Xuan Chuanshu & Zhao Xiaohui: The German Green Party’s Return to the Federal Government and Its China Policy Trends
In the 2021 elections for the 20th German Bundestag, the German Green Party (Die Grünen) secured 14.8% of the vote and 118 seats, trailing only the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (25.7% of the vote, 206 seats) and the Union (CDU/CSU) (24.1% of the vote, 197 seats). Not only did they return as the third-largest party in the Bundestag for the first time in 16 years, but they also successfully formed a "Traffic Light Coalition" with their former center-left allies, the SPD, and the right-wing Free Democratic Party (FDP), occupying five cabinet seats including the Minister of Foreign Affairs. For the Greens, this was undoubtedly their best electoral performance since the end of the Cold War; for Germany, a coalition government of this model was also a first.
The success of the German Green Party in this election has sparked significant imagination. In the view of some Western scholars, the Greens' victory and participation in governance may help heal the social fractures in Western countries. Conversely, some Chinese scholars believe that the rise of the left-leaning Greens may bring negative impacts to Sino-German and even Sino-European relations. What, then, is the nature of the German Green Party? Why was it able to stand out in this general election after long-term marginalization? Why was the "Traffic Light Coalition" successfully formed? What stance will the Greens adopt regarding relations with China, and what role will they play? To address these questions, this article intends to analyze them one by one within the analytical framework of parliamentary politics, aiming to make a rational judgment on the foreign policy—and specifically the China policy trajectory—of the new German government in which the Greens participate.
I. The German Green Party: From the Marginal Left to the Moderate Center
Since its founding in West Germany in 1980, the German Green Party has consistently sought to participate in elections at all levels—local, federal, and European—influencing domestic German and European political trends through parliamentary politics while undergoing continuous self-evolution in the process. Taking participation in the federal government as a benchmark, we can roughly divide the developmental trajectory of the German Green Party into three stages.
The first stage was as a grassroots opposition. At its inception, the German Green Party, like other European Green parties, was a protest-oriented "anti-party" and "anti-parliamentary" entity with left-wing leanings, integrated from new social movements such as the ecological, peace, and feminist movements. However, its membership was more diverse and its issues broader. In terms of value orientation, it adhered to the principles of "ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and non-violence," with the public slogan "Neither Left nor Right, but Ahead." Its goal was not to seek executive office but merely to participate in politics. However, in the process of actual political engagement, these positions and goals faced constant practical challenges. Specifically, after entering the Bundestag and the European Parliament in the mid-to-late 1980s, and even joining coalition governments at the state level, a debate emerged within the party between the "Fundis" [1] (fundamentalists), who maintained idealistic positions, and the "Realos" (realists), who adhered to pragmatism. The former insisted on "moral purity" and wished to remain in opposition; the latter based their stance on "electoral feasibility," advocating for the maximization of electoral gains to manifest their power and will through governing. This debate temporarily concluded when the Realos triumphed at the 1988 party congress. Consequently, the German Green Party gradually transformed from a protest party into a governing party, and from Euroskepticism to a pro-European stance, eventually becoming a force strongly advocating for European integration. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, and the setbacks of the socialist movement, the German Green Party absorbed some members of Communist and Socialist parties. Particularly after the 1993 merger of the West and East German Green parties into "Alliance 90/The Greens" (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), while the party's strength grew, ideological divisions between internal factions further widened.
The second stage was as a "junior partner" in a governing coalition. After more than a decade of accumulating strength and experience in parliamentary activities at various levels, the German Green Party entered the federal government for the first time following the 1998 general election. It formed a "Red-Green Coalition" with the SPD led by then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, thereby completing the transition from a protest party and parliamentary opposition to a governing party and becoming the "junior partner" of the coalition. Participation in government undoubtedly provided the opportunity to put Green ideals into practice, but it also sowed the seeds of internal division or even a split. During their time in power, nearly one-third of the party members left due to dissatisfaction with the Greens' support for German participation in NATO military operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Before the 2002 federal election, the German Green Party was forced to make the first revisions to its Basic Program, expanding its value orientation from "ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and non-violence" to "ecology, self-determination, expanded equality and vibrant democracy, non-violence, and human rights." Although no specific new proposals were introduced, the Greens—emphasizing ecological protection—attained the status of the third-largest party in parliament and continued in the coalition government due to the severe floods [2] in Germany that year. In the 2005 federal election, the Greens fell from the third-largest to the fifth-largest party in the German parliament. The SPD, following its electoral defeat, had to reach a compromise with the Union (CDU/CSU) to join a governing coalition led by Angela Merkel, forming a "Grand Coalition." From then on, the "Red-Green Coalition" of the Greens and the SPD ceased to exist, and the Greens began a 16-year journey in opposition.
The third stage was a period of reflection and adjustment as an opposition party. Facing electoral defeat and the disappointment of returning to the opposition, the German Green Party engaged in self-reflection, attempting to integrate the long-existing internal views of the "Fundis" and "Realos" into a unified "radical realism." Simultaneously, the Greens began to utilize their opposition status to make various adjustments. On one hand, they took advantage of the SPD's weakening and damaged left-leaning image—a result of its participation in the coalition government—to seize center-left political space and absorb traditional SPD voters. On the other hand, at the state level, they experimented with various forms of governing coalitions: not only forming a "Red-Green" coalition with the SPD in Baden-Württemberg but also a "Black-Green" coalition with the CDU in Hesse, and even a "Red-Red-Green" [3] coalition in Thuringia with the SPD and the Left Party (Die Linke). That is to say, the German Green Party became increasingly pragmatic and flexible in its policies, accepting coalitions with the center-right and center-left, as well as with the radical left, and even attempting negotiations for a "Jamaica Coalition" [4] with the CDU/CSU and the FDP in 2017. Although these negotiations collapsed due to the FDP's withdrawal, they nevertheless elevated the Greens' political status. Concurrently, the Greens performed strongly in the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, and 2019, consistently maintaining their position as the largest Green party among EU member states while their vote share and seats continued to climb. Especially in the 2019 European Parliament elections, the German Green Party leaped to become the second-largest German party in the European Parliament, second only to the CDU.
After more than 40 years of development and evolution, in terms of the political spectrum, the initial left-wing and idealistic colors of the German Green Party have gradually faded, replaced by an increasing pragmatic style of the center. In terms of political status, the Greens have grown from a marginal "anti-party" and "anti-parliamentary" force into a key player in the German political arena and even within the European Parliament.
II. Subjective and Objective Reasons for the Continuous Growth of the German Green Party
In Western parliamentary politics, a party ultimately demonstrates its influence through participation in elections, and election results are deeply influenced by objective environments and subjective choices. After 16 years of accumulation, reflection, and adjustment, the German Green Party achieved an impressive performance in the 2021 federal election. Behind this victory lie both subjective and objective reasons.
(1) Western Society Suffers from Political Polarization
For a long time, Western countries have prided themselves on their democratic and liberal order. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the West has entered a period of "democratic recession," where economic crises, social stratification, and political polarization have broken out with increasing severity. Right-wing populist forces in various countries have seized the dominant discourse in nation-building, and the liberal order so celebrated by the West has begun to "lapse into rites and music in ruin" [5] (lǐ bēng lè huài). As the standard-bearer of Western society, the United States saw its political polarization reach a historical peak during the Donald Trump era. Domestically, the Trump administration emphasized "Whites First," practicing racism and nationalism, resulting in social division and racial conflict. The social foundation of the democratic polity was hollowed out, and society lost its basis for stability. Externally, it emphasized "America First" and embraced protectionism, not only launching trade wars against a series of countries including China but also repeatedly "withdrawing from groups," thereby undermining the global economic order. It can be said that the trend of right-wing populism and political polarization pushed by Trump exists to varying degrees in countries on both sides of the Atlantic. This presence has allowed the public in Europe and America to witness the series of social chaos brought about by political polarization. As a response, they expect the reconstruction of order. In recent years, European countries have indeed shown signs of returning to moderate politics. In 2020, Emmanuel Macron even struck at domestic religious extremists through a new religious policy, resolutely saying "no" to religious extremism, thereby forcefully defending the national consensus while also winning the support of Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Cyprus, and the European Union. Macron's success and the support he received from European nations indicate that France and even Europe have begun to reflect on and counter polarized politics. To a certain extent, this played a role in halting the trend of right-wing populism that had been spreading in Europe since Brexit and Trump's election.
Furthermore, European Parliament elections serve as a bellwether for European politics. Compared to the 2014 European elections, in the most recent 2019 elections, Green parties in most European countries achieved good results, sparking a "Green Wave," with the German Green Party's performance being the most prominent. If the German Greens' vote share (and seats) in the 2014 European elections declined compared to 2009—mainly because extreme parties characterized by populism, nationalism, and anti-European integration dominated the electoral process under the influence of the financial crisis—then in the 2019 elections, anti-European or Euroskeptic populist forces overall underperformed, while pro-European centrist liberal parties and ecological Green parties performed more prominently. This indicates that the European public has, to a certain extent, recognized the Greens' image as reformers who have shed their radical left and idealistic colors.
In addition to the further decline of traditional mainstream parties, the success of Macron—the "star pupil" in countering polarized politics—and the rise of the "Green Wave" in the recent European elections share a common cause: extreme populist and nationalist parties are becoming increasingly unpopular. The public desires the emergence of moderate politicians and parties with a different political style—one distinct from those that manufacture opposition and division. The emergence of such an atmosphere on the European continent is clearly favorable for the German Green Party as it moves toward a moderate centrist position.
(2) The Hollowing Out of the German Domestic Political Center
The political party that has long occupied an important position on the German political stage is first and foremost the center-right Union (CDU/CSU). After 16 years of Merkel's governance, the public has grown weary. Specifically, vulnerable and marginalized groups are highly dissatisfied with her recent policy of opening the country's doors to overseas immigrants and using German taxpayer money to bail out other Eurozone members. The federal government led by the Union has gradually lost popular support. In the 2017 election, 49% of German citizens expressed dissatisfaction with the government; by 2021, this proportion rose to 57%. It is evident that the vast majority of voters have a psychological desire for change. This desire prompts voters to lean toward supporting parties that can better plan for the future, and in their eyes, the Greens are a good choice. Furthermore, since Merkel stepped down as party chair, the Union has failed to produce a political figure capable of maintaining party unity; internal power struggles have intensified, and rifts have deepened. Armin Laschet, whose prestige and seniority made it difficult to win over the public, was elected as the Union's chancellor candidate primarily due to these internal struggles. Various unfavorable factors led to a massive loss of traditional Union voters, with approximately 920,000 former Union voters turning to the Greens—the largest single source of voter migration for the Green Party.
Second, consider the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Since the 21st century, Germany has seen three "Grand Coalitions" (2005–2009, 2013–2017, and 2017–2021), all dominated by the Union [6] with the SPD in a subordinate position. Throughout more than a decade of governing as the junior partner, the Union and the SPD engaged in constant mutual compromise. This made it increasingly difficult for the SPD to define itself, leaving voters unable to discern its platform. In voter perception surveys regarding party positions, the SPD’s image was the most blurred, with only 41% of voters able to identify its stance; next was the Union at 42%. The Greens were the only party whose position could be clearly identified by more than half of the voters (56%). Consequently, in this election, the only clear direction for voter drainage from the SPD—which reclaimed its status as the largest party—was toward the Greens. In this cycle, 260,000 former SPD voters chose the Greens, making them the third-largest source of the Greens' voter migration.
Finally, we turn to the far-right and far-left parties which, while not at the center of German politics, still play important roles. For instance, the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) rose rapidly in recent years to briefly become the third-largest party. Its voters are primarily located in the eastern German states, characterized by relative economic fragility and heavy outflows of young people; those remaining supported the AfD out of fear that immigrants would displace them in the job market. However, as the immigration issue faded, its support declined. Additionally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which has long played a balancing role in the German power structure, was the fourth-largest party in the Bundestag prior to this election. Since abandoning "Jamaica coalition" [7] negotiations in 2017, the party has gradually drifted to the right, subsequently sharing a similar voter base with the AfD and seeing a decrease in support.
Meanwhile, as the successor to the Socialist Unity Party of East Germany [8], The Left (Die Linke) has been plagued by internal factional infighting. There are deep contradictions between the "Communist Platform" (KPF) and the "Forum of Democratic Socialism" (FDS). Furthermore, splits within the leadership have intensified. Long-standing public feuds and mutual attacks over policy positions regarding immigration, European integration, and voter bases have occurred between former party chairs Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger on one side, and former parliamentary group leader Sahra Wagenknecht and her husband (former party and parliamentary chair) Oskar Lafontaine on the other. This has made it difficult for The Left to gain voter trust. Compounding this, in the final weeks before the general election, the Union resorted to its old tactics, launching the "Red Socks Campaign" [9] to attack far-left parties and warn voters of the potential disaster of a "slide to the left," which significantly impacted the party as it was already burdened by historical baggage. Consequently, the SPD and the Greens—who belong to the same left-wing camp but hold more moderate positions—absorbed many migrant voters from The Left. Polls show that 480,000 former Left voters chose the Greens in this election, making them the second-largest source of the Greens' voter migration.
(3) Proactive Preparations by the German Greens Prior to the Election
Taken together, a favorable international atmosphere and the hollowing out of the German political center provided space for the Greens to survive and grow. While these are external factors, the actual catalyst allowing these factors to take effect was the multifaceted preparation undertaken by the German Greens themselves prior to the election.
On one hand, distinguishing themselves from the populist rhetoric of the AfD and the exclusionary political discourse of the CDU/CSU, the German Greens adopted a new political discourse. They advocated for active engagement, communication, and interaction, promoting an optimistic rather than pessimistic or fear-based discursive strategy to echo shifts in voter sentiment. To maintain a distinct party identity, the Greens reaffirmed traditional values in their campaign program, reshaped environmental issues, advocated for an ecological economy, and promoted climate-friendly development. On August 3, 2021, the Greens submitted "Save the Climate, Protect People: An Emergency Program for Climate Protection for the Next Federal Government," proposing a ten-point plan including accelerating renewable energy development, moving the coal phase-out up to 2030, transforming the federal budget into a climate budget, making the EU a climate pioneer, and advancing climate diplomacy. This effectively stabilized the party’s traditional base. Data shows that 82% of Green voters chose the party specifically because they approved of its campaign program.
Furthermore, while adhering to traditional environmental issues, the Greens focused on learning from past lessons. They moved away from their previous skepticism toward the free market and the simplistic approach of emphasizing "prohibitions." Instead, they advocated for cooperation with enterprises to advance environmental protection and emphasized seeking a balance between ecological preservation and market protection, avoiding environmental protection at the cost of social justice. In doing so, the Greens "combined the concept of an ethics of responsibility with the promotion of citizens' material well-being." This further eliminated the long-standing factional struggle between "moral purity" and "electoral viability," presenting a more decisive and unified image. This clear, unified party identity became a major factor in attracting voters.
On the other hand, to strengthen party unity, the Greens elected pragmatic members Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck as co-leaders on April 19, 2021, nominating the former as the candidate for Chancellor. This was an attempt to unify the perennially bickering internal factions behind a path of realism. Of course, as the Green candidate for Chancellor, Baerbock had visible weaknesses. Compared to candidates Armin Laschet (Union) and Olaf Scholz (SPD), Baerbock was younger and lacked political and governmental experience; she was also embroiled in scandals regarding resume inflation and plagiarism, which caused the Greens' poll numbers to slip. However, surveys indicated that only 10% of Green voters felt the candidate's performance had a significant impact on their vote. That is to say, Baerbock’s personal weaknesses did not have a decisive impact on the Greens' electoral outcome.
III. The Successful Formation of the "Traffic Light Coalition"
In recent years, the hollowing out and fragmentation of the German party landscape has deepened. The Bundestag has evolved from the previous "three-legged stool" (Union, SPD, and FDP) into a coexistence of six parties. According to the German Constitution, only a party or coalition holding more than half the seats in the Bundestag can form a government. The current fragmentation makes it increasingly difficult for a single party, or even a two-party coalition, to govern. Regarding the 2021 election results, since neither the Union nor the SPD intended to cooperate again in a Grand Coalition, a three-party coalition became the inevitable choice. Consequently, immediately following the election, both the SPD and the Union sought to lead the formation of the new government, making the Greens and the FDP, who followed closely behind, the "kingmakers." The SPD ultimately chose to cooperate with the Greens and the FDP to successfully form a government based on the following five factors.
First is the factor of legitimacy. Since German reunification, there has never been a precedent where the largest party in the Bundestag failed to form a government, leading the second-largest party to take the lead. Although the SPD only narrowly surpassed the Union in this election, it still reflected to some extent the voters' preference for an SPD-led federal government. If the Greens and the FDP had chosen to cooperate with the defeated Union, it would have negatively impacted their own images and shaken public confidence in democratic procedures and the federal government. Thus, for the Greens and FDP, prioritizing negotiations with the SPD was the more legitimate choice.
Second is the factor of historical experience. At the federal level, the Greens' only previous experience in government was the "Red-Green" coalition with the SPD from 1998 to 2005. At the state level, the Greens currently participate in 10 state governments, 5 of which are in cooperation with the SPD, 3 with the Union, and 2 with both the SPD and the Union. Therefore, in terms of governing experience, the Greens have more extensive and mature cooperation models with the SPD. Furthermore, in May 2016, the SPD won the state election in Rhineland-Palatinate and formed the first state-level "Traffic Light Coalition" with the Greens and FDP. Five years later, the SPD won again, and the state government maintained this "Traffic Light" model. The five-year experience of this model at the state level provided a foundation and confidence for the federal coalition negotiations.
Third is the factor of governing programs. On the German political spectrum, the three parties are not aligned; the distance between the SPD/Greens and the FDP is particularly significant. However, in this election, the campaign programs of all three parties were adjusted toward the center. Scholars have distinguished the major parties' programs along two dimensions: economic policy and social policy. On the "left-right" axis of economic policy, the Greens and SPD are relatively close, both supporting state intervention, while the FDP sits at the far-right end (excluding the AfD), emphasizing market freedom. In the progressivism-vs-traditionalism dichotomy of social policy, the three parties are quite close, all pursuing social change. However, compared to their 2017 programs, while pursuing reform, the SPD and Greens both began to lean slightly more toward market freedom. Simultaneously, the FDP shifted toward supporting state intervention while maintaining its market-liberal base. The convergence in overall direction and proximity in positioning increased the opportunity to form a "Traffic Light Coalition."
Fourth is the factor of voter psychology. According to a report by the German polling agency Infratest Dimap on October 7, 2021, 63% of voters believed SPD candidate Scholz would be a good Chancellor; by contrast, only 14% believed Union candidate Laschet was fit for the office. Regarding future cabinet configurations, the "Traffic Light Coalition" received the highest expectations, with 53% voter support. Most people held a pessimistic view of a "Jamaica Coalition." To respond to voter demands, the Greens and FDP naturally had to factor public opinion into their coalition negotiations.
Fifth is the factor of party intent. The opportunity for the SPD to return as the largest party was hard-won, as 16 years had passed since it last led a government. Consequently, the SPD, which had long been in a subordinate position in Grand Coalitions, particularly cherished this opportunity. As for the Greens, they were naturally more willing to participate in a government led by the SPD, given their shared federal history and ideological proximity compared to other parties. The FDP’s mid-way withdrawal from exploratory talks with the Union after the 2017 election led to a "difficult birth" for the new government, which negatively impacted its image and cast a shadow over relations between those two parties. Therefore, the FDP also leaned toward an alliance with the SPD and was more willing to seek common ground while shelving differences to avoid a repeat of past failures.
Thus, after the election results were released, the Greens first held talks with the FDP, and on October 6, officially announced exploratory talks with the SPD. On October 15, the three parties reached a preliminary agreement. Formal negotiations for the "Traffic Light Coalition" began on October 21. On November 24, the parties announced the contents of the coalition agreement, and negotiations concluded smoothly. Finally, on December 8, SPD candidate Scholz was declared Chancellor, Green leader Habeck became Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action, and Baerbock became Foreign Minister—marking the official debut of the new German government.
IV. The German Greens' China Policy Positions
During this German general election, China became a critical issue of heated debate among all participating parties. The governing coalition of the Greens, SPD, and FDP all expressed concern regarding China, and to varying degrees, criticized Merkel for being "too weak" and prioritizing "economy first." Comparatively, however, the Greens’ positions carry a distinct ideological color and a tougher stance toward China. This is evident in the party’s China policy proposals within its campaign program and its various public statements. We must maintain sufficient vigilance regarding this.
First, regarding the basic tone toward China, the Green Party clearly positions China as a "competitor, partner, and systemic rival" of Germany and Europe. This is the fundamental stance that the Green Party repeatedly clarified and emphasized in its election manifesto and through statements by the party's two co-chairs on various occasions. In its manifesto, the Green Party explicitly stated its pursuit of a "values-based diplomacy" [10] that defends human rights and guarantees peace; in the section on foreign policy, China was listed separately and categorized as a systemic rival. Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party co-chair who assumed the post of Foreign Minister in the new federal government, stated in an interview as a chancellor candidate that Germany must strive for a policy of "dialogue and toughness" toward China. She believes that while it is difficult for Germany to simply sever ties with China, it must stand firm on its own values. In the agreement reached during the three-party coalition talks [11] after the election results, although there was no explicit positioning of China policy, it stated that in the future, they would "engage in multilateral cooperation worldwide, particularly strengthening ties with those countries that share our democratic values." Clearly, emphasizing an alliance based on democratic values has become a consensus among the three parties, and China is an "outsider" [12] situated beyond this alliance.
Second, in terms of economic and trade relations, the German Green Party hopes to continue developing trade ties with China to secure the best market access and competitive environment for domestic investment. Major German political parties, including the Green Party, fully recognize that they must engage in constructive dialogue and seek cooperation with China in economic and trade fields; maintaining good economic relations with China has already become a crucial external condition for Germany’s economic and social development. However, the Green Party unilaterally exaggerates the heterogeneity of China’s values, as well as its influence and unfair competition in fields such as science, technology, and the economy. Baerbock repeatedly stated during the campaign that if the Green Party participated in forming a new government, it would tighten German and European trade policy toward China, emphasizing that trade must be linked to environmental protection and "human rights," even claiming "no business without human rights." Clearly, this will interfere with future Sino-German economic cooperation, obstruct the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between China and the EU, and may even lead to its collapse.
Third, regarding China's internal affairs, the German Green Party adheres to so-called human rights principles, continuously accusing China of "human rights violations," "suppression of freedom of speech," and "forced labor." Additionally, the state of Bavaria, a major source of votes for the Green Party, is the primary base of operations for "East Turkestan" [13] elements within Germany. In the future, the new government involving the Green Party may increase pressure on China regarding issues related to Xinjiang and Tibet.
Finally, regarding climate change and environmental protection, the Green Party hopes to conduct a constructive dialogue with China while emphasizing that this cannot come at the expense of third countries or "human and civil rights." Ecological protection is a very important field in the constructive cooperation between Germany and China. To resolve global issues of concern to the Green Party and its coalition allies, such as climate change and carbon neutrality, China's cooperation is required. This is the fundamental reason why Green Party leaders emphasize that they "cannot cut ties with China." However, while emphasizing "joint efforts," "compliance with sustainable production standards," and "transparency roadmaps," the Green Party also stresses that the goal is to "address China's climate crisis," implying China's international responsibility for environmental protection. At the same time, they do not forget the "human rights principle," demanding that "cooperation with China must never be at the expense of third countries or human and civil rights." Therefore, ecological and climate protection policy can either serve as a new breakthrough for the new German government to initiate Sino-German cooperation or become yet another excuse to exert pressure on China.
V. Conclusion
Although the German Green Party has shed much of the thick idealism of its founding years and gradually moved toward realism, its ideological character remains distinct, and it continues to adhere to traditional values. To a certain extent, this was an important factor that enabled the Green Party to win the election and enter government; it may also become an important driver for adjusting Germany's foreign relations. Therefore, we should have a relatively clear understanding of the impact of the Green Party's return to the federal government and its China policy.
First, we cannot simply judge that the Green Party's rise to power is more conducive to the development of Sino-German and Sino-European relations based on its left-wing character. In fact, in this federal election, almost all major German political parties mentioned China in their election manifestos; by comparison, the Green Party’s manifesto devoted the most space to China policy and maintained the toughest stance. The party unilaterally exaggerates the heterogeneity of China in terms of values and its influence in technology and the economy. This attitude will, to some extent, influence the German public's and other parties' views of China, and may even directly push the German government and the EU to adjust their current China policies toward a tougher stance. This has been confirmed by research reports from various institutes, including the German think tank, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).
Second, a tough stance toward China by the German Green Party does not equate to being pro-American. In fact, the Green Party has repeatedly called for Germany and the EU not to rely excessively on external powers—a term that includes both China and the United States. In the view of Green Party co-leader Robert Habeck, Europe is a socio-ecological market economy, which differs from both China and the US. The difference with China, however, lies not only in policy but also in values, hence the perception of China as a systemic rival. Similarly, there is a distinction in the Green Party's attitude toward China and Russia. Relatively speaking, it is tougher when mentioning Russia, whereas with China, while expressing a tough stance, it also acknowledges the necessity of dialogue and cooperation. Clearly, the goal of the German Green Party is to build a strong European "community of values" capable of effectively resisting crises to reduce dependence on external forces, rather than singling out China.
Finally, the Green Party's tough stance during the campaign does not necessarily correlate with its governing policies after taking power. From its electoral strategy, the emphasis and toughness toward China during the election were largely aimed at winning votes. Once in power, the Green Party must face political realities and a dilemma: on the one hand, based on "principles of values," it must take a tough stance toward China; on the other hand, facing global challenges such as climate change, the pandemic, terrorism, and migration, it must cooperate with China. Moreover, Germany's own economic development is inseparable from China, which has been Germany's most important trading partner for five consecutive years. If the Green Party cannot balance these two aspects, it will encounter what former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called the "limitations of 'moral diplomacy' that simply places values above realistic interests." Furthermore, it is unlikely to provide a way out or a model for divided Western democracies to escape the dilemma of political polarization, as some Western scholars might expect.
In view of this, after the German Green Party participates in government and secures the post of Foreign Minister, the relationship between Germany and China may face adjustment or even restructuring. At the same time, there remains a possibility and space for improvement. This possibility and space stem both from the practical needs of governing and from the consensus between the two countries on relevant concepts, such as sustainable development and the pursuit of peace and non-violence.