Li Chunmin: Is Negative Dialectics a Radical Dialectics?
Adorno's Negative Dialectics is regarded as a radical discourse by virtue of its distinct anti-ontological orientation and thoroughgoing negativity, further establishing it as a new morphological stage of dialectics. Taking Adorno's critique of idealist dialectics as a case study, this article attempts to grasp the intellectual trajectory of Negative Dialectics and the conceptual tensions manifest therein across several dimensions. On this basis, it answers whether Negative Dialectics constitutes a radical discourse and, through this answer, attempts to present the contemporary echoes of the dialectical tradition, thereby reshaping the theoretical image of Adorno's work.
I. The Non-Conceptual in the Concept and the Objectivity of the Concept
For Adorno, dialectics is not the essence of the world, but an inevitable conflict of mental activity; dialectics points toward a realm beyond the reach of thought. "The name of dialectics says no more, to begin with, than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder, that they come into contradiction with the traditional norm of adequacy." In Adorno's view, a legitimate discussion of dialectics primarily concerns an examination of the immanence of consciousness. Consciousness possesses an inherent anti-dialectical impulse—a tendency to transcend contradiction—whereas dialectics is committed to revealing the finitude of thought in its attempt to grasp existence; that is, the problem of the limits of thought itself. The ontological predicament presented here is the very context in which dialectics emerges. Consequently, although Adorno refuses to construct an ontological foundation for dialectics, it is not difficult to see that Negative Dialectics is initially presented in an ontological sense. More precisely, it is presented as a critique of the ontological horizon of traditional philosophy of the subject. The constraints of this ontological horizon are epitomized in the idealist dialectics represented by Hegel.
Specifically, in idealist dialectics, the concept itself appears as a tyranny of identity. What Adorno seeks to do is "disenchant" this concept. He keenly proposes the non-conceptuality of the concept, pointing out that its "original sin" lies in its inability to escape the existing "Self." In this sense, the concept is a form of "reified consciousness." Once consciousness is reified, it loses its fluidity and becomes incapable of grasping things in their constant state of becoming and flux. For Adorno, within the traditional ontological horizon, whether one uses thought to subsume existence or existence to subsume thought, dialectics is led into an essential predicament. Adorno reaffirms the antagonism between thought and existence, pointing out that their unity is essentially a delusion of thought. As a thought process, dialectics also struggles to escape the primacy of the subject—a basic presupposition of idealism since Fichte. When mental activity attempts to subsume existence within its own conceptual system, it kills "non-identity" through "identity." Here, the order of existence reveals a profound heterogeneity with the order of the concept. The totality produced by the identity of the concept is a false totality.
On this basis, Adorno undertakes a profound critique of the ideological dimension of identity. In its development, dialectics was associated from the outset with the categories of the philosophy of identity, which subjected it to various reproaches and turned it into a "logic of illusion." The quest for identity is the original sin of thought; thought tends to avoid contradiction and instead constructs an identity that subordinates the object to itself. This is the primordial form of ideology; rather, one could say that ideology and the identity of thought exist in a state of complicity. In Adorno’s aforementioned intellectual trajectory, insofar as "objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a remainder," Adorno is clearly closer to Kant and farther from Hegel. What Kant’s reservation regarding the "thing-in-itself" leads to is precisely non-identity. "Dialectics is not a mere operation of the spirit by which it escapes the constraints of its object—in Hegel, the role dialectics plays is, more precisely, exactly the opposite: the permanent opposition between the object and its own concept." The vitality of dialectics lies in the resistance of the "other" to identity. Dialectics is without reconciliation; it lacks settlement. "Dialectics is not a standpoint (Dialektik kein Standpunkt)."
While criticizing the illusion of identity produced by concepts, Adorno does not dissolve the objectivity of the concept. In fact, reconstructing the objectivity of thought is the core dilemma of idealist dialectics in Adorno's view, as well as the contemporary task of Negative Dialectics. What then is "objectivity"? From the perspective of Negative Dialectics, objectivity is first of all not a simple immediacy, but a mediated immediacy—or, that this immediacy is also one found within conceptual grasping. Dialectics must pass through the medium of consciousness; without consciousness as a medium, dialectics becomes impossible. "In absolute, undifferentiated, total matter, there is no dialectic." Specifically, on one hand, Adorno maintains that the immanence of consciousness is inescapable. In this sense, he criticizes the category of "Being" in Heidegger's vision, pointing out that this category contains remnants of fundamental ontology. Essentially, Heidegger’s mode of inquiry still fails to break out of the paradigm of traditional metaphysics. The immediacy presented by the category of "Being" is itself simultaneously reflective. Heidegger’s ontology attempts to transcend the difference between subject and object, but in his ontological vision, there is neither subjective spirit nor matter. This leads to the abstractness of his category of "Being," which constitutes an illegitimate escape from the immanence of consciousness.
On the other hand, the reconstruction of the objectivity of thought must leap out of the fences of identity constructed by the immanence of consciousness. What philosophy must abolish is not the concept itself, because treating concepts as material is a fundamental characteristic of philosophy. The reification of the concept is inevitable; it allows the concept to establish itself. The union of the conceptual and the non-conceptual can only be realized through this establishment. But Adorno simultaneously points out that the concept itself possesses not only a spiritual dimension but also a substantive transcendental dimension—the real elements of the concept itself—which is the foundation for the objectivity of thought. In this sense, the discussion in phenomenology is insufficient "because it loses itself in the categories of signification, in mere subjectivity; for it, the non-identical state of affairs becomes the immediate datum of consciousness, a mere spiritual thing, and the factual Dasein of this state of affairs becomes an ideal existence, becomes thought." Adorno points out that philosophy need not retreat to some extreme empiricism, nor must it be delivered to a highest principle to progress through concepts toward some universal general concept. For the reconstruction of the objectivity of thought, the primary task is to change the direction of conceptuality, turning it from referentiality toward non-identity, breaking the illusion of the self-sufficiency of thought, and acknowledging that the object of thought exists as something heterogeneous to consciousness, admitting that cognition cannot fully possess its object.
Specifically, the change in the direction of conceptuality means acknowledging the reciprocal action between the synthetic function of thought and the facticity toward which this function is directed. Therein, the concept is not a self-sufficient totality; the non-conceptual within the concept is the medium between the concept and existence. The legitimacy of thought does not stem from the affirmation of identity, but from negation. "Prior to all specific content, thinking itself is already negation, a resistance against what is forced upon it." In Hegel, however, the object from which thought abstracts is already an object of thought, within which an identity is a priori presupposed between subject and object. Adorno points out that the starting point for thought to construct its objectivity can only be non-identity; the essence of this non-identity is negation. Negation endows the concept itself with a state of being "yet to be completed"; thought is both itself and not itself. Thus, negation becomes the basic measure of the legitimacy of dialectics in Adorno’s vision. In Hegel, the "negation of the negation" is ultimately led toward affirmation; in Adorno, it remains negation. If "determinate negation" in Hegel refers to the production of affirmative content from negation—where negation is not total—then in Adorno, the whole itself is negative, and the negation of the particular included within the whole remains negative. "The negation of the negation does not return the negation to affirmation, but only proves that this negation is not a sufficient negation." It is easy to see that through the interpretation of non-identity, Negative Dialectics constructs a supremacy of negation itself. It "frees dialectics from those affirmative essences without reducing it to some determinacy." Consequently, "negative dialectics" inevitably leads to a "logic of disintegration." In this sense, Negative Dialectics presents the rootless state of dialectics. Here, Adorno uses negative dialectics to return to the meta-questions of philosophy. Through the critique of idealist dialectics, he seeks not only to save dialectics but to save philosophy; precisely, to save traditional philosophical thinking and commit to opening a new philosophical position. From this, we can clearly see the thoroughness of Adorno's critical consciousness—a thoroughness that reveals a profound, implicit connection with postmodernist trends of thought.
II. Materialist Dialectics and Non-Reflective Materialism
Adorno’s critique of idealist dialectics demonstrates a transition toward the priority of the object, already assuming the posture of an objective dialectic. However, Adorno disagrees with the "objective dialectics" route of traditional materialism. This stems from the fact that this route ignores human spontaneity; more precisely, it presupposes an "emission" from the object to the subject, which makes reflection possible. Therein, the object is presupposed as a kind of antecedent condition, while the subject is inert, passive, and dependent on this reflection. Reflection theory [1] is the cornerstone of traditional materialist epistemology, yet in Adorno’s view, "reflective thinking is non-reflexive, a non-dialectic contradiction." It is precisely this lack of reflexivity that becomes a breeding ground for idealism, such that "the collection of ideas takes the place of the object of knowledge." Here, reflection is not a bridge connecting subject and object, but a barrier—a "third party" inserted between the two. It unintentionally becomes an accomplice to idealism; by leading toward the reproduction and convergence of ideas, reflection distances itself from the real object.
Adorno proposes the "ideology of phenomena," pointing out that reflection itself is influenced by this ideology. Consequently, reflection itself may become an ideological tool. Materialism based on such reflection can lead to subjective positivism, in which the supremacy of the category of reflection is achieved at the cost of losing the subjective critical element. Specifically, the ideological dimension of reflection points mainly to the following two fields: First, materialism under the domination of political power. Therein, "reflection" is subject to the practice of a certain objective spirit; the reflectivity of consciousness is imprisoned. The paradox of this reflection lies in its essential non-reflectivity, or limited reflectivity. "The deficiency of materialism is the deficiency of the failure to reflect upon the dominant conditions." When this reflection theory is reified into a theory, it is often combined with a terrifying state apparatus. This causes materialism to degenerate into a kind of barbarism, manifesting a rupture with the real life-world and a betrayal of the original intention to grasp the objective world. Therein, the integrated object is lost, replaced by the immediate object. This reflection leads to the subjective arbitrariness of ideas; reflection becomes a functional product constructed by a certain objective spirit, thereby moving toward a new myth. Dogmatic theoretical forms or closed systems of power are both embodiments of this myth. Second, scientism. Contemporary materialism has already tilted toward scientism; or rather, contemporary science has increasingly taken on the implications of philosophical ontology. In this context, the supremacy of the category of reflection leads directly to "science as an ideology." Taking computer systems as an example: therein, consciousness is not given intuitively, but is an abstract thing that has been systematically functionalized. To a certain extent, this leads to the weakening of consciousness.
Based on the above discussion, Adorno proposes...
"Non-representational materialism." Adorno points out that while dialectics exist within things themselves, the "object is open only to a subjective surplus in thought." This "subjective surplus" stands in opposition to the subject's attempt to subsume the object through the power of identity. In the process of becoming an object [in the traditional sense], the object loses itself; thus, the enlightenment of thought must necessarily break through this representational character of consciousness. Without Being, there are no beings; [2] likewise, without beings, there is no Being. Subject and object are mutually mediated. Objectivity itself is a mediated objectivity, and a dialectic that collapses entirely into an objective position is also an illusion—it cannot fulfill the rescue of the "preponderance of the object." However, if representation is dissolved, how is it possible for the subject to grasp the object? Adorno notes that the subject's grasp of the objective is not a "reflection" but a "direction toward": "thought is not a reflection of the thing, but points toward the fact itself." Only a non-representational theory can lead to the authentic, complete object. Taking Lenin’s critique of traditional epistemology as an example, Adorno argues that Lenin keenly intuited the complicity between traditional materialist epistemology and power. Lenin’s critique was not merely theoretical but a political necessity; he recognized that using praxis to dissolve idealism's potential for catastrophic political consequences was essential. In Adorno’s view, Lenin does not directly enter the horizon of traditional epistemology in Materialism and Empirio-criticism. His critiques of Berkeley’s philosophy and Machism, and his materialist interpretation of the "thing-in-itself," all present a dimension of anti-traditional epistemology. Lenin emphasizes that the object of cognition exists independently of our sensations; in the face of the objective item's "in-and-for-itself" nature, traditional epistemology is nothing more than an act of violence against the object. "Non-representational materialism" is an attempt to dissolve this violence and reconstruct the objectivity of cognition. Specifically, this materialism relies on concepts entering a "constellation" (星丛). A constellation is a cluster of concepts with a spatial dimension within which things are situated. Concepts revolve in an orbit centered on the object, and the objectivity of the concept is precisely what this revolution provides: "As a constellation, theoretical thought circles the orbit of the concept it wishes to open, hoping that the concept will snap open like the lock of a well-guarded safe—not through a single key or a single code, but through a combination of codes." Here, the "constellation" leads to the particularity and difference of the object: "In the constellation of the object, knowledge of the object is knowledge of the object in its own process." Adorno attempts to use the "constellation" to realize the rescue of the preponderance of the object; the relationship between concept and thing is not one of "pointing at" but "moving toward." Within this, subject and object are mutually mediated, presenting not a rigid, closed structure, but a dynamic, open one.
It is not difficult to see that Adorno’s negative dialectics does not oppose the concept itself, but rather the primacy of the concept. It seeks to dissolve the fetishism of the concept, thereby negating foundational philosophy, transcendental philosophy, and the philosophy of the subject—all of which take the primacy of the concept as their basic premise—and dismantling the power of the subject and the cult of idealism. In this sense, the dialectics of ideas uses concepts to complete the unity of thinking and being, making it essentially a dogmatic dialectic. Negative dialectics, conversely, advocates starting from the thing itself and maintaining a direction toward reality. Therefore, philosophy must abandon the expectation of totality and move toward facts, toward the fluid and precarious, and toward individuality and difference. Here, the dialectic that is "forced toward the facts" already carries certain connotations of Marx’s practical dialectics.
III. The Unfolding of "Non-identity" and the Mediated "Particular"
Adorno replaces "identity" with "non-identity" as the core category of negative dialectics, using "non-identity," "being," and "facticity" with equivalent meaning. Adorno reiterates that the authentic meaning of dialectics is to return to the matter at hand—this is the mission of dialectics. "Non-identity" is open to all heterogeneity, individuality, and particularity; it opposes all grand narratives of totality and rejects identity, harmony, and consistency. Adorno emphasizes the priority of non-identity over identity: "To think is, according to its own meaning, to think of something." "The non-identical—that which is not thought—is precisely what thought wants to eliminate but cannot." Logic takes the law of the excluded middle as its core; therefore, logic treats qualitative difference as a contradiction that must be excluded, driving out the rupture between subject and object. If the "laws of thought" appeal to identity, then negative dialectics presents precisely "non-identity within identity," which leads to the "laws of reality." In this sense, Adorno critiques Hegel’s absolute idealism. Hegel sought to reconstruct the "reality of the structure of the object of philosophical cognition" to transcend the individual and transcendental consciousness of Kant and Fichte. However, Hegel’s reconstruction did not fundamentally escape the shackles of idealism because, for him, the inner attributes of the specified particular were still Spirit—a "particular" subsumed by Spirit, in which "non-identity" is dominated.
Adorno critiques the absence of "non-identity" in the horizon of traditional philosophy. The paradigm of the philosophy of identity is Hegelian philosophy: "Hegelian philosophy encounters the non-identity of the antagonistic and, with extraordinary difficulty, piles it together; this is the non-identity of the whole, a whole that is not true but untrue—the absolute opposite of justice (Gerechtigkeit)." Beyond Hegel, the medium of identity philosophy exists powerfully across various philosophical discourses, from Schelling’s "absolute ego" to Heidegger’s philosophy of Being: "Since Schelling, substantive philosophical thinking has been grounded in the proposition of identity." In Schelling, the thing and the concept possess identity within a higher spirit. Heidegger seems to take a step forward, reaching the "edge of the dialectical viewpoint that 'non-identity exists within identity,' but without resolving the contradictions in the concept of 'Being,' he ended up suppressing them." Heidegger attempted to subvert traditional metaphysics but ultimately fell into the subjectivism of existential philosophy. The ontologization of the copula made the category of "Being" an abstract tautology; his pursuit of the immediacy and primacy that transcends subject and object caused him to overflow the horizon of dialectics. Adorno makes "non-identity" the fundamental dimension of philosophical thinking; the promotion of "non-identity" simultaneously signifies the establishment of a new philosophical position: "Dialectics is the consistent consciousness of non-identity," "Dialectics tends toward the non-identical," and "In its subjective aspect, the result of dialectics is the insistence that the form of thought no longer turns its object into something immutable." "Non-identity" critiques all prior theoretical positions and philosophical principles, rejecting any form of ontological construction. Negative dialectics aims to replace "identity" with "non-identity," thereby initiating a new form of dialectics.
While exalting "non-identity," Adorno does not treat the "particular" [3] as the end-point of thinking activity. Negative dialectics rejects any form of "end," and submission to the particular thing itself possesses an ideological dimension; therefore, it is not the theoretical posture of negative dialectics. Although the particular itself is the irreducible element of identity, it is not an abstraction but something mediated in itself—a unity of the "thing-in-itself" and the "thing-for-others." Through this mediation, it can be interpreted. In this sense, "the individual existent is 'more' than what it is. This 'more' is not imposed on it from the outside, but is something internal to it, excluded from within itself." The particular as a mediated thing points not only to other particulars but, more importantly, to the universal. The so-called universal resides within the particular, just as in the field of art, the most transcendent works hide universal elements. The universal does not need to be presented through the comparison of many particulars; rather, it is deeply rooted in the heart of the particular. Here, the resistance of "non-identity" against "identity" must rely on reaching identity with its own concept—this is precisely what Husserl neglected: "The object given in the act—according to Husserl’s own terms and the Hegelian terms he ignored—is 'mediated': it is 'thought,' and even if it is thought as something objective, it still carries within itself categorical factors that cannot be removed from the operation on its 'self'." Particularity is presented through the abstract thinking activity of the universal. Opposition to this identity is not external; it must rely on entering this identity—more precisely, subverting identity through identity. In this sense, it is inappropriate to view Adorno as an advocate of absolute difference and the individual; negative dialectics also presents a certain characteristic of theoretical reconciliation. This also marks the essential difference between Adorno’s negative dialectics and postmodernism; the latter rejects the philosophy of reconciliation, while negative dialectics still preserves its imprint. Rather than saying Adorno is dedicated to critiquing the rational totality based on identity, it is more accurate to say he critiques an illegitimate and insufficient use of reason. Taking the principle of exchange as an example, Adorno explores the social model of the law of identity. The principle of exchange, as the law of identity in the sphere of exchange, makes the labor activities of non-identical individuals commensurable. Although their respective labors possess diverse heterogeneities, they can be exchanged according to the principle of equivalent exchange. If this identity were negated, exchange activity would return to barbaric disorder and violence. But the principle of exchange as identity is itself a negation; specifically, the equality promised by this principle is merely an illusion—or rather, this exchange is "equal yet unequal" because it dissolves the differences between non-identical individuals and their labor. To save diverse, heterogeneous, and differentiated labor, one must first dissolve the legitimacy of the identity principle represented by universal exchange, transcending the principle of exchange through the principle of exchange.
IV. The Presupposition of Language and its Absence in the Dialectics of Ideas
Building on the three dimensions above, the intellectual path of negative dialectics ascends to the linguistic dimension of dialectics and philosophy. On the surface, the debate over the language of dialectics serves to provide an argument for the "constellation," but this argument itself touches upon the core of the dialectical tradition. In this sense, it is an "ascent" in the intellectual path.
In Adorno’s view, dialectics presupposes language. Language has a cognitive function, but it is not a "pure system of signs" for things. The essence of language does not lie in the definition of concepts; the demand for precision in conceptual description is, in fact, anti-linguistic. The language presupposed by negative dialectics is termed "linguistic behavior" (语言行为) by Adorno, in which discursive rationality is connected to the communicativity of language itself. This communicativity stands in opposition to the order-compulsion of formal logic and identity. Therefore, individual concepts are limited. Linguistic behavior leads to a conceptual field; concepts are within linguistic behavior, but concepts are not equivalent to it. Linguistic behavior also includes that which cannot be decomposed by individual concepts. The basic aim of linguistic behavior is not to express the concept, but to express what the concept intends; within this, the concept truly attains its objectivity, and language completes itself. Here, linguistic behavior points to the intentionality of the concept itself, shifting dialectics from a linguistic dimension to a semantic one. This is negative dialectics' reconstruction of the legitimacy of the concept.
Adorno also critiques the dialectics of ideas, represented by Hegel, in the sense mentioned above. The dialectics of ideas recognizes only concepts with a clear referential dimension and lacks "language." Specifically, Hegel’s dialectics subsumes language itself (including the non-linguistic) into the system of Absolute Spirit. This system epitomizes the demand for the totality of identity in Hegel’s dialectics—a demand that presupposes there is nothing that cannot be decomposed by this identity. In Adorno’s view, only the undecomposable element of the concept and the non-identity it represents are the growth points of dialectics. The externalization of the concept comes precisely from this non-identity. Only this undecomposable element can transcend the closure of the system itself, whereas Hegel suppressed this transcendence with the identity of the system. In this sense, Adorno points out—
"Hegelian dialectics is a dialectics without language"; "Hegel does not need language because for him everything, even the languageless and the opaque, must be Spirit, and specifically, a relational Spirit." Adorno attempts to transcend language as a mere system of signs and enter into a vision of language as an intentional activity, wherein concepts need to allow linguistic intentions to achieve full expression. Consequently, such a concept is no longer just a single concept in itself, but a "constellation" [6] of concepts. The latter constructs a space of meaning that, to a certain extent, overcomes the subjective curtailment of things that occurs during the conceptual process of abstraction. The relationship of this constellation to the object is no longer one of one-dimensional reference; rather, it achieves a moment of identity by gathering around the object of cognition, without needing to be entrusted to a supreme principle of abstraction through the Hegelian negation of the negation.
Based on the exploration above, Adorno reaffirms the linguistic dimension of philosophy—something that has been disparaged by the philosophical tradition since Plato. On the one hand, the language of philosophy differs from the language of science. Science clings to a fixed referentiality of language, violently excluding whatever description cannot directly provide to thought. This highly systematized, reified language is essentially anti-language, presenting a form of "de-linguistification." In this sense, we can say that scientism, which flaunts its objectivity, is in essence a philosophy of the subject. Taking physics as an example, "physics as an objectifying practice cannot see its own non-objectifiable foundation, nor the process of laying that foundation within historical practice. Just as formal logic is detached from the existence of linguistic meaning, physics is detached from human communicative practice. In a sense, physics perceives reality from the perspective of a single subject and thus plays a leading role in modern subject-philosophy." The reification of language is something philosophical language must guard against: "The alliance of philosophy with science could lead to the deposition of language, and thereby to the deposition of philosophy itself, for philosophy cannot survive without the effort of philosophical language." On the other hand, the language of philosophy also differs from rhetoric (Rhetorik). In the history of modern philosophy, rhetoric is a form in which language is debased under a methodological horizon—a product of the technicalization of thinking. It stands in opposition to the expressive elements of thought, and rhetoric must always face the risk of losing the object.
Based on this double critique, Adorno points out the essence of the linguistic dimension of philosophy: language is not a means of philosophical expression; rather, philosophy is a reflection upon language itself. Specifically, how are philosophical expression and description possible? When we say "this one," the "this one" itself already contains the mediation of the concept. Thus, philosophical expression involves both the conceptual and the non-conceptual—that is, the limits of naming facts with specific words. When we attempt to use conceptual accuracy to express the selfhood of a fact, the presentation of that fact is restricted. The illusion of fetishism lies precisely in the flight from the irreducible element that cannot be subsumed into the concept, freezing the existent into the certainty of a concept. The effort to dissolve fetishism is to treat the existent no longer as a "ready-made thing" but as a "thing in becoming." Philosophical language seeks to approach the name by negating the name. The closing of the gap between "concept" and "fact" is only possible by introducing the non-conceptual into the concept. It is in this sense that Adorno provides the concept of the "constellation," which is also the basic epistemological presupposition of negative dialectics. In this sense, philosophy does not aim to disparage "rhetoric," but rather commits itself to "critically rescuing the elements of rhetoric." By allowing expression and fact to continually approach one another, it reconstructs confidence in philosophical expression. However, when thought seeks the truth of expression within the analysis of words, traditional epistemology is inevitably obstructed. "Adorno saw and consistently emphasized that philosophy can have no other foothold than language to express its critique of conceptual thinking. Yet the very idea of criticizing the concept of identity must find its premises outside of language. Adorno's philosophy is an assault on the boundaries of language (subject-philosophy); it speaks the secret of subject-philosophy without needing to understand that secret." Here, Adorno's exploration of the linguistic basis of philosophy involves the non-essentiality of philosophical language. The path indicated by this non-essentiality is opposed to the task of emphasizing the objectification of language. This does not mean that philosophical language itself is a subjective curtailment devoid of objectivity, but rather emphasizes that the basic interest of philosophical language is to construct a path to understanding, and understanding itself is linked to the construction of linguistic meaning. Here, "as Adorno believed, in philosophy we indeed encounter the limits of concepts, and the reason for this is precisely that we move and think at the limits of language, neither entirely within language nor, as we might hope, on the other side of language."
V. Negative Dialectics and the Tradition of Dialectics
Returning to the title of this article: is negative dialectics a radical dialectics? It must be said that, overall, radicalism is merely the appearance of negative dialectics. Adorno's perplexity involves the authenticity of concreteness and the objectivity of thought within consciousness profoundly associated with it. This is essentially an ancient puzzle regarding dialectics, though he injected it with the content of the era. The dilemma of dialectics in Adorno's vision is essentially the dilemma of all activities of mental abstraction. Moreover, Adorno's solution to this dilemma is also a derivative of the conceptual dialectics he critiqued. He did not substantively complete the reconstruction or advancement of dialectics. His critique of Hegel's conceptual dialectics also contained misunderstandings of Hegel and therefore failed to strike at the heart of the matter.
Specifically, from the very beginning, Hegel presented his dialectics within a vision of dissolving the dualistic opposition between subject and object. Therefore, for him, the starting point of dialectics "is the objective examination of things according to their own existence and process." Hegel did not treat dialectics merely as a thought-process, but as a reality-process presented within the thought-process—the self-unfolding of "substance" as "subject." This means that concepts in Hegel's vision are essentially not the concepts Adorno criticized; his concept "is not an 'abstract concept' separated from the real substance to which it relates, but means 'the real thing as understood conceptually.'" "Language and thought themselves are dialectical only because and insofar as they reveal or describe the dialectics of existence and real things." In fact, when evaluating Hegel, Adorno himself had to admit: "This absolute idealist was likewise a great realist, and he especially possessed sharp historical insight." "The principle of actual becoming (through which a thing is not merely its positivity), or rather the core engine of Hegelian idealism, is at the same time anti-idealistic." Furthermore, the concept itself in Hegel's work is not the "reification of thought." In fact, Hegel does not cling to the determinacy of individual concepts. Compared to the establishment of individual conceptual determinacy, Hegel is more concerned with the dissolution of every determinacy and the necessity of that dissolution. Through the self-evolution and self-development of concepts, he presents precisely the finitude of concepts as the "reification of thought." In this process, each independent concept is but a moment in the continuously unfolding sequence of concepts. Adorno himself admitted: "In terms of the determination to tolerate no limits and eliminate every distinct definition, Hegel completely surpassed Fichte's idealism." Accordingly, in Hegel's work, the negation of the negation does not return negation to affirmation; rather, it should be understood only as an insufficient negation, and every reconciliation in the self-evolution of the concept should be understood as a temporary reconciliation. Adorno violently criticized the violence of identity in Hegelian dialectics; however, "in Hegel, especially in his Science of Logic, the question of whether identity is superior to difference (or vice versa) seems less important than the inevitable mutual transformation between them, provided you pay attention to either one of them for a long enough time." Adorno wanted to present a meta-critique of the philosophy of identity, yet this meta-critique remained saturated with a reconciliation with the philosophy of identity that it could not peel away. "To be sure, Adorno resolutely denies any ontology, but his general theoretical aim is to deconstruct the positivity of the external description of dialectics and construct a concrete positivity grounded in negativity. This may also be the origin of the theoretical predicament from which he could later find no escape." Generally speaking, negative dialectics remains within the field of conceptual dialectics and has not found a realistic path from concepts to things. Similarly criticizing Hegelian dialectics, Marx took an entirely different path. By introducing historicity into dialectics, Marx uniquely opened up a "broad road" [7] for dialectics. In summary, the arguments for regarding negative dialectics as a radical dialectics are insufficient. Rather, negative dialectics is but a contemporary echo of the dialectical tradition—an echo that presents a strong practical concern. This may partly explain why the theoretical paradigm represented by negative dialectics was not isolated in the 20th-century trajectory of thought but merged, in either explicit or implicit ways, into a confluence of thought that takes non-identity as its practical interest.
Nevertheless, Adorno's effort to direct negative dialectics toward individuality and difference is remarkable. His attempt to prevent dialectics from becoming a tyranny of reason or a dogmatic rut, and to transcend the rupture between philosophy and the factual sciences, is a positive theoretical intention. Adorno’s reflections on the limits of dialectical thought and action point directly to the contemporary dilemma of dialectics and resonate with the spirit of the times. "No other Marxist theorist has ever highlighted the relationship between the universal and the particular, the system and the detail, with such single-minded yet expansive attention." Adorno's reflection on the Enlightenment in Dialectic of Enlightenment is his practical critique of conceptual dialectics. In this sense, Negative Dialectics and Dialectic of Enlightenment provide mutual corroboration; the critique of the Enlightenment is only truly completed in Negative Dialectics. Beyond this, negative dialectics demonstrates immense theoretical and practical space in cultural critique (such as the reconstruction of traditional moral philosophy in the "dialectics of freedom"). Although Adorno faced numerous difficulties in the ontological reconstruction of dialectics, he unexpectedly opened a vast horizon for cultural critique. In this horizon, negative dialectics points to the suppression of human beings by various abstract totalities created by capital. These abstract totalities become an identifying power that dominates people—from a one-dimensional moral order and political ideology to the state bureaucracy. What Adorno sought to do was to rebuild the criticality of dialectics within the socio-historical process. Here, Adorno's position coincides with that of Marx; these constitute the rational kernel of negative dialectics.
(Notes omitted)
(Author's affiliation: School of Marxism, Tongji University) Web Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Teaching and Research of Marxist Theory, Issue 2, 2021.