Qu Xuan and Lin Jinping: A Critique of George Brenkert’s Ethical Interpretation of Marx’s Thought on Freedom
The contemporary American ethicist George G. Brenkert not only regards "freedom" as the core concept and fundamental value running through the entirety of Marx's thought, but also unearths the ethical resources inherent in Marx's ideas on freedom from the dimension of ethics, seeking to construct a "Marxian ethics of freedom." However, once this path is taken, the first challenge that must be addressed is the skeptical question: Did Marx have an ethics at all? If the answer is in the affirmative, further questions must be answered: How should one view the relationship between historical materialism and ethics? What kind of ethics is Marx's ethics? Following this line of reasoning, Brenkert clarifies the relationship between historical materialism and ethics on the one hand, and explains that Marx possesses an ethics based on "freedom" on the other. The former regards historical materialism as "Marx’s meta-ethical" methodology, while the latter treats "freedom" as "that virtue" [1] upon which Marx builds his arguments, possessing normative significance. In his view, these two elements together constitute Marx’s unique ethical thought.
I. Historical Materialism as Marx’s Meta-ethical Methodology
Regarding ethics, Brenkert accepts the general demarcation used by contemporary Western scholars, arguing that ethics does not merely consist of normative ethics providing prescriptive content; meta-ethics is also a necessary component, as it can provide foundational reflection and rational justification for the moral presuppositions of normative ethics. Precisely regarding meta-ethics, Brenkert reverses the view typically held by technological determinists—who believe that historical materialism and ethics are incompatible—and points out that historical materialism is not an obstacle to Marx's ethics. Through a reinterpretation of historical materialism, he refutes widely popular misunderstandings rooted in technological determinism, allowing historical materialism to become the methodological premise for Marx's correction of previous ethics, which "consistently fell into moralism, abstraction, and otherworldliness."
Brenkert analyzes that, within the framework of technological determinism, the essence of historical materialism lies in the explanatory priority of the decisive role of material productive forces in the basic structure and development of society. Here, "productive forces," consisting of the means of production and labor power, include neither superstructural factors such as ethics and legal-political obligations, nor human beings themselves who possess value orientations and interest demands; the human beings involved are merely labor capacities that can be quantified into general value or reified into labor products. Consequently, through its "decisive role" in the basic structure of society, this version of productive forces excludes the responsibility that humans ought to bear as subjective forces in historical development, and abstracts away the specific actions of individuals and the specific factors contained within the superstructure. Problems of determinism and even fatalism arise from this, leaving ethics and morality with no place to reside. Under this traditional mode of understanding, historical materialism and ethics are clearly incompatible.
In response to this misunderstanding, Brenkert develops his counterargument by starting with "productive forces" within Marx’s vision. He first points out that in Marx’s accounts, the extension of productive forces "includes not only tools, machines, labor power, knowledge, skills, and raw materials, but also the revolutionary class, community, science, and the division of labor itself," as well as "modes of social activity, the collective (productive) power created by cooperation, state power, and population growth," and "common economy, social knowledge, and capital." While these factors may not form a new, strict definition of Marx’s concept of "productive forces," they at least indicate that the technological determinists' mechanical dichotomy between productive forces and relations of production belongs to a conceptualized, abstract understanding. This is far removed from Marx’s own accounts based on concrete reality, because in reality, productive forces and relations of production necessarily interpenetrate, together constituting the components of production.
Since this broad sense of "productive forces" that interpenetrates with relations of production is closer to Marx's understanding, then compared to the aforementioned narrow "productive forces" of technological determinism, the "mode of production, including both productive forces and relations of production," is more suitable for the position of "the explanatory basis of historical materialism." Brenkert further emphasizes that the rationality of assigning explanatory priority to the mode of production also lies in the fact that the mode of production makes up for the fundamental contradiction—the dialectical contradiction between productive forces and relations of production—which cannot be formed by productive forces alone to drive social-historical development. History has proven that in the dialectical movement of social development, productive forces are not always the primary factor driving the historical process; the innovation of relations of production can also drive historical progress even when productive forces are relatively lagging.
Moreover, regarding the connotation of productive forces alone, whether in the broad or narrow sense, the element of labor power is indispensable. This is because only through the input of labor power can material tools and objects of labor be transformed into actual productive forces. And since labor power includes an individual’s physical strength, intelligence, knowledge, and skills, one cannot exclude the "moral and value structures" possessed by the laborer as an integrated living being, nor the judgment, willpower, control, guidance, and expressive power formed under their influence, for these likewise play a non-negligible role in the production process. Therefore, the elements of productive forces participating in the production process not only have a material side, but the non-material characteristics of the laborer—such as morality and value orientation—are also necessary constituents of productive forces. Only when the two are closely linked can productive forces function in reality.
By this point, through his reinterpretation of the extension and connotation of "productive forces," Brenkert secures a place for values within the explanatory basis of historical materialism. Consequently, historical materialism opens up space for the existence of ethics. However, his intention is not to use these values functioning within the "base" to replace the ideological values of the "superstructure" as traditionally understood. Rather, he seeks to defend the legitimacy of ethics—and particularly Marxian ethics—by emphasizing the decisive role of the mode of production as a consistent methodological premise while defending the basic principles of historical materialism, and by analyzing the differences and connections between these two types of values.
First, according to Brenkert's distinction, the values functioning within the explanatory basis of historical materialism are those that people hold and practice in their actual lives; "they constitute the social existence of man." In contrast, values in the superstructure are those institutionalized values existing in social consciousness. The reason the latter generally depends on the former is that the former, as a component of the mode of production, is directly driven to change by its own internal forces and other elements of the mode of production; whereas the dominant values in the latter are, in the final analysis, externally determined by social existence. It can be seen that what Brenkert adheres to is precisely the methodological premise established by historical materialism by "affirming that the mode of production has a foundational influence in society."
Second, in response to the misunderstandings of "technological determinism," Brenkert highlights two points. (1) The "determination in the last instance" [2] by the mode of production does not mean a unique, eternal, or singular decisiveness, but rather a determination that may be elusive yet does not hinder its continuous and foundational role. (2) From the perspective of historical materialism, this determining role is not an objective necessity entirely external to humans, but is "related to the influence and dominant role that productive activities, relations, and values have in people's lives." It "stems from the social relations presented by human activities and values" and is a "determination brought about by human behavior and its active creation." Thus, in Marx, historical necessity and subjective agency are not naturally contradictory or mutually exclusive relationships. On the contrary, "Marx believes that communism is bound to arrive because he believes that under current circumstances, people's desires and needs will cause them to truly rise up against the existing order."
It is precisely under this methodological premise that Brenkert further responds to the skepticism regarding whether Marx has an ethics by distinguishing between ethics based on two moral concepts—deontological ethics and virtue ethics—thereby resolving the paradox in Marx’s thought of both rejecting and critiquing morality while containing a moral critique. In Brenkert's view, the assertions that Marx has no ethics are debatable. This is because, if one speaks of deontological ethics, it can indeed be said that Marx has no ethics. Regarding the ethics of his time, Marx criticized traditional ethics and moral views that were "alienated from the deep concerns of daily life" and "directly led to their own formalization in laws and regulations" or "reform under existing institutions"—represented especially by deontological ethics based on concepts such as rights, duties, justice, and guilt, which point toward moral imperatives and behavioral norms that specific actions with a sense of moral responsibility should follow. Thus, if one regards deontological ethics as the mainstream or even the entirety of ethics, one would indeed conclude that Marx has no ethics. In fact, however, this thesis is untenable, because the fact that Marx has no deontological ethics does not mean he has no meta-ethics or virtue ethics.
The Marxian meta-ethics interpreted by Brenkert refers to the idea that Marx does not recognize transcendental, abstract, or universally applicable moral or ethical standards. Instead, he emphasizes that morality and ethics must be understood within specific historical and economic structures, particularly grasped within specific modes of production; that is, "those moral standards unique to a specific mode of production are justified through that mode of production." He believes that Marx was engaged in ethical inquiry throughout his life: "For example, he explored the relationship between morality/moral principles and their historical and material environments; he analyzed and criticized egoism, utilitarianism, bourgeois rights and freedoms, and other similar ideas such as fraternity." Brenkert refers to these inquiries as Marx's meta-ethical inquiries: "This is equivalent to an investigation of Marx's meta-ethics, that is, an investigation of his methodological thoughts concerning the nature and justification of morality."
Brenkert believes that Marx's rejection and critique of the deontological ethics of his time was not intended to construct a new deontological ethics or to transform deontological ethics with the spirit of historical materialism. In his view, Marx did point out a development path for contemporary ethics, but what functions in Marx’s thought is not deontological ethics, but virtue ethics. Virtue ethics aims to cultivate character or personality traits "associated with certain virtues, excellent qualities, or a rich way of life." Protected by Marx's meta-ethics, it no longer avoids reality, appeals to the otherworldly, or falls into the traps of universalism and rationalism in traditional ethics—becoming illusory, abstract, and ineffective moral preaching; rather, it can face the real situation of concrete human beings, further penetrate into the level of social systems and social structures to question the essence of man, ask why the state of human life has come to this, and resort to the practice of changing the world.
In summary, Marx’s meta-ethics can clear the premises and lay the methodological foundation for the existence of his virtue ethics, and Brenkert uses this to describe Marx’s ethics as a broad moral view that "unifies daily concerns with moral care." Of course, to complete the effective construction of Marx’s ethics, one must find some fundamental value that can run through the development of Marx’s thought from beginning to end. To this end, Brenkert has found "freedom," which he believes possesses normative significance.
II. "Freedom" as the Value of Marx’s Virtue Ethics
Brenkert states bluntly: "Marx’s ethics is an ethics of freedom." He argues that Marx’s critique of capitalism is based on freedom rather than other values. This proposition touches upon the debate then-prevalent in academic circles regarding "whether Marx criticized capitalism as unjust based on justice." In this debate, Brenkert explicitly sides with Allen Wood, maintaining that Marx did not criticize capitalist society as unjust. This is because, in his view, "freedom" and "justice" exhibit a certain "asymmetry" in Marx’s work. That is to say, according to the distinction of values mentioned above, freedom—which contains an ontological dimension—belongs to the fundamental values practiced within the social base, whereas justice belongs to the superstructure as an ideological, institutionalized value subordinated to social production. However, while Brenkert agrees that Marx did not criticize capitalism based on justice, he does not accept Wood’s view that Marx’s critique was based on non-moral goods such as freedom, self-realization, and community. He points out that Wood’s approach of equating freedom with non-moral goods like self-realization and community is uninspired and lacks discernment; moreover, treating the freedom Marx pursued as a non-moral good is improper.
Furthermore, Brenkert believes it is untenable to regard values such as equality, human dignity, or interests based on utilitarian considerations as the rationale for Marx’s critique of capitalist society. He notes that among many values, only "freedom" can shoulder the heavy responsibility of running through the entirety of Marx’s thought, becoming the more fundamental and inclusive "cardinal virtue," and thus "becoming a moral concept that can be clearly discerned throughout Marx’s entire corpus." To this end, having established the basis in Marx’s meta-ethics, he provides a focused and forceful new interpretation of the normative connotations of Marx’s thought on freedom: "What does freedom mean in Marx’s eyes? In the most concise terms, freedom means that a person can live in such a way that, in communal relations with others, they can fundamentally determine the concrete totality of their desires, capacities, and talents, which constitute a person’s self-objectification. ... Marx's view of freedom has three distinct yet interrelated aspects: (a) self-determination requires self-objectification through a person's desires, capacities, and talents; (b) a person's self-objectification must be a concrete self-objectification involving others and nature; (c) self-determination is possible only in harmonious communal relations with others. In short, freedom for Marx is a specific type of self-determination." Through Brenkert’s detailed analysis, these three aspects highlight the following three major characteristics of Marx’s thought on freedom.
First, as a form of self-determination, the specificity of Marx’s concept of freedom lies first in its dual identity as both normative and ontological. It is a process of self-creation accomplished by "creating new conditions and forms of life for oneself" and through the active realization and full development of human "desires, capacities, and talents." It points toward an ontological mode of existence and state of being that life should achieve, while simultaneously pointing toward the "fundamental virtues by which people should live," which are concretely composed of a series of complex temperaments and character traits.
Regarding scholars like Bertell Ollman and Eugene Kamenka, who interpret Marx's view of freedom through the theory of "self-realization," Brenkert focuses on analyzing the failures of the "self-realization" theory in interpreting Marx's view of freedom and how "self-determination" can avoid these pitfalls to provide a more effective interpretation. He notes that "self-realization" theories often either understand Marx's freedom in an empirical, descriptive sense—thereby excluding its moral connotations—or unrealistically demand the full development of all individual capacities and talents, leading to formalistic moral obligations and responsibilities while excluding the satisfaction of natural desires. In contrast, Marx’s "freedom as self-determination" is based on the methodology of historical materialism [3], requiring the development of the self as a whole within reasonable limits, thereby avoiding the illusory fantasies detached from reality that plague the normative implications of the "self-realization" theory.
On this point, Brenkert writes: "Marx’s view does not, as (at least) some self-realization theories claim, require that all of a person’s powers and talents be realized without exception. Marx did not hold such a romantic and exaggerated understanding. Consequently, his view of freedom is free from the problems often encountered and difficult to overcome in self-realization theories. Marx’s thought also does not imply that we inherently contain two different selves, one false and one ideal, and that only the latter is what we should realize." "The problems prevalent in the ethics of self-realization are not problems for Marx"; people would not question whether the "self-realization" of the free person as Marx understood it "might come at the expense of others." As a subversion of the traditional view of freedom in speculative philosophy, freedom in Marx’s eyes—because it belongs to "practical problems" that can only be "solved in a practical way"—is essentially different from Kantian transcendental freedom or freedom of the will, which are detached from determinacy and the constraints of specific conditions.
Second, Brenkert argues that Marx’s thought on freedom should be grasped through the idea of "self-objectification." He emphasizes that to achieve freedom in Marx’s vision, "the process of human self-objectification cannot merely treat others and nature as means, or as irrelevant, abstract objects of the human will. On the contrary, man must live in concrete social relations with others and nature." This "self-objectification" is achieved under given conditions that include the concrete characteristics of "others and nature." That is to say, freedom in Marx’s vision is not about completely escaping the "realm of necessity" [4] to achieve the subjugation of natural and social objective conditions, but rather a rational control over them. Furthermore, we "must grasp the human essence by understanding human relations." Therefore, he summarizes Marx’s ethics as "an ethics that attempts to grasp the roots of things and thereby grasp man himself."
This thought demonstrates that while Marx inherited Hegel’s idea of "objectification," he simultaneously achieved a transcendence over Hegel via Feuerbach’s anthropology. Its main point is that "objectification" should not treat objects merely as "useful objects," turning the "pure usefulness" of things into "human utility," nor should it treat others as means to achieve one's own ends to possess and dominate "others and nature"—even replacing the powers and qualities of the possessor with those of the possessed. Such a path would reduce the human being to a thing-like existence. Instead, one must, on the one hand, "grasp the aesthetic qualities of things and nature" and, on the other hand, through human social interaction, realize the exchange of concrete individual qualities and characteristics, allowing humans to recover an authentic essence "determined by individual characteristics."
Third, Brenkert emphasizes that Marx’s thought on freedom must be grasped within harmonious relations with others. He believes that the "true community" is a necessary condition for realizing freedom in Marx’s vision—a community that achieves unity on the basis of respecting differences, or "harmony without uniformity" [5]. It overcomes the opposition of "interests" found in capitalist society, which is merely a collection of atomic individuals, and is filled with mutual recognition among members of each other's potentially different basic needs and desires. "By integrating with and identifying with others, we may also attain freedom—a higher and more significant type of freedom."
Unlike the first two characteristics, Brenkert specifically points out certain deficiencies in Marx’s understanding of freedom here: (1) In reality, identification varies in degree, nature, and scope; it may not be able to avoid differences in intimacy or distance between people, nor is it related solely to material interests, yet Marx took no explicit stance on this complexity. (2) Marx was overly optimistic about "eliminating the authoritarian consequences that might arise from conflicts of interest," failing to fully consider the impact of limited, uncertain knowledge and different expectations or risk assessments. (3) "Marx’s vision of community places excessively high demands on the social individual"; he calls for the "suppression of bourgeois individuality" and the formation of a community by individuals who are "more socially conscious and organized," yet he makes no mention of the "guilt or shame" required for individual solidarity.
By developing an interpretation of three dimensions of freedom centered on "self-determination," Brenkert believes he has presented Marx's ethics of freedom quite comprehensively. Regarding Marx’s ethics, Brenkert offers a poignant overall judgment: "Marx’s ethics is best understood as an approach to solving ethical problems, rather than a set of final answers." He points out that Marx’s fragmentary remarks on relevant basic concepts, while leaving enormous interpretative space for posterity, might also leave room for certain vulgarized understandings. In this regard, he specifically discusses the misreadings of Marx’s thought on freedom by Isaiah Berlin and others.
In 1958, Berlin published "Two Concepts of Liberty," distinguishing between so-called "negative liberty" and "positive liberty," and expressing concern from a classical liberal standpoint regarding the tyrannical threat inherent in positive liberty. Subsequently, Berlin’s distinction became an unavoidable topic in discussions of freedom, and Marx was often categorized into the camp of spokesmen for "positive liberty." To this, although Brenkert admits that freedom in Marx’s vision is indeed "social, collective, and active" human freedom and human liberation—an enrichment and expansion of the "political, individual, and negative" liberty of the bourgeoisie—he does not agree with using Berlin’s classification to pigeonhole this comparative perspective, nor does he believe that Berlinian positive liberty can effectively cover the rich connotations of Marx’s thought on freedom.
Brenkert’s specific rebuttal mainly includes: (1) Marx attempted to escape and overcome the various constraints and restrictive conditions imposed by capitalism on freedom through active social revolutionary practice, thereby seeking liberation from class oppression and class relations; he was "clearly concerned with both positive liberty and negative liberty, both being constituent parts of his concept of freedom." (2) Marx’s thought belongs to the objectivist philosophical tradition; in his work, there is no distinction between a "true self and an empirical self," "nor did he attempt to impose the former on the latter," and even less did he use his own subjective judgment to "suggest that what the capitalist truly wants is what he [Marx] believes is best for them." (3) The distinction Berlin makes covers only "two different aspects and orientations" of the "unified view of freedom" held by Marx, which is not helpful for understanding Marx’s view of freedom; by contrast, Gerald MacCallum’s "triadic" understanding of freedom is more applicable.
Another important challenge related to Berlin comes from a pluralistic standpoint on values. Berlin noted: "Liberty is liberty, not equality or fairness or justice or culture, or human happiness or a quiet conscience." "Liberty is not merely the absence of frustration of any kind; this would again inflate the meaning of the word until it meant too much or nothing." From this perspective, freedom is just one of many potentially conflicting values; so-called "freedom in a broad sense" not only sacrifices the clarity of the concept of freedom but may also exclude other values in the pursuit of "moral consistency" or "impose a value monism on all individuals." This is indeed diametrically opposed to Brenkert’s view that Marx "elevated the value of freedom to the ultimate value of all values."
To this, Brenkert responds: (1) Freedom in Marx’s vision, as the most fundamental value, is inclusive rather than unique or exclusive; this "broadly inclusive connotation of freedom can open people's horizons and propose new ideas." (2) What the objective development of history reflects is precisely the history of striving and struggling for freedom. Under this historical outlook, the fundamental reason Marx critiques capitalist society and demands the abolition of private property and the division of labor is that they trap human beings in a state of un-freedom. In other words, Marx does not deny that private property and the division of labor might still exist in communist society, but they must exist in a non-exploitative manner conducive to freedom. (3) A free life is a whole that "maintains moral consistency" between private life in the sphere of civil society and public life in the sphere of the political state. It requires not only the necessary guarantee of external conditions but also the development of "certain" human capacities (or at least that they are not deprived) and rational autonomy regarding choices of specific lifestyles as its necessary internal components.
It is easy to see that Brenkert utilizes the theoretical resources available to him from an ethical perspective to the best of his ability to defend Marx's ethics of freedom. On one hand, he attempts to stand on Marx's ground and, based on an ethical perspective, challenge the doubts and critiques directed at Marx's ethics. Through active dialogue with these "theoretical opponents," he excavates the charm of Marx's ethics, allowing the unique aspects of Marx’s ethics of freedom to be highlighted more effectively. On the other hand, although he does not lack laudatory words for the superiority of Marx's ethics compared to contemporary ethics during his defense, he also does not forget to make as objective and fair an evaluation of its own pros and cons as possible.
III. Contributions and Defects of Brenkert's Ethical Interpretation
An evaluation of Brenkert’s ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom must be examined within the context of constructing Marxist ethics, even though Brenkert did not intend to construct a "Marxist ethics" per se, but rather sought to interpret an ethics that "returns to Marx." This interpretation of his indeed has its significance. Imagine if Marxist ethics were already established; it would then have to respond to the following questions: Among the founders of Marxism, especially with Marx himself, is there an ethics? If one cannot directly provide an affirmative answer, are there ethical resources within his work that can be unearthed? Or must one answer the question of why there is none? Brenkert’s book Marx’s Ethics of Freedom is precisely an attempt to answer this series of questions. His primary effort lies in providing an ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom. Viewed today, this interpretation by Brenkert is clearly a mix of successes and failures.
(i) Deficiencies in Brenkert's Ethical Interpretation
The most obvious deficiency of Brenkert’s interpretation lies in his "ethicization" of many of Marx’s thoughts—especially historical materialism and the concept of freedom. Consequently, his interpretation either leads to a generalization of ethics or a narrowing of Marx’s thought. This is specifically reflected in the following four aspects:
First, many of the deficiencies Brenkert points out regarding the "Marx’s ethics of freedom" are conclusions he reached only by scrutinizing them through an ethical lens. For example, his conclusions that Marx lacked consideration for "concrete moral issues of privacy and individuality" or that "there always exists a tension between the particular and the universal" are judgments that can only be made if one views Marx entirely as an ethician. However, this is not the case. When we truly "return" to Marx, an undeniable theoretical fact is that the key to Marx's thinking was not how ethics could be made effective, nor was he exploring the moral norms that individuals should follow. Rather, he attempted to look through these appearances to probe and unearth a deeper social essence. Although Marx's thought indeed implies insights regarding a truly effective ethics, he was, after all, not thinking at the level of perfecting the individual, but at the level of what kind of social system is conducive to the free development of human beings. This way of thinking can certainly provide resources and references for ethics, and its rationality can be discovered when scrutinized from an ethical perspective, but it is by no means something that ethical reflection alone can encompass. To deny this would lead to either narrowing Marx’s critical thought into ethics or generalizing ethics into an all-encompassing theory that blurs disciplinary boundaries.
Second, in Brenkert’s specific arguments, a pan-ethical tendency is visible everywhere, with "ethical" discourse leaping between the lines. According to his logic, we can deduce that because Marx had discussions regarding moral or ethical phenomena, Marx possessed a moral philosophy or ethics, and we can then explain this ethics as Marx's broad moral outlook with freedom as its supreme criterion and core. This kind of argument is not uncommon in contemporary academic research. But if such an inference were valid, could we also say that any discipline researching "phenomena" could be collectively termed "phenomenological research"? If so, then such "ethical" and "phenomenological" research could indeed "conquer all under heaven" [6]. In his specific analysis, Brenkert not only fails to distinguish between moral values and non-moral values but also tends to subsume values that differ from moral values or do not necessarily possess moral significance. As he says, in Marx, private property is regarded as an "evil," and the "abolition of money, exchange value, wage labor, and private property in general" possesses "moral necessity." Even the "true community" is given normative significance because Marx once said that "brotherhood among men is no mere phrase with them, but a truth of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies." [7] This is tantamount to treating morality as a "tiger skin" [8], where everything is judged by moral standards.
Third, Brenkert’s ethical interpretation weakens the content of many of Marx's insightful ideas and blurs the essential difference between Marx and the moralists he critiqued. The pan-ethical tendency ultimately prevented Brenkert from truly standing at the height of historical materialism and effectively breaking free from the rationalist and universalist modes of thinking inherent to the ethical perspective. This resulted in him interpreting the community in Marx's vision merely from the levels of interest and individual identity (which are not applicable here), believing that such a community is "composed of reflective, rational beings who act in the realization that they are not divided by interests, but on the contrary, are united by them." Clearly, such a perspective is narrow. It not only fails to realize that interests and identity are insufficient to become the premise for a community to transcend rights and justice, but also blurs the essential difference between Marx and Kant, Proudhon, or the utopian socialists of whom Marx was always wary.
Fourth, Brenkert is also biased in his treatment and reading of Marx’s texts; some important texts and ideas were filtered out by Brenkert’s ethical "sieve." Although Brenkert attempted to avoid the pitfalls of failing to utilize textual resources like the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 or the Grundrisse (as Howard Selsam did), or limiting the interpretation of the whole of Marx's thought to the early works (as Kamenka did), he tried to find a balance between these two scenarios. However, being confined by the ethical perspective, Brenkert generally followed Kamenka’s path, staying too long with newly discovered manuscripts (especially the 1844 Manuscripts) to interpret Marx's ethical thought. Therefore, in Brenkert’s elaboration, there is inevitably a tendency to rely too heavily on Marx’s early thought and to attempt to subsume the entirety of Marx’s thought under the ideas of the "Young Marx." This causes important turning points in the evolution of Marx’s thought to be obscured by the continuity of his thought as a whole. Theoretically, this manifests as a convergence with the humanist trend of Western Marxism.
(ii) Main Contributions of Brenkert's Ethical Interpretation
Just as pantheism contains a critique of religion and theology—once the religious cloak of pantheism is removed, it is not difficult to find the rational factors within it—so too does Brenkert’s pan-ethical interpretation imply a rational understanding of Marx’s thought. Once we strip away the ethical cloak Brenkert draped over Marx’s thought on freedom, the rational components hidden in his interpretation of historical materialism and freedom, as well as the objective and pertinent viewpoints he expressed in refuting various misreadings of Marx’s thought, remain very insightful.
First, Brenkert’s interpretation of historical materialism is constructive. As he observed, in understanding historical materialism, people often find it difficult to grasp the dialectical unity between the regularity of history and the initiative of the historical subject's choices, often leaning stubbornly toward one extreme. For instance, this is the case with technological determinism and vulgar economic determinism. According to their understanding, historical materialism is incompatible with ethics and morality, which would mean the initiative of the historical subject could not be exercised. In contrast, Brenkert points out that when Marx emphasizes historical necessity, he does not negate the role of "people's needs, desires, and wants": "The arrival of communism is inevitable not because it has nothing to do with people's wants and needs. Quite the opposite."
Although Brenkert made this new interpretation of historical materialism for the purpose of defending Marx’s ethics, his explanation has obvious positive significance for both historical materialism and contemporary ethics. On the one hand, he resolved the "problem of determinism characterized by oversimplified understanding attributed to historical materialism" in an ethical manner. On the other hand, he pointed out a direction for the development of contemporary ethics. For contemporary ethics to avoid becoming empty moral preaching lacking a sense of history and to allow theory to take root, it must absorb the spirit of historical materialism and incorporate the historical dimension and factors of material production into the basic considerations of ethics. One could say that through his re-interpretation of historical materialism, Brenkert highlighted the non-material factors inherently contained within human agency, thereby reasonably revealing and demonstrating the value dimension and moral implications inherent in historical materialism itself.
Second, Brenkert regards freedom as Marx's most core and fundamental value pursuit, grasping the uniqueness and important status of freedom in Marx's thought. Today, more and more scholars disagree with the assertion that Marx had no value pursuits. So, what exactly was Marx’s value pursuit? To this, Brenkert believes the answer is freedom. Because only freedom is the most important value running through Marx’s entire intellectual process. Whether it is Marx's argument for the swerve of atoms in his doctoral dissertation or the statement in the Communist Manifesto that "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all," both imply Marx's declaration of freedom. Compared to freedom, justice, equality, and rights are insufficient to serve as Marx’s value pursuit. Even in a communist society, there will still be a pursuit of freedom, even if by then it has reached a state similar to "the common people all say, 'We are as we are by nature'" [9]; however, there will be no room for the existence of equality, rights, or justice, as these values will be sealed away in the museum of historical ideas.
If one must construct a Marxist ethics, then Brenkert’s approach of using freedom as the core category of Marx's ethics can be considered profound, and his construction is no less impressive than the Marxist ethics of the Soviet Union. Since communist morality, as the core category of Soviet Marxist ethics, was not the morality that would exist within a communist society, but rather a set of moral requirements derived for the realization of the communist cause; if communist society indeed has its morality (even if it might be in a pan-ethical sense), then it is not excessive to believe that this morality is "freedom."
Furthermore, Brenkert is highly vigilant against adopting a dogmatic attitude toward Marx, advocating instead for a grasp of Marx’s thought that is holistic, dialectical, and developmental. As he suggests, if one truly wishes to grasp the essence of historical materialism, one should neither treat Marx as a flawless intellectual saint nor view him as a scientist prophesying the development of history. Returning to Marx’s own texts—whether in the prefaces to the Manifesto of the Communist Party or in his reflections on Oriental societies [10] in his later years—it is clear that he himself harbored a strong aversion to his ideas being treated as dogma. Moreover, it should be recognized that his thought was not only formed through continuous development, but also that his early critiques of religion, morality, and philosophy share a common lineage with the "external critiques" he conducted after founding historical materialism; Marx's thought constitutes a coherent intellectual whole.
In addition, writing from a contemporary perspective, Brenkert emphasizes that people in different eras should not uncritically accept Marx's thought. Nor should they blame Marx himself for the deviations of his so-called admirers and followers, or demand that he foresee the many variables of the 20th century, such as the destructive effects of technological development and the "complexity and uncertainty of the relationship between human values and social and political institutions." After all, there is a certain gap between the various new conditions of actual historical development and Marx’s somewhat optimistic projections regarding the theory of historical progress.
Finally, Brenkert is effective in refuting erroneous assertions. When interpreting Marx’s concept of freedom, to avoid merely talking to himself and out of respect for the perspectives of existing scholars, Brenkert often develops his arguments through dialogue and refutation. For example, when interpreting Marx’s freedom as "self-determination," he launches a series of comparative arguments against the then-dominant "self-actualization" theory. He ultimately demonstrates that the "self-actualization" theory fails to escape the limitations of the Kantian theory of "free will," whereas only the "self-determination" theory fits Marx’s original intention and highlights his inheritance of Hegel's thoughts on freedom. Furthermore, as a supporting argument, he devotes considerable space to refuting the misreadings of freedom by Isaiah Berlin and others, while engaging in dialogue with scholars like Allen Wood, showing no ambiguity in grasping the vital points of his theoretical opponents.
In short, Brenkert’s ethical interpretation of Marx’s thought on freedom can be described as "success and failure both springing from the same source" [11]. Regarding Marx’s thought, whether one insists on an ethical or a non-ethical interpretation—or even if one ultimately interprets freedom as a moral good versus a non-moral good—these are all biased misreadings of the totality of Marx's thought. They can neither effectively resolve the tension between the "particular and the universal" nor help in understanding Marx's solution to the difficult problem of unifying fact and value. In fact, Brenkert’s claim that Marx lacks a theory regarding the universal applicability of morality and specific individual moral issues is not a deficiency of Marx's thought on freedom itself. Rather, it is a defect resulting from Brenkert’s own scrutiny as an interpreter through an ethical lens.
However, just as Brenkert, in evaluating the contributions of Marx’s ethics, argues against judging them by potential flaws or "measuring him by the sum of his errors," we should not evaluate Brenkert’s contribution primarily on the basis of the shortcomings in his interpretation of Marx’s concept of freedom. Regardless, he remains a courageous, active, and insightful contemporary scholar.
(Authors: Qu Xuan, Department of Philosophy, Party School of the Guangdong Provincial Committee of the CPC (Guangdong Institute of Public Administration); Lin Jinping, School of Marxism, Sun Yat-sen University) (This article is a staged result of the National Social Science Fund of China Youth Project "Research on the Basic Problems of Anglo-American Marxist Political Philosophy Since the New Century")
Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Foreign Theoretical Trends, Issue 2, 2022