89%, respectively. In May 2020, Argentina experienced the ninth sovereign debt default in its history. Risks of a debt crisis are accumulating and may be released in a concentrated manner over the next two years. In this context, if the Latin American economy is to achieve restorative growth in the post-pandemic era, it must implement large-scale vaccinations. However, as of May 2021, Latin American countries had not yet developed any vaccine, and vaccines remained a scarce commodity. Therefore, how to obtain vaccines and achieve equitable distribution has become a major task facing Latin American countries. Due to insufficient medical infrastructure, many governments mobilized the armed forces to ensure vaccine delivery. Every country in the region sought deals with pharmaceutical developers to obtain vaccine allocations and joined the COVAX program created by the World Health Organization (which attempts to provide sufficient doses for 20% of the global population and currently involves 190 countries). According to data from the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the number of people in poverty and extreme poverty in Latin American countries increased by 45.4 million and 28.5 million respectively in 2020, with the total number of people in poverty reaching 231 million, or 37.7% of the total population.
Second, in the next two years, many Latin American countries will hold elections, and the left may continue to expand its space. The pandemic in 2020 intensified this trend; Latin Americans began to reflect on the various drawbacks of right-wing neoliberalism and once again sought a role for the government and society in economic development and distribution. This is conducive to the development of leftist forces and the further expansion of their space. In 2021, general elections were held in Latin American countries such as Ecuador (February), Peru (April), and Chile (November); in 2022, general elections will be held in Colombia, Brazil, and Venezuela. Given the performance of President Bolsonaro in Brazil, President Duque in Colombia, and President Piñera in Chile before and after the pandemic, it is expected that they will have difficulty continuing to run for president or winning general elections, which objectively creates conditions for the development of the left in these countries.
In Ecuador, the first round of the presidential election was held on February 7, 2021. Left-wing "Union for Hope" candidate Andrés Arauz received 32.7% of the vote, followed by conservative "Creating Opportunities" (CREO) candidate Guillermo Lasso with 19.7%. Yaku Pérez, candidate for the radical left indigenous organization Pachakutik Multi-national Unity Movement, and Xavier Hervas, candidate for the Democratic Left Party, ranked third and fourth, both receiving over 15%. In the second round of elections held on April 11, 2021, Lasso ultimately reversed the tide to be elected president with a 5.08% lead. It is noteworthy that among the top four candidates in the first round of Ecuador’s presidential election, three were from the left, yet in the end, it was the right-wing Lasso who achieved a reversal to win the presidency.
In Brazil, on March 8, 2021, Federal Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin determined that the 13th Federal Court of Curitiba—which had issued the 2018 verdict on former President Lula da Silva's corruption case—lacked jurisdiction, and the case should be transferred to a court in Brasília. In mid-April, the Supreme Court voted to uphold Fachin's ruling. As a result, Lula’s political rights were restored, granting him the right to participate in the October 2022 election.
eligibility for the October presidential election. Although the Brazilian Left does not lack young and outstanding candidates, Lula’s political legacy is irreplaceable; his charismatic leadership, capacity for political integration, and pragmatic policies remain powerful draws. Against the backdrop of a persistently sluggish economy and an out-of-control COVID-19 pandemic under the current Bolsonaro government, Lula’s candidacy is more likely to evoke voters' memories of economic prosperity during his tenure. This is clearly conducive to a comeback for the Workers' Party and the Brazilian Left as a whole to regain governing status.
In Peru, the Left achieved a historic victory in the presidential election. On April 11, 2021, presidential and congressional elections were held, in which the presidential race produced a major upset. Pedro Castillo—a 52-year-old primary school teacher, a leader of the teachers' union, and the candidate for the leftist Free Peru party (Peru Libre) who had initially trailed in the polls—and Keiko Fujimori, the candidate for the right-wing Popular Force (Fuerza Popular), emerged as the top two finishers with 18.92% and 13.25% of the vote respectively, advancing to the second round on June 6. Hernando de Soto, a renowned economist and candidate for the right-wing Go on Country (Avanza País), received 11.9%. Verónika Mendoza—who had a high profile and was renominated as the presidential candidate for the leftist "Together for Peru" (Juntos por el Perú) amidst a severe institutional crisis—failed to advance past the first round. In the second round held on June 6, Castillo ultimately defeated Keiko Fujimori with a razor-thin margin of 0.25% to be elected president.
In Chile, elections for the Constitutional Convention and local offices were held in May 2021. In the election for the members of the Constitutional Convention, the right-wing governing coalition "Let’s Go for Chile" (Vamos por Chile) won only 38 out of 155 seats, accounting for 21%; independents won 54 seats (34.97%); "Approve Dignity" (Apruebo Dignity) took 18.04%; "The List of the People" (Lista del Pueblo) took 15.1%; and indigenous peoples were allocated 17 seats. In local elections, Irací Hassler, a member of the Communist Party of Chile, was elected mayor of the capital, Santiago, marking the first time in history a Communist has won the capital’s mayoralty. Chile will hold general elections in November 2021, while also approving a new constitution drafted by the Constitutional Convention and a new National Congress. Since the large-scale popular protests of 2019 [3], Chile’s market-oriented economic model since the Pinochet era has been challenged, with the public demanding the state play a larger role in guaranteeing health, education, and pensions. As President Piñera from the right cannot seek re-election, leftist forces enjoy an advantage in the general election. The outcome of this election will be critical for Chile’s policy direction.
In Mexico, the leftist President Andrés Manuel López Obrador continues to enjoy high approval ratings. Out of 32 governors, seven belong to the governing party; the governing party holds a majority in 19 state legislatures, possessing the majority required to amend the federal constitution. In the mid-term elections held on June 6, 2021, although the governing party, Morena (the National Regeneration Movement), lost its two-thirds supermajority, it still maintains a majority in both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. It can pass legislation by aligning with some small parties without needing support from major opposition parties like the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the National Action Party (PAN), or the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). The governance environment remains favorable.
Third, the 2020 US election was also a major event influencing the Latin American political landscape. Joe Biden’s victory over Donald Trump weakened the international environment of "maximum pressure" exerted by the Trump administration against leftist regimes, which is conducive to the Latin American political pendulum swinging left once more.
III. Leftist parties have strengthened international solidarity and coordination, but are seriously fragmented domestically.
After more than a decade of governing, participating in government, and campaigning, Latin American leftist parties have gone through a process from united struggle to gradual differentiation. Facing offensives from domestic and foreign right-wing forces, leftist parties must unite as they have before to jointly confront challenges. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, both the world socialist movement and the Latin American leftist movement fell into a low ebb. However, Latin American leftist parties, including Communist parties, successively launched the São Paulo Forum and the World Social Forum to criticize capitalism and neoliberalism, explore alternatives to the neoliberal development model, and point out that "another world is possible." This allowed the Latin American leftist movement to quickly step out from the shadows of the Soviet collapse and the changes in Eastern Europe. Supporting one another, they won elections one after another, triggering a magnificent "Pink Tide." In domestic policy, the Left advocated for the role of the state or even nationalization; externally, they opposed US hegemony and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) plan it promoted. They advocated for regional integration and successively established regional integration organizations such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), which excludes the United States and Canada but includes all Latin American nations. The cycle of leftist governance greatly advanced the process of Latin American countries seeking strength through unity and promoted relations between Latin America and Asia and Africa.
Internationally, in the face of the new situation of right-wing offensives and coalitions, leftist unity and coordination have also made new progress. Election observation by the Organization of American States (OAS) has consistently been an important method for the Right to accuse leftist parties and candidates in the name of democracy. In the October 2019 Bolivian elections, the OAS claimed that the governing party, the Movement for Socialism (MAS), had committed fraud. Amidst a wave of large-scale domestic protests and the defection of the military and police to the Right, President Morales, who had already declared victory, was forced to announce his resignation and go into exile. Following the inauguration of the new leftist President Luis Arce in November 2020, Bolivia restored diplomatic relations with Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela, which had been severed by the right-wing interim government of Jeanine Áñez. Bolivia called on the OAS to correct its mistakes and re-audit the 2019 Bolivian elections. MAS is one of the most active parties in the Puebla Group. This organization is a regional leftist coordination body reorganized by leftist parties from 14 Latin American countries; it has established a specialized election observation department, hoping to counter and replace the functions of the OAS in this regard. The first task of Arce and MAS after taking power was to provide financial and ideological support to the Puebla Group and to support leftist parties in the 2021 elections in Chile, Ecuador, and Peru. If the leftist parties win the Chilean general election in November 2021, Bolivia expects to renew the relationship between the two countries.
Under the prompting of the United States, the right-wing Lima Group has continuously intensified its interference in the Venezuelan leftist regime, demanding that Venezuela release political prisoners, "hold fair elections, and restore constitutional order." In August 2017, Mercosur (the Southern Common Market) suspended Venezuela's membership, claiming it had violated the democratic commitment clauses of member states. The decision to suspend Venezuela was only delayed by three months at the request of Uruguay’s then-governing party, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio). The rise of the Left in Mexico in 2018 changed the attitude toward the Maduro regime in Venezuela, causing the Lima Group—which sought to contain Venezuela internationally—to lose a key pillar. In October 2019, the Argentine leftist Justicialist Party candidate Alberto Fernández won the general election, forming a counterweight to Brazil within Mercosur. In March 2021, the Argentine government announced its withdrawal from the Lima Group. In July 2021, after the leftist Castillo was elected President of Peru, the new Foreign Minister Héctor Béjar Rivera announced a change in stance toward Venezuela to promote the development of bilateral relations. This may signify the formal dissolution of the Lima Group.
At the same time, however, Latin American leftist forces are seriously fragmented within their respective countries.
First, new leftist forces have emerged or risen, but they have become competitors to the traditional Left. In Chile, the student movement that arose in 2011 to protest high higher education costs led to the formation of a New Left. Its most famous leader, Camila Vallejo, was absorbed into the leftist "New Majority" coalition in 2014. However, two other main leaders of the student movement, Giorgio Jackson and Gabriel Boric, not only remained outside the broad leftist coalition but the Democratic Revolution party led by Jackson and other organizations of the student movement existed in opposition to it. In the 2017 general election, the Broad Front (Frente Amplio) continued to consolidate relations with extra-parliamentary leftist movements and parties, achieving a decisive victory in Valparaíso by absorbing the Autonomous Movement led by former student leader Jorge Sharp. Sharp received 53.8% of the vote in the city, while the "New Majority" and the right-wing coalition received only 22.4% and 22.6% respectively. Yet on the national level, the leftist majority coalition failed to form a union, leading to defeat in the December 2017 general election.
In the 2021 Ecuadorian elections, Yaku Pérez, the candidate for the Pachakutik Plurinational Unity Movement—a leftist indigenous organization—became a dark horse. He received 19.4% of the vote in the first round, and the number of parliamentary seats won by his movement increased from 4 to 27. He fell into third place by a narrow margin of only 0.35 percentage points, failing to enter the second round. However, due to disagreements with Rafael Correa on issues such as environmental protection, he supported neither the right-wing CREO and Social Christian Party candidate, banker Guillermo Lasso, nor Correa’s follower and candidate for the leftist Union for Hope (UNES), Andrés Arauz, in the second-round presidential election. He even called on voters to spoil their ballots or cast null votes. In the elections of five provinces, the number of spoiled ballots even exceeded the number of votes received by Arauz. This was a major reason why Arauz, despite holding a significant lead in the first round, was overtaken by Lasso in the second.
Second, in the face of a grim governance situation, the Left is divided over policy responses. In Ecuador, Lenín Moreno, who was known as Rafael Correa’s successor, underwent a major change in style after taking office, turning toward more market-oriented economic policies. He shifted policies to the right while the leftist party remained in power. The governing PAIS Alliance even split over whether to support Correa; Vice President Jorge Glas, who supported Correa, was removed from office and placed in preventative detention on corruption charges. In the 2021 general election, the PAIS Alliance lost all 74 of its parliamentary seats, failing to win a single one.
Third, the phenomena of political fragmentation and ideological polarization have intensified. In the 2021 Peruvian election, the candidate with the highest share of the vote received only 19%. The governing party and the traditional leftist party "Together for Peru" won only 42 out of 130 seats, becoming a shortfall for leftist governance. In Ecuador’s parliament, as many as 15 parties won seats, and the Union for Hope, which won the most, held only 49. In recent years, especially since the pandemic, ideological polarization in Latin American countries has intensified, with the emergence of the far-right and the far-left. The former is represented by Bolsonaro in Brazil, while the emergence of the far-left, such as Castillo in Peru and Yaku in Ecuador, has on one hand expanded the leftist camp, but on the other hand, their radical policy proposals have formed new challenges for the solidarity and strength of the Latin American Left.
IV. Whether a new leftist governance cycle can begin remains to be seen, but the Left will exist in Latin America for a long time.
In the coming years, the Latin American left will experience a pivotal moment in which it must prove its capacity to serve as a social engine. Whether a new leftist cycle can be initiated will depend on at least the following factors:
First, in addition to calming public dissatisfaction regarding the way the state functions and its demands for political innovation, the Latin American left must form a new social consensus through political revitalization and restore and improve the living conditions of the people. Second, the new left must prove it possesses sufficient political management capacity to secure institutional power while simultaneously maintaining its links with social movements to garner the momentum necessary to win elections. In particular, whether leftist leaders can respond to the pandemic with efficiency and transparency will be of great significance in enhancing public trust in the government. Third, it is crucial whether the Latin American left, upon taking office, can correctly define the role of the state and complete its exploration of a new development model. In the governing cycle that recently concluded, although the left won high prestige among the populace, it did not emphasize the shaping of the state—failing, in particular, to carry out necessary reforms in the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary. Consequently, far from achieving the goal of replacing neoliberalism, it fell into a governing predicament and ultimately lost power. Now that a second cycle may be about to begin, we shall wait and see what new strategies leftist forces will adopt to effectively redefine the presence of the state.
Following the "Pink Tide" [4] of the early 21st century, a series of significant trend-based changes have appeared in Latin American politics, providing the conditions for the long-term political presence and development of the left. At present, the leftist regimes existing in various countries can still contend with the right on equal terms. In 2021, the Peruvian left achieved a historic victory; the Bolivian left will govern until 2025; the Venezuelan and Mexican left will both govern until 2024; and the Argentine left will govern until 2023. There is also the possibility for the left in Nicaragua and Chile to win in the 2021 elections. The left remains a political force that cannot be ignored in the Latin American political landscape, and the foundations for its resilient existence and development remain intact, manifesting primarily in the following aspects:
First, countries in the Latin American region are continuously carrying out reforms in political, economic, and diplomatic spheres to resolve issues such as social wealth polarization and economic stagflation left behind by neoliberal policies, under the premise of enhancing the legitimacy of the political system and consolidating democracy. While developing the economy, they focus on solving political and social problems, striving to seek a more just, reasonable, and sustainable mode of development and increasing the degree of political inclusion and integration. The achievements made therein will lay the foundation for the next round of the modernization process in Latin American countries.
Second, changes in the political environment and institutional conditions have accelerated the evolution of Latin American parties and party systems, enabling them to continuously adapt to the new political demands brought about by democratic consolidation. Party politics is nurturing a greater and higher degree of modernity. Through transformations in guiding ideologies, organizational methods, and mobilization techniques, leftist parties are actively responding to the trends of mass politics and grassroots politics, demonstrating new characteristics in their governing styles and capacities.
Third, with economic growth and the deepening of democratic systems, the social foundation of the political systems in Latin American countries is continuously expanding, and the degree of political integration has reached an unprecedented level. Countries in the region are paying increasing attention to the social and political rights of the lower classes, their political participation, and their role in the formation of political, economic, and social policies. At the same time, the growing middle class and its political demands are posing new challenges to traditional political systems.
Furthermore, the long-standing wealth polarization and inequality in Latin American countries provide a supportive foundation for the existence of the Latin American left. Following the implementation of neoliberalism in the 1990s, the proportion of the impoverished population in the Latin American region was as high as nearly 50%. Even today, following the "Pink Tide," it remains above 30%. Under democratic political conditions, this segment of the population will support a left that advocates for social equality—a situation that will persist in Latin America for a long time.
In short, the existence and development of leftist political forces in Latin American countries have political, economic, social, and even demographic foundations. Leftist and socialist trends of thought that advocate for social equality have broad space for existence; this is also the important reason why the Latin American left has maintained resilient development for over 100 years. (Notes omitted)
(Author’s Unit: Office of Marxist Theory and Latin American Politics, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)
Network Editor: Zhang Jian Source: World Socialism Studies, Issue 9, 2021