Marxism Research Network
Unofficial English Translation

Ren Chengjin: The Evolution of Historical Nihilism Discourse Within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Its Contemporary Implications

Marxism Abroad

Historical nihilism is not only a cultural phenomenon and an academic topic, but more importantly, a political trend of thought. Currently, the trend of historical nihilism has exerted an extremely negative influence on the field of social ideology in our country. Hostile forces at home and abroad attempt to use historical nihilism to deconstruct the mainstream socialist ideology and the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China's governing status; this should arouse our high vigilance and reflection. The painful historical lesson of the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the 20th century is particularly worthy of our earnest absorption. "Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) collapse? An important reason was that the struggle in the ideological field was extremely intense. They completely negated Soviet history, the history of the CPSU, negated Lenin, and negated Stalin. They engaged in historical nihilism, which threw thinking into chaos. Party organizations at all levels had almost no function, and even the military was no longer under the Party’s leadership." [1] Therefore, drawing lessons from the dissolution of the Soviet Union and analyzing the evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU is of important cautionary and referential significance for us to effectively lead social trends of thought through discourse strategy, effectively block the infiltration of Western ideology, and avoid falling into discourse traps set by the West.

The spread and prevalence of historical nihilism within the CPSU were closely related to the deviation of the CPSU leadership group's theory, line, principles, and policies. In the construction of ideological discourse, the CPSU unconsciously introduced liberalism, realism, and destructivism, linking them to historical judgments of the "Soviet model," the Soviet system, and CPSU leaders. This formed a system of historical nihilist discourse that dealt a fatal blow to the CPSU regime.

I. The Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU

The evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU primarily underwent three stages: the Khrushchev period, the Brezhnev period, and the Gorbachev period. In different periods, the historical nihilist discourse was both "diverse in form" and "renewed in variety," while also being "sequential" and "originating from the same lineage."

1. Khrushchev's "De-Stalinization" campaign opened the Pandora's box of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU

The initial appearance of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU began with Khrushchev's "De-Stalinization." At the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956, Khrushchev delivered a "Secret Report" exposing Stalin's cult of personality, setting off a high tide of "De-Stalinization" within the Party. This was the ultimate root of the nihilist social trends that appeared thereafter. In this movement, Khrushchev attributed the root of the cult of personality to Stalin's personal qualities, conducting comprehensive criticism and personal attacks against Stalin using extreme and biting vocabulary such as "paranoid," "cruel," "neurotic," "hysterical," and "abuse of power." [2] Stalin had already become a spiritual symbol and cultural icon of the Soviet Union; the demonization of Stalin not only deconstructed the rational connotations that the concept of "Stalin" should have held but also emasculated the national spirit of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev's report exceeded the psychological endurance of the Soviet people, changed the operational direction of Soviet society, and caused ideological confusion and disorder. Simultaneously, to create a favorable public opinion atmosphere for breaking the cult of personality around Stalin, Khrushchev utilized the "Thaw" [3] in the cultural field to loosen intellectual policy, using this to deconstruct the Stalinist model. Driven by Khrushchev, the wave of the "Thaw" spread across the country, making the exposure of historical "dark sides" and the promotion of humanism the two major themes of Soviet literary creation.

While opposing the "cult of personality" and "autocratic dictatorship," Khrushchev introduced terms into the CPSU’s governing discourse that did not correspond to the stage of Soviet socialist development, such as "the comprehensive commencement of building a communist society" and "communist education." This achieved a "humanistic turn" in the CPSU’s view of history, thereby affecting the masses' identification with the communist vision. At the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1962, Khrushchev not only proposed the term "comprehensively building communism" but also announced the establishment of a "state of the whole people" and a "party of the whole people." He replaced scientific socialist terms like "satisfying the needs of the people" and "realizing the free and comprehensive development of man" with humanistic symbolic codes such as "everything for man, everything for the happiness of man." [4] Through this symbolic conversion, Khrushchev released a signal that the ideological connotations of the CPSU were undergoing major changes. Subsequently, humanism began to permeate every aspect of Soviet social life and became the basic criterion for judging social and historical issues. Although Khrushchev did not intentionally negate the history of the CPSU, the humanistic turn of his guiding ideology inevitably initiated the historical precedent of nihilating CPSU leaders. It signaled to the world an epistemological shift in the CPSU's ideology in response to changes in the domestic and international situation. The deep significance of this shift lay in linking the CPSU's political strategy with more fields and aspects of the Soviet Union to achieve the questioning and negation of the pre-Khrushchev era.

As the "Thaw" progressed, East-West relations eased, and the door to cultural exchange between the Soviet Union and the West opened. "Western books, paintings, movies, and songs continued to appear—controlled, censored, distorted, but nonetheless constant." [5] The screening of films from countries like the US, France, and Italy, the holding of the Moscow International Youth Festival, and the introduction of works by Western thinkers opened a window for Soviet people to understand the Western world. The influx of Western culture brought not only Western movies, literature, and lifestyles but also hidden political concepts, values, and ways of life that impacted the Soviet people’s overall perception of capitalist countries. In the past, "Russian ideology was considered omniscient and omnipotent; the teachings of Lenin and Stalin were absolutely correct." [6] However, there was a huge gap between the Western world—constructed by the humanism, egoism, existentialism, and Protestantism conveyed through Western films and literature, alongside modern lifestyles involving refrigerators and washing machines—and the dull monotony of their daily lives. Some intellectuals developed a "liberalization" illusion; the criticism of the "humanitarian disaster caused by Stalin" went to another extreme, resulting in a tendency toward the total negation of Stalin and a humanistic turn. For example, Ilya Ehrenburg once attacked Stalin for "systematically and over a long period creating this idiolatry," even using the words of Machiavelli from the Renaissance to curse Stalin: "Any means is good—poison, informers, assassination," and "to be as wise as a man, but also as vicious as a beast." [7] The criticism of the cult of personality, the loosening of ideology, the humanistic turn, the pursuit of profit by enterprises, and the diversification of Soviet social life promoted by Khrushchev altogether caused a fission in Soviet social values. "In the late 1950s, the monolith of social consciousness was covered with deep cracks," [8] which became the source of the later Soviet crisis of faith.

2. The "stagnation" of the Brezhnev period led to the further spread of historical nihilist discourse within the Party

During the Brezhnev period, the ideological theory of the CPSU became increasingly rigid and dogmatic, and the undercurrents of the nihilist trend within the Party surged. During this period, historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU took many forms: first, nihilization and demonization; second, "sacralization," which distorted the correct perception of historical figures by infinitely exalting them; and third, "humanization," using humanism as the standard to judge the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU.

In the early period of Brezhnev's rule, he continued the momentum of the "Thaw," maintaining the tone of "De-Stalinization" from the Khrushchev era. Furthermore, he began a comprehensive liquidation of Khrushchev in terms of politics, economy, military affairs, diplomacy, and relations with socialist countries. He not only fundamentally negated Khrushchev's personal achievements but also stigmatized Khrushchev's personal character, declaring him "extremely crude, inconsistent, dissolute and capricious, and narrow-minded." [9] Brezhnev’s "final verdict" on Khrushchev actually formed a tradition in the history of the CPSU where leaders "negated the previous generation," leading to the further spread of historical nihilist discourse within the Party.

In the middle and late periods of Brezhnev's rule, in order to establish his own cult of personality, the governing discourse within the CPSU began to quietly restore Stalin’s honor and historical status while rigidly understanding Lenin and sacralizing his thought. As Brezhnev’s personal status consolidated, the stance toward Stalin became clearer, changing from the original criticism and negation to praise and affirmation. After the 1970s, they began to selectively ignore Stalin’s mistakes. Although this discourse construction did not nominally overturn the resolutions of the 20th and 22nd Congresses of the CPSU, it practically overturned Khrushchev's evaluation of Stalin. This further developed the discourse mode where successors deny predecessors to establish a new cult of personality, deepening the people's sense of distrust in the regime. By the 1970s, the glorification of Brezhnev in the Soviet press reached a nauseating level, calling him the "wise leader of the Party and the state" and a "true Leninist leader." Theoretical circles even fabricated a personal myth of "the two Ilyichs." [10] During this period, Brezhnev not only restored the evaluation of Stalin and established a cult of personality for himself but also achieved the sacralization of Lenin. Under the "praise" of CPSU ideological experts, "Lenin gradually became an idol that people had to worship," and "Lenin’s name was involuntarily linked to ideological vacuity." The subjective, arbitrary, and unrealistic "sacralized" discourse of CPSU leaders toward historical figures deepened the resistance and distrust of intellectuals. "More and more intellectuals began to treat Lenin with sarcasm," and "Lenin was called 'Goatee,' Party cadres were called 'Big Bellies,' and those who believed in Lenin were called 'Night Owls'." [11]

In addition, the historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU exhibited "humanistic" characteristics. To further consolidate his governing position, Brezhnev turned the Party's theory toward humanism; humanism became the basic starting point for judging the history of the CPSU and the Party's lines, principles, and policies. On various occasions, Brezhnev further reinforced the humanistic discourse of "everything for man, for the happiness of man." For example, in 1964, when celebrating the 47th anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev proposed that "'everything for man, for the happiness of man' is the criterion for our Party’s activities." In 1968, in a speech at the Soviet-Hungarian Friendship Rally in the Kremlin, he again emphasized that "everything for man, for the happiness of man" was an unswerving principle of the Soviet Communist Party. This construction, which appeared to be "socialist discourse," carried the color of Western humanistic discourse, creating a certain "halo effect" for Western countries in the eyes of a significant number of Party members and cadres. This effect made it easier for them to glamorize Western countries while doubting or even belittling their own country's beliefs and pursuits, leading to an ideological crisis of faith in the CPSU. Under the advocacy of the CPSU, humanism became a banner in theoretical circles. Some scholars detached themselves from specific social and historical conditions to study and propagate humanism, and they combined humanism with Western liberal democracy and human rights to criticize and attack the Soviet socialist system, thereby deconstructing the positive significance that Marxism possessed in the Soviet Union.

The demonization, sacralization, and humanization of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU accelerated the hollowing out and nihilization of the Party's ideology. This ultimately caused the Party to lose its ability to lead domestic social trends and its capacity to critique and neutralize Western social trends. As East-West relations eased during the 1970s and as further fragmentation occurred within the Soviet domestic ideological and cultural spheres, Soviet Marxist education became increasingly dogmatic and formalized. It failed to provide a powerful response to the new developments appearing in advanced Western countries, providing an opening for Western ideological infiltration. After the signing of the Helsinki Accords, as a backlash against long-term ideological confinement, people rapidly shifted toward a veneration of the freedom of thought, religion, and belief advocated by the West. The essence, dignity, and status of the individual became the core issues of discussion in the ideological and cultural realms. Khrushchev’s "Thaw" did not lead to a political subculture antagonistic to the Soviet mainstream culture; however, under the infiltration of Western culture, a non-mainstream political subculture seeking Western-style liberal democracy and opposing the mainstream culture formed during the Brezhnev era. This manifested primarily through dissidents, "night people," [8] and samizdat [9] publications. Its primary content consisted of attacking the history of the Soviet Union and the CPSU: "Certain scholarly works, literary compositions, art, films, and the press were exploited among us to slander the history of our Party and our people" [18]; "various 'critics' were able to arbitrarily distort our history" [19]. For instance, claims were made that the Aurora fired blank shells, and that the heroic soldiers of the Panfilov Division were a fabrication; furthermore, "all sorts of criticism began to be directed at Lenin from every angle" [20]. This indicates that the field of expression, narrative modes, and communicative content of historical nihilist discourse were all undergoing transformation. The focus of historical nihilist discourse was no longer merely on the negation of Stalin, but had shifted toward questioning and critiquing the necessity of Soviet socialism and the governing legitimacy of the CPSU. To a certain extent, this led to chaos in the Soviet ideological and cultural spheres and a loss of control over ideological discourse power. During this stage, the Soviet Union "lost the faith capable of unifying the thoughts of the masses" [21].

3. "Glasnost" and "Democratization" during the Gorbachev period led to the proliferation of historical nihilist discourse within the Party

Although historical nihilist discourse appeared intermittently within the CPSU during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, from a general perspective, Marxist ideological discourse remained dominant, and Soviet socialism had not deviated from its correct course. However, as Western countries intensified their democratic offensive against socialist nations in the 1980s, Gorbachev successively introduced "Glasnost," "Democratization," and "Pluralism." Historical nihilist discourse achieved unprecedented development in terms of its subjects of dissemination, content, narrative modes, media carriers, and the struggle for discourse power, gradually displacing the dominant position of Marxist ideological discourse.

Under the impact of Western liberal trends, the second and third generations of the CPSU leadership collective became the primary subjects shaping and disseminating historical nihilist discourse. "The Soviet Party and state elite realized in their own consciousness the transition that the Western leftist intellectual elite had already completed"; "this transition meant abandoning support for the Soviet system and openly switching to the side of the Soviet Union’s enemies in the Cold War" [22]. Although Gorbachev "sincerely intended to renew socialism rather than replace it with capitalism," his reforms "created a new coalition of groups and classes that favored replacing socialism with capitalism" [23]. This "new coalition of groups and classes"—including high-level defectors, political commentators, dissidents, and writers such as Yakovlev, Yeltsin, Korotich, Afanasyev, and Pomerants—launched a political movement to negate the history of the CPSU and the Soviet revolution, becoming the constructive subjects of historical nihilist discourse within the Party. After Gorbachev took office as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee in 1985, Reagan and Bush successively proposed the "Promotion of Democracy" strategy and the "Beyond Containment" strategy, "striving to integrate the Soviet Union into the international community" and inducing domestic democratization and liberalization. Lured by Western nations, Gorbachev proposed "Democratization, Glasnost, and Pluralism" to cater to Western demands, loudly advocating that "there are no forbidden zones in history and no limits to Glasnost," which led historical nihilist discourse into a state of total loss of control. In his 1987 book Perestroika and New Thinking, he systematically expounded on the issue of Glasnost, emphasizing the implementation of thorough "openness." He argued that historical issues should leave no "blank spots" or forbidden zones, and that "working people should have full and accurate information" [24]. Under Gorbachev's impetus, policies toward intellectuals were loosened, the "censorship system" was abolished, and "dissidents" and their works were legalized. Yakovlev and liberal figures took control of the mass media, thereby forming a radical democratic faction pushing for reform. Driven by this group, radical intellectuals represented by Afanasyev, Vasily Selyunin, Sakharov, and Medvedev gradually seized dominance over the reform process. The stance of the intellectuals gradually shifted, and their political views became increasingly extreme: "A significant portion of the newly liberated Soviet intelligentsia ultimately took a path contrary to Gorbachev's central goal of establishing a reformed socialism" [25].

Driven by the CPSU leadership, Party newspapers and media became the carriers for disseminating historical nihilist discourse. Media outlets within the Soviet Union were not only privatized in large numbers but were mostly controlled by liberals, becoming ideological strongholds against Soviet socialism. Among them, the magazine Ogoniok published the article "Farewell to God," openly spreading the idea that Tsarist Russia was wealthy, Lenin was tyrannical, and the October Revolution was a mistake. The weekly New Times [10] published "The Second Revolution," which argued that the October Revolution was a reactionary social regression. Pravda reiterated Gorbachev’s view of the "state of the whole people," further arguing that "the core of socialist thought is the person and the person’s well-rounded development" [26]. In April 1991, Literary Gazette [11] (Issue 4) published a conversation between Supreme Soviet members Burlatsky and Shatalin. Burlatsky stated: "Socialism throughout the world and socialism in new states are dangerous utopias"; "Implementing a two-party system like that of the United States is most ideal." Shatalin believed that "modern social democracy based on Marxism is meaningless; such a party would be a non-constructive party with no future" [27]. Under Gorbachev’s advocacy, the Soviet political and theoretical circles broke through forbidden zones, launching a major revolution to publicize historical facts and expose the dark side of the USSR. All sorts of rhetoric vilifying Soviet leaders, negating the socialist system, and attacking socialist faith flooded the press. Party newspapers and media transformed from their original role as the main ideological battleground of the Party into dissemination carriers for historical nihilism.

Historical nihilists set out from abstract humanitarian concepts to judge Soviet historical figures and the Soviet socialist system. They argued that the center of Soviet socialist development was "things" (material objects) rather than "man," and that the way out for Soviet reform lay in Western freedom, democracy, human rights, the market economy, and the multi-party system. This formed a nihilistic trend of total negation of the Soviet socialist system. The historical nihilist discourse system of this stage not only emphasized the nihilization of history but also expanded its connotations, making the content more systematic. In the pre-Gorbachev period, interpretations were often vaguely conducted from the perspective of nihilizing history, with few concentrated expositions. During the Gorbachev period, expositions on historical nihilist discourse gradually increased, covering aspects such as the nihilization of history, politics, morality, values, and epistemological nihilism. The discourse evolved from reconstructing Soviet history and maintaining the status quo toward what should be done about the Soviet future, to the point that terms reflecting the socialist nature of the state, such as "working people," "socialism," and "communism," were deleted from the Soviet Constitution. These discourses further disintegrated the ideological foundation of Soviet socialism and ultimately shook the roots of Soviet ideological legitimacy. In July 1990, the 28th Congress of the CPSU adopted the program "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism," which argued that the "fundamental crisis of the CPSU is a crisis of communist ideas" and that "the principle of democratic centralism is the main link causing the undemocratic nature of the Party itself and the entire political system." It advocated that reform should "discard dogmatic understandings of Marxism," "completely eliminate the totalitarian system," and achieve "political and ideological pluralism within the Party" [28]. The 28th Congress of the CPSU achieved the discursive deconstruction of Soviet socialism and the legitimacy of CPSU governance, finally establishing the dominant position of Western democratic discourse.

The 90-plus years of the CPSU's history itself carried the values, order, and governing legitimacy of Soviet socialism. Over the nearly 40 years from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, democratic life within the CPSU was continuously undermined; organizationally, it completed a bureaucratic transformation; politically, it moved toward a process of extreme democratization, abandoned the developmental direction of scientific socialism, negated the materialist conception of history, and negated the logic of revolution and reform. Culturally and historically, it moved onto the track of nihilization. Soviet historical identity, Marxist identity, and national identity suffered a profound crisis, and ultimately the CPSU lost its ability to lead and shape ideological discourse. Whether it was Khrushchev's "de-Stalinization," Brezhnev's "stagnation," or Gorbachev’s "Glasnost," although they did not subjectively intend to negate the history of the CPSU and Soviet socialism, the measures they took—negating Stalin, sacralizing Lenin, and dogmatizing Marxism—objectively led to the hollowing out and pluralization of Soviet core values. This facilitated the spread of historical nihilist discourse in the CPSU and the emergence of a crisis of faith, eventually leading to the loss of ideological direction and a dramatic mutation in social consciousness.

II. Inquiry into the Causes of the Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU

The generation of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU was not accidental but had profound socio-historical roots and cultural causes. The lack of awareness and ability in the autonomous construction of the CPSU’s mainstream ideological discourse was the primary cause; Western ideological propaganda and infiltration in the Soviet Union provided material support; the unique Soviet historical and cultural traditions provided the cultural soil; and the support and identification with historical nihilism by Soviet academic, literary, and media circles provided the social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse.

1. Lack of awareness and ability in the autonomous construction of the CPSU's mainstream ideological discourse provided an opening for its generation

Adhering to the autonomous construction of ideology is a fundamental principle of Marxism. To uphold the principle of autonomy in mainstream ideology, one must base oneself on the concrete national conditions and practical developmental needs while mastering the basic principles of Marxism, thereby achieving the localized development of Marxism. The discursive construction of mainstream ideology must find usable resources from the intersection of Soviet historical culture, specific national conditions, and human civilization, and even more importantly, it must maintain the socialist direction of the discourse system. However, the CPSU's awareness and ability for the autonomous construction of mainstream ideological discourse were relatively insufficient. On one hand, the CPSU's vigorous introduction of Western humanitarian discourse diluted the faith in Marxism. From Khrushchev’s official establishment of the guiding status of humanitarianism and his negation of Marx's theory of class struggle, to Gorbachev making "humanization" and "liberalization" the core of New Thinking, the target of critique was pointed not only at Stalin but also at Lenin and Marxism. Ultimately, the Party unconsciously fell into a Western discourse trap: first "abstracting the person," and then using "this abstracted person to personify historical development and conceive the ideal future society they yearned for" [29].

On the other hand, the CPSU's dogmatic understanding of Marxism-Leninism led to a lack of proactive consciousness in constructing a discourse around core values. During the years of revolutionary war, the Soviet Union formed a mainstream value system of "state supremacy." This value system required maintenance and reinforcement through continuous political movements and political indoctrination within a closed environment; over a short period, it played a dominant role in uniting the people and leading society. However, with the launch of the "de-Stalinization" movement during the Khrushchev era, the breaking of the cult of personality, and the diversification and increasing complexity of social life, these values gradually lost their ability to command and guide social development. "By the end of Khrushchev's rule, the utopian energy that had nourished the spirit of Soviet patriotism was exhausted. The identification with the Soviet Union, which had experienced a temporary resurgence based on this energy, also began to disintegrate under the powerful influence of domestic and foreign factors."[34] During the Brezhnev era, personal power became centralized and intra-Party democracy was lacking. Long-standing dogmatism and bureaucratism led to a deficit in the capacity for mainstream ideological discourse innovation. The CPSU's ideological work degenerated to the point of relying on quotations from classical authors to adjudicate right and wrong, lacking the ability to respond to real-world problems or to criticize and dissolve erroneous trends of thought. (WeChat Public Account: Sizheng Xuezhe) The officially propagated ideology drifted further away from the people. According to the "Report of the KGB to the CPSU Central Committee on the Sentiments of Young Students" (November 5, 1968), Marxism was viewed as a "dogmatically rigid science" that "can neither explain nor predict the course of events."[35] "Social and national problems, ecological threats, the deterioration of education and healthcare, and the poverty of a large section of social members—all these problems seemed to no longer exist. In their place, discussions were replaced by superficial propaganda jargon such as the 'new social community—the Soviet people.'"[36] By the Gorbachev era, the Soviet value of "state supremacy" completed its own fission. Marxism was stripped away from the core of socialist values, and "humane, democratic socialism" officially became the CPSU's ideological and political line. Socialism evolved into a "humane" socialism that conformed to abstract "human nature" and the interests of "all people," fundamentally deviating from the socialist direction of the discourse system.

  1. Western ideological propaganda and infiltration provided material support for its generation

The fundamental reason for the emergence and evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU lay internally, but Western ideological propaganda and infiltration toward the Soviet Union disrupted communist faith within the Party and played a role in fueling the spread of historical nihilist discourse. Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the purpose of Western ideological propaganda led by the United States was very clear: to use psychological warfare to change the historical consciousness and socialist beliefs of the Soviet public, making the people of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe unconsciously become people with Western mindsets. This was the strategy of "peaceful evolution." The concept of "peaceful evolution" was first proposed by George Kennan in February 1947. In August 1948, the U.S. National Security Council passed document NSC 20/1, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia," marking the beginning of the U.S. psychological war against the Soviet Union. According to document NSC 20/4 approved by President Truman, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," the United States would use "means short of war" to strengthen pro-American tendencies in countries outside the Soviet Union. It also formulated the "Drip-on-Stone" [12] plan, which included large-scale psychological warfare to "eliminate the people's support for the Soviet Union" and "disseminate among the various peoples of the Soviet Union the consciousness that the overthrow of the Politburo could become a reality."[37]

Under the offensive of the "peaceful evolution" strategy, Western countries used radio broadcasts to conduct "heart-conquering warfare," such as the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe (RFE), and Radio Liberty (RL). Among them, RFE and RL focused on discussing human rights and democracy, while VOA mainly introduced domestic American politics, social conditions, and lifestyles, with localized programming focusing on political struggles within the CPSU leadership. In 1982, the Reagan administration invested $1.3 billion to launch the "Voice of America Modernization Project," also known as the "Broadcast Star Wars Plan," to promote its "peaceful political offensive." During the Cold War, the West continuously strengthened the international communication capabilities of its national radio stations. The United States established more than 20 news centers, nearly 2,000 television stations, radio stations, and wireless relay stations around the Soviet Union. Spending $1 on propaganda truly achieved the effect of spending $5 on national defense. According to the "Report of the KGB to the CPSU Central Committee on the Sentiments of Young Students" (November 5, 1968): "College students listen to the radio regularly, but they prefer Western radio stations," and "Voice of America and Radio France Internationale are the most popular stations."[38] By the 1970s, "80% of college students and 90% of high school and vocational school students in Moscow" listened to foreign radio broadcasts.[39] In his 1980 book The Real War, Richard Nixon pointed out: "Mutual visits, books, and broadcasts allow Western information to cross the barrier of dictatorship and bring hope to the people behind the barrier. Over time, like water dripping on a stone, the foundation of the Soviet system will gradually be eroded."[40] After the "August 19" incident [13] in 1991, VOA, RFE, RL, and the American Broadcasting Company (ABC) extensively disseminated Western views and positions, influencing and guiding domestic public opinion in the Soviet Union. These radio stations exploited errors in CPSU history to wantonly attack the "failure" and "bankruptcy" of the Communist Party and the socialist system, sensationalizing and exaggerating domestic problems and difficulties in the Soviet Union. They shaped the myths of the "civilized country," the myth of "primitive accumulation" (beautifying Western primitive accumulation), and the "sawdust sausage" myth. "The role of the myth lies in cutting off independent Russian thinking, causing it to lose its capacity for autonomous evaluation and follow the West step by step,"[41] falling into a vicious cycle of self-negation, providing material support for the production of nihilist discourse within the CPSU and convenient channels for its dissemination.

In addition to strengthening radio broadcasts, Western countries also used educational exchanges, human rights issues, political asylum, and religious dissemination to support opposition forces within the Soviet Union and cultivate pro-Western individuals. According to document NSC 86/1 issued by the U.S. National Security Council in 1951, the "Defector Program" was to be implemented in Soviet and Eastern European countries, and President Truman approved the project in 1952. The "Defector Program," also known as the "Far East Refugee Project," mainly aimed to strengthen the power of the non-communist world by instigating the defection of personnel who were useful, influential, and willing to cooperate with the United States. While providing aid and resettlement for "valuable refugees," they were incited to criticize the Soviet system and leaders. Materials regarding the reasons for their flight from the Soviet Union, the measures taken by the Soviet Union to prevent their flight, and especially the humanitarian aid provided by Western countries were sent to world-renowned media outlets such as VOA, RFE, the BBC, and the CBC to stir up more discontent, incite more Soviet citizens to defect, and build a terrifying image of the Soviet Union worldwide. After the signing of the Helsinki Accords in 1975, Western countries cited the "human rights" provisions to provide financial aid to Soviet "dissidents" and political opposition, letting them serve as internal forces for peaceful evolution. In 1983, the U.S. Congress passed the National Endowment for Democracy Act, with funds mainly used to support the "development of democracy" and internal opposition in Soviet and Eastern European countries. If dissidents induced Soviet reform from the outside, then liberal-minded intellectuals revised official Soviet ideology from the inside, deeply influencing the governing thoughts of CPSU leaders.[42] The reform program proposed by Gorbachev in the 1980s was almost identical to the reform measures proposed by dissidents such as Medvedev and Sakharov in their "Letter to the Soviet Leaders." Under the influence of the Western strategy of peaceful evolution, the ideological foundation of the CPSU's rule was continuously eroded, and the Marxist faith of the Soviet people was continuously weakened: "The Soviet path is not the correct path for civilized development; 'civilized countries' are the models for social development, and we should follow them in all aspects."[43]

  1. The unique historical and cultural tradition of the Soviet Union provided the cultural soil for its generation

As a social trend of thought, nihilism has a deep historical and cultural background in Russia. Russia is like a giant cultural pendulum, swinging back and forth between the two major cultural blocs of East and West, lacking a sense of cultural identity and belonging, which has caused a split in national consciousness and a cultural confrontation between East and West. Since ancient times, the Russian nation has formed an important characteristic: it both fears authority, possessing a servile and obedient side, yet also despises traditional customs, often openly showing hostility toward recognized moral tenets while constantly digging for and obsessively seeking "truth." The philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev said: "In the Russian spirit, the two elements of East and West are always wrestling with each other... Russia is the most state-less, most anarchist country in the world... Anarchism is a Russian spiritual phenomenon; it manifests in various forms and belongs to both our left and our right."[44] Russia both advocates spiritual freedom, pursuing a universal human spirit with a near-religious purity, yet also trumpets narrow nationalism, believing that only Russianized Christianity is the most Christianized religion.

In the 1830s, Russian intellectuals split into two major factions based on their political stances: the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. Among them, the Westernizers advocated abolishing tradition, expanding political, economic, and cultural exchanges with Western European countries, and following the same development path as Western Europe. Represented by Chaadayev, Annenkov, Belinsky, and Herzen. The person who first voiced the precursor to nihilism was Chaadayev. Chaadayev was a "negative patriot," or in today's terms, a national nihilist. As a staunch Westernizer, Chaadayev worshipped the West and insisted that Russia's way out was to unify with Western Europe. He believed that taking the Western European path was the most labor-saving and ready-made route for Russia, and he preached "negative patriotism." The main proposition he put forward in his 1836 Philosophical Letters was that Russia had no history of its own worth boasting about, no "alluring stages" or "most fully developed eras," no "charming memories" or "beautiful images." "We live only in a very narrow present, without past or future, placed in a dead stagnation."[45] Chaadayev's reflection on Russian history, on the one hand, expressed a pessimistic mood toward Russia's destiny and a tendency toward national nihilism; on the other hand, it sought unification with Europe in terms of religion, spirit, and culture. Because in the East, "submissive wisdom kneels before historical authority," while the West "has mastered the fruits of human wisdom," where "people advance proudly and freely, bowing only to the authority of reason and heaven, stopping only before the unknown, and never ceasing to cast their eyes toward the infinite future."[46] Therefore, "the more we strive to integrate into European society, the better it will be for us."[47]

In the 1860s, nihilism as a social trend of thought began to spread throughout Russia. The publication of Ivan Turgenev's Fathers and Sons in 1862 popularized the term "nihilism" across Russia; the novel explained nihilism as "treating everything from a critical point of view," "not bowing before any authority," and "not taking any principle as a matter of faith" [50]. As the novel gained popularity, nihilism became a household word and became associated with terrorist assassinations. The foundation of nihilism lay in the Orthodox Church's negation of the world. Although "Russian nihilists denied God, spirit, soul, norms, and supreme values," nihilism possessed typical characteristics of Russian Orthodoxy: "it is the external manifestation of the ascetic life of Orthodoxy, an ascetic life that renounces any happiness"; "ascetic Orthodoxy doubts the positive significance of culture and tends to regard cultural creation as a sin" [51].

Rooted in the unique soil of Russia, Orthodoxy preserved much of the humanitarian tradition of early Christianity, emphasizing that "God is the Father, and all men are brothers." The intellectual community growing up in this soil also possessed a strong humanitarian spirit, worshiping a sublime love for humanity, believing that all suffering, ugliness, and privilege should be eliminated, and exhibiting a relatively strong spirit of resistance against social injustice. Later, the nihilist movement in Russia placed more emphasis on achieving a state of anarchy through destruction. In this sense, the prevalence of nihilism within the Soviet party was closely related to the nihilist movement of the Russian period, which took pure negation or destruction as its primary goal.

  1. The identification with and support for historical nihilism by Soviet academic, literary, and media circles provided a social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse.

Historical nihilism often utilizes academic research, literary and artistic creation, and news media to wantonly distort historical facts, or even concoct rumors and forge history. This creates ideological confusion, reshapes value coordinates, modes of thinking, and national culture. Among these, the field of literature is a major stronghold where historical nihilism runs rampant and serves as the main battlefield for Western ideological infiltration and inducement. Literary creation, literary criticism, and the writing of literary history all exhibit, to varying degrees, a tendency to "nihilize" history. Allen Dulles once said: "Yielding the spiritual treasures of Russia, we shall gradually extinguish her social consciousness... We shall find our fellow travelers, our allies in Russia herself... We will support and encourage so-called artists who will begin to plant and drill into people's consciousness a cult of sex, violence, sadism, and betrayal" [52].

The shift in political stance and the radicalization of intellectuals were closely related to the Soviet Union's unsuccessful policies toward them. During the more than 70 years of CPC rule [N1], intellectuals, as a "special social group" in the Soviet Union, played an extremely important role in the process of revolutionary construction. However, intellectuals never attained a status as important as that of the working class and were criticized and suppressed in multiple political campaigns. This policy of devaluation and distrust led to increasingly tense relations between the leadership of the CPSU and the intellectual community, eventually producing a group of radical intellectuals. By the Gorbachev period, these intellectuals stood in opposition to the CPSU and Soviet socialism.

Khrushchev's "Thaw" in the 1950s opened the floodgates for nihilist trends in the literary field. This was followed by the samizdat (underground publications) of the Brezhnev era and Gorbachev's "resolute abandonment of ideological monopolism." The literary and artistic circles published a large number of articles attacking and vilifying Stalin and the socialist system. Under the guise of "writing the truth" and glasnost [N2], they engaged in the reality of vilifying CPSU leaders and dismantling the history of the CPSU. During the Soviet period, a total of five writers won the Nobel Prize in Literature, four of whom were dissidents, including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Boris Pasternak, Ivan Bunin, and Joseph Brodsky. These dissidents established direct contact with the West and sent underground publications to be published there, such as The Gulag Archipelago, Doctor Zhivago, and The End of a Beautiful Era—all of which were underground publications that opposed the current system and vilified Soviet leaders. According to a sampling analysis by American scholars of 392 underground publications of that period, 366 articles concerned political democracy, national rights, human rights and the legal system, the rationality of development, religious freedom, and creative freedom, accounting for 93.37%. This indicates that the politically oriented thinking of dissidents occupied a dominant position and proves their concern with the fundamental systemic legitimacy defects of the Soviet system [53]. The Western countries, led by the United States, precisely used the Nobel Prize in Literature to coerce the direction of Soviet literary development, turning Soviet literature into an important platform for cultural infiltration and using the influence of indigenous Soviet writers to change the political beliefs of Soviet youth.

Later, the "Thaw" trend spread to the academic world, bringing extreme liberalism. The Soviet historical community formed a "New Direction" movement [N3], "striving to re-examine the conventional patterns of historiographical research formed under extremely harsh ideological suppression in the 1930s and 40s" [54]. In the name of academic research, they touched upon the most sensitive political issues in the Soviet Union, attempting to argue that the Russian October Revolution was not a historical necessity, denying the proletarian nature of the October Revolution, and contending that the Soviet socialist path was atypical [55].

With Gorbachev's accession to power, Aleksandr Yakovlev was nominated as the Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee, in charge of mass media. The Soviet cultural positions were lost one after another; mainstream newspapers and periodicals such as Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Moskovskaya Pravda were successively controlled by liberals, becoming ideological strongholds against socialism. From 1985 to 1987, the focus of criticism in these publications was concentrated on Brezhnev's "rigidity and stagnation." In 1988, they began a comprehensive attack on Stalin and the "socialist model" formed during his leadership. Under the misleading influence of the mass media, the planned system was declared the chief culprit of economic chaos. Glasnost was transformed into "a denigration of the entire Soviet past, concentrating on various true and false 'historical stains'," while "those who advocated preserving the Soviet Union" were framed as "conservative" forces, with calls for their complete suppression [56].

This nihilation of Soviet history and CPSU leaders, on the one hand, caused the Soviet people to gradually lose confidence in the CPSU and Soviet socialism. High school and university students, in particular, began to form "a negative comprehensive evaluation of certain aspects of reality, failing to use a class perspective to understand concepts such as freedom, speech, press, and creation; they supported the multi-party system actively promoted by bourgeois propaganda tools and held a negative attitude toward the mass information media of the Soviet Union" [57]. On the other hand, it echoed the nihilist discourse within the Party, providing a social atmosphere for the maturation and flourishing of historical nihilist discourse within the Party.

III. The Enlighment [N4] Provided by the Evolution of Historical Nihilist Discourse within the CPSU for Our Country

Recently, the trend of historical nihilism has resurfaced in our country. Examining the evolution of historical nihilist discourse within the Soviet party in the 20th century is of great significance for understanding the essence of historical nihilist discourse and responding to the current stage of historical nihilist thought.

  1. Constructing historical identity is the prerequisite for responding to historical nihilism.

Historical identity is the prerequisite and foundation for achieving national identity. Historical identity plays an important role in cultivating the political and national identity of citizens. Once historical identity is formed, it can evoke the group consciousness of social members, activate the national spirit, and form a political identity with the state. Whether it is Liang Qichao's view that historiography is "the bright mirror of the citizenry and the source of patriotism" [58]; or Zhang Taiyan's lofty assertion that "if one does not read history books, there is no way to love one's country" [59]; or Mr. Qian Mu's proposition that "if one wishes the citizens to have a profound love for their country, one must first make the citizens have a profound understanding of the country's past history" [60]—all indicate that historical identity is an important driver for advancing national identity. That is, only under the prerequisite of distinguishing "this is our history" or "this is their history" can historical memory activate the national spirit and condense the power of the citizenry.

The dissolution of historical identity implies a change in political identity. The reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union were multifaceted, among which the disintegration of historical identity was an extremely important factor. Using anti-historical methods, Soviet historical nihilists did not examine historical figures under specific socio-historical conditions. Instead, they used current circumstances and today's level of understanding to measure and make excessive demands on former leaders. Through the analysis of errors that occurred during certain stages of development in Soviet revolution and construction, they comprehensively nullified the history of the Soviet revolution and socialist construction. This ultimately caused the dissolution of identity regarding the ideological, theoretical, social, and political foundations upon which the CPSU relied to lead the country.

General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out at the symposium commemorating the 120th anniversary of the birth of Comrade Mao Zedong: "History is history; history cannot be chosen arbitrarily. The history of a nation is the foundation for a nation's peace of mind and destiny" [61]. History does not allow for nihilation, nor does it allow for tampering. It is precisely because of the existence of historical consensus that the cornerstone of the Chinese nation's state and political identity is constituted. The prerequisite for realizing identity with our country's socialism is the preservation of historical memory.

Historical memory is produced within specific social systems and cultural traditions. Utilizing historical memory can shape the way citizens think and behave and interpret the legitimacy of governance. History—especially the history of the revolution in modern China, Party history, and the history of the People's Republic—is an important ideological and cultural resource for constructing national and ethnic identity. It exerts a strong integrating and cohesive effect on contemporary citizens and is the basis for advancing socialist identity. If the state is to shape citizens' correct cognition of history, it must use dialectical materialism and scientific historical thinking.

As General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: we must construct a correct "Grand View of History" and "View of Party History," "accurately grasping the themes, main lines, mainstream, and essence of the Party's historical development, and correctly recognizing and scientifically evaluating major events, important meetings, and important figures in the Party's history" [62]. We "cannot completely negate them or erase their historical achievements because of their lapses and mistakes, falling into the quagmire of nihilism" [63]. We must cultivate historical consciousness and cultural self-awareness, "meaning that in thinking about problems and making decisions, one must have a historical perspective, be able to draw experience and wisdom from past history, and consciously act in accordance with historical laws and the dialectics of historical development" [64]. Through education in Party history, the history of the People's Republic, the history of reform and opening up, and the history of socialist development, we recognize the historical necessity of the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, recognize that the leadership of the Communist Party of China is the choice of history and the people, gradually establish political identity with socialism with Chinese characteristics, and strengthen emotional identity with the state and the people.

  1. Mastering the power of discourse in Marxist ideology is the key to opposing historical nihilism.

The "power of discourse" [N5] is essentially a soft power that dominates and controls discourse, reflecting power and values. The power of ideological discourse is a "power" that reflects class interest relations; it is an important force for enhancing the attractiveness of the mainstream ideology and achieving the rule and management of society. (WeChat Public Account: Si Zheng Xue Zhe) The deep-seated reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union was that while historical nihilism was nihilizing and subverting Soviet history, it recreated a new ideological discourse. The Soviet public began to use Western-style discourse to think and evaluate the current Soviet political system, eventually leading to the loss of the CPSU's mainstream ideological discourse power.

For a political party, losing ideological discourse power inevitably means losing the hearts of the people and the foundation of governance. During the Soviet period, the construction of the Marxist ideological discourse system as the mainstream ideology fell into various degrees of difficulty regarding theoretical explanatory power and persuasiveness toward realistic problems. On the one hand, "Stalinization" formed a deformed situation of a commercial monopoly on Marxist discourse, "putting Marxism-Leninism into a state of stagnation and rigidity, separating it from reality and specific sciences, and gradually turning it into a kind of dogma" [65], which distorted the Soviet people's correct cognition of Marxism; the scientific and truthful nature of Marxism was damaged to varying degrees. On the other hand, "de-Stalinization" caused Soviet socialist ideology to encounter a crisis of legitimacy and discourse power, leading to the loss of the guiding position of Marxism and the collapse of the CPSU regime.

Over the forty-plus years of reform and opening up, China has formed a relatively complete socialist ideological discourse system. However, it has also been impacted by historical nihilist discourse to a certain extent. The "hollow" and "negatory" nature of historical nihilist discourse attempts to reconstruct modern and contemporary Chinese history to achieve the ends of denying the justice and necessity of the New Democratic Revolution and the socialist revolution, and dissolving the historical inevitability of the CPC's governance. This poses a practical challenge to the power of Marxist ideological discourse. The power of ideological discourse is of extreme importance; mastering the power of Marxist ideological discourse is an inherent requirement for upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics. The power of Marxist ideological discourse stems both from the logical self-consistency of its theory and from its capacity to answer real-world problems. On the one hand, we must maintain a problem-oriented approach toward China's issues to enhance the factual persuasiveness of Marxist ideological discourse. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out: "insisting on a problem-oriented approach is a distinct characteristic of Marxism" [71]. This requires us to grasp and base ourselves upon the historical coordinates [19] of the New Era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, using Marxist stances, viewpoints, and methods to solve practical problems in the process of building socialism with Chinese characteristics in the New Era. We must promote ideological identification by enhancing interest identity and respond appropriately to the people's concerns. Only by doing so can we spark resonance, build consensus, and continuously strengthen the factual persuasiveness of Marxist ideological discourse. On the other hand, we must provide new interpretations of the basic principles of Marxism to enhance the theoretical explanatory power of ideological discourse. Adhering to the principle of "not forgetting the original foundation, absorbing the foreign, and facing the future," we must conduct academic refinement of Chinese experience and continuously enrich the content of Marxist ideological discourse. We must create new concepts, categories, and expressions that bridge China and the West, reshaping the discourses of "reform" and "development" and properly explaining discourses such as the "Chinese Dream," the "New Era," "Chinese characteristics," and "a community with a shared future for humanity," ensuring they align with the cognitive psychology and knowledge structures of the masses. Furthermore, we must innovate forms of discourse expression to enhance the appeal and transmission of Marxist ideology. Through telling China's stories well [20], we can achieve a "daily-life" expression of discourse. "We must tell the stories of the Party, of the revolution, of the revolutionary base areas [21], and of heroes and martyrs" [72]; "we must tell the stories of socialism with Chinese characteristics, of the Chinese Dream, of the Chinese people, of excellent traditional Chinese culture, and of China's peaceful development" [73]. Only thus can we strengthen the leading power and cohesion of Marxist ideological discourse.

3. Deeply Rooting the CPC's Governance Foundation is the Fundamental Way to Respond to Historical Nihilism

The governance foundation primarily refers to the forces upon which the Party relies for its rule, including the political, class, organizational, and performance foundations. The core of these is the element of the people—that is, the gaining or losing of the people's hearts. Whether the people's hearts are with or against the Party is the key factor determining whether a ruling party possesses legitimacy. The loss of the people's hearts may lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the ruling party or even its collapse. Deeply rooting the Party’s governance foundation is conducive to the shaping of the Party's governing authority and the enhancement of its sense of self-identity. The reason historical nihilism was able to succeed in the Soviet Union was, to a large extent, because a series of problems arose in the CPSU's political construction, ideological construction, organizational construction, and work style construction, providing an opening for historical nihilism. The period from Khrushchev's rise to power in 1953 to Gorbachev’s loss of power through peaceful means in 1991 was forty years during which historical nihilism spread in the Soviet Union and forty years during which the CPSU's governance foundation was continuously eroded. The highly centralized planned economic system caused economic stagnation; the long-term failure to implement democratic centralism led to the estrangement of relations between cadres and the masses within the Party; the huge contrast between theoretical propaganda and realistic development led to the weakening of socialist faith; a privileged stratum formed, and the Party completed a bureaucratic degeneration in its organization; and the lack of intra-Party democracy blocked the channels for autonomous expression of opinion within the Party, causing ideological ossification. "The 'Marxism-Leninism' propagated by thinkers, including 'scientific communism,' was understood by many by the early 1980s as a kind of cliché that was fundamentally unachievable but had to be paid lip service" [74]. As the Cold War progressed, these problems were not effectively resolved but instead intensified. The economic, class, ideological, and organizational foundations of the CPSU's rule were continuously weakened. "By the beginning of 1991, the Party was left with only a shell, and it had itself disintegrated and become paralyzed" [75].

The governance foundation is the basic condition for maintaining the ruling status of a political party. The Party's ruling status is neither innate nor secured once and for all. This necessitates the continuous strengthening and expansion of the Party's class, ideological, organizational, and performance foundations as socio-historical conditions change. In recent years, the reason historical nihilism still finds a market in our country is largely that historical nihilists link real social problems such as corruption, moral decline, and the gap between rich and poor since the reform and opening up with the Party's qualifications for governance and leadership status. While "critiquing reality," they point the spearhead of their struggle at the socialist system. "The country is its people, and the people are the country; the gaining or losing of the people's hearts is a matter of life or death for the Party" [76]. Therefore, the fundamental way to deal with historical nihilism is to win the hearts of the people and, on this basis, deeply root the CPC's governance foundation. We must implement the new development philosophy of innovation, coordination, green development, openness, and sharing; optimize the industrial structure; vigorously develop the productive forces; and enhance the quality and efficiency of development. Simultaneously, we must modernize the national governance system and capacity, develop socialist democratic politics, and promote social fairness and justice. This satisfies not only the people's new needs for a better material and cultural life but also their new needs for democracy, the rule of law, fairness, and justice, thereby consolidating the performance foundation of the Party's rule. We must strengthen the self-identity of Party members and enhance their consciousness of their political, organizational, and behavioral identities, resolutely upholding the CPC Central Committee’s authority and its centralized, unified leadership. Proceeding from the understanding that "intra-Party democracy is the lifeblood of the Party," we must improve the system of intra-Party democracy, respect and protect the democratic rights of Party members, and closely combine the development of intra-Party democracy with the promotion of primary-level democracy [22] and consultative democracy [23] to consolidate the organizational foundation of the Party's rule. We must continuously adhere to and improve the Party's policies toward intellectuals, upholding the principle of "respecting knowledge and talents" and the principle of "the Party managing talents." In dealing with intellectuals, we must "achieve full political trust, active ideological guidance, creation of conditions for their work, and care for their lives" [77] to consolidate the class foundation of the Party's rule.

4. Adhering to the High Unity of Loving the Country, the Party, and Socialism is an Important Guarantee for Opposing Historical Nihilism

Loving the country, the Party, and socialism constitute a unified and closely linked whole. In his important speech at the centenary of the May Fourth Movement [24] , General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "In contemporary China, the essence of patriotism is the high unity of loving the country, the Party, and socialism" [78]. The Communist Party of China stepped onto the stage of history at a time of internal strife and external aggression, rooting itself in five thousand years of cultural tradition. It first united and led the Chinese people to establish a New China, achieving national independence and ethnic liberation. It then broke the constraints placed on state power by traditional feudal forces and capitalist forces, established the basic socialist system, and opened the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics, leading the Chinese nation to a great leap from standing up and growing prosperous to becoming strong.

Historical nihilists repeatedly emphasize that loving the country does not equal "loving the Party" or loving "socialism." The essence of their practice is to sever the high unity of loving the country, the Party, and socialism, and to dissolve the legitimacy of the Party's rule and the historical inevitability of socialism. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "The crux of historical nihilism is to fundamentally deny the guiding position of Marxism and the historical inevitability of China's move toward socialism, and to deny the leadership of the Communist Party of China" [79]. Loving the country, the Party, and socialism are unified. Historical nihilists use postmodern narrative styles to "re-evaluate" history with a mindset of "viewing the truth through a tube" [25]. They deny the objectivity of "historical choice" and attempt to strip the Party's leadership status away from the nation's revival process, using historical contingency to deny the inevitability of socialism in China and fundamentally denying the consistency of loving the country, the Party, and socialism. Since the founding of New China in 1949, the CPC has been in power for 72 years, with 4.864 million primary-level Party organizations and over 95.148 million members, its influence reaching every aspect of Chinese society. In contemporary China, the connotation of the Communist Party has long surpassed the categories defined by Western "political parties." The CPC is not only the core of leadership for the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics and the dominant force driving China's modernization movement and national rejuvenation; it is also the explorer of socialism and the founder of the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. It has formed a "trinity" of logic with the State and Socialism—a community of shared destiny where they "prosper together and suffer together." Throughout the historical processes of revolution, construction, and reform, the CPC's leadership status and the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics have been tightly bound with the future and destiny of the country, gaining broad recognition from hundreds of millions of people and forming stable political convictions. The report of the 19th National Congress of the CPC clearly stated: "The defining feature of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China; the greatest strength of the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China" [80]. In China, not only are the Party and the State consistent—with loving the Party equaling loving the country—but socialism and the State are also unified. Socialism is the inevitable choice of China's historical development. Only by adhering to a historical and political view that unifies these three can we profoundly grasp the historical laws of China's development, uphold the spiritual tradition of patriotism, and clarify the most essential features of the CPC's leadership and the historical inevitability of socialism. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out: "For thousands of years, the Chinese nation has followed a path of civilizational development different from that of other countries and nations. It is no accident that we opened the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics; it was determined by our country's historical inheritance and cultural traditions" [81].

The discourse of historical nihilism within the CPSU passed through the periods of Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, forming a discourse system centered on concepts such as "the Party of the whole people," "humane, democratic socialism," and "New Thinking," with negationism as its main body. This greatly undermined the Marxist faith of Soviet Communists. The trend of historical nihilism is an erroneous ideological trend that must be constantly guarded against during the construction of socialist modernization. Drawing lessons from the generation of historical nihilist discourse within the CPSU is of great importance for us to effectively block the infiltration of Western ideology in our discourse strategies and avoid falling into certain discourse traps intentionally set by the West.

(About the author: Ren Chengjin, Professor at Shandong University of Science and Technology) Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Marxism Studies, Issue 10, 2021.