Li Shenming, Yin Bin, et al.: On the Post-Cold War Views of War and Peace of the U.S. Ruling Clique
World War II transformed the United States into the dominant power of the global capitalist system and the leader of the West. Following the war, to establish a "global family" under its leadership and create a global order under its dominance, the United States employed the dual instruments of war and peace to pursue a foreign policy aimed at ensuring the "political and economic interests of the United States and its allies on a global scale." Consequently, U.S. foreign and military policy shifted to primarily target socialist countries and the Third World. Beginning with the Truman administration, American political figures, major news media, and certain scholars continuously proposed various "viewpoints" on the questions of war and peace. These exceeded any previous period in scope, providing the theoretical basis for the policy choices of successive post-war U.S. governments. Among all post-war U.S. presidents, Richard Nixon authored the most extensive body of theoretical work. Although Nixon stepped down due to the "Watergate scandal," his successor presidents invariably consulted him when encountering major international issues throughout his lifetime, illustrating his profound influence on the U.S. ruling clique. Therefore, Nixon's views on war and peace represent the perspectives of the American ruling class in a relatively comprehensive and systematic manner. Due to the power status and leadership role of the United States, these views were fundamentally accepted by U.S. allies and became the mainstream perspective of the West.
I. "War is a Tool for Gaining Power and Influence"
American political figures believe that war is a tool—a means to acquire power and influence and to advance national interests. They posit that war is caused by political differences, and the use of military means is intended to achieve specific political objectives; U.S. leaders can only engage in war with the resolute support of public opinion. Regarding involvement in Third World conflicts, the United States must be selective. Nixon stated, "When a nation goes to war, achieving victory is essential," and "victory should be defined as the use of military means to achieve specific political goals." He argued that when American "interests are threatened," the "capability and will to resort to force must be the primary instrument," as this "will reduce the ultimate probability of resorting to force," while "always keeping the use of force as a last resort." [1] (p. 265) Furthermore, "the greatest danger of war breaking out between superpowers is that when their interests conflict, a small war may escalate. Small wars always have the potential to trigger a world war."
(1) After World War II, the United States launched a global Cold War against communism
Nixon believed that in the 20th century, the United States "already experienced three great wars: World War I, World War II, and the Cold War." Following World War II, the United States "launched a global Cold War against communism."
First, the Cold War was a total war characterized by an intense struggle between political ideas and economic systems. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill of the United Kingdom delivered a speech in Fulton, Missouri, which raised the curtain on the Cold War. On March 12, 1947, U.S. President Truman delivered a message to Congress (later known as the Truman Doctrine [1]), marking the formal beginning of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. "The Cold War covered every region of the world and forced most of them into this intense struggle between political ideas and economic systems." From the Truman administration’s initiation of the Cold War to its conclusion during the George H.W. Bush administration, political figures in every U.S. administration were active practitioners of the Cold War.
Nixon believed that the Cold War was not a conventional war as defined in our history books, but rather "a war called peace." He stated, "If this war is not to escalate to the level of actual armed conflict, we must effectively Wage this war in non-military dimensions." He argued, "What is at stake in the success or failure of this conflict is not only our own freedom but the freedom of all nations in the world." It was a great struggle to decide the fate of all nations, and "the survival of freedom depends on the actions of the United States." Regarding this, American political figures held the following primary views:
First, the Cold War served as a substitute for a "hot war" between the two superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR), particularly nuclear war. While "the Cold War prompted an intense arms race and triggered dozens of smaller-scale military conflicts such as the hot wars in Korea and Vietnam," it "did not lead the superpowers into direct combat against one another."
Second, the United States must resolve the question of which type of nation will dominate the "destiny of the world." Therefore, the U.S. had no choice but to make achieving victory in the Cold War the primary goal of its foreign policy.
Third, the Cold War was a combination of military, economic, philosophical, political, and diplomatic power; every single point was vital to the outcome of the war and would dominate the global situation.
Fourth, the United States must distinguish between vital interests, important interests, and peripheral interests. So-called "vital interests" of the United States referred to those essential not only to America but also to the "Free World" [2], forming part of the massive struggle between two worlds. The highest priority for defense should be these vital interests.
Fifth, the United States not only "saved the world from the clutches of communism but also helped transform the world into one where freedom is no longer threatened."
Second, the end of the Cold War does not mean the end of conflicts between regions and small nations; rather, the threat of small-scale wars has grown sharply. Nixon believed that the end of the Cold War did not usher in a "New World Order." He noted, "In the 'New Era' of world history, ideological conflict may not occupy the dominant position, but the degree of violence in this era may become even more intense than the previous one." He warned that "The collapse of communism in the Cold War" and the "tending of the Cold War toward disappearance does not mean the end of international conflict." Instead, "instability in the developing world will continue to pose a major threat to U.S. interests," and "dozens of civil wars and regional wars are still caused by ancient struggles based on tribal, ethnic, national, or religious hatred."
On one hand, in a world of inter-state competition, conflicts of interest and national conflicts are inevitable and a necessary state of affairs. Nixon believed that the core of interstate relations is competition, which makes conflict a "necessary state of affairs in the world." He observed that "certain nations are dissatisfied with what they already possess" and "attempt for various reasons" and "through various means to acquire more." Meanwhile, other nations "resist the schemes of these reaching nations," causing "conflict to occur between countries in these two positions." Furthermore, "If they cannot resolve their conflicts peacefully, they will ultimately attempt to resolve them through violent means." The "end of the Cold War between superpowers does not mean the end of conflicts between small nations."
On the other hand, the United States must not allow a "clash of civilizations" to become a defining characteristic of the post-Cold War era. Nixon agreed with the view proposed by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington and others that "the 'clash of civilizations' will place the West and the Islamic world in a state of hostility," noting that "military conflicts since the 1990s have confirmed this thesis." Nixon stated that if the United States "continues to allow" such conflict to persist, it will "inevitably bring fire upon itself, leading to conflict between the Muslim world and the West." He argued that "the civilized world must establish a unified policy for dealing with terrorism" and that "once military retaliation is appropriate, they should be prepared to act together."
(2) The developing world is the battlefield of the ongoing struggle between East and West
American political figures believe that "the war in the Third World began before World War II ended." This is a war to determine "the future of developing countries" and is conducted "to save freedom." The "developing world" has become "the battlefield of the ongoing struggle between East and West." John F. Kennedy said, "This kind of war is unique," "its intensity is new," and it requires "a completely new set of strategies" and "a fundamentally different kind of force."
First, the United States cannot stay out of or stand on the sidelines of wars in the Third World. American political figures believe that between peace and war lies a vast gray area of "neither-war-nor-peace," and the competition between the United States and communism "will be primarily concentrated in the Third World." The Third World is the epicenter of global wars and revolutions; "the struggle will be decided to a large extent in this arena... we must engage the opponent within this field." The importance of the Third World means the United States cannot "stay out of" or "stand on the sidelines" of this war. If the United States stays out, the West is certain to lose. Since "the cost of open aggression will become increasingly high" in the 21st century, if we "expect to win without fighting, or even just expect to avoid losing without fighting," we "must be determined to use our power in a manner that does not involve war." Anywhere in the world, the United States is not just defending a line but must expand "freedom" globally.
Second, the goal of the U.S. in the East-West struggle is to establish a "Global Family" that includes all nations and largely mirrors the U.S. political system. American political figures believe the U.S. must "do everything in our power" to establish a global family including all nations—an "ideal world" where "all nations have free economic and political systems and are forever loyal to social justice and human rights," largely identical to the American political system. This has been the "purpose since the founding of the nation," and in pursuing "these unchanging purposes, every generation of Americans has encountered different problems. Although the problems have changed, the purposes remain the same." The U.S. objective is diametrically opposed to that of the Communists; between the U.S. and socialist countries lies a "struggle between two incompatible systems and concepts," and this struggle "will continue until freedom achieves victory."
Nixon stated that in the second half of the 20th century, "we have lived in a world dominated by the conflict between two superpowers caused by two contradictory ideologies. The East-West struggle is the prominent feature of this era." Walt Rostow, former Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, believed the "ultimate question" of the struggle is whether "this small planet should be organized according to the principles of the Communist bloc, or according to the principles of voluntary cooperation among independent nations committed to human freedom," moving toward a "family of free nations."
American political figures believe the "root of the conflict" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union "lies in the profound differences in ideology, interests, and intentions between the two superpowers." It is "part of the massive struggle between two worlds" and "directly involves our own most vital interests." While "the Soviet Union attempts to expand communism," "the United States seeks to block communism." They argue that "the U.S.-Soviet conflict is not a 'problem' but a 'condition'"; "problems can be solved, but conditions can only be managed." Competition is the core of Soviet-U.S. relations and will determine who prevails in the superpower struggle.
More importantly, we must recognize that American political figures, represented by Nixon, believe that although war as a means of pursuing policy has become obsolete, the instruments of war must continue to play a role in maintaining peace. "The era in which war was an alternative is over. Peace is the only choice for the future. We are currently in a dangerous middle state between peace and war," where "military deterrence, including nuclear forces, is an indispensable component of any lasting peace. When each side holds an equally good hand of cards, potential aggressors are unlikely to act recklessly."
II. "Real Peace is a Means of Tolerating Conflict"
Among all U.S. presidents, Nixon discussed the issue of peace most extensively and with the clearest viewpoints. His views on peace lacked the usual window-dressing, hypocrisy, and taboos, fairly frankly reflecting the U.S. ruling clique's true views on peace. Nixon divided peace into two types: "real peace" and "perfect peace." He repeatedly clarified that what he spoke of was "not a mythical perfect peace," but "a real peace based on a shared recognition of harsh realities." This peace acknowledges that "there are deep, irreconcilable differences between them, but their survival depends on finding ways to manage these differences without having to fight a war."
Nixon believed that real peace would not "suddenly and once and for all" emerge from some grand scheme, but is rather "a continuous process of managing and controlling conflicts that arise between competing nations, systems, and international ambitions." This "peace is not the disappearance of conflict" and "not the end of contradictions"; "on the contrary, it is a means of tolerating conflict"—it is the only kind of peace that has ever existed to date. Furthermore, "Without the United States, it would be impossible for peace and freedom to continue to be maintained."
Nixon also believed that "conflict is a natural state in the world" and "is inherent to humanity"; "nations will inevitably clash over various issues through various means, and the danger that these clashes will lead to violence will always exist." Realistic peace is "a means of learning to coexist with conflict," it is "the management of conflict so that it does not erupt into war," and "the ultimate test of a nation's character is not how it endures the misfortunes of war, but how it meets the challenges of peace."
(1) Peace and strength are inseparable in the real world Nixon believed that "world peace and national strength are inseparable." For countries with fundamentally opposed ideologies, "the peace sought cannot be built on mutual friendship; it can only be built on mutual respect for each other's strength."
First, perfect peace exists only in the fantasies of diplomats and in the grave. Nixon argued that "in a world where conflict between people is ever-present and pervasive," perfect and permanent peace exists only in "two places: in the grave and on the typewriter." Such peace "is an illusion," "shaped by beautiful thoughts and pretty words"; "it never existed in the past, and it will never exist in the future." "Idealists long for a world without conflict," which is "a world that has never existed and will never appear." Nixon cautioned that "the real world does not revolve around wishful thinking about the 'full realization of peace,' but around the enduring realities of geopolitics." 7 It is a danger to "confuse real peace with perfect peace"; "we should not engage in a futile search for perfect peace, but instead strive to forge a realistic peace." Real peace requires the United States to have the determination to use American power in every way except war.
Second, seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth. Nixon believed that seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth and a fallacy. The idea that "economic power has replaced military power as the primary instrument of foreign policy" is a philistine view. "Trade itself can never produce peace or prevent war"; "seeking peace through trade has not worked in the past and will never work now." "Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence and competition." "Although economic interdependence limits each nation's freedom of action, it has not rendered military power meaningless." "When an issue involves vital national interests, a great power will discard even the strongest economic ties to achieve victory." "If handled correctly, economic relations can strengthen deterrence and competitiveness," making trade "an important additional force acting as a check on potential aggressors," but "it can never replace a tangible deterrent built on the foundation of military power." "Shaking hands and making nice" cannot change a nation's ambitions or interests.
(2) Peace is not the ultimate end; peace should be a means to achieve a higher purpose Nixon argued, "We should not allow ourselves to be tempted by the claim of peace at any price." "If peace were truly our only goal, we could have it at any time we wish—simply by surrendering." "The peace we seek must be a peace combined with justice." Peace should be a means to achieve "a new world where everyone can enjoy the blessings of freedom, justice, and progress." If peace is made "our only goal, then the freedoms already won may be jeopardized." Peace is a great goal, but it is not a panacea for all ills.
(3) A sober policy of détente must be pursued to maintain peace and defend freedom During the Cold War, the United States sequentially implemented policies of containment and détente [3] toward socialist countries. American dignitaries and scholars debated which policy was more effective for dealing with socialist states until the end of the Cold War. Nixon said: "The debate over this word is so fraught with emotion that the argument over substance has turned into a semantic one. Therefore, we must clarify what a sober détente is and what it is not."
Nixon's views on détente can be summarized in five points: First, détente is not a substitute for the Cold War; rather, both détente and the Cold War are substitutes for a hot war between the two superpowers, particularly a nuclear war. Second, U.S. policy must combine détente with deterrence. Third, détente is an attempt to expand elements of cooperation and impose certain limits on elements of competition. Fourth, détente without deterrence is a prescription that inevitably leads to retreat and defeat. Fifth, implementing a sober détente requires the use of both "carrots" and "sticks."
3. Nuclear weapons have greatly changed the way the world operates U.S. dignitaries, some scholars, and the news media believe that nuclear weapons, as a new force, have changed "the nature of war" and "will also change the nature of peace." In 1953, Truman said: "We have now entered the atomic age; war has undergone a technical change that makes it starkly different from wars of the past." U.S. nuclear strategy has evolved in tandem with changes in its nuclear advantage.
First, when the U.S. held nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, it always maintained the option of fighting a nuclear war. In 1962, then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara said: "While no nation can rationally take steps leading to nuclear war, that fact does not guarantee that nuclear war will not break out." "Nuclear weapons are a reasonable weapon only in circumstances where they can be reliably used—where the alternative might be worse than the risks of nuclear war (such as gradual surrender to Communist aggression)." Former President Kennedy said: "In some circumstances, we must be prepared to use nuclear weapons from the start." On one hand, the "edge of the blade" for American action was non-nuclear forces, with nuclear forces kept in the background.
In 1959, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor argued that the U.S. strategic "atomic deterrent will serve as a shield" providing security, "but not as a tool for flexible application." This is because "in future military operations, limited war forces will play an active role, while atomic retaliatory forces can only play a passive role." The U.S. "strategy of massive retaliation may have prevented the outbreak of a Great War," but it failed to "eliminate local disturbances."
U.S. dignitaries and military generals believed that nuclear power could not be used for "brushfire wars" [4] on the periphery. The U.S. must possess sufficient non-nuclear forces to have conventional options in marginal situations, so it is not forced into nuclear war for lack of alternatives. The outcome of global conflicts may depend on unconventional, limited warfare; America's powerful nuclear weapons have little impact on Third World conflicts, and superior conventional military power may be unable to deal with an enemy employing unconventional warfare. The U.S. cannot face a choice between total war or total defeat.
On the other hand, "limited nuclear war" was seen as the most effective U.S. strategy. In 1957, Kissinger proposed that "in fighting a nuclear-armed state or a power capable of substituting manpower for technology, limited nuclear war is our most effective strategy," and "the policy of limited nuclear war should not be treated as a means to relax our preparations for total war." In 1959, Taylor also proposed that "tactical atomic weapons" could be used "in relatively rare circumstances and conditions consistent with our national interests."
Second, after the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States, the U.S. believed a superpower could no longer use war as a policy tool against another superpower. Nixon said that during the Cold War, the two superpowers, the U.S. and the USSR, "possessed the power to destroy each other and the rest of the world. This greatly reduced the possibility of a global nuclear war." "Neither superpower can afford to fight the other"; resorting to war as "this final means is self-destruction. In the era of nuclear war, continuing our political differences through the means of war would destroy our civilization today."
U.S. dignitaries and some scholars believed that direct conflict between superpowers would almost certainly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Any local war could suddenly spread into a nuclear holocaust, and nuclear war could lead to the destruction of all nations and societies. In any conventional or nuclear world war, there will be no winners, only losers. Nuclear parity changed the nature of U.S.-Soviet conflict; nuclear weapons made war between great powers obsolete as a means of resolving contradictions. Due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, there will be no more world wars in the 21st century. In addition to maintaining sufficient nuclear deterrence, the U.S. must learn to compete without direct military intervention.
Third, the attempt by developing countries to become nuclear states makes the nightmare of nuclear war a potential reality. Nixon argued: "All countries in the developing world are now trying to become nuclear states," and "as a result, the danger of nuclear war is now more serious than during the Cold War."
Fourth, for the foreseeable future, the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war will persist, and nuclear weapons must remain part of U.S. strategy. U.S. dignitaries believe that the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is a fundamental fact of international life; nuclear weapons must be part of the U.S. strategy to deter the outbreak of war. Nixon said it was irresponsible to "condemn nuclear deterrence as immoral," and the U.S. "must possess nuclear weapons to deter potential aggressors from starting a war or forcing our surrender without a fight."
4. To protect vital U.S. interests, peaceful methods must be combined with resolute action U.S. dignitaries believe that in protecting its vital interests, the U.S. should combine "firmness with flexibility," using "peaceful methods" and military methods as complementary tools. The U.S. must possess capabilities in six areas: ideology, diplomacy, economic aid, military aid, military force, and covert operations. At the same time, the U.S. "must understand where and how to use each instrument" and "cannot exercise leadership by example alone or by force alone, but must combine the best elements of both."
First, the U.S. must maintain a strong and diversified military force capable of a wide range of military activities. After WWII, regardless of which party or president was in power, the U.S. consistently viewed the strengthening and maintaining of a vast and diverse military force as the preferred means of defending its interests.
In 1961, upon taking office, Kennedy proposed, "First, we must strengthen our military tools." He believed that "facing a new and difficult world," the U.S. "must maintain a strong, diversified military force, a force capable of a wide range of military activities." His successor, Johnson, claimed the U.S. would "never allow our adversaries to gain an advantage in any possible war, whether it be nuclear, conventional, or guerrilla." Once the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces were roughly equal to those of the U.S., Nixon believed the U.S. "urgently needed to greatly increase our general-purpose forces and strengthen our regional capabilities."
U.S. dignitaries and military generals have always believed the U.S. must master the most advanced weapons and maintain superiority over the Communist bloc, particularly in military technology. Otherwise, it could lead to a resurgence of the Soviet Union's declining revolutionary will. To this end, the U.S. must maintain a strong strategic deterrent to ensure that both sides utilize nuclear weapons politically and diplomatically rather than using them militarily.
Second, democratic nations cannot win by military might alone. Kennedy said that in our time, "no significant problem can be solved by military force alone," and "the world situation must be dealt with on social, economic, and political foundations." U.S. dignitaries believe: 1) In the global competition, one of the West's most powerful weapons is the idea of freedom; the U.S. president must fully utilize this weapon and do so appropriately and effectively. 2) Economic power itself is a potent weapon; if used skillfully, it can promote our interests. 3) The U.S. must learn to achieve strategic objectives by providing foreign aid; U.S. military and economic aid should prevent new opportunities for Communist expansion. 4) Without military strength and the determination to use it decisively and selectively in important conflicts, we will defeat ourselves without a fight; a moderate tone must be combined with tough action. 5) According to the needs of the situation, military, political, economic, and psychological means should be used alternately or in combination.
V. All peaceful means must be utilized to induce the Communist bloc In April 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower delivered a speech titled "The Search for World Security," in which he proposed the policy of implementing "peaceful evolution" [5] toward Communist countries. He stated, "We must use every peaceful means to induce the Soviet bloc to correct the existing injustices." The following year, at a NATO meeting, he referred to the "distinct possibility of victory for the free nations by peaceful means" as a "noble strategy." John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State under the Eisenhower administration, remarked on certain actions by Soviet leaders at the time, stating, "There are now signs that a new era may be dawning," and "the results of this change may emerge—not this year, or next year, but after many years." The United States had to "go all out" to execute Eisenhower’s "noble strategy," noting that "its cost will be high, not only in terms of money, but especially in terms of will, tenacity, and faith." Consequently, "peaceful evolution" and the Cold War became the dual means by which the United States dealt with socialist countries.
First, "In the long run, we can encourage 'peaceful evolution' within the Communist bloc itself, which will take many years to complete." From the Eisenhower administration onward, American politicians and scholars believed that within Communist countries, there existed "forces demanding greater liberalism." If these forces could persevere, they might bring about "fundamental internal changes" in those nations. "We cannot predict when or by what means the countries and peoples still under Communist rule may move toward freedom. But we must always keep the lamp of freedom burning before them." They "looked forward to that day" when, "within ten years or a generation," the "ultimate goal of our policy" would be achieved. John F. Kennedy believed that "there is clearly no easy solution to the problem of how to eradicate the Communist movement." One way was for the Communists to "do it themselves," while "another way is through action from the outside." Richard Nixon asserted, "This task will not be completed in decades, but will take many generations."
In April 1963, Kennedy said that achieving "peaceful evolution" "relies on the gradual evolution of human institutions." In June of the same year, George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, opined, "From the perspective of world peace prospects, the Russian approach is relatively encouraging and hopeful." Nixon, meanwhile, believed the Western bloc, led by the U.S., would win without fighting through "peaceful evolution." In 1984, he stated, "If we remain firm in our will, we need not be pessimistic about the outcome of the competition. As one generation succeeds another, we will begin to see a process of peaceful evolution emerge within the Eastern bloc... In the long run, we will prevail, and we will win without war."
Second, "In this world, even established Communist governments are inevitably subject to the forces of evolution." Some in the U.S. argued that "military evolution is too dangerous, and peaceful evolution is impossible" for Communist states. Nixon did not entirely agree. He said, "They are right on the first point, but wrong on the second. In this world, everything—even an established Communist government—is inevitably subject to the forces of evolution." As long as the U.S. "adopts a responsible policy" in the competition, "we can help shape and accelerate the process of positive change." The U.S. must seek cooperation with Communist leaders who wish to implement "genuine reform."
U.S. politicians and scholars believed that contact between "their society" (referring to socialism) and "our society" would sow seeds of discontent that would one day bear the fruit of peaceful evolution; thus, the U.S. must adopt a policy of maximizing such exchanges. Applying various economic weapons to Communist regimes and increasing trade contacts could promote "peaceful evolution" within the bloc. Trade must be used as a weapon, not a gift, to ensure that Communism meets its failure years or even decades before its actual collapse. It was considered "extremely important" to distinguish between different Communist countries by adopting friendly or hostile policies to "strengthen the divisions within the Communist world."
Third, "There is a limit that cannot be exceeded in the development of U.S.-China relations." Nixon believed that regarding China, the U.S. "should first consider a long-term investment, an investment that will make China's future progress dependent on continued cooperation with the West." Since the U.S. and China "are not allies," the development of relations "has a limit that cannot be exceeded," and the U.S. "will not sacrifice its Chinese friends in Taiwan." He noted, "In the face of shifting international realities, there are no shared experiences, struggles, or ideals between us to keep us inseparable forever. Unless a large-scale political reform movement occurs in China, our fundamental views on how to govern a country will remain diametrically opposed." Furthermore, "the future of U.S.-China relations lies in the hands of both American statesmen and American businesspeople." The route China might take could ultimately determine the survival or demise of the West.
Fourth, "Defeating Communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 20th century is only the first step toward the worldwide victory of freedom in the 21st century." After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Nixon claimed the West had "defeated Communism" in the Cold War. This was "not only a military victory, but also a victory in ideological, political, and economic dimensions," representing "one of the most brilliant achievements of free people in the history of civilization." Nixon stated, "while celebrating the failure of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we must seize the opportunity to strive for the victory of peace and freedom throughout the world."
Nixon remarked, "The Communists have lost the global ideological struggle. However, the fact that they lost does not mean the West has won." In the 21st century, "nothing will have a greater political impact on the world than whether political and economic freedom can take root and thrive in Russia and other former Communist countries." He warned that "until this transition is finally transformed into irreversible political freedom, economic freedom, and a non-aggressive foreign policy, there remains the danger that the remnants of the shattered Soviet empire will launch a 'huim槍' (parting shot) [6] upon the world with catastrophic consequences." Nixon believed the challenges facing the U.S. after the Cold War were greater than those during it. Since the Cold War's end, choosing how and when to fight for peace and freedom has become more complex. The end of the Cold War between superpowers did not mean the end of conflicts between smaller nations.
Fifth, one of the greatest challenges of the 21st century is handling the deep differences that still exist, and will always exist, between peoples who adhere to diametrically opposed ideologies. Nixon believed that in the 21st century, "two types of revolutionary change still threaten the Third World." "The first is the Communist revolution," and the second is Islamic fundamentalism, the latter of which "replaced Communism as the primary means of violent revolution." The U.S. must concern itself with events in the Third World because they involve massive U.S. strategic and economic interests. If the 21st century is to be a century of peace, the hardships and wars of the Third World must be addressed; otherwise, "when one revolution subsides, another will occur." The term "Third World" is outdated; now there are only two "worlds" composed of developed and developing countries. "If the 'Tale of Two Worlds' continues to exist, the foundation of future peace and stability will be built on sand."
VI. Armaments are not the cause of war, nor can arms control achieve peace Nixon argued that war is not caused by the existence of weapons, but by political differences between nations that lead to the use of weapons; arms expansion is a symptom of political conflict, not the cause. While we should try to alleviate the symptoms, we should not ignore the disease itself. The advocacy for disarmament is based on a logical fallacy that equates people's intentions with the means they use to achieve them. "Because of this fundamental misunderstanding, the path that disarmament advocates believe is most promising for peace is precisely a prescription for international disaster."
U.S. politicians believe that armaments are determined by political differences and adversarial relationships; attempting to disarm before eliminating these conflicts of interest is putting the cart before the horse. The myth of disarmament is the progenitor of all myths about peace.
First, the United States must simultaneously pursue the two paths of disarmament negotiations and arms expansion to maintain high military effectiveness. U.S. politicians advocate that the U.S. goal is not disarmament, but the realization of a stable strategic balance, and they will never weaken the means to defend the American system. The U.S. government will not propose any recommendations that would shift the balance of power to its disadvantage.
Second, total nuclear disarmament is an unattainable dream. Nixon said that those who advocate for the elimination of nuclear weapons live in a fantasy world. "One of the most reckless and dangerous fallacies of the nuclear disarmament movement is that the world would necessarily be better off without nuclear weapons."
American politicians and some scholars believe that nuclear weapons will exist forever. As long as people know how to manufacture them, the U.S. cannot simply dream of eliminating them from the earth; it must accept these harsh realities. While nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated, much can be done to prevent their use. Only by learning to coexist peacefully with its adversaries can the U.S. learn to coexist with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the U.S. will perish by the atomic bomb. Preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to other countries is in the interest of the U.S.; to stop nuclear proliferation, the superpowers must make a joint effort. Without U.S. leadership in the world, the problem of "avoiding nuclear anarchy" will remain unsolved.
(Author Profiles: Li Shenming is the Director of the World Socialism Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), and former Vice President and Research Fellow of CASS; Yin Bin, Xu Shiping, and Wang Liqiang are Guest Researchers at the World Socialism Research Center of CASS; Hong Yuan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of American Studies of CASS) Online Editor: Tong Xin Source: Journal of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory Research, Issue 2, 2022