Tian Zhengxuan: New Explorations in the French Communist Party's Coalition Strategies Since the Drastic Changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
I. The Trajectory of the PCF’s Exploration of Alliance Concepts and Actions since the Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Since the abrupt changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the French Communist Party (PCF) has gradually innovated its Party theory while undergoing transitions in leadership. In 1994, the PCF held its 28th Congress, where Robert Hue was elected National Secretary and proposed the fundamental tenets of "New Communism." At the 29th Congress in 1996, the theory of "New Communism" was established as the PCF's guiding ideology, subsequently enriched and developed by successive National Secretaries Marie-George Buffet, Pierre Laurent, and Fabien Roussel. Correspondingly, the PCF has pursued new propositions and actions regarding the question of alliances.
(1) The Robert Hue Period: Left-wing Alliances based on "Citizen Intervention" and the "Government of the Plural Left"
The 28th Congress of the PCF adjusted the Party’s alliance policy, shifting "from the long-standing advocacy of a Union of the Left to the implementation of an alliance of left-wing progressive forces based on citizen intervention." The PCF argued that because changes had occurred in the national class structure and the balance of class forces, the form of violent revolution had become obsolete in France. Revolution could only be "peaceful, legal, and incremental," yet this democratic form of revolution "does not belong to the path of reformism"; rather, it "is consistent with the function of violent revolution in that both oppose capitalist rule." Under these new conditions of class struggle, the PCF sought to unite all forces opposed to capitalism to carry out diverse forms of intervention and effective struggle across all fields. This involved both conducting political cooperation with left-wing parties to establish a parliament and government favorable to the working class—thereby creating the conditions for a democratic transition toward socialism—and uniting the broad laboring masses through an alliance of progressive left forces to participate in the struggle to transform political power, strive for rights in all areas, and ultimately realize communist goals.
First, the PCF successfully entered government through the plural left alliance. Prior to the 1997 National Assembly election, the PCF and the French Socialist Party (hereafter "Socialist Party") issued a "Joint Declaration" on issues such as the 35-hour workweek, tax reform, and the cessation of privatization; the Greens and the Citizens' Movement also joined to form a left-wing electoral alliance. Ultimately, this alliance won 320 seats, with the PCF holding 37, becoming a parliamentary majority by a decisive margin. Socialist leader Lionel Jospin included all parties from the electoral alliance in his cabinet, forming the "Government of the Plural Left." Four PCF members joined the government, serving as "Minister of Equipment, Minister of Youth and Sports, and Secretary of State for Tourism." Through this governing cooperation, the PCF proposed the goals of promoting progressive reform policies that aligned with the interests of the laboring masses, strengthening its own political status, and expanding its room for development. Second, the PCF tightened its links with grassroots organizations and supported mass struggles. In 2000, the 30th Congress elected a group of trade union officials and social movement leaders to the Party's executive leadership bodies. The PCF also actively supported the work of the Movement of Young Communists of France, the Union of French Women, the Republican Association of Veterans, and the Union of Retired and Elderly Workers, leading and participating in strikes and demonstrations against dismissal laws, laws restricting foreigners, and the privatization of Renault. Facing increasingly severe environmental issues, the PCF also began advocating for efforts alongside various green movements to address the environmental crisis caused by capitalism. Third, the PCF committed itself to left-wing alliances at the European and international levels. The PCF first became a member of the New European Left Forum, then joined the communist caucus in the European Parliament in 1994, and repeatedly participated in organizing international Marxist academic symposia to promote exchange and cooperation among socialists worldwide.
(2) The Buffet Period: "Focusing on Popular Movements" and Different Attempts at Party Alliances
Facing new problems in the implementation of "New Communism" and the defeat of the Left in the 2002 presidential election, the PCF held its 32nd Congress in 2003. The Congress re-elected Buffet as National Secretary to take full charge of Party work from Robert Hue, developed the theory of "New Communism," and proposed an alliance strategy "centered on popular movements." Though the experience of participating in the "Government of the Plural Left" allowed the PCF to play a certain role in promoting social reform, the overall results were not significant. During its participation in the left-wing government's actions, the PCF was constrained by the Socialist Party's leading position, making it impossible to put its own policy propositions into practice and difficult even to maintain the Party’s autonomy. The PCF's alliance strategy remained trapped within old frameworks, "overly fixing its relationship with the Socialist Party, which hindered the developmental needs of the popular movements driving change and the establishment of new relations with social actors (associations, unions, citizens...)." After a period of reflection, the PCF decided to abandon the "illusion of state-centered social change," opting instead to "let popular movements intervene in inter-party relations" and to "place popular movements first under all circumstances."
To this end, the PCF on one hand opposed the Socialist Party's long-term monopoly on left-wing leadership and actively pursued cooperation with other left parties. In the 2007 National Assembly elections, the PCF won 18 seats (including sympathizers), falling short of the 20 seats required to form a parliamentary group, but ultimately formed a joint group with the Greens. During the 2009 European Parliament elections, the PCF, the Left Party, and "Unitary Left" jointly established the Left Front [1] to oppose the "Europe of the Lisbon Treaty," winning 6.47% of the vote and 5 seats. On the other hand, the PCF persisted in focusing on and responding to mass demands, placing particular emphasis on coordination with social movements. In 2006, the PCF held its 33rd Congress, "holding high the anti-neoliberal banner" and proposing a 2007 election platform that included commitments to economic growth, full employment, strengthening public services, re-nationalizing large enterprises, and implementing tax reform. Buffet and all delegates to the 33rd Congress participated in demonstrations against the "First Employment Contract" (CPE) [2] on the opening day of the congress, which eventually led to the withdrawal of the bill. At the 34th Congress in 2008, Buffet called for the establishment of a "Progressive Front for the Defense of Liberties and Democracy" with broad participation from left-wing political forces, unions, associations, and citizens. Under her leadership, the PCF attempted to bridge the gap with various participants in social movements—such as "Alternative Citoyenne" and the "Association for a Republican Left"—under the label of the "People's and Citizens' Left," promoting cooperation with gender equality movements, green movements, and anti-globalization movements. Furthermore, after years of advocacy and consultation, communist and other left-wing parties from some European countries established a unified party organization in 2004—the Party of the European Left—with the PCF as a founding member, dedicated to advancing the overall union of the European Left and the realization of shared left-wing goals.
(3) The Laurent Period: The Development and Stagnation of the Left Front and the Expansion of European Left Unity
In 2010, the PCF held its 35th Congress, and Laurent succeeded Buffet as the new National Secretary. The 35th Congress pointed out that governments responsible for the 2008 financial crisis were making workers pay for it through austerity plans, causing millions to fall into unemployment, precariousness, and poverty. Capitalism was increasingly unable to meet the challenges of human development, making the communist promise of human liberation more necessary than ever. The PCF aimed to launch a process to establish a "Pact for a People's Alliance" nationwide, inviting Left Front members, union leaders, intellectuals, elected representatives, social movement participants, and all citizens seeking a way out of the crisis to participate through various activities to open up another choice for the 21st century—transcending the capitalist system and its logic to "oppose financial markets and put people first."
Under Laurent’s leadership, the PCF persisted in expanding left-wing alliances and people’s solidarity. First, the PCF continued its joint actions within the Left Front. In the 2010 regional elections and 2011 cantonal elections, the strength of the Left Front increased, encouraging further expansion of its joint actions. In the 2012 presidential election, the PCF supported Left Party leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon as the common candidate for the Left Front. Mélenchon received 11.10% of the valid votes in the first round, ranking fourth; although he failed to enter the final runoff, it was the best performance for a PCF-backed candidate in a presidential election since the 1990s. However, in the subsequent 2012 National Assembly elections, the Left Front received 6.91% and 1.08% in the two rounds respectively, ultimately obtaining only 10 seats, 7 of which went to the PCF—significantly fewer than in the previous parliament. In the subsequent European Parliament elections, the Left Front also failed to make a breakthrough. Meanwhile, divergences among the various parties within the Left Front gradually emerged, leading to conflicts in a series of local and municipal elections between 2014 and 2015. Second, the PCF proposed the formation of new social and political fronts based on evolving conditions. Since 2012, the policies implemented by Socialist President François Hollande severely harmed public interests, and cracks appeared within the Left Front, rendering it "unable to effectively coalesce left-wing forces hoping for change." To "allow the people to regain the initiative," the 37th Congress of the PCF in 2016 proposed the "People's and Citizens' Front" initiative, hoping to unite left-wing and ecological political forces, unions, and social movements to eliminate the dangers of the Right and Far-Right and establish a new majority. Third, the PCF further promoted left-wing alliances at the European level. The Party Constitution adopted at the 36th Congress in 2013 added content regarding solidarity actions at the European and global levels, setting basic standards for regional and international alliances. In December 2010, Laurent was elected Chairman of the Party of the European Left. During his tenure, the Party of the European Left expanded to include parties from 27 European countries, including Northern Europe, and organized movements against the "Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement" (CETA) between Canada and the EU, against the "Troika" regarding Greek debt, in support of a "new organization for the ECB," and in support of "diplomatic initiatives for peace, human rights, and the reception of refugees." He also founded the European Forum in Paris and Marseille in 2015 and 2017, strongly promoting communication and cooperation between the PCF and various European left-wing parties.
(4) The Roussel Period: Continuing to Strive for the Broadest Alliance and "Another Globalization"
The 2017 presidential election shattered France’s traditional political landscape. The Socialist Party and the Republicans, who had alternated in power for years, were eliminated in the first round, and Emmanuel Macron, leader of the newly formed "En Marche!" movement, was ultimately elected President. Macron claimed to be "neither left nor right," attempting to forge a new path for reform. The following year, the PCF held its 38th Congress, and Roussel was elected the new National Secretary. He stated that Macron and his government still had not broken with capitalist autocracy or the control of capital power and could not save the country from crisis—as evidenced by the damage to workers' rights and the intensifying social contradictions. To achieve social goals that "put people first and are not dominated by financial markets," the PCF would continue to strive to "build the broadest alliance, which is the only way forward; no left-wing political force can win alone." The 38th Congress mapped out a new strategy for people’s solidarity and alliance, proposing the establishment of an "active and effective people's and political union." First, the PCF pointed out that the "unity of wage earners is decisive." Although diversity exists among them, they share a common demand for opposition to the rule of financial capital; efforts must be made to unite all wage earners broadly, raise their awareness of necessary changes, and create conditions for the alliance of progressive forces. Second, because Mélenchon established the "La France Insoumise" movement [3], the Left Front moved toward a split, and the PCF returned to a left-wing alliance with the Socialist Party and the Greens in the 2020 municipal elections. In reality, all left-wing parties fell into developmental difficulties after the 2017 election, yet the PCF still hoped to "unite all left-wing political forces, respond to the questions raised in the struggle, and strike at the dominance of capital." Third, regarding situations like the Yellow Vests movement—which "rejected the leadership, organization, and traditional protest structures of unions, parties, and associations"—the PCF rethought its relationship with various social movements, stating: "Without the support of those struggling for specific goals, the PCF’s social alternative will be powerless; conversely, the struggles of social movements cannot achieve lasting victory if they are not linked to a comprehensive alternative. Therefore, it is both necessary and possible for the PCF to establish new relations with social movements."
Furthermore, the PCF continues to pay close attention to developments in the international situation. The PCF maintains that the exploitation and predation of capital in economic, social, and environmental spheres have intensified global injustice and inequality, plunging the world into a profound crisis. One manifestation of this was the global health crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, which was accelerated and deepened by the systemic flaws of capitalism, posing a serious threat to the lives and safety of the people. Another manifestation is the provocation of new conflicts and wars by imperialist forces—with the support of the United States—in violation of the UN Charter and the principles of international law, thereby exacerbating regional tensions. Faced with the crisis of capitalism, imperialist aggression, and their devastating effects, the PCF remains committed to "strengthening the internationalist solidarity and union of progressive forces," promoting "another kind of globalization that prioritizes national and popular sovereignty, workers' rights, social and democratic progress, the transformation of modes of production, and ecological transition."
II. Characteristics of the PCF’s Alliances at Different Levels since the Drastic Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
In response to the evolving situation, the PCF has continually adjusted its proposals for alliances, carrying out a rich variety of collaborative actions at different levels: domestic and international, high-level inter-party cooperation, and grassroots mass solidarity. Indeed, the PCF has a tradition of alliance-building; however, compared to its previous historical experiences, its proposals and actions since the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe exhibit several new shifts and characteristics.
First, the subjects of party alliances have become more diversified. Before the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the PCF engaged in three major instances of party cooperation: the anti-fascist Popular Front established in the 1930s with the Socialist Party and the Radical Party; the tripartite coalition government formed with the Socialist Party and the People's Republican Movement in the early post-WWII period; and the Left Union and coalition governments formed with the Socialist Party and the Radical Party in the 1970s and 1980s. It is evident that the Socialist Party was consistently the primary and habitual choice for the PCF’s inter-party cooperation. Since the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, however, the Socialist Party is no longer the PCF’s inevitable partner. The composition of the PCF’s party alliances has become more pluralistic. This is, on one hand, the result of the PCF reflecting on the lessons of its past cooperation with the Socialist Party and, on the other hand, due to the continuous rise of emerging left-wing political forces in France, such as the influential Greens and the Left Party. In 1984, various ecological groups in France formally established a unified national ecological party organization, "The Greens–Ecologist Confederation–Ecologist Party" (simplified as "The Greens"). By the end of the 1980s, the Greens’ influence had grown significantly, achieving breakthroughs in elections and briefly becoming France's fourth-largest party. Although the Greens claimed a "neither left nor right" stance, their critique of capitalist ills and many of their demands shared common ground with the PCF, providing a foundation and possibility for cooperation. Consequently, the two parties have cooperated in elections, parliament, and at the governmental level. The Left Party (PG) is a far-left party established in 2009 by Jean-Luc Mélenchon, a former Socialist. While still in the Socialist Party, Mélenchon was dedicated to promoting substantive cooperation between the Socialists and the PCF; after the Left Party was founded, the PCF displayed a proactive cooperative attitude, and the two parties eventually facilitated the formation of the Left Front (Front de Gauche). Beyond this, the PCF has also cooperated with numerous other small left-wing parties, such as the Citizen and Republican Movement, "Solidarity Left," and the "Alternative Association for Social and Ecological Alternatives."
Second, it has reaffirmed the central position of mass alliances. The PCF grew and strengthened through solidarity and cooperation with the masses, achieving a series of victories in struggle. Facing the fascist threat in 1935, Maurice Thorez, then General Secretary of the PCF, exerted every effort to bring about the Popular Front and initiate a massive mass movement. While preventing the fascists from taking power in France, this also greatly enhanced the PCF's reputation and influence among the masses. In the early post-WWII period, due to its leadership in the heroic Resistance movement and its outstanding contribution to the liberation of France, the PCF was indisputably the largest party in France in terms of membership, parliamentary seats, and popular influence. However, with the onset of the Cold War and changes in the international communist movement, the PCF's theory and practice also shifted. In the 1970s, the PCF gradually developed the theory of "building socialism in French colors," advocating for a peaceful, democratic, and alliance-based path to socialism. In practice, the PCF also devoted more energy to political cooperation with the Socialist Party and to parliamentary struggle. However, the historical result was not the anticipated seizure of power through a parliamentary majority, but rather the erosion of the PCF's own strength, damage to its image and influence, and alienation from the laboring masses. Consequently, in recent years, the PCF’s alliance slogans—such as "citizen intervention," "centering on the people's movement," a "People’s and Citizens’ Front," and the "new strategy for popular solidarity and union"—all strongly emphasize the power and participation of the laboring masses. They maintain that the broad masses of workers and their struggles to transform society are the PCF’s most powerful support and source of strength.
Third, it has enriched the content and forms of left-wing alliances within Europe and internationally. In 1950, the French government proposed the "Schuman Plan" based on the coal and steel industries of France and Germany; two years later, six countries including France and Germany officially established the Coal and Steel Community, marking the beginning of European integration. The PCF’s stance and views on European integration have undergone a process of change. Due to its close ties with and significant influence from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), the PCF's theoretical policies were highly consistent with the CPSU for a long period. In the confrontational context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union viewed European integration as a conspiracy by monopoly capitalism to unite against the Soviet Union and the socialist camp; thus, the PCF resolutely opposed the Schuman Plan upon its introduction. In the 1960s, the Italian Communist Party took the lead in the process of participating in the European Parliament, while the PCF still insisted on not joining the institutions of the European Community. By the 1970s, as the Soviet Union began economic and trade exchanges with the European Community and the PCF’s own theories changed, the PCF’s stance on European integration gradually shifted from total opposition to conditional participation. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the PCF began to critique the neoliberalism and supranational connotations of European integration more from the standpoint of safeguarding national independence and workers’ interests, demanding the construction of a democratic, peaceful, and social Europe. The PCF has both participated in the struggles and coordination of the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group in the European Parliament and actively promoted the activities of the Party of the European Left to strive for the goals of "changing Europe" and "building a new EU political structure." Looking at a broader geographical scope, since the 1990s, the PCF has also expanded its international alliance actions. By participating in and organizing international conferences and left-wing forums, hosting the Fête de l’Humanité [4], and conducting international solidarity and protests, it has strengthened ties and exchanges with left-wing forces worldwide, striving to "unite and mobilize all forces globally to break the globalization of financial hegemony and build a just world of common development and peace."
Fourth, it has increasingly advocated for the equality and autonomy of alliance subjects, no longer placing special emphasis on leadership over the alliance. In the early period following the victory of WWII, the PCF held a Central Committee plenary session and proposed the organizational merger of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party to establish a single French Workers' Party. It drafted a unified charter based on its own guiding ideology and organizational principles, but this was rejected by the Socialist Party. In the subsequent practice of the Left Union, the PCF explicitly stated that the decisive factor ensuring the smooth development of cooperation was the existence of a strong French Communist Party; only if the Communist Party held leadership over the alliance could the Left Union be prevented from a possible turn to the right and maintain the correct direction of development. Since the end of the 20th century, due to the objective factors of its own declining social presence and influence, the PCF can hardly speak of leadership in its alliances with other domestic left-wing parties. At the same time, out of a rejection of the Soviet model and the "Great-Party Chauvinism" [5] of the CPSU, the PCF began to advocate for alliances that respect pluralism and equality and reject any form of hegemony. In the European left-wing alliance organizations in which the PCF participates, independence and autonomy are also regarded as important principles. The statutes of the Party of the European Left stipulate that member parties and political organizations "remain independent and enjoy autonomy," and within the GUE/NGL, each party delegation "retains its own political sovereignty." "If a delegation does not favor a position supported by the majority of the group, then the delegation is free to vote according to its own position." Regarding solidarity with the masses, the PCF has also abandoned the terminology of a "vanguard party" and advocates for "establishing partnerships in various appropriate forms with all progressive organizations and relevant citizens, respecting the identities, specific goals, and independence of all parties." A representative example is the relationship between the PCF and the Movement of Young Communists of France (MJCF). The MJCF is an independent political organization "initiated by youth, serving youth, and standing on the side of the broad youth." While "pursuing its own goals and independence," it participates in and supports various PCF activities, and the PCF provides assistance for its development; the two "achieve complementarity" in policy and action.
III. The Dual Dilemma Constraining the Effectiveness of the PCF's Alliance Strategy
Since the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the PCF's exploration of alliances has objectively promoted communication and exchange between the PCF and various domestic and international left-wing forces, facilitating cooperation and common struggle in specific actions. Overall, however, due to various internal and external reasons, the PCF's alliance strategy has yet to achieve breakthrough results.
First, the party alliances lack cohesion and stability. The numerous parties in the PCF’s alliances basically all belong to the left; although they share similar ideologies, theoretical tendencies, and goal pursuits, they also have differences, causing the alliances to contain seeds of fragmentation. Domestically, the contradictions between the PCF and the Socialist Party, as well as those within the Left Front, have had a significant impact on its alliance strategy. The French Socialist Party once belonged to a relatively radical wing of the Socialist International; in the 1970s, the PCF’s "socialism in French colors" and the Socialist Party’s "French-style socialism" still shared many similarities in policy proposals. However, since the changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, under the impact of neoliberalism, the crisis of the welfare state, and years of governing, the Socialist Party's theories have become increasingly moderate. During its time in power, it even adopted a series of measures to deregulate, cut public spending, and weaken the protection of labor rights. Consequently, the PCF has leveled much criticism at the Socialist Party, arguing that "under so-called left-wing leadership, it implemented a liberal offensive, sowing seeds of confusion in people's minds." However, the PCF's turn toward alliances with other more radical left-wing parties—namely the practice of the Left Front—has also not been smooth. Besides the PCF and the Left Party, the Left Front included many groups such as the New Anticapitalist Party, ecologists, and feminists; their "histories, political cultures, and stances on important issues, as well as their ways of being rooted in society, all possessed marked differences." Similar situations exist in the alliance of European left-wing parties. The GUE/NGL, in which the PCF participates, has a lower degree of integration compared to other groups in the European Parliament. Although member parties have a high degree of agreement on economic and social issues, they differ on European integration and national sovereignty. Due to differences in historical traditions and cultural backgrounds, the PCF and other members of the Party of the European Left also find it difficult to move in lockstep regarding party organizational building and the understanding of certain historical issues of socialism.
Theoretical divergences and practical conflicts, coupled with a party alliance model that encourages equality, autonomy, and diversity, have rendered the forms of coalition relatively loose and lacking in cohesion. This has led to both insufficient operational capacity and a propensity for fragmentation. For example, disagreements between the French Communist Party (PCF) and the Left Party (PG) [6] regarding the planning of the Left Front (Front de Gauche), Mélenchon’s leadership status, relations with the Socialist Party (PS), and a series of international issues eventually drove the Left Front toward collapse. The role that the European United Left–Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) [7] can play in the European Parliament is also extremely limited, making it difficult to implement the proposition of "building another Europe." Simultaneously, such inter-party friction and the brittleness of these alliances have caused the PCF’s coalition strategy to lack stability. The most obvious manifestation is the repeated cycling of coalition partners: from initial cooperation with the Socialist Party and the Greens, to opposing the Socialist Party’s rightward turn and establishing the Left Front with radical left political forces [8], and finally returning to an alliance with the Socialists and Greens after the rupture of the Left Front. While this "oscillation" between left and center-left has objective causes—such as changing circumstances and irreconcilable inter-party contradictions—it also reflects the defects of the PCF's own wavering theoretical propositions and blurred positioning. Internal factional divisions also persist within the PCF, with different factions holding divergent views on coalition strategy. For instance, the "Orthodox" faction advocates a return to the traditional path and abandoning cooperation with other left-wing parties, while the "Reconstructionists" advocate for properly managing relations with the Socialist Party and uniting with other progressives. After Jean-Luc Mélenchon announced his candidacy for the presidential election in 2016 as the representative of "La France Insoumise" (LFI) [9], the PCF held two internal votes on whether to support him. The first passed a resolution of opposition by a slight majority, while the second decided to support him, also by a slight majority. This illustrates the difficulty of achieving policy unity. In short, if the PCF is to play a greater role domestically, regionally, and internationally through alliances with other parties, it must still overcome numerous difficulties.
Secondly, there is an insufficient level of attraction and mobilization regarding the masses. Since the 1990s, although the PCF has consistently emphasized solidary and uniting the masses—committing itself to strengthening cooperation with various grassroots organizations and social movements—the actual results have not been optimistic. Electoral performance provides a direct reflection of the changing trends in the PCF’s attraction and mobilization power among the masses: from the 10th National Assembly (1993) to the 15th National Assembly (2017) of the Fifth Republic, the number of seats won by the PCF was 24, 35, 21, 15, 7, and 10 respectively. In five presidential elections, except for 2012 and 2017 when it supported Mélenchon and achieved vote shares of 11.10% and 19.58% respectively, the vote share in years where the PCF ran independently never exceeded 10%, at times even hovering around 1%. Regarding European Parliament elections, the PCF held 7 and 6 independent seats in 1994 and 1999, but only 2 seats in 2004. In 2009 and 2014, the PCF ran as part of the Left Front and won 4 seats each time, but in 2019, running independently again, it failed to secure any seats. Furthermore, the PCF has lost many municipalities in local elections where it had governed for many years. It is evident that the mass support and influence of the PCF are in continuous decline, and its political status is being increasingly marginalized. Meanwhile, the formal links between the PCF and the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) [10] are also weakening. The PCF gained leadership of the CGT in 1947 and maintained close cooperation with it, but since the end of the 20th century, its influence over the CGT has continued to wane; in 1997, the CGT produced its first General Secretary who did not hold a position within the PCF leadership. Additionally, as a country with a long tradition of mass struggle, France has seen a series of "new social movements" in recent years, such as "Nuit debout" [11] and the "Yellow Vests movement." The PCF has shown clear interest in these movements and expressed the necessity and will to strengthen ties with them, but the overall level of coordination between the two remains low.
A variety of interacting factors, including changes in French social structure and the political environment alongside the PCF’s own issues, have collectively hindered the effectiveness of the PCF in uniting the masses. First, the development of science, technology, and the socio-economy has led to changes in the social class structure. Specifically, the contraction of the primary and secondary sectors and the prosperity of the tertiary sector in France since the mid-to-late 20th century have brought about the following results: (1) The traditional industrial working class has shrunk, weakening the PCF's most core and fundamental mass base. (2) The middle strata have risen and expanded; their demands have shifted due to the improvement of working and living conditions brought by rapid economic development. More attention is paid to blurred class identities and non-material issues, while the PCF’s propositions—demanding changes to the ownership of the means of production and the nature of state power—have gradually lost appeal for them. (3) The differentiation and diversification of the social structure have made the landscape of French mass struggle increasingly complex. The subsequent emergence of various new political groups, grassroots organizations, and social movements means that laborers now possess more diverse ways to express their demands beyond relying on the PCF as a traditional working-class party. Secondly, because the various ruling parties in France have become increasingly helpless in the face of social problems and contradictions in recent years, the French public has displayed growing skepticism and apathy toward party politics. Some participants in social movements "refuse to associate with traditional political actors they believe are unable to defend the values of liberal democracy or respond to changes in international financial markets," creating a serious obstacle to the PCF’s efforts to unite the masses. Thirdly, to adapt to changing circumstances and expand its mass base, the PCF has continually monitored and absorbed a large number of new social issues, constantly adjusting its theory. However, overly complex and fragmented policy propositions have weakened the PCF's own distinct characteristics, making it hard to distinguish from other left-wing parties or even some right-wing parties. Consequently, this has led to the loss of traditional supporters while failing to sufficiently attract other citizens. Furthermore, although the PCF states that "while elections are important, they are only one part of the Communist Party’s revolutionary activities" and that the goal is to "unite the struggle against domination to strive for common liberation," in practice, the emphasis on mass coalitions often exists only as a reflexive response to setbacks in elections or governance. The effectiveness of mass coalitions also struggles to escape the negative influence generated by integration into the existing political system. In practice, the PCF has yet to explore an effective method for balancing struggles inside and outside parliament.
IV. Conclusion
Although the PCF’s exploration of alliances has faced numerous dilemmas since the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, alliance will remain an important strategy in the PCF’s future planning. After all, in the face of the powerful offensive of French domestic and international capital, it is difficult to develop or exert influence through "lone-wolf" tactics or isolation. The PCF’s practice over many years also profoundly demonstrates that alliance is a systematic strategy, the effectiveness of which depends on the synergy between the strengthening of the Party’s own building [12] and scientific, rational alliance policies. First, it is necessary to strive for maximum effectiveness in alliances while maintaining strategic positioning. Theoretical innovation of the Party cannot simply and mechanically absorb various emerging social issues just to attract the masses; more importantly, it should use the standpoint and method of scientific socialism to analyze and clarify the inherent nature and connections of various specific problems, thus adhering to the principle of upholding the fundamentals and breaking new ground. In the negotiation and implementation of specific alliance plans, the relationship between adhering to principles and making appropriate compromises must also be handled well. One must be vigilant against tendencies that deviate from Marxism as the guiding ideology, which might turn specific actions under the alliance framework into part of the capitalist ruling policy, thereby harming the long-term goal of socialism. Secondly, unity is the essence of an alliance. Although an alliance manifests as a form of external work, its actual effect reflects the Party's own development. A party that is theoretically scientific and organized in an orderly fashion is an essential prerequisite and condition for the success of an alliance. Internal Party unity must be strengthened to avoid "oscillations" in theory and policy, providing continuous and stable support for alliance work. At the same time, one should strive for all parties in the alliance to act in unison as much as possible on the basis of seeking common ground while reserving differences. While respecting equality and encouraging the expression of diverse opinions is very important, if this results in a loss of cohesion, it deviates from the original intent and purpose of the alliance. Finally, the support of the masses is the key to the success of an alliance. In countries with developed electoral politics and a long history of bourgeois rule, it is essential for the Communist Party to focus on both cooperation with other left-wing parties in parliament and actively striving for mass unity outside of parliament, fully exerting the synergy of united struggle both within and without. Regardless of whether the action is within parliament or the struggle is outside it, the most fundamental task is to strive for and protect the rights and interests of the laborers, and to establish a flesh-and-blood bond of shared destiny [13] and a deep friendship of common struggle with the masses.