Zhang Xiong and Fu Dongmei: A Historical Inquiry into the Logical Presuppositions of Western Modernity
"The Scottish Enlightenment 'invented' the modern world"—this perspective by Arthur Herman opens a new path for our understanding of modernity and the critique of political economy. He points out that the Scottish Enlightenment not only created the concept of modernity but also drafted a new blueprint of civilization for humanity. Scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment forged an innovative link between classical values and practical needs, allowing freedom and democracy to radiate new vitality within civil society. Consequently, the relationship between civil society and the state became the axis of the logic of Western modernity. The free market dogmas of classical political economy and the principles of individual capital dynamics further substantialized the logical presuppositions of Western modernity, greatly elevating the modern significance of civil society. Western modernity created a rich material civilization, advanced urban and industrial civilizations, and more; however, it also led to imbalanced phenomena such as the antagonism between wealth and poverty and the coexistence of material abundance with spiritual deprivation. In particular, it caused the "total loss" [1] of the proletariat, which further demonstrates that the historical unfolding of the logic of Western modernity is accompanied by a crisis of legitimacy. Marx’s critique of political economy was initiated precisely within the dialectical movement of the logic and history of Western modernity; the Scottish Enlightenment, Rousseau, and Hegel all exerted a key influence on the final formation of the theoretical system of Marx’s critique of political economy.
I. The Scottish Enlightenment and the Logical Presuppositions of Western Modernity
The Scottish Enlightenment refers to a movement of intellectual contention regarding the modes of modern civilization sparked by a group of intellectuals active in the Scottish region during the 18th century, with principal representatives including Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, Adam Ferguson, and Adam Smith. Tracing it back to its roots, the 18th-century Scottish Enlightenment maintained a relationship of inheritance, critique, and development with the 17th-century English Enlightenment regarding core ideas, being closely linked in particular to the thoughts of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. The difference between the two lies in the fact that the latter prioritized the state and tended to reflect on the construction of modern civilization from a political dimension, while the former focused on civil society and emphasized the construction of a modern civilizational mode from an economic dimension. These two successive Enlightenment movements within Britain precisely manifested the gradual unfolding and deepening of the Western investigation of modern civilization. The shift of the focus of inquiry from the political state to the economic society meant that the secular and economic characteristics of modern civilization became increasingly prominent, and scholars' reflections on practical problems gradually moved from their forms of appearance toward their essential determinations. This article attempts to analyze the historical significance of the Scottish Enlightenment in modern civilization through three logical presuppositions of Western modernity.
(1) Logical Presupposition I: "Civil Society" is the form of the economic community of the future civilized society
Ferguson was the first to propose the concept of "civil society" in the modern sense, with "freedom" and "democracy" serving as the value supports of his ideal society. What is true freedom? In the view of Hume and Smith, freedom consists of people breaking away from relations of servitude, pursuing their own interests in their own way, and having the rights of owners guaranteed by equal laws. Ferguson also acknowledged that the protection of civil rights by law is an embodiment of freedom and that the elimination of servitude is a positive aspect of modern liberty. However, he believed that classical liberty—represented by Sparta and Rome—should also have a place in modern society, regarding it as the "true value of liberty." Citizens focused exclusively on individual interests find it difficult to maintain public liberty within their inherent disposition; passive compliance with rules and political apathy inevitably lead to the loss of public spirit, and specialized administrative agencies instead become breeding grounds for despotism and evil. Ferguson pointed out that a nation busy with private affairs and devoid of public spirit is a "nation possessing valueless liberty." To this end, his conception of civil society implied the following three principles: first, the legal guarantee of citizens' property rights and rights to liberty is indispensable; second, the modern civic lifestyle paradigm centered on economic attributes is an important practical arena for the realization of the spirit of freedom and democracy; third, participating in and discussing state affairs and cultivating public spirit are indispensable parts of modern liberty. Ferguson’s "civil society" is of key significance in linking the past with the future and in the cognitive transition from tradition to modernity. In terms of theoretical origins, he both valued the orthodoxy [2] of classical political philosophy and emphasized the secular foundation and claims of rights of modern political philosophy, truly initiating the modern logic of civil society.
Smith, for his part, described modern civilized society as a form of economic community—namely, "commercial society"—for the first time. In Smith’s view, modern civil society is essentially a large market with economic attributes in which man is a completely free subject; yet, due to the refinement of the division of labor, everyone must rely on exchange to live. By exercising their own talents, everyone produces various different goods, "forming a common resource, from which each individual can purchase at will the goods produced by others that they need." Everyone has needs and the capacity to provide utility to others; economic activity becomes increasingly independent, and economic logic dominates social logic. In Smith’s view, civil society is more like a community of interests with "exchange" as the bond; individuals remain separated even within the interactions of mutual need and satisfaction. Separated individuals take the pursuit of self-interest as their starting point, but from an overall perspective, free competition promotes the general interest of society. "Greed, and the war between the greedy, namely competition, are the only wheels which the political economist sets in motion." [3] Later, through the critique of political economy, Marx directly identified the two pillars of civil society’s operation: desire is the fundamental driver for the development of Western modernity, and free competition is the vital law of modern society.
(2) Logical Presupposition II: State governance is the modern art of political philosophy
Regarding the core force of governance for the future civilized society, the views of Scottish Enlightenment scholars (especially Hutcheson) diverged from those of mainstream British thinkers (such as Hobbes and Locke). Historically, the debates and critiques concerning the boundaries of modern state power have always been inseparable from the development of civil society. Since the Renaissance, Niccolò Machiavelli "reduced moral and political questions to technical ones," initiating modern political science. Not only was political rule viewed as a technique, but even the state was seen as an artifact [4]; by peering into its internal textures, one could master its ways. Hobbes is a typical representative of this. Grounded in human nature, he deduced natural law and natural rights from human passions, explaining the necessity of constructing the state from natural human character. Fear, desire, and hope lead people to use their reason to discover the laws of nature—but can the self-preservation of man be achieved by the laws of nature alone? Hobbes clearly did not think so. He pointed out that the coordination among animals is based on instinct and is natural, whereas human agreements are based on artificial covenants; yet desire, vanity, and the like mean that humans can tear up or violate covenants at any time. Therefore, beyond the covenant, humans need something else to ensure the agreement is fulfilled: "this thing is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit," namely, the Leviathan. Whether it be the legitimacy of "bodily liberty" or the legitimacy of comfortable self-preservation, Hobbes tended to believe that human nature requires the spur of the absolute power of the state, the artificial construction of moral concepts, and that the state always occupies the primary position.
Contrary to Hobbes, Hutcheson—the father of the Scottish Enlightenment—explicitly proposed that humans have an innate moral sense, reflecting the benevolent nature of man, which is the sole source of moral sentiments. Humans have an innate inclination to do good and will naturally feel joy at the happiness of others or society as a whole, and feel pity and sympathy for the suffering of others; this moral intuition is an instinct. It is the wondrous determination of human nature that drives us spontaneously to seek social life; this social life is the true nature in the sense of instinctive sensation. Therefore, civil society is a product of instinct and is primary; humans can rely on internal moral forces to achieve social regulation. Conversely, "the necessity of state power certainly comes either from the defects of people or from their depravity." Human malice is not a direct existence but is often triggered by ignorance or contingency; hence, the state can only be considered an existence in the secondary sense. Although humans are not absolutely wise or kind, and cannot see everything clearly or reach a consensus on the appropriate way to promote the general welfare, people naturally trust spiritual qualities such as courage, wisdom, benevolence, justice, and public-spiritedness, voluntarily bestowing the power to manage common social affairs upon those who possess these qualities.
Human nature is the premise and foundation for understanding Western modern civilization. Any answer to the question of the good or evil of human nature points to the core logic of Western modernity—civil society and the state. Of course, the discussion concerning the relationship between civil society and the state is also the most profound answer to the question of human nature. Whether it was Hutcheson’s expectation of relying on moral force to construct modern civilization, or the desire of Hume and Smith to use the power of the state to realize constraints on human nature to establish modern society, the Scottish Enlightenment provided answers different from those of Hobbes and Locke. Their characteristic feature lay in granting modern civil society sufficient space for development, thereby allowing the relationship between modern civil society and the state to exhibit new characteristics of the times. We can see from the developmental process of Western modernity that "Ferguson’s concept of 'civil society' and Hobbes’s concept of the 'state' constitute the two sensitive academic nerves for the development of Western modernity since the early modern period, and are also the classic sources of propositions for the critique of political economy."
(3) Logical Presupposition III: Sympathy or pity is the psychological stabilizer for resolving the contradiction between wealth and poverty
Desire is the source of power for the modern economic community, and the self-interested nature of man inevitably intensifies the state of competition; market competition promotes the social division of labor and the circulation of factors, where people "serve each other" with different talents and resources. The poor rely on selling their labor power to maintain survival, while the rich obtain high profits through capital, but this inevitably leads to the polarization of social wealth. How can the self-interested heart be kept from threatening the moral order? How can the potential threat brought by polarization be mitigated to ensure the rich enjoy their lives in peace? To this end, they regarded sympathy or pity as another foundation of human nature for regulating relationships between people and ensuring the harmonious operation of civil society. "Desire drives the world; sympathy regulates wealth and poverty" became an important model for the development of Western modernity and for mitigating its internal contradictions.
Hutcheson, Rousseau, and Smith regarded sympathy or pity as human nature, and even proponents of the theory of the evil of human nature, such as Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville, were deeply convinced of this. In Leviathan, Hobbes expressed human nature thus: "Grief for the calamity of another is pity; and ariseth from the imagination that the like calamity may befall himself; and therefore is called also compassion, and in the phrase of the present time a fellow-feeling." Mandeville also admitted that sympathy or pity is human nature, manifesting as "feeling the misfortunes and disasters of others as if they were one's own, grieving and pitying them." In their view, sympathy or pity is based on an imagined fellow-feeling; although it is not a virtue in itself, it can urge humans to take certain "benevolent actions." Compared to the former, scholars of the Scottish Enlightenment magnified the active role of sympathy or pity, believing that "innate benevolence is sympathy," a primordial capacity bestowed upon man by God. Humans have a nature for pity or sympathy: "social natures which make him concern'd in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him"; we help others not because humans have "no other choice," but because helping others fills our hearts with peace and satisfaction. Hutcheson also pointed out that even if interest (or benefit) may prompt people to do certain cruel things or overcome pity, it rarely makes pity disappear entirely. When desire or sudden fits of passion subside, pity often returns. Thus, Hutcheson marveled: "How wonderfully the constitution of human nature is suited to produce sympathy"; it also provides the possibility of moral order for a brutally competitive society. The presupposition of the human nature of sympathy or pity provided a theoretical possibility for the moral construction of civil society and provided a mitigation channel for the antagonism between wealth and poverty induced by market competition.
Hume and Smith endeavored to build a solid bridge between the theory of sympathetic human nature and social moral norms. They understood sympathy on two levels: first, as an innate emotion akin to "pity" or "compassion," used to denote a shared feeling for the sorrow of others; second, as a psychological mechanism—an "empathy" that enables us to share in the joy or pain of every person close to us. Whether as pity or empathy, it is generated through the aid of imagination, based on the relationships of resemblance and proximity between individuals. Hume pointed out that utility is the only real bridge between sympathy and morality. Sympathy functions only when one enters into relations with others and where utility is closely concerned; thus, beneficial actions receive approval, while actions detrimental to the public good meet with opposition. Utility is the foundation of sympathy and, by extension, the foundation of morality.
Smith’s reflections on the relationship between sympathy and the functioning of society were even more profound. On one hand, sympathy is the basis for the exchange of wealth and the realization of interests. Only when the "butcher" or the "baker" puts himself in the consumer's shoes can he truly realize his self-interest and achieve the exchange of wealth. On the other hand, sympathy is the human foundation for the re-transfer of wealth and the reshaping of socio-psychological balance. Departing from Hume’s utility principle, Smith took "the sympathy of the spectator, or a correspondent affection" as the natural and fundamental measure for judging propriety; the sense of propriety is the basis of moral identity. The self-control required by the sense of propriety is a virtue Smith highly endorsed, and this self-control is manifested not only in emotions but also as a requirement for daily conduct. "Grief and resentment... require the healing consolation of sympathy." "The relief and consolation of human misery depend entirely upon our compassion for the latter [the poor, the miserable, and the unfortunate—Author's note]." "And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature."
Based on sympathy, Smith pointed out that the self-control and benevolence of the wealthy constitute an important socio-psychological mechanism for moving toward equality and harmony between people, making social distribution more fair and rational through the re-transfer of wealth. Thus, self-interest and sympathy together constitute a rich, multi-layered presupposition of human nature; desire and competition, alongside self-control and benevolence, constitute the dialectical movement of civil society. Here, there is both the vitality of competition and the foundation for harmony, maintained in a dynamic equilibrium driven by multiple motives. However, viewed from the developmental trajectory of Western modernity, sympathy or pity did not fundamentally resolve the internal contradictions of capitalist society: the polarization between rich and poor, the dominance of capital, class antagonism, and the loss of the human essence all became objects of reflection in Marx’s critique of political economy.
II. The Interpretation of the Logic of Western Modernity by British Classical Political Economy
If the Scottish Enlightenment proposed the logical presuppositions of Western modernity, then British classical political economy was the first theoretical system to deduce, interpret, and flesh out that logic. There is an overlap in core figures and core concepts between the Scottish Enlightenment and the School of Classical Political Economy; for example, Smith was both a major figure of the Scottish Enlightenment and the founder of classical political economy. Given the economic attributes of modern civilization, the contribution of classical political economy to the development of Western modernity must be listed separately for investigation.
(1) Classical political economy interpreted the key principles in the development of Western modernity
Hegel once regarded political economy as a science that elucidates the internal relations and movements of modern civil society. The greatest contribution of British classical political economy was to redefine civil society and re-demarcate the relationship between the modern state and civil society. It not only expanded the understanding of civil society but also provided a detailed interpretation of four major principles in the development of Western modernity.
First, "every man is a merchant, and society is a market." The civil society described by Smith was not a self-sufficient society, but one mediated by money and taking the form of exchange, where every individual must exchange the surplus of their own labor, which they cannot consume, for the surplus of others' labor which they need. "Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial society." Therefore, in the logic of classical political economy, civil society is a market-oriented society where everyone needs to maintain their existence and development through exchange—even beggars are no exception. "Merchant" and "market" were Smith’s redefinitions of the modern "individual" and "society"; here, the common relationship with objects becomes the primary issue. Under this principle, commodity fetishism, money fetishism, and capital fetishism are logical necessities.
Second, the principle of economic freedom. Classical political economy advocated a system of natural liberty—that is, "the realization of man's natural capacity to control his own life"—which includes individual freedom and economic freedom. "When the rights to freedom of trade and marriage, etc., are violated, the person's freedom of action and thought is violated." The ideal state envisioned by classical political economy is a perfectly competitive market: "The establishment of perfect justice, perfect liberty, and perfect equality is the simplest and most effective secret for achieving the highest degree of prosperity." Smith pointed out that the desire to better one's condition is a human instinct and "the principle from which public and national, as well as private opulence is originally derived." Free competition and full exchange are the prerequisites for the wealth of nations and the prosperity of the people. Conversely, any practice of using "political power" or other external forces to expand or restrict specific industries runs contrary to natural tendencies. Thus, the most obvious and simple system for maintaining natural liberty should be the abolition of all systems of preference or restraint, allowing "the individual to enjoy the freedom to look after himself and participate in the harmonious order of free trade." History, however, has repeatedly shown that a state of laissez-faire competition only leads to the spread of Darwinian "law of the jungle" [5] in human society, turning the free-market battlefield into a zero-sum game.
Third, the allocation of resources by the market in modern civil society. Modern civil society centers on the free market; the effective allocation of social resources depends entirely on the market. The greatest contribution of the system of classical political economy was to abstract the complex operation of society into simple market principles, such as the principles of the division of labor, exchange, competition, distribution, and the rule of law. Among these, free competition and equal exchange are the dominant principles; the division of labor is both a means and an internal necessity of social development; the principles of just distribution and the rule of law are the recognition and protection of the rights of market subjects to ensure the orderly operation of the market. Consequently, the modern market is not only a stage for commodity transactions but also possesses the capacity to organize social activity, making production, exchange, distribution, and consumption into a complete system. Correspondingly, the market subject is a conscious being driven by desire, emphasizing rational calculation; wealth becomes the primary carrier of modern power. It is foreseeable that such a society would inevitably take material wealth as its sole objective and emphasize the positive role of productive forces, while failing to give sufficient attention to the internal antagonism of the relations of production.
Fourth, the "night-watchman" function of the government. Classical political economy was rooted in the free individual and identified with the competition of interests and spontaneous harmony within the market system, yet it did not thereby deny the necessity of coercive power. Coercive power is intended to protect private property rights and the right to free trade; therefore, government power must be restricted and reduced to a minimum—the government is the "night-watchman" of the market. As Smith pointed out, the establishment of modern government is primarily to ensure the security of property—that is, "to protect the rich against the poor, or those who have some property against those who have none at all." Thus, the free market based on the individual capital dynamic is essentially an arena for capitalists to "race and fence in land" (pǎomǎ quāndì) [6], and the supervision of the state and law is essentially a guarantee of the interests of the capitalist. For those who possess great property, "without the assistance of the civil magistrate... he could not even sleep a single night in safety." Smith’s proposition of the government as a "night-watchman" both granted civil society full freedom of competition and spoke to the essential relationship between the modern Western state and civil society. Through his critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, Marx broke through the mist of the "rational state" to re-reveal this relationship: the political state is merely the form of manifestation of civil society.
(2) Classical political economy interpreted the principles of individual capital dynamics in the development of Western modernity
The "aim and object" of classical political economy is "to enrich both the people and the sovereign." What is wealth? How is social abundance achieved? These are precisely the questions it sought to discuss. Classical political economy sublated the Mercantilist claim that "wealth is equivalent to money or gold and silver," pointing out instead that real wealth "consists in the consumable goods annually reproduced by the labor of the society," while money is merely the medium and measure of transaction. Similarly, rewarding exports and obstructing imports are not the means of enriching a nation; "perfect liberty" is the "only effective expedient" for increasing national wealth "to the highest degree." Classical political economy identified "manufacturing" as the primary vehicle for the increase of wealth. Compared to agriculture, urban industries such as manufacturing and commerce are not only less restricted by natural conditions like seasons, climate, and soil, but manufactured goods are often small in volume, high in value, and relatively inexpensive to transport. Manufacturing has the potential to broaden the scope of the market and enhance social productive forces: "the labor of the artificer and manufacturer can be more finely divided than that of the farmer and rural laborer," thereby elevating the productivity of useful labor to a much higher degree.
Classical political economy allowed individualism to take deep root in people's hearts, with the "rational economic man" presupposition being its typical manifestation. In manufacturing, individuals rely more on their own labor to produce and enjoy corresponding means of subsistence; thus, modern industry makes individuals more self-reliant and heightens the demand for freedom and order. Based on the modern division of labor, everyone can hone and exert their talents or abilities in their respective trades to improve their condition, and such improvement is boundless. "The cheerful hope of bettering their condition, and of ending their days in ease and plenty, animates them to the utmost exertion." Based on this understanding of human nature, classical political economy tended to analyze the causes of the increase in national wealth from the perspective of individual dynamics (desire and interest). Smith noted that, based on self-interest, "every individual is continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command." Applying capital to support a particular industry and striving to make the product of that industry of the greatest value is the only way to realize the capital owner’s sole aim—"to earn a profit." Therefore, as long as the laws of justice are not violated, everyone should have perfect freedom to pursue their own interests in their own way and to compete with their labor and capital against any other person or class. "Competition and emulation often prompt the greatest exertions"; the progress of science and technology and the widespread use of machinery are all results of individual capital chasing the maximization of profit. The principle of individual capital dynamics became the comprehensive logic followed by modern Western society to enhance productive forces and achieve the "wealth of the nation and the prosperity of its people."
In the view of classical political economy, the progress of productive forces and the continuous increase in national wealth meant the society was in a state of advancement, and the people (including the poor laborers) were at their most happy and comfortable. The increase in national wealth would inevitably improve the general condition of the lowest ranks of the people. "No society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the far greater part of the members are poor and miserable," let alone be a just society. Although human nature is selfish and greedy, acting only for its own convenience, the wealthy, while employing hundreds or thousands of people to satisfy their own boundless desires, must inevitably share the fruits of improvement with the poor, enabling laborers to obtain the corresponding necessities of life. With the increase in national wealth, the demand for laborers must also increase, thereby allowing the wages of laborers to rise. The greatest advantage of modern civilization lies in the full exertion of individual potential to provide a comfortable and convenient life for humanity. Although the economic logic of rational self-interest is conducive to significantly enhancing social productive forces and realizing the accumulation of material wealth, this logic only highlights individuality while ignoring the social essence of the individual; it focuses only on the principle of historical particularity while ignoring the principle of historical universality. These became the primary contents of the critique of modernity later launched by Hegel and Marx.
III. Rousseau’s Doubts and Anxieties Regarding the Logic of Western Modernity
Unlike the Scottish Enlightenment scholars who took human nature as their theoretical foundation, their contemporary Rousseau questioned what constitutes true human nature from the dimension of historical philosophy, expressing anxiety over the logic of Western modernity: historicization—which is to say, civilization—is also the process of human alienation. Unlike the Scottish Enlightenment scholars who envisioned human history as a process of continuous progress, Rousseau saw the two-sided nature and internal contradictions inherent in the development of human history: humanity is progressing and regressing at the same time. Rousseau’s reflections on modernity are characterized by a reflexive quality; he demonstrated his doubts about the logic of Western modernity through three important propositions.
(1) Modernity is a multi-dimensional historical logic, not a mono-dimensional linear logic
Rousseau deeply embedded his historical dialectics within his inquiry into the progress of human civilization. The era in which Rousseau lived was one of rapid scientific development in Europe, where the prosperity of the sciences and arts was regarded as a vital hallmark of modern civilization. From Bacon onward, through Newton, Locke, Leibniz, and the Encyclopedists, great hopes were pinned on science; the development of industry, markets, and cities existed in a virtuous cycle with science and technology. From the perspective of "science and technology—productive forces—wealth," modernity is indeed positive and progressive. However, Rousseau proposed that we should instead scrutinize modernity through the lens of historical diversity and its pluralistic developmental outcomes. He simplified the criterion for whether civilization progresses into an easily comparable balance sheet of income and expenditure, emphasizing that beyond liberty and ownership (wealth), one must value the moral balance sheet: "we must add to the gains of the social state moral liberty." Reflecting on the gains and losses of modernity from the dimension of human history reveals human degradation; so-called civilization and progress have forced humanity to pay a heavy moral price. Rousseau pointed out: "As human knowledge increases, the human heart becomes more sinister; as the sciences and arts flourish, society becomes increasingly characterized by luxury, indulging in the enjoyment of life and the pursuit of wealth." Civilization is internal to the person, not external to knowledge or technology, and certainly not external to wealth. However, modern civilization has not only obscured human nature but has perturbed humanity’s efforts at self-cognition through complex appearances, forms, and rational instruments.
(2) A dialectical view of the "dynamism" of modernity
"Happiness is a continual progress of the desire, from one object to another." Wealth and the capacity to acquire it provide individuals with feelings of pleasure or pride. Classical political economy, based on a human nature that seeks pleasure and avoids pain, transformed desire into the fundamental power source of market operations. Yet Rousseau, from the dimension of human history, pointed out that desire is both the driver of modernity and the root of human alienation. On one hand, the degree of development in science and reason and the degree of accumulated social wealth are directly related to the cultivation of desire. It is precisely because we hope for enjoyment that we have the motivation to pursue knowledge. When human desires exceed the boundaries of instinct, the seeds of abstract thought emerge; certain concepts, modes of thinking, and ideas begin to form and shape the framework of civilization. On the other hand, human fallibility and regression both stem from desire. In Rousseau’s view, the pursuit of "perfectibility" is both a human desire and human nature; in the process of self-perfection, humanity constantly gains and constantly loses. For example, humans learned to use tools, but their survival instincts degenerated; humans learned to wear clothes for warmth or prepare cooked food, but they became physically weaker; humans learned to fully exercise the initiative of freedom, but this further stimulated infinite cravings and luxuries. "It was precisely the enjoyment of comfort that became the specific cause making his degradation more apparent"; it is the cultivation, satisfaction, and re-satisfaction of desire that traps humanity in a frenzied "game of desire," causing the loss of the ability to contemplate true human value and elevate morality. Compared to his contemporaries, Rousseau focused more on the way of human existence and the state of the spirit. While others were intoxicated by external pursuits, Rousseau launched an internal inquiry and proposed the earliest ideas of alienation. According to this line of thought, the Western logic of modernity constructed by the Scottish Enlightenment is both a logic of progress in human civilization and a logic of accelerated human alienation. Even today, Rousseau’s questions and anxieties regarding modernity remain extremely valuable. Western modernity leads to the "sanctification of external standards" (such as commodity fetishism), the result of which is inevitably the obscuring or usurping of true human needs.
(3) The essence of modernity is antinomy
Whether it is "civilization is alienation" or "man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains," Rousseau was consistently revealing the internal paradoxes of modernity. Especially in the 18th century, when markets were becoming pervasive, wealth was rapidly accumulating, and science and technology were flourishing—while the British sang praises for the maturation of modernity and the French and Germans committed themselves to the Enlightenment for its development—Rousseau’s sober recognition of modern civilization was precious. From the perspective of human history, natural freedom and human reason are a zero-sum game; the "chains" of freedom are essentially the constantly growing reason of humanity. In modern society, these chains manifest as institutions and laws, which are the externalization of human reason. Because of the concepts of private property, private ownership, and private institutions, humanity has moved step-by-step toward inequality; wealth has gradually become the primary standard for determining equality, which is also the most thorough state of human corruption and degradation. The increase in social wealth is always based on the exploitation and enslavement of the majority by a small number of rich people. Not only are the exploited and enslaved in darkness and poverty, but even the wealthy few are in a more severe state of slavery due to the impulse of their lusts. "He who believes himself the master of others does not escape being more of a slave than they." "Only moral liberty makes man truly master of himself." In Rousseau’s view, civilization is the process of humanity moving toward inequality; the logic of Western modernity runs diametrically opposed [7] to true freedom.
If Rousseau’s anxieties remained at the logical level, Jean Sismondi’s questioning of Western modernity became concrete. Through his critique of classical political economy, he proved the internal contradictions of the Western logic of modernity. Sismondi accused classical political economy of "seeing things but not people" and posed an ultimate inquiry: What is the essence of wealth? What is the purpose of production? Is the essence of wealth to satisfy people’s living needs or to pursue the valorization of capital? Is production aimed at the human being, or is it production for production’s sake? In Sismondi’s view, the Western logic of modernity, enriched by classical political economy, eventually moved toward production for production’s sake, purely pursuing numerical increases in wealth while severing the relationship between production and consumption, thereby causing social polarization, economic crises, and class antagonism. Fundamentally, the series of crises in modern Western society are the concrete externalizations of the internal paradoxes within its logic of modernity.
IV. Hegel’s Reflection on Modernity and the Origin of Marx’s Movement toward a Critique of Political Economy
Rousseau’s historico-philosophical scrutiny of modern civilization was incorporated by Hegel into the developmental logic of the "Absolute Spirit," which not only dissolved the pessimistic color of Rousseau’s thought but also emphasized the unity of historical particularity and universality. Although Hegel maintained an objective idealist stance, he highly abstracted the problem of Western modernity into the problem of the relationship between civil society and the state, recognizing that the paradox of modernity is rooted in the contradiction between the two. This reflects the profundity of the German understanding of Western modernity. Simultaneously, in 19th-century Western European society, the triple crises—between man and nature, man and man, and man and society—were increasingly intensifying. It was under the dual influence of German Classical Philosophy and the crisis of European modernity that Marx’s critique of political economy was generated.
(1) The Western logic of modernity within the horizon of Hegel’s philosophy of history
Hegel understood the paradox of Western modernity as the separation and opposition between civil society and the state—"this is the more profound aspect of his work"—but his greatest error lay in placing the logic of modernity within the total historical process of the spirit’s self-movement and growth. Hegel believed that civil society and the state are based on completely different principles: the principle of particularity and the principle of universality. The internal necessity of particularity tending toward universality is the vital basis for the state's sublation of civil society; this is a logical necessity. Individuals recognize this necessity through civil society and consciously desire the universal, realizing the ethical identity of particularity and universality—this is the actualization of freedom. Therefore, in Hegel’s view, the separation of the state and civil society is the inevitable result of the self-movement of the Idea, and it is logically ordained that the state determines civil society.
Civil society is both the stage of the externalization and alienation of the spirit’s self-movement and the realm based on the purpose of particularity, mediated by the form of universality. From the perspective of the idealist conception of history, civil society belongs to the stage of "Objective Spirit" in Hegel’s system of the philosophy of spirit; it is a vital stage where individual consciousness rises to social consciousness and finally returns to the Absolute Spirit. Hegel placed the discussions of Western modern civilization by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, the Scottish Enlightenment, and classical political economy within the grand framework of "civil society" for analysis, viewing it as the "phenomenal world of the ethical," a vital negative moment in the spirit’s self-movement. From the perspective of actual society, on one hand, the principle of particularity—primarily manifested as human desires and needs—is dominant, and self-interest is the sole purpose. Of course, the concrete individual as a totality of various needs has both natural necessary needs and accidental needs formed by caprice and preference; satisfying and cultivating needs becomes the main goal of civil society. Hegel highly affirmed the historical significance of civil society in liberating the power of particularity; the drive of desire not only brings about the accumulation of social wealth but also allows all human inclinations, talents, and passions to be freely active. Yet he also saw the "dialectics of civil society": polarization between wealth and poverty, the imbalance between material abundance and spiritual poverty, overproduction, and underconsumption. Hegel accurately recognized that the inherent negativity of capital is the internal chronic malady of civil society. On the other hand, the form of universality is the medium through which concrete individuals satisfy their needs; the necessity of connection and the universal, as the most essential things, are deeply rooted in the universal intercourse of modern society. Civil society is a society of increasingly developed intercourse (interdependent exchange); the satisfaction of every person’s needs must be mediated by others and by universal forms. Therefore, the realization of self-interest must be based on altruism. The system of mutual dependence (centered on property rights) constitutes the "external state"; political economy, political science, and jurisprudence are the theoretical expressions of universal forms. Through a myriad of complex accidental events, they rationally and abstractly express the necessary connection between particularity and universality within civil society. Thus, civil society is both the realm where the power of particularity develops fully and the vital base where individuals gradually recognize the necessary connection between the particular and the universal.
Hegel not only highly affirmed the historical significance of civil society but also pointed out the inevitable trend of civil society toward the state. He opposed the utilitarians' reduction of the state to a mere institutional existence for the protection of individual property and freedom, pointing out that only the union between persons based on the universal will is the true content and purpose of the state. This union is not a formal union, but an ethical union. Hegel understood the state as an ethical spirit that thinks itself, knows itself, and accomplishes all that it knows, specifically manifested as the national spirit, the state spirit, and altruism. These spirits are not a subjective mood but a conviction obtained from truth or a disposition that has become a habit, containing a trust or consciousness: "My substantial and particular interest is contained and preserved in the interest and end of an other... which then is not an other for me." Being "at home" with the other is being at home with oneself; this is true freedom. Therefore, in the state, the individual’s particular ends and universal ends are internally consistent; the individual does not only live for themselves but consciously acts to achieve universal ends. Individuals "recognize and desire the universal, even acknowledging the universal as their own substantial spirit, and act toward the universal as their final end." Compared to the logical necessity between the particular and the universal in civil society, Hegel emphasized the actualization of freedom in the state—that is, the ethical identity between particularity and universality existing as freedom. "In civil society, universality is nothing but necessity." This universal form is first and can only be law, and it relates only to the protection of property rights; but in the state, individuals not only recognize this necessity but elevate this intellectual understanding to rational self-consciousness, reaching freedom—where the individual sublates particular ends and universal forms to achieve internal consistency with the universal. Of course, the state does not negate particular ends, but the state does not confirm and protect the individual’s particular ends through universal forms; rather, it ensures the realization of individual welfare through the realization of the universal end. "The essence of the modern state is that the universal is bound up with the full freedom of particularity and the welfare of individuals." Only when both "moments" of the universal and particular "maintain their strength can the state be regarded as a sound and truly organized one." Hegel’s cognition of the modern state was visionary and a full expression of the modern community, but its greatest problem lay in its detachment from social reality, presenting humanity with a logically rational state.
(2) The generative logic of the young Marx’s thought on the critique of political economy
The dialectical movement of the logic and history of Western modernity facilitated the generation of the young Marx’s thought on the critique of political economy. The logical presuppositions of modernity held by the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, the principled interpretations of classical political economy, Rousseau’s anxieties regarding modernity, and the practical paradoxes within Western modern civilization all reflect this dialectical movement. This movement of Western modernity was incorporated by Hegel into his philosophical system; consequently, the relationship between civil society and the state became the first major problem Marx reflected upon when investigating modernity. This question not only runs through his entire critique of political economy but also impelled Marx to explore a new developmental logic for modern civilization from the perspective of "real individuals."
Whether observing German social reality or reflecting on the modernity of countries like Britain and France, Marx consistently centered his work on the two categories of civil society and the state. The transition from political critique to the critique of alienated labor reflects the gradual deepening of Marx’s thinking on this issue. The actual suffering of civil society became the greatest irony of the logic of Western modernity. To sublate [8] Hegel’s speculative idealistic conception of history and turn toward seeking the roots of paradox within social reality and social structures became a crucial step for Marx in launching his critique of political economy. Although A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right was unfinished and not fully mature, it was Marx’s first major work reflecting on modernity and the embryonic site of his historical materialism and critique of political economy. The "Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right" (hereafter the "Introduction"), published in the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher [9], used this foundation to point out the nature of true liberation and true critique. From this point on, Marx clarified his proletarian standpoint (the essence of which is the people's standpoint); only a critique of political economy launched from a proletarian standpoint can possess true historical penetration.
It is not concepts that determine the entity, but the entity that determines concepts. Precisely through his critique of Hegel’s idealistic conception of history, Marx proposed the first proposition of the critique of political economy: it is not the state that determines civil society, but civil society that determines the state. Marx agreed that contradiction is the internal driving force of historical development, but he criticized Hegel’s view of reducing the process of human history to the contradictory movement of the Absolute Idea and its externalized objects. In Hegel’s logical system, the state becomes the spiritual subject, while the property relations of civil society become derivatives of spirit. Human history is viewed as the self-movement of ideas, with spirit as the sole essence and motive force—this is a typical case of logical mysticism. Marx pointed out that the causes and internal spirit for the existence of the family and civil society should not be sought in hollow concepts, but should be pursued from their reality and their interior. The family and civil society "are the essence of the state"; "the family and civil society make themselves into the state. They are the driving force." Therefore, civil society not only has its own logic and spirit but is also the essence and developmental drive of the state. Civil society is not derived from conceptual necessity; on the contrary, the real state is determined by civil society, wherein property relations are the essential relations of civil society—whoever owns the property rights holds the decision-making power. As Marx later summarized: "Legal relations as well as forms of state... are rooted in the material conditions of life." This was both the germ of historical materialism and a clear indication of the vital direction of Marx’s critique of political economy: the anatomy of civil society.
The discourse on the essence and spirit of civil society in A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right foreshadowed the direction of Marx’s critique of political economy. Although the work did not focus exclusively on "civil society" (bourgeois society), Marx’s basic understanding of it is reflected between the lines through five major judgments. First, civil society is the real subject and the foundation of the state, possessing its own spirit and logic. Second, civil society is a battlefield of "all against all," where the citizen is a fixed individual with particular interests who has cast aside other qualities. Third, civil society and the rational state exist in a dualistic opposition; the citizen exists in a state of self-fragmentation. The so-called "identity" is merely an "illusory identity": "Here there appears to be an identity... but this subject has essentially different determinations, so in reality there is a double subject." Fourth, enjoyment and the capacity for enjoyment are the principles of civil society; its estates [10] are fluid groups based on the principle of caprice, with money and education as the primary standards. Fifth, humans in civil society have not obtained the true meaning of being human (i.e., the determination of a social being); all determinations in civil society are external and non-essential to the human being. On one hand, civil society does not absorb the individual as a communal organization or community; social status is merely an external determination of the individual and does not arise from the individual’s labor. On the other hand, the individual's existence is the ultimate end, while activity, labor, and content all become mere means. Thus, the greatest paradox of Western modern civilization lies in placing the majority of people in civil society in a sub-human state; they pursue human freedom and liberation, yet end up being determined and dominated by more abstract external forces. Modern civilization "separates man’s objective essence from him as something merely external and material; it does not consider man’s content as his true reality." From these scattered narratives on civil society, we can see that Marx had already formed his initial understanding of "alienated labor," with the internal paradoxes of modernity vividly portrayed.
The establishment of the proletarian standpoint defined the value coordinates for Marx’s critique of political economy. In the "Introduction," Marx distinguished between political emancipation and human emancipation. He pointed out that the former is merely a part of civil society emancipating itself and achieving universal dominance—that is, the bourgeoisie pursuing the universal emancipation of society from its own particular position. The latter is the emancipation of man as man, the overthrow of all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, and despicable being. "The proletariat heralds the dissolution of the hereto existing world order"; the continuously growing proletariat is the realization of the internal paradoxes of the logic of Western modernity. Marx pointed out that the proletariat is the material force for transforming the world, and its historical mission is to achieve the true liberation of humanity. Marx’s philosophy is the spiritual weapon of the proletariat, while the proletariat is the "heart" of this liberation. The establishment of this standpoint reflects the essential attribute of Marxism and directly governed Marx’s subsequent theoretical reflections and practical activities. But in what sense does the proletariat possess true universality? First, from the perspective of labor, the proletariat possesses a universal character. The development of human history follows a principle of universality, but this principle is not a logical universality of concepts over objects, but a practical universality of labor over human beings. Although labor in civil society remains "alienated labor," it is also objective labor—the essence of the human being. Furthermore, the proletariat is the "foundation upon which the various groups of civil society rest and move." Second, from the perspective of their existential condition, the proletariat suffers universal distress and possesses a thoroughgoing revolutionary will and spirit. The proletariat is "a class with radical chains," signifying the "complete loss of man" and the "dissolution of society," and thus possesses a need for universal emancipation. Third, from the perspective of its historical mission, the proletariat has the capacity to realize universal emancipation. On one hand, the proletariat is the product of the movement of large-scale machine industry and is the representative of advanced productive forces; their demand to "return to themselves" necessarily necessitates the negation of private property and the destruction of all systems of slavery. This is the internal requirement for the proletariat to emancipate itself. On the other hand, a thorough theory will surely convince the proletariat, achieving the combination of material and spiritual weapons so that human emancipation becomes a reality. "As soon as the lightning of thought has struck deep into this virgin soil of the people, the Germans will emancipate themselves to become men." Therefore, in the "Introduction," Marx not only clarified his class standpoint—the proletarian standpoint—viewing the proletariat as the leading force of human liberation, but also pointed out the path to human liberation: the negation of private property and the abolition of all forms of slavery. If in A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right Marx saw that civil society is the essence of the state and property relations are the essential relations of civil society, then in the "Introduction," he further pointed out that human liberation lies in sublating civil society and realizing the principle that "man is the highest essence for man." The drive to "transcend capitalist society toward a more humane, freer, and more satisfactory society" remained the consistent starting point for Marx’s critique of political economy.
V. Conclusion
Since the dawn of the modern era, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke have viewed desire and interest as vital components in the construction of the state, regarding the protection of individual rights as the basis for the state’s (power) legitimacy. Hume, Smith, and others went further, integrating desire and interest into the dogmas of the free market and embedding them deep within the human heart; the free pursuit of individual interest became the fundamental setting of civil society. Driven by desire and interest, the state and civil society emerged as the main threads of the logic of Western modernity, and formal freedom and substantive freedom gradually became conflated. The essence of modernity is antinomy. From the very beginning of the construction of Western modernity’s logic, Rousseau expressed his anxieties: civilization is alienation; the pursuit of freedom and the loss of freedom are the same path. Hegel placed civil society and the state within the grand narrative of the movement of spirit, viewing the transition from civil society to the state as the realization of freedom, thereby completely inverting the relationship between reality and illusion, subject and object. It was on this basis that the young Marx developed his reflection and critique of the logic of Western modernity. First, he negated Hegel’s idealistic logic, locating the focus of the investigation of modernity in civil society and its property relations (private property), restoring the essential relationship between civil society and the state. Second, he negated the logic of Western modernity constructed by the Scottish Enlightenment, pointing out that Western modernity, based on "human nature" and predicated on private property, is essentially a "negation" of the human being, where the forms of freedom and democracy outweigh their content. Finally, Marx pursued a new form of human civilization—an association of free individuals. Inheriting the core of freedom and democracy from classical civilization, Marx used historical materialism as his foundation and the critique of political economy as his path, striving to sublate the logic of Western modernity and clear away all obstacles to the realization of free individuality and the well-rounded development of the person. From the perspective of Marx’s intellectual progression, the critique of political economy is a fundamental critique of modernity. A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and its "Introduction" constitute the generative foundation of the young Marx’s thought on the critique of political economy. The germination of historical materialism, the clarification of the direction of the critique of political economy, and the establishment of the proletarian standpoint essentially framed the developmental direction and internal logic of Marx’s system of thought.