Zhao Pei: Lenin’s Logical Process of Understanding Socialism
After the victory of Russia’s second bourgeois revolution, the socio-political and economic crises continued to intensify. In the course of revolutionary practice and socialist construction, Lenin creatively answered fundamental questions regarding socialism, and his understanding of it continuously deepened. These insights innovated and developed the theory of scientific socialism, occupying an important position in the international socialist movement. Clarifying the logical progression of Lenin’s deepening understanding in practice is of great significance for scientifically grasping the full scope of Lenin’s socialist thought and for summarizing and reflecting upon the practical experiences of socialism.
I. Advancing the Revolution to Construct the Prerequisites for Socialism
In Lenin’s view, "the basic question of every revolution is that of state power." After the February Revolution [1], a situation of "dual power" emerged in Russia, with the bourgeois Provisional Government and the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies coexisting. The socialist revolution had reached a brand-new historical turning point. Lenin believed that because the February Revolution had transferred power into the hands of the bourgeoisie, "the bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia is completed." Communists, he argued, should immediately push the revolution into a new stage, namely, the stage of socialist revolution.
Lenin’s advocacy for continuing the revolution met with strong opposition from the Constitutional Democrats, the Social Democrats, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Mensheviks [2] of that time; it was not even recognized within the Bolsheviks themselves. Opponents argued that although Russia had completed its bourgeois revolution, its productive forces were relatively backward, large-scale socialized production had not been universally established, small-scale production remained the primary component of the social economy, and the proletariat was insufficiently developed; therefore, the conditions for a socialist revolution were not present. At this time, the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, dominated by the Mensheviks, insisted on handing power over to the bourgeois government. Its leaders not only failed to inspire the revolutionary consciousness of the working class but also used bourgeois values and ideology to obscure and eliminate the revolutionary consciousness of the workers and peasants. In Lenin’s words: "It has entered into a direct agreement with the bourgeois Provisional Government, made a host of actual concessions, and is itself steadily surrendering its positions to the bourgeoisie." Faced with this complex situation at the historical turning point of the Russian socialist revolution, Lenin integrated theory with reality, creatively applied the basic principles of Marxism, developed the theory of socialist revolution, and attempted to answer basic questions of socialism with new thinking.
First, the direct basis for advancing the socialist revolution was Russia’s crisis and predicament. Organizing the proletariat and advancing the socialist revolution "is a matter of famine, economic dislocation, impending collapse, the horrors of war, and the grievous wounds the war is inflicting on humanity," which forced the proletarian party to take action. The coexistence of two powers left society in a state of practical anarchy. The imperialist war could not be ended, the domestic economic crisis was difficult to overcome, and the people lacked bread and peace. Between May and July 1917, Lenin published numerous articles condemning the bourgeois Provisional Government’s inaction in ending the war and dealing with the economic crisis. They colluded with imperialist capitalists to continuously sabotage the economy, leaving the people to suffer while they themselves used the war to seize wealth and make exorbitant profits. Lenin pointed out: "The deeper the economic disruption and the crisis produced by the war, the greater the need for a most perfect political form." Achieving a perfect political form and healing the wounds of war and crisis required the people’s own organizational construction, "not depending solely on a group of bourgeois politicians and officials occupying 'lucrative posts'."
Second, from the perspective of the level of development of productive forces, Lenin admitted that Russia did not possess the conditions for "introducing" socialism at that time. He repeatedly emphasized the thesis of Article 8 of the April Theses: "Our direct task is not to 'introduce' socialism, but only to bring social production and the distribution of products at once under the supervision of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies." Regarding what specific measures should be taken after the revolution, Lenin’s principle was: "Modifications which are not yet absolutely mature both in the economic reality and in the consciousness of the overwhelming majority of the people, the Commune, i.e., the Soviets of Workers' and Peasants' Deputies, have not 'introduced', do not intend to 'introduce' and must not 'introduce'." During the crisis, the incompetence and limitations of the bourgeois Provisional Government had been fully revealed, whereas "the workers, soldiers, and peasants would prove more capable than the officials and the police in dealing with the practical difficulties of increasing grain production, improving grain distribution, and improving the soldiers’ provisions." Lenin was convinced: "The Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies will develop the initiative of the masses of the people more rapidly and better than a parliamentary republic." As an already formed type of proletarian state power, the Soviets did not actually hold power. Thus, seizing power from the bourgeoisie and advancing the socialist revolution became the prerequisite for Russia’s progress toward socialism—"this is a step toward socialism."
Third, in Lenin’s view, the main factor hindering the Russian socialist revolution was not the insufficient development of the proletariat, but "the insufficient class-consciousness and organization of the proletarians and peasants." First, workers and peasants still harbored illusions about the bourgeois Provisional Government, failing to see that "it is an oligarchic, bourgeois government, not a government of the whole people; it will not give the people peace, bread, and full freedom." Thus, the revolutionary will of the proletarians and peasants was not yet firm. Second, the proletariat, and especially the peasantry, had not yet been effectively organized. Lenin emphasized: "We are not in favor of seizure of power by a minority; we are Marxists, we stand for the proletarian class struggle against petty-bourgeois intoxication, against chauvinism-defencism [3], against phrase-mongering, and against dependence on the bourgeoisie." Faced with these unfavorable factors, Lenin hoped the proletarian Communist Party would separate itself completely from the petty bourgeoisie during the revolution, "cast off the timidity of these petty-bourgeoisie, and conduct the proletarian class struggle." Meanwhile, as social class contradictions intensified, the people would increasingly cast off their illusions about the bourgeoisie. At this point, if the Communist Party "unites to carry out the work of the proletarian class, more and more proletarians and poor peasants will come over to our side."
In short, using the Marxist view of class, Lenin analyzed the unique situation of dual power in Russia prior to the October Revolution. Basing his argument on the contradictions between the bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants, he elucidated the realistic grounds for the Russian socialist revolution. Guided by historical materialism, he reached the scientific conclusion that socialist revolution is the prerequisite for Russia’s path to socialism, though not equivalent to socialism itself. Regarding the difficulties facing the revolution, he proposed targeted revolutionary strategies for Communists. Led by Lenin’s ideas on continuing the revolution, the October Revolution eventually broke out and achieved rapid victory, establishing the world's first socialist state and worker-peasant regime, turning socialism from theory into reality.
II. Developing Production to Construct the Economic Base of Socialism
After the victory of the October Revolution, Soviet Russia entered a period of major transition. In March 1918, under the leadership of Lenin and the Bolsheviks, Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk [4] with Germany, escaping the imperialist war and winning a precious period of peace for socialist construction, shifting the focus of work from revolution to construction. However, Soviet socialist construction faced an extremely complex situation from the very beginning.
Between the spring and summer of 1918, foreign armed intervention and the Civil War broke out. Large swaths of Soviet territory were occupied by Germany, the United States, Britain, and France. Internal counter-revolutionary forces took the opportunity to launch rebellions, putting the worker-peasant regime in crisis. Thereafter, the situation of the struggle changed continuously. Soviet Russia fought courageously on all fronts and achieved a decisive victory in the Civil War. In January 1920, the imperialists were forced to lift the blockade, giving Soviet Russia another opportunity for peaceful development. But in late April 1920, the Polish landlord and bourgeois armies, supported by imperialism, launched a war. Simultaneously, Wrangel’s White Army in Crimea launched a new offensive, reigniting the flames of war and forcing socialist construction to be interrupted again. Having endured four years of imperialist war, the Soviet Russian economy was severely damaged. Socialist construction, initiated under extremely difficult conditions, was an unprecedented undertaking. At the same time, the socio-economic components of Soviet Russia were complex; feudal and capitalist economic relations still existed, and dispersed small-scale production remained the primary mode of social production. Therefore, Soviet socialist construction could neither find answers in the classical theories of scientific socialism nor rely on any available practical experience for reference.
The extremely complex situation contained two intertwined problems: first, how to deal with imperialist armed intervention, win the Civil War, and consolidate the worker-peasant regime under conditions of extreme economic hardship; second, how to establish new economic relations and construct the economic base of socialism upon the old economic foundation. In Lenin’s view, "these two aspects of the task of effecting the socialist change are inseparable." Moreover, the second task was more important, more difficult, and more urgent than the first: "If we do not complete the second task, any achievements or victories in the cause of overthrowing the exploiters and resisting international imperialism by force will come to naught, and the restoration of the old system will be inevitable." It is evident that Lenin already recognized that establishing new economic relations, constructing the socialist economic base, and achieving the development of productive forces were the keys to Soviet Russia’s path to socialism. He pointed out: "The deepest source of the strength required to defeat the bourgeoisie, the only guarantee that this victory will be unshakable, can only be a new and higher mode of social production—the replacement of capitalist and petty-bourgeois production by large-scale socialist production." Of course, establishing new economic relations was more difficult than consolidating political power. "For this task cannot be solved by a sporadic display of heroism; it requires the most prolonged, most persistent, and most difficult heroism in daily, mass work." In other words, given the complex economic reality of Soviet Russia, establishing new economic relations could not be achieved overnight; it required continuous summarization and exploration in long-term practice to find the correct path to this goal.
In practice, Lenin advocated utilizing state power to rapidly adjust economic relations and using the state machine to directly carry out the socialist transformation of economic relations. At the same time, he admitted that the transition to new economic relations would be a long process requiring a gradual approach to achieve the transition from small-scale production to large-scale socialist socialized production. If one were to "use hasty and rash administrative and legislative measures, it would only delay this transition and create difficulties for it." Superficially, these two lines of thought seem diametrically opposed, but both had deep realistic roots. Utilizing state power and the state machine to directly transform economic relations was for the purpose of defending the regime; thus, a series of emergency measures later known as "War Communism" [5] were adopted to mobilize all human and material resources to defend the country. Through the "Surplus Appropriation System" [6], a grain monopoly was implemented; through the nationalization of enterprises, the abolition of currency, and the prohibition of private trade, the centralized production and distribution of materials were achieved to sustain the Red Army, urban workers, and personnel of Party and state organs; through the implementation of the distribution principle "he who does not work, neither shall he eat," labor was militarized and made compulsory to promote social production. Notably, however, when the war situation tended to ease, Lenin leaned more toward using a gradual method to establish new economic relations. Lenin pointed out that the economic basis of the Russian petty bourgeoisie was mainly the middle peasants: "Only by recognizing this reality and clarifying the nature of the small-commodity economy can we correctly solve problems such as the attitude toward the middle peasants." "To attempt to use some rapid method, some order from the outside or from the side to force its transformation, would be absolutely absurd." Instead, one must "use the method of ideological influence and by no means the method of suppression to overcome their backwardness." Later, in anticipation of imminent peace, Lenin’s attitude toward old economic relations began to change; he believed that capitalist economic relations such as concessions had a positive role in economic recovery, and even proposed that the capital of the bourgeoisie should be utilized to assist Soviet Russia's economic development. On agricultural issues, the coercive measures of the grain monopoly increasingly caused dissatisfaction among the peasants. After learning about the demands and sentiments of the peasants, Lenin began to consider adjusting agricultural policy and explicitly proposed replacing the Surplus Appropriation System with a tax in kind [7].
In short, from the victory of the October Revolution until before the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in March 1921, Lenin’s understanding of socialism began to transform. He explicitly proposed that the focus of the Party's work should shift from revolution to construction, and that developing social production was the only way to construct the economic base of socialism. However, the political situation remained unstable, and the struggle to consolidate power lasted for three years. He was clear that Soviet Russia did not yet possess the conditions to implement socialism, but to defend the regime, he was forced to use the state machine to directly carry out the socialist transformation of economic relations. Once the war situation became clear, Lenin returned once again to gradual socialist construction, emphasizing that the proletarian regime should utilize old relations of production to build the economic base of socialism, as only economic development could consolidate the regime.
III. Restoring the Market and the Roundabout Transition to Socialism
In November 1920, Soviet Russia achieved total victory in the Civil War, but the domestic economy had been severely damaged. Materials were in extreme shortage, development had nearly stagnated, and social contradictions intensified once more. The Surplus Appropriation System [8] was not terminated in a timely manner; although the peasants had obtained land, they could not enjoy the fruits of their own labor, leading to intense dissatisfaction with the Bolsheviks. Post-war shortages of industrial raw materials and fuel caused the textile industry to halt and almost all blast furnaces to go cold, making steel production impossible and forcing a reliance on existing stockpiles. To meet the demands of the war, a large number of workers had joined the army at the front, leaving transportation and industrial sectors not only short of raw materials but also short of manpower. Finally, faced with comprehensive shortages, the national treasury could only be maintained by massive currency issuance, leading to a sharp devaluation of the ruble and the collapse of the unified monetary system. Many regions printed their own paper currency, and the state was forced to implement a system of wages in kind. Furthermore, in 1920, Soviet Russia suffered a rare historical drought, which exacerbated the economic crisis. Large-scale famine appeared across the country, and the basic material life of the people could not be guaranteed.
The severe economic crisis brought about violent social upheaval. Peasant discontent spread rapidly among idle workers and soldiers who could not be demobilized, eventually evolving into peasant uprisings, worker riots, and soldier mutinies. These events greatly shook the Bolsheviks and represented the most dangerous political and economic crisis since the establishment of Soviet power. After the crisis, Lenin conducted a profound reflection and admitted his errors. He pointed out that in a country with backward economy and culture like Soviet Russia, "the direct transition to purely socialist forms and purely socialist distribution was beyond our strength." To escape this predicament, in March 1921, the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) convened its Tenth Congress, terminated the policy of War Communism, and made a series of adjustments to economic policy to restore social production and promote economic recovery. These adjustments were explicitly called the "New Economic Policy" at the Tenth National Conference of the RCP(B) held in May of the same year.
The essence of the New Economic Policy (NEP) was to use the restoration of the market economy as a means to make concessions to the economic interests of the broad peasantry, small producers, and private traders. The goal was to mobilize initiative and quickly restore social production and revive the economy. Faced with severely damaged productive forces, "it is necessary to immediately take the swiftest, most resolute, and most urgent measures to improve the conditions of the peasantry and increase their productive forces." "To increase grain production and harvests, and to increase the procurement and transport of fuel, it is indispensable to improve the status of the peasantry and raise their productive forces." To fully account for peasant interests and effectively improve their lives, the grain policy had to be changed. "What is most urgent now is to adopt measures that can immediately raise the economic productive forces of the peasantry." "This change consists of replacing the Surplus Appropriation System with a Tax in Kind." Besides restoring grain production, Lenin emphasized the rapid restoration of small industry and small-scale production. Under conditions of severe domestic economic destruction, it was impossible to immediately restore large-scale, state-run socialist production. Therefore, "helping to restore small industry to a certain degree is necessary because it does not require machinery, nor does it require state-held or large-scale reserves of raw materials, fuel, and grain; yet it can immediately provide considerable help to the peasant economy and raise its productive forces." To mobilize the initiative of small producers, their interests had to be considered. Thus, the Council of People's Commissars eventually rescinded the decision of the Supreme Council of National Economy to nationalize enterprises with more than five workers. Small and medium-sized enterprises were no longer managed according to administrative structures but adopted independent economic accounting [9], used monetary payments, freely disposed of products and income, and assumed sole responsibility for profits and losses. Through these reforms, two-thirds of the enterprises in Soviet Russia were no longer managed by the center. As enterprises shed their administrative management models and turned toward autonomous operation and self-responsibility for profits and losses, the initiative of small production and small industry was greatly mobilized, and social production—especially small production—was rapidly restored. With peasants holding surplus grain and the availability of materials produced by small industries and enterprises, a demand for commodity exchange and free trade necessarily arose; this was an inevitable result of implementing the NEP. Lenin initially opposed commodity trading and free trade, viewing them as capitalist economic activities that were illegal under the dictatorship of the proletariat. However, Soviet Russia at the time simply did not have enough industrial products to exchange with the peasants for surplus grain. Therefore, it was impossible to eliminate commodity trading through total product exchange. Particularly after implementing the Tax in Kind and encouraging the restoration of small production, the recovery of a market economy was an inevitable outcome. It is in this sense that Lenin viewed the NEP as a reform focused on the interests of the people and as a concession: "We have made a concession to the peasant as a trader, that is, a concession to the principle of private trade."
In the practice of implementing the New Economic Policy, Lenin’s understanding of socialist economic relations transformed. He admitted: "The attempt to implement socialist principles of production and distribution by the simplest, quickest, and most direct means has failed." Given the situation in 1921, a direct transition to socialism, the immediate completion of socialist transformation, and the establishment of socialist economic relations were unrealistic. Since the direct path was impassable, one could only rely on a roundabout path. By adjusting economic policies, allowing private trade, and restoring market principles, "the petty bourgeoisie and capitalism will revive on the basis of a certain (even if only local) freedom of trade." Lenin believed this result was unavoidable; therefore, "instead of trying to prohibit or block the development of capitalism, we must strive to channel this development into the tracks of state capitalism." We must strive to make state capitalism "a middle link between small production and socialism, a means, path, fashion, and method of increasing the productive forces." At this point, Lenin’s understanding of using state capitalism to transition toward a socialist economy had formed. The crux of the problem was how to combine the workers' and peasants' political power with capitalism to make it a proletarian state capitalism—or, in other words, how to combine the socialist system with the principles of the market economy. Lenin believed that the task of the proletarian regime was not to eliminate free trade, commodity exchange, and market mechanisms, but to become the supervisor and manager of the market. He pointed out that "at that time, the question of the relationship between our economy and the market or commerce was not raised at all," whereas "now our task is not so much the expropriation of the expropriators as it is accounting, supervision, increasing labor productivity, and strengthening discipline." Through the practice of the NEP, Lenin saw the value of this combination more clearly. He noted: "We have now found that degree of combination of private interest, the interest of private trade, with state supervision and inspection of this interest, and that degree of subordination of private interest to the common interest, which was the stumbling block for many, many socialists in the past." Lenin believed that although this combination was not yet socialism, it laid a solid foundation for the building of socialism.
IV. Summary and Reflections
The development and transformation of Lenin's understanding of socialism occurred during a period of rapid social change in Soviet Russia. Strictly speaking, although Soviet Russia had begun socialist construction, it had almost no socialist foundation in economic terms, apart from the workers' and peasants' political power. In a period of rapid change, how should the Russian socialist revolution be viewed? What kind of socialist path should be chosen? On these basic questions of socialism, Lenin's understanding was constantly developing and changing. Even across different stages, some views were oppositional or conflicting. This creates difficulties for a scientific understanding of Lenin's socialist thought. Therefore, it is essential to clarify the logical progression of Lenin’s understanding of socialism.
First, in answering the basic questions of socialism, Lenin always adhered to the epistemological principle of basing himself on reality. Lenin advocated for the continued advancement of the revolution, turning the bourgeois revolution into a socialist revolution. His argument was based on the coexistence of two powers and the resulting state of anarchy. At that time, economic development had stagnated, the interests of the people were ignored, and the bourgeois government would not fulfill its promises of peace and bread. The intense class contradictions in Russian society determined that the socialist revolution was a necessary condition for restarting social development. After seizing power, Lenin proposed shifting the focus of work to socialist construction as soon as possible. This was because the fundamental task of socialism is to abolish classes. To abolish classes, one must fundamentally develop the productive forces and eliminate the economic base that produces classes. During the Civil War, defending the regime and the Soviet Republic was the overriding task. The policy of War Communism was "forced upon us by war and economic ruin." After the restoration of peace and the beginning of socialist construction, Lenin realized that the backward development of productive forces in Soviet Russia was the root cause of why socialist construction was more urgent and difficult. After the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B), Soviet Russia replaced War Communism with the NEP, utilizing the market economy and state capitalism to make a roundabout transition to socialism. The realistic basis for this was once again the reality of Soviet Russia’s economic and cultural backwardness. In short, realistic problems were the logical starting point for Lenin’s answers to the basic questions of socialism. As he said: "The era when socialism was debated according to books has passed... today we can only speak of socialism based on experience."
Second, taking reality as the logical starting point implies that when problems and tasks change, ideological understanding must necessarily develop accordingly. Therefore, it is entirely logical for oppositions or mutual negations to appear in ideological understanding over time. This does not mean, however, that there is no internal logical relationship between these changing ideas. On the contrary, based on Russia's national conditions of economic and cultural backwardness, Lenin’s understanding of the basic questions of socialism was logically consistent. First, the bourgeois revolution created a de facto state of anarchy; with class contradictions growing increasingly fierce and the petty bourgeoisie wavering and compromising, it became inevitable for Russia to move toward a socialist revolution. Second, the purpose of the proletariat seizing power through socialist revolution is to abolish classes. Thus, in an economically and culturally backward country, the socialist revolution is not equivalent to the completion or implementation of socialism, but rather the establishment of the political foundation for new economic relations. Communists need to further utilize political power and the state apparatus to liberate the productive forces and achieve economic development, creating conditions for the eventual abolition of classes. Finally, in the practice of promoting economic development and liberating productive forces, old economic relations cannot be artificially abolished due to the low level of development of the productive forces. Therefore, the task of the workers' and peasants' regime is not to eliminate old economic relations through administrative means and commands, but to bring them under the supervision, accounting, management, and organization of the state power, making them factors that promote the development of the socialist economy and intermediate links in the transition to socialism.
Third, so-called logic consists of judgments made under certain premises; Lenin's understanding of the basic questions of socialism was premised on Soviet Russia's national condition of economic and cultural backwardness. The premises of the classical Marxist writers were different from Lenin's; they contemplated the basic questions of socialism under the premise of fully developed capitalism. Therefore, when the premises of understanding change, different conclusions from those of the classical Marxist writers will necessarily be drawn. It is precisely in this sense that Lenin innovated and developed classical scientific socialist theory. This innovation and development are mainly reflected in two aspects: First, on the question of socialist revolution, it is entirely possible for an economically and culturally backward country to achieve a socialist revolution alone, ahead of developed capitalist countries. This is because revolution is not only a natural result of the development of productive forces but also the inevitable product of sharp class contradictions and fierce class struggle. Second, on the issue of socialist construction, the primary task of Communists who have seized power is not further "expropriating the expropriators," [10] nor can they rely on the power of the regime to directly abolish old economic relations. Instead, Communists must learn to utilize the market economy, explore effective ways to combine the market economy with socialism, liberate the productive forces, and lay the economic foundation for the true realization of socialism. Of course, Lenin's understanding still had limitations. He continued to believe that the market economy belonged to capitalist economic relations and did not fall within the scope of socialism. This understanding would cause ideological confusion and lead to a contradiction where the market economy was seen as incompatible with socialism. This was also the ideological root of the eventual forced termination of the New Economic Policy.