Yang Zhichen: Engels' Preliminary Elaboration on the Particularity of Russia's Path of Social Development | Marxism Research Network

In the mid-1870s, "the torrent of Russian Populism finally burst through the gates of history," and an "all-encompassing encounter" with Marxism inevitably broke out. Pyotr Tkachev ^[1] was a typical representative of the "seizure of power" faction within 19th-century Russian Populism. His public polemic with Engels stands as a classic case of the comprehensive confrontation between Russian Populism and Marxism. The imminent Russian social revolution in Tkachev’s discourse was, in essence, a socialist revolution. That is to say, what Tkachev truly intended to express was that Russian society was moving toward revolution—specifically a socialist revolution—and that this revolution would break out earlier than the socialist revolutions anticipated in Western European countries. Consequently, he argued, Russia would advance earlier than Western Europe toward the state of social development already delineated by Western European socialist thought.

The key question here is: given that Western European social development at the time was far more advanced than that of Russian society following the Serfdom Reform ^[2], and given that capitalist forms of social production were only just beginning to emerge in Russia in a sporadic and scattered manner—in short, when Russian capitalist development was merely at a low-level, initial stage, and when the Russian bourgeoisie and proletariat were far from fully developed—why did Tkachev, as a representative of the Russian Populists in the 1870s, firmly believe that Russian society could achieve socialism sooner than Western society? On Social Relations in Russia and its "Preface," formed during Friedrich Engels’s polemic with Tkachev, powerfully refuted the view of socialism held by Tkachev from a critical perspective. Simultaneously, by "discovering the dawn of a new world within the critique of the old," Engels provided a preliminary positive exposition on the question of the particularity of Russia’s path of social development.

I. Critique of Tkachev’s View of Socialism

The core of Tkachev’s view of socialism was the claim: "It is true that we have no urban proletariat; however, we also have no bourgeoisie." Therefore, Russian workers did not need to struggle against a non-existent capital power, or one that was still embryonic and weak; they only needed to struggle against political power. Compared to power built upon capital, the struggle against political power would be much smoother and easier; thus, Russia would achieve social revolution and reach a socialist state much more smoothly and easily than Western Europe.

Social revolution in its original sense. In this "first important document discussing Russian social issues in the history of scientific socialism," Engels critiqued Tkachev’s view of socialism from the perspective of returning to foundational principles. He maintained that the social revolution—that is, social transformation—pursued by socialism in its original sense consists essentially in "the victory of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, and the establishment of a new social organization through the abolition of all class distinctions." Engels’s definition of the social revolution or transformation desired by socialism implies that the true realization of socialism must first possess a fundamental prerequisite: the proletariat and the bourgeoisie must be real entities, and must by no means be merely illusory existences in the mind. Secondly, a basic condition is that the existential states of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie themselves must be in a state of forward motion within world history. Thirdly, this state of forward motion should gradually approach or reach a certain degree of development—in other words, the development of the proletariat itself must have reached or nearly reached the realistic capacity to defeat the bourgeoisie and take over its world-historical mission. Meanwhile, the development of the bourgeoisie itself must have pushed the overall level of the social productive forces to a degree sufficient to realize social revolution.
The true pursuit of modern socialism. This is necessary because modern socialism pursues a social state in which class distinctions have been abolished. The term "abolished" here reveals that human society previously existed in a state without class distinctions at a certain stage of development. For example, every nation in the earliest period of its development experienced a stage of social development that, while devoid of class distinctions, was overall in a state of barbarism or semi-barbarism. Although such a stage of social development might be infinitely yearned for by modern people due to its lack of class distinctions, the modern proletariat does not intend to return to this stage. This is because in such a society, social production and the inherent productive forces are non-existent, or if they do exist, are in an embryonic state of development at an extremely low overall level, and are thus almost entirely unable to satisfy even the most basic human needs. Furthermore, such a social state would either stagnate, remaining forever in a primitive state to maintain the status quo; or it would regress into a purely natural state lacking any sociological human presence; or it would continue to develop forward on its original basis. As long as the social state continues to develop forward, it indicates that the productive forces—which provide the fundamental impetus for this continued development—are constantly growing. This continuous growth, whether slow or fast, must inevitably cause the classless human society to generate class distinctions within itself.
Human society must continue to evolve forward. Once human society has advanced from a state of no class distinctions to one where they exist, it can no longer return to the previous classless state merely by the power of subjective human will or the subjective feeling of liking classlessness and loathing class distinctions. The socialism defined by Engels maintains that human society should not turn back to a classless state, for such a retreat is detrimental to the fundamental interests of humanity itself. Only by continuing to advance and develop forward, thereby gradually reaching or approaching communism—where classes no longer exist—can the existence of humanity be best served. To reach or approach such a social state, one must investigate the fundamental cause, or fundamental driving force, behind human society’s transition from a classless state to one of class existence. This fundamental driving force, as mentioned above, is the productive forces themselves—more accurately, the existence and continuous growth of the productive forces. In other words, there is a profound correspondence between the productive forces and the state of human society: when productive forces do not exist or are at an extremely low level, human society correspondingly does not exist or remains in a classless state; when productive forces achieve a certain degree of development but the overall level remains low, class divisions and distinctions emerge; only when productive forces continue to grow to a very high degree—even much higher than the productive forces of the most developed modern capitalist societies—does it become possible and feasible for human society to push social production to an exceptionally high level. Only then can classes and their distinctions be truly abolished in accordance with fundamental human needs, turning the lofty ideal of class abolition into a tangible reality, and ensuring that this abolition promotes social progress and possesses a realistic material basis for sustainability. However, the living reality of world-historical development tells us that the highly developed productive forces providing this material basis have only grown to such a high degree under the bourgeoisie; only under the bourgeoisie has society itself gradually generated the realistic and true need to realize social revolution. Ironically, the bourgeoisie itself cannot truly undertake this realistic and true need; therefore, the heavy burden of the world-historical social revolution naturally falls to the proletariat. It is evident that both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are fundamental conditions necessary for the realization of the socialist revolution—they constitute "a necessary prerequisite."

II. The Prospect for Russia’s Path of Social Development Already Shows a Clear Revolutionary Trend

On Social Relations in Russia and its "Preface" take the form of positive exposition within theoretical critique. In the process of critiquing Tkachev’s socialist view and the idea that Russia possessed unique advantages to realize socialism before Western Europe, Engels positively expounded his understanding of the prospects for Russian social development. Engels believed that under conditions where the interests of the peasantry were fundamentally damaged and their survival crisis worsened during Russia’s 1861 Serfdom Reform, where national finances were deteriorating, the foundation of agricultural production was shaken, and the state political apparatus was increasingly corrupt, the prospects for Russia’s social development path had already shown an obvious and clear trend: "The Russian revolution is drawing near."

Analysis of the reasons for the clear revolutionary trend. The theoretical analysis of the fundamental reasons why Russian social development had shown a clear revolutionary trend is precisely reflected in Engels’s critique of Tkachev’s Populist view of socialism with Russian characteristics.

First, as the Tsarist government forcefully implemented the Serfdom Reform aimed at developing the capitalist mode of production, backward Russia was gradually giving birth to a modern bourgeoisie and a corresponding modern proletariat. A particularly clear fact was that the modern proletariat would necessarily come primarily from the "new-style serfs" who, having just received "liberation" from the yoke of serfdom by the Tsarist government, were immediately plunged into a tragic state of being unable to survive. The "old-style serfs" who lived long under Tsarist autocratic power were declared liberated by their rulers, only to be accelerated into a difficult situation where they could not obtain basic means of subsistence. They became proletarians—"new-style serfs" oppressed by the combined power of the Tsarist government and the burgeoning modern capital—and were thus accelerated into "transforming" into the modern proletariat. Tkachev’s declaration in his open letter that "It is true that we have no urban proletariat; however, we also have no bourgeoisie" was undoubtedly contrary to the basic historical trends and facts occurring right before his eyes.

Second, in the 1860s and 1870s, with the forceful implementation of the Serfdom Reform, industries of a capitalist nature began to be birthed and developed in specific regions and sectors, which meant the birth and development of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Indisputably, the birthing and accelerated development of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat had become a most fundamental historical fact and existence, increasingly demonstrating a particularly vigorous potential for forward development on Russian soil.

Third, as the transformers and "metamorphosers" of previous exploiting classes, the bourgeoisie always enters the historical stage earlier than the proletariat, taking the lead in mastering the advanced productive forces of an era and becoming more powerful than the proletariat. Therefore, the awakening of the proletariat and its conscious organization as a class, and its subsequent victory over the bourgeoisie, is a long historical process requiring arduous struggle. The same was true for the proletariat then being birthed and developed in Russia. At the same time, it is important to note that the birth and development of the Russian bourgeoisie was then in a period of historical ascent, still possessing vigorous space and time for growth.

Furthermore, as a backward Eastern country, Russia’s historical traditions, cultural customs, and stage of social development differed significantly from Western society. These factors already contained a fundamental fact: Russia’s path of social development would necessarily have its own particularity distinct from the West. In short, at this time, the prospects for Russia’s path of social development had become clear, accelerating toward the direction of social revolution.

A multi-dimensional vision of clear revolutionary trends. In the polemic surrounding the "particularity of the Russian revolution," Engels criticized Tkachev’s ^[3] conception of socialism and social revolution while simultaneously providing a multi-dimensional analysis of the nascent Russian social revolution, grounded in the historical conditions of the time. He dismissed Tkachev’s assertion—that the Russian revolution would be a "social revolution"—as a tautology devoid of practical meaning. Engels emphasized that the essence of the matter lay in a serious inquiry into reality: what social consequences the coming Russian revolution might produce. He argued that every genuine revolution is, in substance, necessarily a social revolution of profound social significance. This is because every revolution that truly drives history forward thrusts new social forces—new social classes—onto the center stage of the historical social structure, placing them in a key dominant position. This allows the new social force, manifesting in class form, to utilize the social conditions at its disposal (whether potential or actual) to transform society according to its own class character, compelling society to adapt, sooner or later, to its fundamental class interests and needs. Such a genuine, history-driving social revolution must be a comprehensive, multi-dimensional, and holistic revolution encompassing both economic and political revolutions—never a one-sided, single-dimensional, or localized revolution involving only one or the other.

III. Economic Dimensions of the Russian Revolutionary Trend (I): The Artel

Engels held a general judgment regarding Russia's social development prospects: namely, that Russia was moving toward revolution. As for the basic form of the revolution and its possible outcomes, these required further observation. The economic aspect of this impending Russian revolution—the economic revolution—first involved what Tkachev described as the "mysterious" artels ^[4] that existed pervasively across both non-agricultural and agricultural sectors in Russia.

The so-called mystery of the artel in Tkachev’s discourse and its demystification. Tkachev believed the artel was a unique advantage that would allow Russia to achieve socialism ahead of Western Europe—a unique advantage possessing a certain "mystical" quality. However, he only briefly alluded to this mystical advantage to the Western European working class, particularly the German working class, without detailing what that mystery actually entailed. To clarify the nature of this mystery and thereby effectively critique Tkachev’s idea—that the artel was a unique advantage exclusive to Russia and absent in Western Europe—and his subsequent notion that Russia could achieve socialism before the West, Engels conducted a study of the artel itself. He thoroughly demystified the long-held belief among many Russians that the artel possessed some unique mystery. The artel had long been a common form of cooperation in Russia. Because this form of cooperation possessed an inherent nature of free association and a simple external structure, it appeared very similar to the spontaneous forms of cooperation (sometimes dispersed, sometimes concentrated) adopted by hunting peoples. To many Russians, such artels were undoubtedly an indigenous product of the Slavic people, later carried to other parts of Russia through Slavic expansion. However, such an interpretation was not definitive, nor was it necessarily historical fact, as there were other compelling explanations for the origin of the artel. The artel was not unique to the Slavs within Russia, nor was it unique to Russia on a global scale. The inherent freedom and simple composition of the artel were expressions of its internal spontaneity. This meant that the developmental level of the association was still very low and required further growth; it also meant that it was precisely this innate spontaneity that allowed the association to appear more universal during its underdeveloped stage.
The need for the artel to continue its forward development. In his critique, Engels exposed the "mysteries" regarding the discovery, uniqueness, and advanced nature of the artel. He argued that while this underdeveloped form of cooperative existed widely in Russia, showing a genuine desire for association among the Russian people (especially the emerging working class), this did not simply or directly mean they could rely solely on such subjective strength to "leap directly" into the socialist society for which the Western European working class was struggling but had not yet realized. What was needed here was not a "direct leap"—not on the current basis of the artel—but a gradual transition based on a reformed and developed new artel. That is to say, the artel itself must first avoid regressing into the dispersed, atomized state that preceded its formation. Provided this fundamental condition was met, the artel had to maintain its trend of forward development. To truly achieve this, the artel had to gradually and consciously overcome its ever-present spontaneous nature and move past forms that appeared to serve the workers but in fact benefited the capitalists. Furthermore, the Russian artel needed to develop at least to the same level as existing Western European cooperatives. Compared to the latter, the Russian artel remained backward as late as the 1870s, lacking the consciousness and capacity compatible with organized large-scale industry. Consequently, as Russian large-scale industry—capitalist industry heavily fostered by the Tsarist government—began its rapid and powerful development, the survival and growth of the artel faced an increasingly grim situation. If it did not continue to develop, improve, and perfect itself, it would likely—and perhaps inevitably—be swallowed up by large-scale capitalist industry.

IV. Economic Dimensions of the Russian Revolutionary Trend (II): The Russian Commune

The economic aspect of the impending Russian revolution also involved what Tkachev called the pervasive rural communes (obshchina) and their "mysterious" system of communal land ownership ^[5]. Employing a logic similar to his analysis of the artel, Engels used his critique to expose the mysteries surrounding this system—its origins, its alleged uniqueness to Russia, and its supposed advanced nature—as propagated by Tkachev. He then pointed out two possible yet opposing developmental prospects facing this communal land ownership.

The prospect of disintegration. Tkachev believed the spirit of collective ownership embodied in the Russian communal land system was inextricably linked to the spiritual world of the Russian peasantry. Therefore, he argued, the Russian government could only exorcise this spirit and destroy the communal system through political coercion, such as bayonets and whips. Engels, however, believed this land system faced the possibility of disintegration primarily due to two factors: internal factors within the system itself and external factors.

Regarding the former, if "Russia continues to develop in a bourgeois direction," the communal land system would be doomed even without coercive government intervention. Within the rural commune, this trend toward capitalism manifested as follows: although land remained communal property, it was redistributed periodically among the individual households of the commune. Each household then farmed its allocated plot individually, and the fruits of that labor belonged to the household. This method of agricultural production allowed different households and members to produce different—even vastly different—results based on their specific conditions. This, in turn, created the space for serious socio-economic differentiation within the commune. Indeed, severe wealth disparities among commune members were a reality. "Almost everywhere," there were a few very wealthy members within the communes who were moving toward rapid wealth accumulation by lending money at usurious rates to other members.

Regarding the latter, the primary external factor was the policy of redemption payments and land distribution adopted by the Tsarist government since 1861, which was highly detrimental to the rural communes. This series of biased reform policies brought increasingly dire consequences for the peasantry. Regarding land, landlords gained a distinct advantage over peasants in both quantity and quality; peasants received only enough land to barely survive, and often not even that. Regarding forests, ownership of this resource was handed entirely to the landlords, stripping peasants of their traditional natural right to gather timber for free and forcing them to pay fees they had never previously owed. Thus, under pressure from the Tsarist government concerning the very resources necessary for life, the peasants fell into a state where basic survival was difficult to maintain. Additionally, they had to endure economic exploitation via taxes from local administrations and interest from speculative usurers. In short, under these layers of oppression, they could no longer view their small plots as a "boon" from the 1861 reforms, but increasingly saw them as the source of their extreme hardship. Consequently, abandoning this source of misery and attempting to flee the rural commune to "earn a living as a day laborer" became an increasingly common way for peasants to escape their plight.

The prospect of continued development and transformation into a higher social organization. While recognizing the possibility of disintegration for Russian communal land ownership, Engels did not treat this as an absolute certainty. Instead, he maintained a dialectical attitude, believing another prospect existed: that it might continue to develop and transform into a higher form of social organization.

Here, he employed two "as long as" conditional clauses: "as long as" the communal system could survive until the moment conditions allowed its transition from a lower to a higher form, and "as long as" it could transform its mode of cultivation from individual farming to collective, associated farming, and continue to develop under the latter. In other words, if these conditions were met, the Russian communal system might avoid disintegration—avoiding a regression into the intermediate stage of dispersed, small-scale capitalist land ownership—and instead develop directly into a higher social organization based on communal ownership and associated cultivation. If these conditions were present, the prospect for the Russian obshchina would be a transition from a lower to a higher form. However, it must be noted that such a prospect still required a fundamental, foundational condition. Engels emphasized the extreme importance of this condition, arguing that it was "only" with this condition that the aforementioned prospect "could" arise. This condition, in short, was a proletarian revolution in Western Europe. Specifically, the Western European proletarian revolution and the Russian communal system were closely linked. Given the ongoing disintegration of the Russian system, the Western European proletariat would need to achieve victory before that disintegration was complete. Then, the West could provide the Russian peasantry with the necessary conditions to develop the obshchina into a higher form—especially the material conditions urgently needed for the inevitable transformation of agriculture and its institutions.

V. The Political Dimension and Profound Significance of the Russian Revolutionary Trend

Regarding the imminent Russian revolution, its political dimension—that is, the political revolution—will be a complex, layered, and multi-staged ensemble formed by the interaction of various classes, particularly the interaction between the government and the Tsarist autocracy and the peasantry. This emerging political revolution, due to its inherent complexity, stratification, and phasing, will exert unpredictable and significant influence on the development of both Russian and Western European societies.

Complexity. The imminent Russian political revolution is complex in nature; although it will manifest prominently as a political revolution, it will not be exclusively political. This is because the revolution is induced by a "historical resultant force" ^[6] formed through the interaction of diverse factors: economic, political, and ideological factors have all participated in its brewing. The economic factors inducing this revolution primarily include: a state treasury in total disarray, making it difficult to sustain the government’s massive expenditures; land taxes and various levies that have reached such a heavy level that they cannot be further increased; and a vicious cycle of borrowing national debt, paying interest, and re-borrowing from which it is difficult to escape. Furthermore, agricultural production—the most vital component of Russian production—was severely weakened during the 1861 Reform ^[7] due to the Tsarist government's predatory "redemption" policies imposed on the peasants. This has left the classes directly tied to landed interests in an awkward state of contradiction. The political factors primarily include: the various classes constituting society, driven by the political and economic situation, are increasingly forced to involve themselves in political activities and the coming revolution; and the state government apparatus is increasingly mired in serious political corruption and graft. The ideological factors primarily include: influenced by Russian historical traditions and especially by the economic and political conditions rapidly formed since the 1861 Reform, the dissatisfaction of all social classes toward the Tsarist government and its autocratic system grows day by day; bourgeois and proletarian ideologies have gradually begun to spread; and the peasantry has begun to fall under the influence of Russian Narodnik ^[8] thought.
Stratification. The imminent Russian political revolution possesses a stratified character, involving interactions among the government and Tsarist autocracy, the peasantry, the bourgeoisie, and the proletariat, which together will form a new political landscape. Russian society is a typical pyramidal structure: the upper stratum consists of the Tsar and his family, government officials of all levels, and large landowners; the middle stratum primarily comprises the newly emergent and rapidly developing bourgeoisie and proletariat; and the lower stratum consists mainly of the laboring masses, with the peasantry as the mainstay. Due to the inertia of Russian history, and specifically the practical influence of the economic, political, and ideological conditions taking shape since the 1861 Reform, these three strata are being forced into political struggles involving their various interests. Consequently, the coming Russian revolution is likely to be the result of a historical resultant force generated by the interaction of class powers, leading to a new political configuration born of their mutual influence. Within this, because Russian capitalist production is only beginning to develop, both the bourgeoisie and the concomitant proletariat remains weak in terms of both numbers and actual strength. Given that a serious struggle has existed between the Tsarist government and officials/nobility on one side and the peasantry on the other—both historically and in the reality of the post-1861 era—it can be foreseen that the coming revolution will primarily be a political struggle between the Tsarist autocracy and the peasantry, though other classes will also play their respective historical roles in this struggle.
Phasing. The imminent Russian political revolution will be multi-staged. It may first manifest as the political reforms envisioned by the "enlightened" upper classes in the capital, perhaps even including reformers within the Tsarist government itself. These reformers imagine that the coming changes can be "channeled into a quiet constitutional track" just like the 1861 Reform, serving as a political tool to realize the fundamental interests of the upper classes. However, once a political revolution that initially appears as reform begins, it will likely be pushed forward by the peasantry, eventually exceeding the limits of the "quiet constitutional model" envisioned by the upper classes and developing into a powerful political revolution. What, then, would such a revolution—transformed from initial reforms and driven primarily by the interaction between the government/Tsarist autocracy and the peasantry—look like? What would happen next? Engels did not explicitly mention this. However, one point is certain: thereafter, as long as the contradictions between the Tsarist government and the peasantry remain unresolved, and as long as the emerging bourgeoisie and proletariat gradually participate in Russia's political struggles as society develops, the Russian political revolution will continue. It will reveal new forms and develop into new stages; consequently, with the emergence of these new forms and stages, the nature of the revolution itself will undergo new changes. In addition to this general judgment and these forecasts, Engels also noted that under certain conditions—for instance, if the Tsarist government wins a foreign war and continues to receive firm support from its allies, or if peasant uprisings occur prematurely and "drive the propertied classes back into the arms of the government"—this political revolution might be delayed for a long time.
Significant Meaning. The imminent Russian political revolution will exert a major influence on the development of Western European society. Since the 17th century, the development of Western European society has maintained an increasingly obvious and close connection with Russian social conditions. This is centrally manifested in the Tsarist government’s increasing involvement in Western European affairs, intervening directly or indirectly to become a decisive external force affecting Western European social development. Particularly as Tsarist Russia increasingly allied itself with the backward, reactionary forces within Western European nations, becoming their most vital external pillar, it became an important external factor that the progressive forces of Western Europe had to consider seriously whenever taking steps toward social progress. By the mid-19th century, as the feudal reactionary forces in Western Europe were forced off the historical stage under the sustained blows of the productive forces, political revolutions, and progressive ideas, and as bourgeois-led capitalist society developed generally alongside the rapid growth and union of the proletariat, Tsarist Russia completely transformed into the most significant and final external threat hindering Western European social development. It is based on this international perspective—of the mutual influence, shared destiny, and "East-West complementarity" between Western Europe and Russia—that Engels emphasized that the coming Russian revolution, provided it could destroy the Tsarist autocracy and all reactionary forces supporting it in one stroke, would thoroughly remove the major external threat posed by Tsarist Russia as the "final reserve" of the European reactionary alliance. This would have an extremely important international impact on Western Europe as a whole.

VI. The Major Impact of New Changes in Russian Social Development and Revolutionary Trends on European Society

The "Prefatory Note to the Booklet On Social Relations in Russia" was written by Engels in May 1875 for the forthcoming separate edition of On Social Relations in Russia. It provided important supplements and explanations, particularly emphasizing the significant impact that new changes in Russian social development—especially the imminent Russian revolution—would have on the development of European society.

It will have a major impact on Western Europe, especially Germany. Since the implementation of the so-called "emancipation of the serfs" reform led by the Tsarist government in 1861, major changes have been occurring in all aspects of Russian society. The previous state of "stagnant water" in Russian society is becoming increasingly impossible. By analyzing these multi-faceted changes, Engels pointed out that they would have profound and far-reaching effects on the development of Western European society and the movement of the German working class.

First, from the perspective of current Russian foreign policy, the mutual influence between Russia and Western European society is deepening. Russia is increasingly becoming the "last powerful pillar of all Western European reaction." From the 17th century, and especially from the European Revolutions of 1848 until the time Engels wrote the "Prefatory Note," this reactionary pillar played a prominent role in European affairs, acting as the de facto final arbiter. For example, Tsarist Russia played a reactionary but powerful role as an arbiter during the 1848 Revolutions: most notably, at the critical final moment when the Hungarian Revolution was about to succeed in 1849, the Tsar’s army appeared in time to issue a crushing "verdict" on its fate; in Warsaw, Poland, in 1850, it intervened in the internal affairs of the German nation to maintain the status quo of fragmentation and restore the old powers; and just before Engels wrote the "Prefatory Note," Tsarist Russia reprised its 1848 role in Berlin, once again becoming the arbiter of the newly established German Empire after German unification, and consequently the most important balancer of all Western European affairs.

Second, from the perspective of the geographical positions of Western Europe, Germany, and Russia, they are neighbors with contiguous territorial borders. Attention must be paid here to the specific referents of "Western Europe," "Russia," and "Germany" in Engels' discourse. Here, "Western Europe" does not refer to the geographical region, but to the whole of Europe to the west of Russia, covering what we geographically consider Eastern, Central, and Western Europe. "Russia" refers to the Tsarist autocratic empire that annexed the majority of Polish territory after the three partitions of Poland ^[9] carried out jointly with Prussia and Austria. "Germany" is used in a dual sense, referring both to the various German states before unification and to the recently established German Empire (the Second Reich) under Prussian leadership. The proximity of Western Europe to Russia—specifically Germany’s proximity to Russia—has an obvious and major impact. First, the very existence of the Russian Tsarist autocracy signifies firm support for reactionary forces in Western Europe, objectively aiding their consolidation. Second, it means that any progressive action in Western Europe, particularly those resulting from the social revolution of the working class, would inevitably face suppression from the combined reactionary forces within and outside Western Europe, making it difficult to achieve a complete and final victory. Third, should a social revolution led by the working class occur in Western Europe, Tsarist Russia would leverage its geographical advantage to first unite with reactionary forces in Germany to intervene in the German revolution, and subsequently intervene in the working-class revolutions of all of Western Europe through Germany. In such a case, the prospects for the Western European proletarian revolution would become uncertain. Therefore, if the revolutionary prospects emerging within Russian society since the 1861 Reform become a reality—a revolution against the Tsarist autocracy that truly buries the Tsarist system and empire—then the final victory of the Western European proletarian revolution would gain an extremely favorable external condition, and the final victory of the German proletarian revolution would possess an essential "primary condition."

It will have a major impact on Poland. If the Tsarist system in Russia and the Russian Empire built upon this autocracy were to perish, it would undoubtedly be extremely beneficial to the development of Western European society. At that time, progressive forces in the West, especially the working class, could focus on the struggle against reactionary forces within Western Europe itself. However, the elimination of Tsarist Russia does not rely solely on the impetus of external factors—such as exhaustion or blows from external wars—to truly take effect, although external factors might unexpectedly accelerate its demise. Here, Engels speaks of the important foundational role of Russia's internal factors in the process of disintegrating Tsarist autocracy. He emphasizes that the social developmental changes in Poland (then part of the Russian Empire) and Great Russia ^[10] (the core of the Empire) were the two major internal factors disintegrating the Tsarist autocracy and the Russian Empire. Since the majority of Poland was annexed by Russia, the Polish people had long been under the heavy oppression of Tsarism; their situation had reached a perilous moment where they had to choose between resistance for survival or apathy and certain death. Yet, to win liberation and survival through resistance, their own strength alone was far from sufficient, so they had to secure true allies. Their nearly century-long history of resisting Russia has fully demonstrated that the Western European bourgeoisie was by no means their true ally. Based on their own interest requirements, the Western European bourgeoisie always treated Poland as a bargaining chip for maximizing their own interests; their policies toward Poland always revolved solely around themselves. This was typically manifested in alternating between allying with and abandoning Poland—Poland became a victim of Great Power ^[11] maneuvering. This is especially illustrated by the history of Poland’s interactions with its two closest major powers, Germany and France. Looking first at Germany: Prussia and Austria, the two monarchical states of the German nation, participated in the aggressive partitions of Poland ^[12]; the German bourgeoisie, since beginning to play a substantive historical role in the European Revolutions of 1848, always adopted a policy of hostility toward Poland; and the German Empire led by Bismarck was artfully seeking to maintain its own tangible interests by establishing friendly diplomatic relations with the Tsar. Looking then at France: during the Napoleonic era, the Bourbon Restoration, the Second Republic, and the Second Empire, there was a consistent record of shameful behavior in betraying Polish interests. Subsequently, to deal with the German Empire, the French bourgeois government intended to sacrifice Poland in exchange for an alliance with the Tsar to encircle Germany.

The above analysis indicates that in Western Europe, the path of Poland aligning with bourgeois forces to oppose Russia was a dead end. In Western Europe, only the proletariat was the true ally of the oppressed Poles. This is because the Western European proletariat was a growing political force truly committed to the complete liberation of all oppressed people, and because they, like the Poles, faced Tsarist Russia as a common enemy; they shared a fundamental consistency on the issue of eliminating the Russian threat. In other words, an alliance between the Poles and the Western European proletariat conformed to the common interests of both parties. On one hand, it strengthened the Polish resistance against Tsarist rule and weakened Russian dominance, thereby causing new changes in Russian society from within to a certain extent and prompting Russia toward internal collapse; on the other hand, as Russia moved toward internal collapse and its strength weakened, Poland would be liberated from within Russia, which would in turn benefit the development of the Western European proletarian movement. However, Polish resistance activities had geographical limitations, and thus their effect on Russia's internal collapse was limited. Based on this, Engels believed that if Great Russia, as the core of Russia, could nurture a revolution to overthrow the Tsarist system amidst the new social changes following the 1861 Reforms ^[13], it would produce a crucial and truly historically significant effect on the resolution of the problem—that is, the internal collapse of the Tsarist Empire.

In summary, On Social Relations in Russia and its "Introduction," formed during the polemic between Friedrich Engels and Pyotr Tkachev ^[14], forcefully refuted the conception of socialism held by Tkachev from a perspective of theoretical critique. Simultaneously, while "criticizing the old world to find the dawn of the new world," they provided an initial positive elaboration on the specificity of the path of Russian social development. In the 1860s and 1870s, Engels positively articulated that the prospects for Russia's social developmental path had presented a clear revolutionary trend, and he analyzed the reasons for and offered multi-dimensional projections of this clear revolutionary trend. He positively elaborated on the economic and political dimensions of this trend, explaining that the impending Russian revolution would necessarily be an integrated revolution encompassing multiple dimensions—not merely an economic or political revolution, but an integrated, multi-dimensional social revolution. He further elaborated that this clear revolutionary trend would inevitably have a major international impact on the developmental situation of European society, especially in Germany and Poland.

(Author Profile: Yang Zhichen, Associate Professor, Institute of Marxism Studies, Party School of the CPC Guangdong Provincial Committee)