Wang Youming: Characteristics, Causes, and Impact of the Left-wing Resurgence in Latin America
As the shocks of a once-in-a-century pandemic and once-in-a-century profound changes [1] overlap, the political ecosystem of Latin America is undergoing deep evolution. During the 2021 Latin American "Election Year," left-wing and right-wing forces launched a new round of confrontation, with left-wing parties in many countries winning successive victories in presidential, parliamentary, and local elections. A strong "leftward turn" has swept across the Latin American political stage, marking a powerful return of left-wing parties. The regional balance of political power has entered a new cycle of adjustment and reconstruction, opening a new pattern in geopolitics.
Left-wing parties in Latin America drive the accelerated oscillation of the "political pendulum"
The "pendulum effect" is a universal phenomenon of rotation between ruling and opposition roles on the international political stage. This effect is particularly pronounced in Latin America, where left-wing and right-wing forces alternate in power through enduring struggles, manifesting a distinct "either-left-or-right" governing logic in the political ecosystem.
Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic ravaging many Latin American countries, the struggles between the left and right, as well as the conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, did not weaken. Instead, they used the pandemic to attack one another, causing confrontational tensions to escalate repeatedly. The pandemic not only amplified the endogenous structural contradictions in Latin America but also exposed long-accumulated latent crises. Latin American leftists took advantage of the trend, capitalizing on the mistakes and shortcomings of right-wing ruling parties to set off a wave of electoral victories. Under the new circumstances, this left-wing resurgence exhibits several new characteristics.
First, the frequency of the pendulum's swing has significantly accelerated. Marked by Hugo Chávez's election as President of Venezuela in 1998, Latin America entered a "Left-wing Era." The left and center-left controlled the vast majority of the Latin American landscape, with the regional political map appearing entirely in "red" and "pink." [2] However, starting in 2015, a "rightward turn" began to blow across Latin America, growing increasingly strong. Argentina's left-wing regime was the first to fall in a general election, losing power held for over a decade. Subsequently, left-wing parties lost power in succession in countries serving as political "bellwethers," such as Brazil, Peru, and Chile. Furthermore, with the coordinated efforts of internal and external forces, the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America" (ALBA) countries—including Venezuela, Bolivia, and Cuba—encountered the most intense challenges or upheavals since the alliance’s founding. The Maduro regime in Venezuela was momentarily in a precarious position, and Bolivian President Evo Morales lost power and fled the country. Consequently, the left gradually lost its dominance over the regional order, and Latin American political forces were reshuffled, forming a political pattern of "right-wing advance and left-wing retreat."
However, the right-wing's dominance over regional politics did not last long before the Latin American political ecosystem changed once again. In 2018, the Mexican left was the first to stage a counterattack; López Obrador, the left-wing candidate, maintained a steady lead throughout the presidential election and defeated the right-wing candidate without suspense. The rise of the Mexican left against the trend was a "turning of the tide," [3] strongly boosting the morale of the regional left. Thereafter, the center-left in Argentina won the 2019 presidential election, and the Bolivian left won in 2020, together constituting a sequential "wave of electoral victories" for the regional left. In the 2021 "Election Year," left-wing parties pushed this resurgence to a high point. Pedro Castillo, the candidate of a Peruvian left-wing party, defeated right-wing candidate Keiko Fujimori to be elected president; Xiomara Castro, the left-wing candidate in Honduras, defeated the right-wing candidate by a large margin; and Gabriel Boric, the left-wing candidate in Chile, won the presidential election. In Chile, the so-called "top student" of neoliberalism, this election result carried even more symbolic significance, pushing the regional left-wing resurgence into a new stage. The powerful return of the left in Brazil, the region's largest country, consolidated this wave. Mock polls conducted by authoritative Brazilian polling agencies for the 2022 presidential election showed that former president and left-wing representative Lula would likely win a decisive victory over the incumbent right-wing president Bolsonaro.
The rapid return of the Latin American left to the center of the political stage after briefly losing dominance over the regional order indicates that, as the once-in-a-century changes and the pandemic interweave and ferment, the intensity of regional political maneuvering has risen, and the frequency of the Latin American political pendulum is showing an accelerated trend.
Second, all factions of the left performed impressively in this resurgence. The Latin American left is divided into many factions with varying propositions and types; to this day, there are still debates in academic circles regarding their classification and nomenclature. Based on party traditions, platforms, value systems, and differences in their stances toward the United States, they are generally categorized into the so-called radical left following Chavismo and "Socialism of the 21st Century," the left implementing Peronism and Kirchnerism, as well as various other factions and designations like the moderate left and center-left. In this resurgence, all left-wing factions performed excellently. Although the policies of the radical, moderate, and center-left in various countries are not identical, to defeat the right, they were able to keep the big picture in mind, reach political consensus, form campaign alliances, and join forces to defeat right-wing and center-right forces.
In addition to the significant gains made by moderate and center-left parties in many countries during their general elections, Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua also played a role in laying the foundation and stabilizing the base for this left-wing resurgence. Facing the spread of COVID-19 and suppression by the United States, these three countries took multiple measures to successfully consolidate their foundations and maintain stability. Relying on the "Bolivarian Alliance," they banded together for warmth, continuing to preserve the "rear area" and "basic base" of the regional left. In July 2021, large-scale public protests—rare in many years—occurred in Cuba, including the capital Havana. The Cuban government took timely measures to quell the unrest and maintain stability, successfully disintegrating the "Color Revolution" planned by the United States. In November 2021, Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council announced the successful re-election of incumbent left-wing president Daniel Ortega. Despite exceptionally difficult circumstances, the Maduro regime in Venezuela adopted a combination of pandemic prevention and economic recovery measures, striving to make up for shortcomings in people's livelihoods and help the public through the crisis. At the same time, progress was made in the political reconciliation process between the government and the opposition. Although negotiations remain difficult and complex, the situation in Venezuela is becoming increasingly stable, and the Maduro regime remains "wavering but not falling."
Third, the foundation of the left-wing resurgence is unstable, and governance remains difficult. The success of the Latin American left's return has not been smooth sailing; facing the country's chronic ailments and new maladies, it has not produced many effective remedies for governance. Left-wing regimes must face various criticisms and obstructions from the opposition, and constant friction and disputes persist within the governing alliances themselves. After the Argentine left took power, the radical and moderate factions within the governing alliance found it difficult to reconcile their political views and argued incessantly. Serious disagreements and open quarreling within the governing alliance signify a split in Peronism, severely affecting the governing foundation of the Argentine left and directly leading to a heavy setback for the alliance in the November 2021 mid-term parliamentary elections, where it lost control of the Senate for the first time in nearly 40 years. Similarly, as soon as the Peruvian left-wing president Castillo took office, he faced impeachment jointly filed by 28 members of the opposition camp. The opposition sensationalized issues such as Castillo's meetings with representatives of financial groups at his private residence, triggering public dissatisfaction and causing Castillo’s approval ratings to drop significantly. According to polls by the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), the percentage of people expressing dissatisfaction with Castillo rose rapidly from 48% in October to 65% in November, casting a shadow over the left's governing prospects.
The unstable foundation of the left-wing resurgence indicates that the duel between the left and right did not end with the general elections but instead opened a new round of maneuvering and contention. This also suggests that the fragility of this left-wing resurgence may become a new footnote to the accelerated frequency of the regional political pendulum.
Multiple factors driving the resurgence of the Latin American left
This resurgence of the Latin American left was not caused by accidental factors alone, nor was it formed by a single factor; rather, it is the result of the combined action of inherent regional structural political factors and exogenous factors.
First, the combined effect of Latin America's unique political system and party structure has jointly driven an inertial resurgence of the left. Latin American political systems are deeply influenced by the democratic value systems of their former colonial metropoles and the regional superpower, the United States. Based on local history and traditional politics, Latin American countries basically transplanted the Western system of checks and balances between the president and parliament as well as electoral democracy. However, this simply transplanted political system is clearly disproportionate to the level of economic and social development in Latin America and a social structure where the lower and middle classes constitute the mainstay of society. This has led to an overflow of "ballot politics" and "street politics," where various political parties emerged and grew strong by utilizing social movements, leading to the formation of Latin American party structures. Although parties have undergone continuous fragmentation and reorganization over the years, showing a trend toward "fragmentation," the basic pattern of the two major camps—left and right—remains unchanged. The pattern of radical, moderate, and centrist factions formed by each camp in the process of partisan struggle also remains unchanged. While factions sometimes adopt the other side's propositions, causing parties to show a "centrist" trend, the essential nature of the party platforms of both the left and right has not undergone major changes. The right promotes neoliberal policies of "marketization, privatization, and liberalization," while the left advocates putting a halter on the free market, emphasizing that the state must intervene in the economic and social development process and implement welfare policies favoring the lower and middle classes. Both propositions have a certain degree of rationality and appeal in Latin American countries. When the "hand of the market" favored by the right fails, the public remembers the state role favored by the left. When the "big state, small market" welfare state policies advocated by the left become ineffective, the public recalls the efficiency and freedom of the market.
For many years, ruling and opposition parties in Latin America have skillfully used their respective policy advantages and their opponents' flaws to engage in multiple rounds of confrontation. Often, a party in opposition will "oppose for the sake of opposing," seeking ways to exploit the ruling party’s mistakes, amplifying and intensifying social contradictions through momentum-building to topple the opponent. When the left is in power, the government often intervenes excessively in economic development and implements welfare policies to please the lower and middle classes; as a result, the economic cake is not enlarged but rather becomes smaller, eventually triggering public dissatisfaction and leading people to take to the streets. The right takes the opportunity to come to power and adopts neoliberal policies, but the result is that not only does the economy fail to escape its predicament, it does so at the cost of intensified wealth polarization, which, as usual, invites a new round of street protests and social movements. The left then uses this momentum to return to the governing stage, and so the cycle repeats. Therefore, even when a "rightward turn" was sweeping through Latin America, the left did not fall silent but was biding its time for another battle. The left knows its public support remains, the lower and middle classes are still its loyal followers, and its dual banners of "welfare" and "fairness" still possess great rallying power and appeal. In recent years, when the right encountered governing crises, the left did not miss the opportunity to launch street politics and social movements, encouraging voters to use their ballots to welcome the left's triumphant return. Latin American party politics is like a pendulum; when it swings to the end, it must return.
Second, the once-in-a-century pandemic helped drive the left-wing resurgence. The COVID-19 pandemic has continued to ravage Latin America, with many countries becoming severely affected areas and some experiencing historic economic recessions. The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) stated that, impacted by the pandemic, the Latin American economy in 2020 showed its worst performance in 120 years. In 2021, against the backdrop of the "normalized" pandemic, although many Latin American economies showed signs of recovery, they were affected by external factors such as the spread of virus variants and blockages in global supply chains. The characteristics of Latin American economic recovery—high at the beginning and low later—were obvious, and the momentum for subsequent recovery generally slowed. The World Bank stated that in the next two years, Latin American economic growth will decline significantly, with the overall regional growth rate falling below 3%, returning once again to the low-growth cycle seen before 2010. A report released by ECLAC in October 2021 argued that Latin America is the region most severely affected by the pandemic globally, and the socio-economic development achievements of the past few decades risk being reversed; it is predicted that Latin America’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) will not recover to pre-pandemic levels until 2023–2024.
The COVID-19 pandemic caused inherent social contradictions in Latin America to become prominent and stimulated latent social crises. Social polarization and fragmentation directly gave rise to "street movements" and "street politics" with strong Latin American characteristics. Survey results from the renowned polling agency "Latinobarómetro" show that the pandemic's impact on middle- and low-income classes was most direct, and its influence is deeper and more lasting; about 60% of the public said they are willing to take to the streets to express their demands. Under the pandemic, the anger of the middle class and the despair of the impoverished classes interwove and fermented, social confrontational tension continued to increase, and Latin America entered a new period of high incidence of social contradictions. In this context, the pandemic drove accelerated changes in various economic factors, triggering rapid splits among social classes, which in turn brought about the rise and fall of political forces. This created favorable conditions for a large-scale resurgence of the Latin American left.
Third, the left has advanced with the times, constantly adjusting policies and attracting voters with a new posture. In the long-term process of maneuvering against the right, the left has gradually returned to realism, constantly summarizing experiences and lessons. It no longer sticks stubbornly to existing policy propositions but instead adjusts them to make them flexible and pragmatic, thereby catering as much as possible to the key demands and core interests of various classes. While maintaining their basic voter base, leftists have sought to win over voters from the opposing camp, placing particular emphasis on attracting young voters with new media, new fields, and a new posture. For example, Chile's youngest-ever president-elect, Boric, in addition to raising the banners of left-wing state welfarism and anti-neoliberalism during the campaign, took advantage of the rising tide of the green economy and sustainable development to...
Incorporating "carrying out a green transition and establishing an ecological government" into campaign platforms has attracted support from voters committed to global climate governance and low-carbon development. To win the Peruvian presidential election, Pedro Castillo initially presented radical measures such as nationalization; however, to secure the support of business owners, he managed to downplay his radical-left profile, stating he would not establish a left-wing regime similar to those in Cuba or Venezuela. Furthermore, former Brazilian President Lula has already entered an early state of campaigning for the general election. To defeat the incumbent President Bolsonaro, he has adjusted his campaign strategy in a timely manner, absorbing the rational core of other parties' policies. He proactively met with his political rival, former President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to great effect; Cardoso explicitly stated that between Lula and Bolsonaro, he would support Lula without hesitation. In Honduras, the first female president, Xiomara Castro, repeatedly stated during her campaign that while she would end neoliberalism upon election, she would implement inclusive reform policies to reassure anxious private business owners.
While maintaining their labels of "equity and justice" and "state welfarism," the Latin American Left has proactively absorbed the rational core of their rivals' platforms, actively introduced new concepts, and continuously injected new momentum. This demonstrates that under the new situation of intensifying struggles between the ruling and opposition parties and the left-right game in Latin America, the Left is capable of advancing with the times and is adept at self-innovation. They have cleared the programmatic constraints and conceptual obstacles to their rapid return to the center of the political stage.
Geopolitical Effects of the Resurgence of the Latin American Left
The continuous oscillation between the Left and Right in Latin America is gradually becoming the norm. Although the domestic and foreign policies of the Left and Right overlap, they belong to camps with significantly different partisan natures. If one side experiences a large-scale resurgence and gains dominance over the regional order, it will inevitably trigger corresponding geopolitical effects. This round of the left-wing resurgence will likewise trigger internal and external geopolitical effects characterized by left-wing traits.
Internally, there is a possibility that the pace of regional integration may accelerate. Regional integration is a process of collective political, economic, and cultural convergence among nation-states within a region; it requires nation-states to cede part of their national interests as a condition for obtaining greater national interests within the overall benefit of integration. Latin America was the earliest among underdeveloped regions to promote integration. However, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the African Union (AU), and the Arab League have been established and functioning effectively for many years, a "Latin American Union" (referred to below as the "LAU") [4] has remained elusive. The reasons for the lagging integration of Latin America are complex, but the primary cause is the lack of internal cohesion resulting from the unceasing struggle between the Left and Right.
In Latin America, compared to the conservative Right which advocates for "country first" and the supremacy of national interests, the Left possesses a stronger will, greater motivation, and better results in promoting regional integration. During his lifetime, the late Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez—in order to realize the long-cherished wish of the Latin American independence leader Simón Bolívar to establish the "broadest and most transcendent union of Latin American nations"—strove to promote the regional integration process. He joined forces with left-wing powers from various countries to establish the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) in 2011. Under the active promotion of the Left, CELAC operated effectively, various cooperation mechanisms were gradually established, and the prototype of a "Latin American Union" was nearly ready to emerge from its cocoon. However, as the "rightward turn" blew strongly through the region, the Left fell into difficulties, and the regional integration process faced constant setbacks. Not only did CELAC lose its prominence, but the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), primarily pushed by the Left, also disintegrated. The regional integration process fell into a state of stagnation and low ebb.
This round of the left-wing resurgence may bring new opportunities for regional integration. On September 18, 2021, under the chairmanship of Mexico's left-wing President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the sixth CELAC Summit was held in Mexico City, with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro invited to attend. The summit focused on themes such as strengthening regional integration, opposing external interference, conducting anti-pandemic cooperation, and responding to climate change. Leaders of left-wing countries condemned the United States' hegemonic behavior and power politics toward regional countries. López Obrador called out: "It is time to eliminate the policy of blockades and unjust treatment and replace it with mutual respect. For the sake of the interests of the Americas, standing together in unity, a new and vibrant relationship should be established among the people of the Americas." CELAC once again manifested the strong will of regional states for independence and collective self-reliance, showcasing the "Latin American's Latin America" dream diligently pursued by the region's people. It is widely believed that if Lula—who has a special affinity for regional integration—is successfully elected President of Brazil in 2022, he will further stimulate the vitality of regional integration.
Externally, the United States will increase its efforts to guard against and contain the Left. Changes in the internal political ecosystem will inevitably trigger geopolitical spillovers. Latin America has special geopolitical, economic, and cultural ties with the United States; a large-scale resurgence of the Left will certainly trigger vigilance and concern in the U.S. Although Latin America is not the core consideration of U.S. global strategy, immigration, drugs, and the containment of the radical Left are the three major concerns of successive U.S. administrations' policies toward Latin America. The policies of the Latin American Left toward the U.S. vary due to their differing positions. Among them, the primary representative countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our Americas (ALBA)—such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua—have long been bullied and suppressed by the U.S. and therefore pursue policies of "de-linking from, distancing from, and opposing the U.S." Consequently, they have been smeared by some U.S. politicians and scholars as the "Troika of Tyranny," and ALBA has earned the nickname of the "Anti-U.S. Alliance." Countries governed by the moderate Left or center-left mostly regard diplomacy with the U.S. as crucial while also pursuing flexible "distant but not detached" policies to escape U.S. control. Overall, the U.S. adopts a "pull the Right and strike the Left" strategy toward the left-right struggle in its "backyard," particularly guarding against the moderate Left moving toward the radical Left and containing the expansion of contiguous radical-left countries.
Facing this round of the left-wing resurgence in its "backyard," the Biden administration has intervened comprehensively in the process of changing the Latin American political ecosystem. First, it has increased investment and attention toward Latin America, using "carrot policies" to support right-wing governed countries. The Biden administration stated it would prioritize the implementation of the "Build Back Better World" (B3W) initiative in right-wing Latin American countries to counteract the influence of China's "Belt and Road Initiative." Second, it secretly supports dissidents in countries like Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, instigating "color revolutions" [5] and implementing plans for regime change. Third, it woos moderate-left and center-left countries, reaching a new security cooperation framework with Mexico and terminating the "Mérida Initiative" that had long been used to interfere in Mexico's internal affairs. Fourth, it uses "values-based diplomacy" to reshape U.S.-Latin American relations, preventing regional countries from "turning left" further. The U.S. emphasizes maintaining the so-called "irreplaceable and unique connection" between the U.S. and Latin America through a democratic value system. During Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visits to Colombia and Ecuador, he stated that the U.S. would firmly support "vibrant, inclusive democracies that respect civil rights." In short, the left-wing resurgence has prompted the Biden administration to re-examine its policy toward Latin America, forcing it back toward realism. U.S.-Latin American relations will undergo continuous adjustment within the new cycle of regional political ecosystem changes to maximize their respective strategic interests.
In summary, this resurgence of the Latin American Left is the result of the combined action of political, economic, and social factors in the region against the backdrop of systemic shocks in global governance. The Left taking power has not eliminated the region's structural contradictions; on the contrary, divergences within left-wing governing coalitions, policy imbalances, and fluctuations in public opinion suggest that opponents are gathering strength and waiting for an opportunity for a new round of confrontation. The Latin American political pendulum will continue to swing with regularity.
(Affiliations: Institute of Developing Countries, China Institute of International Studies; China Society of Latin American Studies)
Online Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Contemporary World, Issue 1, 2022