Su Yang: Historical Nihilism in the Process of the Soviet Union's Evolution
Thirty years have passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While opinions vary regarding the reasons for its collapse, the erosion of the Soviet Union by historical nihilism and the resulting collapse of its ideological sphere cannot be ignored. General Secretary Xi Jinping once pointed out: "Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) collapse? An important reason was that the struggle in the ideological sphere was extremely intense; they completely negated the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU, negated Lenin and Stalin, and engaged in historical nihilism. Thoughts were thrown into chaos, Party organizations at all levels became virtually useless, and the military was no longer under the Party's leadership. In the end, the CPSU—a party of such great size—scattered like birds and beasts, and the Soviet Union—a socialist state of such great size—collapsed and disintegrated. This is a lesson from the past [1]!" Deeply studying the lessons of the Soviet Union holds practical significance.
The Overflow of the Countercurrent of Historical Nihilism in the Soviet Union
Khrushchev sowed the seeds of ideological calamity. The rise of historical nihilism in the Soviet Union can be traced back to the Khrushchev era. After Stalin’s death in 1953, Khrushchev launched a campaign to completely negate Stalin. Under his call and support, a group of literary and artistic works, represented by the novel The Thaw, began to "discover the contradictions and conflicts in life" and expose the "dark side" of society. Western countries also began to hype the term "thaw," hailing it as an "epoch-making event." In 1956, as the 20th Congress of the CPSU was nearing its close, Khrushchev convened an impromptu secret meeting at midnight, where he delivered a four-hour secret report titled "On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences." This "great trial" of Stalin served as the prelude to Soviet historical nihilism. Thereafter, anti-communist and anti-socialist phenomena began to emerge in Soviet society, with slogans like "Down with the Communist Party" and "Down with the Soviets" being shouted openly. Even some Party newspapers and periodicals became platforms for attacking the Party’s cause, and the CPSU and Soviet society began to fracture and split.
After Brezhnev came to power, a force of historical nihilism had already formed within society, and rhetoric negating or distorting the history of the CPSU continued to spread. During the later period of Brezhnev’s rule, the increasing rigidity of the economic system and ideology, the bureaucratization of Party organizations and their estrangement from the masses, and the corruption of Party and government cadres provided a breeding ground for historical nihilism. Historical nihilism began to "overflow the embankments of the Soviet riverbed."
Gorbachev opened the "Pandora’s box" of historical nihilism. Once in power, Gorbachev repeatedly made public statements regarding the "re-evaluation" of the histories of the CPSU and the Soviet Union, asserting that "there should be no zones off-limits to criticism in Soviet society" and "there should be no forgotten names or blank spots in Soviet history and literature." He called for the courage to break through "forbidden zones" in Soviet history and to stop concealing past mistakes and difficulties. He even claimed that "the entirety of the Soviet experience since 1929 was wrong" and "more than three-quarters of the Soviet experience is suspicious and should be negated or corrected." Under his summons, chaos intensified in the Soviet ideological sphere. Historical nihilism aimed its attacks at Marxism, criticizing many of Marx’s "errors" and claiming that Marxism should be driven out of Russia.
Facing the steady encroachment of historical nihilism, the CPSU did not provide a forceful counterattack but instead surrendered its ideological positions. Various films vilifying Soviet history entered theaters. All sorts of rhetoric and writings regarding the history of the CPSU and the Soviet Union became a jumble of "mud and sand" [2], leaving people at a loss; some so-called "historical archives" took the opportunity to "smuggle in private goods" [3]. In June 1988, Soviet educational authorities decided that all Soviet history textbooks in schools across the country would be destroyed in 1989 and school history examinations would be canceled until new, "more authentic" textbooks could be compiled. By 1989, Soviet institutions of higher learning had canceled many traditional social science courses: "History of the CPSU" was replaced by "Socio-Political History of the 20th Century"; "Scientific Communism" by "Problems of Modern Socialism"; "Marxist-Leninist Philosophy" by "Philosophy"; and "Principles of Marxist Ethics and Aesthetics" by "Principles of Ethics and Aesthetics." Soviet universities became outposts for disseminating Western political science, and liberal teachers capable of using Western terminology were lauded as academic "great masters." On June 12, 1990, the Supreme Soviet passed the Law of the USSR on the Press and Other Mass Media, giving the green light to "free press" throughout the Soviet Union. Within just four months of this law taking effect, over 700 newspapers and periodicals were established, with their primary orientation being opposition to the CPSU. Meanwhile, many Soviet state organs or state-owned publications took the opportunity to declare "independence." According to statistics, of the 1,800 national newspapers and periodicals registered with the State Committee for the Press, the CPSU controlled only 27, or 1.5%—and even these few remaining positions lacked a clear stance. For a time, a flood of articles vilifying the CPSU, slandering its leaders, and attacking Marxism filled the Soviet media like "runaway horses"; some media used rumors, slander, and absurd methods to attract readers' attention. This caused widespread dissatisfaction among the Soviet people toward the Party and government; the people gradually lost trust in the Party and the state, as well as their communist ideals and socialist convictions. With the 28th Congress of the CPSU passing the programmatic statement Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism, "humane and democratic socialism" replaced Marxism’s dominant position in the Soviet ideological sphere. The history of the CPSU was completely discarded, and the Soviet Union was led onto a road of no return toward disintegration.
The Manifest Harms of Historical Nihilism in the Soviet Evolution
The dissemination of an erroneous view of history. Regarding the view of history, Khrushchev set a bad example. He not only caused extreme confusion in the political and ideological thinking of the international communist movement but also left Communist Party members in the Soviet Union and many other countries in a state of bewilderment. More seriously, this erroneous view of history nurtured the "gravediggers" of the CPSU and the Soviet socialist system.
The distortion of social values. Errors in the view of history inevitably lead to chaos in values and to the reversal of people's perceptions of right and wrong, good and evil, and beauty and ugliness. The primary method of historical nihilism is to proceed from its political demands, manipulate historical materials, fabricate history, and conflate historical trifles with the mainstream, or phenomena with essence—using partial truths to represent the whole and turning black into white. Under the clamor of historical nihilism, the achievements of Soviet socialist revolution and construction were treated as a fundamental mistake, and the image of the CPSU was seriously disparaged and distorted. By the Brezhnev period, the CPSU was no longer the core that the younger generation admired and followed. Historical nihilism demonstrated immense power in distorting social values; Soviet socialist values were gradually discarded, and the CPSU faced increasing social centrifugal forces and a social order that was difficult to integrate.
The destruction of political faith. The total negation of the CPSU and Soviet socialism during the Gorbachev period caused political faith to collapse. Encouraged by Gorbachev’s policies of "glasnost, democratization, and pluralism of socialist ideology," "democratization" ignored the historical and class nature of democracy, opening wide the gates for the rampant spread of anti-communist and anti-Marxist views; "glasnost" became a veneer for anti-communist forces to recklessly disparage and attack the CPSU and historical legacies; and "pluralism" directly targeted the guiding status of Marxism in the ideological sphere. This allowed bourgeois trends of thought to overflow and permitted speeches and ideas negating the leadership of the CPSU and the guiding role of Marxism to grow. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the total negation of CPSU history and socialism became fashionable in Soviet society. In the final years of the Soviet Union, the historical necessity and legitimacy of the CPSU's rule and of Soviet socialism were fundamentally negated. The Soviet people’s faith in Marxism and socialism was seriously shaken, while Western democratic systems were depicted as the "final destination" of world history. Large numbers of CPSU members, disillusioned with communist ideals and distrusting the CPSU as a political force, withdrew from the Party. Statistics show that 140,000 members left in 1989; 371,000 in the first half of 1990; and another 311,000 in July and August following the 28th Congress. In July 1991, Gorbachev stated in his report to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that 4.2 million members had left the Party in the previous year. Under the catalysis of historical nihilism, people’s faith in Marxism and socialism completely collapsed.
Lessons and Enlightenments of Soviet Historical Nihilism for Contemporary China
Upholding historical materialism and a correct view of Party history. The Resolution of the CPC Central Committee on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century, adopted at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, points out that the whole Party must uphold historical materialism and a correct view of Party history. We must see clearly why we were successful in the past and understand how we can continue to be successful in the future from the Party’s century of struggle, so as to more firmly and consciously practice our original aspiration and founding mission and better uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era. The theoretical root of historical nihilism is historical idealism; starting from an abstract theory of human nature, it severs the connection between historical phenomena and essence, and between historical contingency and necessity. It treats human history as a "little girl who can be dressed up at will" [4], negating the objectivity and progressiveness of history through historical relativism, and analyzing history with isolated, one-sided, and distorted methods in an attempt to manipulate and falsify it. In this regard, Lenin once noted: "It is easy to select any examples, but this is meaningless or has purely negative significance, because the whole issue lies in the fact that every individual case has its specific historical environment. If facts are grasped from their entirety and their connections, then facts are not only 'stubborn things' but also absolutely conclusive evidence. If facts are not grasped from their entirety or their connections, if they are fragmentary and selected at random, then they are merely a child's game, or even less than a child's game." To uphold historical materialism and establish a correct view of Party history, we must strengthen study and education in basic Marxist theory, as well as the history of the Party, the history of New China, the history of reform and opening up, and the history of socialist development. We must persist in the organic unity of "required courses" and "mastering the courses," promote the popularization of historical knowledge and education in historical materialism, improve the historical literacy of the masses, and enhance their ability to identify historical nihilism. We must deepen theoretical research on Party history, explore the laws of development of the Party and New China, profoundly reveal the laws of Communist Party governance, the laws of socialist construction, and the laws of human social development, firmly grasp the discourse power [5] to research and interpret Party history, and effectively strengthen the theoretical and methodological basis for resisting historical nihilism.
Strengthening cultural confidence. Historical nihilism inevitably leads to cultural nihilism. History is the carrier of culture, and culture is the lifeblood of history; the two share an inherently unified relationship. The key to resisting historical nihilism lies in strengthening cultural confidence. As General Secretary Xi Jinping said: "Strengthening cultural confidence is a major issue concerning the rise and fall of national fortunes, cultural security, and the independence of the national spirit." Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the CPC Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has accurately grasped the trend of mutual agitation between thoughts and cultures worldwide and the profound changes in social concepts in our country. It emphasizes that ideological work is the work of "establishing the heart" for the country and "establishing the soul" for the nation. Cultural confidence is a more basic, broader, and deeper confidence; it is the most basic, profound, and lasting force in the development of a country and a nation. Without high cultural confidence and cultural prosperity, there will be no great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. To resist historical nihilism, we must strengthen cultural confidence, firmly grasp leadership over ideological work, build a socialist ideology with strong cohesive and guiding power, build a powerful socialist cultural country, and stimulate the cultural innovation and creativity of the whole nation. We must better construct Chinese spirit, Chinese values, and Chinese power, consolidate the common ideological basis for the united struggle of the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups, and provide a strong ideological guarantee and spiritual strength for opening a new chapter for the Party and the state in the New Era. To strengthen cultural confidence is to fully recognize that fine traditional Chinese culture is a prominent advantage of the Chinese nation and the foundation for us to stand firm amidst the agitation of world cultures. We must inherit and carry forward the unique ideas, traditional virtues, and humanistic spirit formed in our national history in light of new era conditions, so that they become the value basis for modern social development through creative transformation and innovative development. We must inherit the revolutionary culture nurtured by the CPC in leading the Chinese people through great struggles, carrying forward the revolutionary spirit, courage, and character formed in specific periods to provide powerful spiritual strength for overcoming difficulties and achieving new victories on the great journey of the New Era. We must promote the advanced culture formed during socialist construction and reform, profoundly recognize the scientific, contemporary, and people-centered nature it displays in supporting socialist modernization, and better build Chinese spirit, Chinese values, and Chinese power.
Strengthening network construction. Historical nihilism will not simply disappear. Nowadays, historical nihilism often exploits the characteristics of the "we-media" [6] era—such as fragmented and viral dissemination—to constantly change its forms of expression and narrative styles, infiltrating and spreading erroneous views in more hidden ways. Therefore, resolute measures must be taken to curb the online spread of historical nihilism. General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that if we cannot pass the test of the internet, we cannot pass the test of long-term governance. We must attach great importance to the internet as the main position, main battlefield, and front line of the ideological struggle, persist in managing and governing the network in accordance with the law, and create a clean and upright online space. We must continuously enhance the influence of mainstream ideological discourse, promote the deep integration of traditional and emerging media, and let the Party’s innovative theories "fly into the homes of ordinary people."