Li Han and Yuan Dongzhen: The Pendulum Effect of Political Development in Latin America and the Characteristics of the New Left-Wing Wave
In the modern political trajectory of Latin America, left-wing and right-wing parties have competed, developed in alternation, and rotated in power, exhibiting a unique "pendulum effect" in political development. Following the start of the new century, a "Pink Tide" emerged in Latin America, during which left-wing parties held power for over a decade. After 2014, this "Pink Tide" faded across large areas; right-wing parties secured governing status in multiple countries, and the region experienced a brief period of right-wing resurgence. In recent years, left-wing parties have successively returned to power in various Latin American nations, catalyzing a second wave of the Left since the start of the new century. This new wave is both a result of the continued fermentation of the pendulum effect and a reflection of the new realities of current economic, political, and social development in the region. This new round of the left-wing wave is not only transforming the political and social ecosystem of Latin America but will also exert a significant influence on the domestic and foreign policies of Latin American countries.
I. The Pendulum Effect of Latin American Political Development and the Arrival of the New Left-Wing Wave
Starting from the late 19th and early 20th centuries, a large number of left-wing parties appeared in Latin America, and left-wing political forces grew rapidly. However, for a considerable period, the Left was suppressed by the Right, and its overall strength remained weak. The victory of the World Anti-Fascist War in 1945 enhanced the political influence of the Latin American Left. After the Cold War began, the survival environment for the Left deteriorated again, and the regional political process was basically dominated by the Right. The victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 immensely bolstered the morale of Latin American left-wing forces and drove the global spread of left-wing political movements after the 1960s. Subsequently, inspired by the "May Storm" in France [1], the civil rights movement in the United States, and the decolonization movements in Africa, the Latin American Left became more active, and its environment improved. The scholar José Natanson even argues that the first left-wing wave in history appeared in Latin America during this period. In the 1970s, right-wing authoritarian rule suppressed the development of the Left. From the late 1970s through the 1980s, alongside the consolidation of the democratic transition process in Latin America, the Left was generally in a process of slow recovery from a low ebb, while the Right maintained a dominant position in most countries. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, with the end of the Cold War and the drastic changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe [2], Latin American left-wing forces once again suffered a fatal blow, and the influence of the Right rose once more.
In the late 20th century, Latin American countries began to universally implement neoliberal reforms. Although these reforms helped stabilize macroeconomics, they also triggered serious social consequences, leading to the intensification of social contradictions and increased social conflict. Faced with many governance challenges, many traditional ruling parties in Latin America were either at their wits' end or took ineffective measures, gradually losing the support of the people. Left-wing parties timely proposed alternatives to neoliberalism and advocated searching for new paths of development. These proposals found many points of convergence with popular demands and won broad social support. Against this backdrop, from the late 20th century to the early 21st century, the Latin American Left exhibited a trend of collective rise. Left-wing parties took power in multiple countries, forming what is known as the "Pink Tide." In December 1998, Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela and took office in early 1999, initiating the governing cycle of the Latin American Left in the new century. Thereafter, left-wing parties came to power through general elections in Brazil (2002, 2006, 2010, 2014), Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011), the Dominican Republic (2004, 2008), Uruguay (2004, 2008, 2014), Chile (2000, 2006, 2014), Bolivia (2005, 2009, 2014), Ecuador (2006, 2009, 2013), Peru (2011), Nicaragua (2006, 2011), Paraguay (2008), and El Salvador (2009, 2014). In many of these cases, left-wing parties achieved consecutive terms in office. Marco Schwartz believes the scope of this "Pink Tide" of left-wing governance was unprecedented. In the first decade of the 21st century, 13 of the 20 major Latin American countries were governed by the Left. Except for Colombia, the South American region was almost entirely under left-wing rule. After taking power, Latin American left-wing parties modified the neoliberal model to varying degrees; radical left-wing ruling parties, such as those in Venezuela, even put forward socialist slogans and propositions, generating significant political and social impact.
From the second decade of the 21st century, and especially after 2015, the pendulum of Latin American political development clearly swung back to the right. Left-wing forces were frustrated and even suffered major setbacks. In 2009, the constitutional referendum promoted by the left-wing Honduran President Manuel Zelaya failed; he was subsequently overthrown by a right-wing "coup" and forced into exile. In 2010, Sebastián Piñera, the candidate for a right-wing coalition, was elected President of Chile, interrupting the 20-year streak of consecutive governance by the Chilean left-wing party coalition that had begun in 1990. In 2012, the left-wing Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo was impeached by the right-wing controlled Congress on the grounds of "poor performance of duties." After 2014, as commodity prices on the international market continued to fall, the Latin American economy entered a downward cycle, triggering social unrest and spreading public discontent. Right-wing forces in the region utilized this dissatisfaction to intensify their counter-offensive, leading to a succession of shifts in ruling parties where "the Left retreated and the Right advanced." The "Pink Tide" faded extensively, and right-wing forces re-emerged in many countries. In 2015, the left-wing party in Argentina lost its governing status after 12 consecutive years in power. That same year, the left-wing ruling party in Venezuela lost its long-term control over the National Assembly, which it had held since 1999. In 2016, the left-wing Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff was impeached by a right-wing controlled Congress. In the same year, the term of Ollanta Humala's left-wing government in Peru ended, and a right-wing government took office. In 2017, the ruling left-wing PAIS Alliance in Ecuador was severely challenged in the general election and nearly lost power; after taking office, the party's presidential candidate Lenín Moreno shifted to the right, deviating from the established governing line. In 2018, the right-wing Jair Bolsonaro defeated the candidate of the left-wing party to be elected President of Brazil, which not only changed the configuration of domestic political forces but also drastically altered the political map of the Latin American region. In 2019, the left-wing party in El Salvador, which had governed for 10 consecutive years, was defeated in the general election. Also in 2019, although the left-wing Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) won the general election in Bolivia, the Organization of American States (OAS)—which was observing the election—claimed there was electoral fraud. Under pressure from right-wing forces, then-President Evo Morales was forced to resign and go into exile, interrupting nearly 14 years of consecutive governance by that party. Based on this series of events, many analysts believed the "Pink Tide" that began at the turn of the century had essentially ended, and that the Right and neoliberalism were experiencing a "resurgence" in Latin America.
Recently, the pendulum of political development in Latin America has swung leftward once again, and the political influence of left-wing forces has strengthened. Some scholars refer to this trend as the second wave of the Latin American Left or Latin American progressivism in the new century, while Angel Arellano directly calls it a new round of the "Pink Tide." In 2018, the left-wing National Regeneration Movement (MORENA) won the general election in Mexico and took power, providing great encouragement to the Latin American Left, which was at a low ebb at the time, and immediately creating a "contagion effect" in the region. In the 2019 Argentine general election, Alberto Fernández, the candidate for the left-wing "Frente de Todos" (Everyone's Front), was elected president; left-wing parties returned to power in Argentina and maintained their status as the largest bloc in parliament. In the 2020 Bolivian general election, Luis Arce, the candidate for the Movement Toward Socialism, was elected president; the party returned to power and secured more than half the seats in both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, occupying a dominant position in the national legislature. In 2021, five countries in Latin America held general elections. Except for Ecuador, left-wing parties won in Peru, Chile, Nicaragua, and Honduras, further increasing the magnitude of the region's political shift to the left. In Peru, Pedro Castillo, the candidate for the left-wing Free Peru party, was elected president, resulting in a change of government favorable to the development of the Left. In Chile, Gabriel Boric, the candidate for "Approve Dignity" (a coalition of the Communist Party and other emerging left-wing forces), was elected president, once again flipping the Chilean political arena from right to left. In Honduras, Xiomara Castro, the candidate for the left-wing Liberty and Refoundation party, was elected president, also representing a change of government in favor of the Left. In Nicaragua, Daniel Ortega, leader of the left-wing Sandinista National Liberation Front, was re-elected, continuing the party's consecutive governance since 2007. Furthermore, the left-wing ruling party in Venezuela secured an absolute advantage in the 2021 regional elections, with the party and its allies winning 20 out of 23 governorships, further consolidating its governing foundation. In 2022, countries including Colombia and Brazil will hold general elections, and left-wing parties have already demonstrated strong competitiveness. Should they win, the magnitude of the leftward swing of the pendulum in Latin American political development will increase even further.
II. General Characteristics of the Latin American Left and Features of the New Left-Wing Wave
First, within the Latin American Left, although the political inclinations of various factions differ, their basic political positions and policy proposals share commonalities or similarities. In summary, the commonalities of the Latin American Left's political positions and policy proposals include at least four aspects: (1) Their primary social base is the lower and middle social strata; they typically represent the interests and demands of these strata, advocating for the transformation of the irrational social order and demanding the redistribution of social rights and benefits. (2) They possess an anti-elitist preference, favoring the expansion of the scope and degree of political participation and advocating for the promotion of mass politics, with a "populist" (民众主义) tendency. (3) They favor a degree of government intervention in economic activities and emphasize social equity. (4) In foreign policy, they have a "de-Americanization" orientation, specifically opposing U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs and supporting the integrated development of Latin American countries.
Secondly, the boundary between the Left and the Right in Latin America is not always clearly defined. When discussing Latin American politics, in addition to the terms "Left" and "Right," scholars frequently use the concepts of "Center-Left" or "Center-Right." Following the start of the 21st century, with a group of center-left parties taking power, the boundary between the Latin American Left and Right has become more blurred, and there is no unified standard for which parties are left-wing or right-wing. For example, Arellano regards the government of Leonel Fernández (2004–2012) of the Dominican Liberation Party, as well as the governments of Martín Torrijos (2004–2009) and Laurentino Cortizo (2019–) of the Democratic Revolutionary Party of Panama, as left-wing governments. Schwartz considers the governments of René Préval (1996–2001) and Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2001–2004) in Haiti, and the government of Alan García (2006–2011) in Peru, as left-wing. However, many scholars do not agree with the left-wing categorization of these governments.
Thirdly, the Latin American Left is constantly changing. Whether Left or Right, political positions, policy proposals, interest demands, and social and mass bases change and adjust with the times; the Left and Right can evolve into one another. For example, the Christian Democratic Party of Chile was traditionally regarded as a center-right party, but since Chile...
After achieving democratization in the 1990s, the party shed its traditional right-wing identity and became a key member of a center-left governing coalition. Conversely, some left-wing parties have gradually degenerated into right-wing parties. For example, the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) of Peru, which once advocated armed struggle, was considered the first populist party in Latin America. During its time in power in the 1980s, it implemented radical populist policies; however, after entering the 21st century, many believe it has become a "center-right" party, and its political stances and policy proposals have been severely criticized by the country’s traditional left-wing parties.
Since the turn of the new century, the two left-wing waves in Latin America have followed similar historical trajectories, both gaining governing status through fierce competition in general elections. In both waves, left-wing governing parties have shared similar support bases. Their rise to power was supported by various left-wing forces—including traditional communist and socialist parties, numerous new national and regional left-wing parties—as well as social movements that grew after the late 20th century. Left-wing governing parties in both waves reflected, to some extent, traditional Latin American populist political characteristics. However, compared to the "pink tide" [3] that rose at the beginning of this century, the new round of the Latin American left-wing wave possesses its own unique characteristics. These are manifested in the following specific areas:
First, the backgrounds and environments in which they occurred are different.
The first left-wing wave occurred during a period of economic ascent in Latin America, providing a relatively favorable environment for left-wing governments to govern. After 2003, the Latin American economy experienced a "golden decade," with an average annual growth of 4.8% between 2003 and 2008. Relying on strong economic growth, Latin American countries successfully resisted the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis; economic growth in the four years from 2010 to 2013 reached 5.9%, 4.5%, 2.8%, and 2.9%, respectively. Economic growth provided the fiscal support for left-wing governments to implement poverty reduction and other social programs. The background of the new left-wing wave is far more complex. After 2014, the Latin American economy entered a downward channel, experiencing consecutive negative growth in 2015 and 2016, achieving only a low growth rate of 1.1% in 2017 and 2018, while the growth rate in 2019 was only 0.1%. Meanwhile, affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, Latin American countries saw a sharp drop in export demand and a slump in tourism; the regional economy contracted by 6.8% in 2020, the lowest growth in 120 years. although driven by favorable factors such as accelerated vaccinations, the gradual resumption of work and production, increased accumulated demand, rising international commodity prices, and the recovery of major world economies, the Latin American economy began a strong recovery in 2021 with a growth rate of 6.2%, this occurred on the basis of the nearly 7% decline in 2020. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) predicted that the economic growth rate in Latin America would drop to 2.1% in 2022, making it difficult to change the low-growth situation that existed even before the pandemic. In the short term, the Latin American economy remains unable to escape the negative impact of the pandemic. In the medium to long term, structural problems that limit Latin American economic growth—such as irrational industrial structures, low investment and productivity, a high proportion of informal employment, and severe inequality and poverty—remain difficult to eradicate. These issues will inevitably have a negative impact on economic activity and the labor market. Due to the deteriorating economic environment, the policy execution capabilities of left-wing governments will be subject to more constraints.
Second, the priority options of government policies differ.
In both left-wing waves, Latin American left-wing governments have advocated for the integration of justice, equality, and freedom, favoring the realization of social equity and the promotion of sustainable development; they emphasize that one should not merely pursue the speed of economic growth, but rather the rational distribution of wealth. However, the policy priorities of left-wing governments differ between the two waves. During the first wave, although left-wing governments in various countries varied in their degree of radicalism, their leaders basically gained voter support through slogans opposing neoliberalism. During their election campaigns, they all criticized the "Washington Consensus" [4] and neoliberal policies, arguing that these had caused unprecedented poverty and inequality in Latin America. Consequently, after taking power, these left-wing leaders made significant adjustments to the neoliberal policy orientations, social policy priorities, and directions of structural reform previously held by right-wing and center-right governments, emphasizing the abandonment of the neoliberal model to explore new development models and paths. Radical leftists represented by Hugo Chavez, Evo Morales, and Rafael Correa even regarded the "Washington Consensus" and neoliberal reforms as the source of all evil in Latin America. In contrast, the left-wing governments in power during the current wave have relatively pragmatic policy proposals and demands for change; they only advocate for reforms in certain areas and have not launched a subversive negation of the country's development model or path, nor have they simply attributed the predicament of Latin American development to external factors such as the United States and the International Monetary Fund.
Third, the governance lines are more moderate.
During the first left-wing wave, the policy proposals and administrative programs of Latin American left-wing governments carried a heavy radical color. Standard-bearers of the left such as Chavez proposed the ideas and theories of "21st Century Socialism in Latin America," advocating for an alternative to the capitalist and neoliberal models, and putting forward slogans to oppose traditional systems and political elites and to achieve social transformation. Radical left-wing governments promoted constitutional and political reforms, attempting to replace representative democracy with direct democracy; they advocated for the government to play a regulatory role and strengthened state control over the economy, enhancing state control over strategic sectors such as resources, energy, electricity, and telecommunications through continuous nationalization. What has emerged in the current left-wing wave are not traditional left-wing parties, but rather new left-wing forces with a proclivity for change that have suddenly risen to prominence during recent social movements. For example, the left-wing governing parties in countries like Peru, Honduras, and Chile have not been established for long. Given the unique political, economic, and social environment of Latin America, these new left-wing governing parties have adopted more moderate governance policies to maintain and solidify their governing foundations. Many left-wing parties and leaders have retreated from their previous radical positions, making every effort to avoid radical changes that might trigger more social confrontation. During the election, Peruvian President Pedro Castillo put forward relatively radical policy proposals, including nationalization reforms in several major fields such as the mining industry, demanding that the government obtain 70% of mining profits, and stating that "large companies will not be allowed to continue plundering the country." However, his position and governance line after taking office tended toward moderation, as he exerted effort to downplay the radicalism of his administrative program and sought steady economic policies to enhance the confidence of international investors. Chilean President Gabriel Boric actively stripped away the "excessive" proposals put forward during his campaign, tending to move closer to the middle way upheld by previous governments. Xiomara Castro, who proposed building "socialism" in Honduras during her campaign, also began implementing moderate policies after taking office. On a regional level, whether it is the emerging left-wing parties in countries like Peru, Chile, and Honduras that have taken power in this wave, or the left-wing governing parties in countries like Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua that have many years of governing experience, all tend to adopt moderated governance principles and policies.
Fourth, foreign policy—particularly relations with the United States—is more pragmatic.
During the first left-wing wave, although not all Latin American left-wing governments were fiercely anti-American, some countries—especially the radical left-wing governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua—still displayed a strong anti-American orientation. Many left-wing governments harbored hostility toward the United States, opposing U.S. imperialism and hegemony, condemning U.S. interference in Latin American affairs, criticizing and boycotting the U.S.-proposed "Free Trade Area of the Americas" (FTAA) initiative, and openly challenging the United States on several sensitive international issues. Latin American left-wing rulers also proposed alternative initiatives with clear anti-American leanings, such as the "Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America" (later renamed the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America"), exerting great effort to advance the process of Latin American regional integration and promote a truly free, equal, just, and peaceful integration among Latin American countries. Some left-wing rulers also opposed the intervention of international financial institutions led by developed countries like the U.S., such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, in the development processes of Latin American countries. Compared with the first left-wing wave, the foreign policies of many left-wing governments in this wave—especially their attitudes toward the United States—are more moderate and pragmatic, appearing less interested in geopolitical anti-Americanism. In 2019, the government of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico signed the revised "United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement" (USMCA) with the U.S. and Canada, and signed an agreement with the U.S. government to control illegal immigration. In 2021, after being elected President of Chile, Boric expressed a desire to maintain good relations with the United States. Honduran President Castro stated her hope to promote a pragmatic cooperative relationship with the U.S. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who was preparing for the 2022 Brazilian general election, also expressed his hope for friendly relations with the United States.
Fifth, there is a lack of a "bellwether" to lead the regional left-wing forces.
During the first left-wing wave, Latin American left-wing governments were divided into moderate and radical categories, with both having their own bellwethers. The moderate left was led by Brazil; in 2011, Brazil and other moderate left-wing governments spearheaded the establishment of the "Union of South American Nations" (UNASUR), which became an important regional organization for promoting the Latin American integration process at that time. Venezuela was the bellwether of the radical left, consistently promoting "revolutionary diplomacy" in Latin America and providing economic support to other left-wing governments—supplying oil, funds, and other aid to relevant countries at preferential prices to expand the influence of the "Bolivarian Revolution." In 2006, together with Cuba, Venezuela led the establishment of the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America" (ALBA), actively promoting cooperation with other Latin American left-wing governments. In the current left-wing wave, however, the Latin American left lacks a regional bellwether. Brazil is currently still governed by a right-wing government; Mexico's López Obrador government lacks leadership over other left-wing countries in the region; and Venezuela has fallen into a serious economic, social, and governance crisis, rendering it unable to provide oil and other economic support to other Latin American left-wing countries as it did before. The "Union of South American Nations" established during the first left-wing wave is on the verge of collapse, with most countries having "withdrawn from the group"; its members are currently limited to a few countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, and Suriname, and it has lost its leading role in regional cooperation and integration. Due to the lack of regional leaders, regional cooperation issues have been de-emphasized in the governing agendas of most Latin American left-wing governments. Most left-wing rulers are busy dealing with domestic problems, lowering their rhetoric on promoting regional integration and losing the momentum and enthusiasm for regional cooperation. From the current situation, Latin American left-wing governments have not shown a clear interest in revitalizing regional cooperation mechanisms or establishing new ones.
Sixth, the foundations of governance are weaker.
During the first left-wing wave, the foundations of the left-wing governing parties were relatively solid. Many left-wing parties not only held clear advantages in presidential elections but also held a majority of seats in Congress, or were themselves the largest party in parliament, holding a dominant position in the national legislature, which provided strong support for the government to govern effectively. In contrast, in the current wave, the foundations of most left-wing governing parties are not solid; they did not receive the support of the vast majority of voters in the elections and failed to hold a majority of seats in the national legislature, making it difficult to escape the predicament of being a weak government.
In 2021, although Pedro Castillo was ultimately elected president in the Peruvian general election, he received only 13.36% of the vote in the first round and won by only a narrow margin in the second-round runoff. Within the 130 seats of the legislature, his party secured only 32, making the administration’s progress difficult and leaving it unable to escape the constraints imposed by the right wing. In the Chilean general election, Gabriel Boric was also only elected president in the second round; in the first round, he received just 25.8% of the vote, lower even than the total obtained by the right-wing candidate. In the parliamentary elections, his "Approve Dignity" coalition (Apruebo Dignidad) occupied only 37 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of 43 seats in the Senate. In the Honduran general election, although Xiomara Castro of the Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) was elected president, the party won only 50 of the 128 seats in Congress. In the 2021 midterm elections in Mexico, the ruling left-wing party saw its seats in the Chamber of Deputies decrease by 55, weakening its dominant position and ensuring that major reforms promoted by the government will encounter stronger resistance. Argentina’s "Everyone's Front" (Frente de Todos) also suffered losses in the parliamentary midterms, further increasing the pressure on the administration. Meanwhile, Bolivia’s ruling left-wing party was defeated in local elections, securing only one-third of the country's governorships, which reduced its influence over local affairs.
Seventh, it is becoming increasingly difficult for ruling left-wing parties to achieve the goal of continuous or long-term governance.
During the first left-wing wave, the phenomenon of left-wing presidents seeking consecutive re-election was extremely common, occurring in countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. If one counts from the rise of left-wing governance in Venezuela in 1999 to the loss of power by the left wing in Argentina in 2015, the Latin American "Pink Tide" lasted for fifteen or sixteen years. Currently, however, it is increasingly difficult for Latin American left-wing parties to achieve continuous rule, and party rotation or government turnover may become the keynote of elections across the region. The left-wing governing cycle is expected to shorten, and it is feared that the new wave will be unable to persist for over a decade. The recent return to power of the left in some Latin American countries stems more from public dissatisfaction with the current situation and the performance of the right wing than from an identification with the ideology of left-wing parties. If left-wing parties cannot achieve good results within a limited governing term to meet public expectations, it will be difficult to realize continuous governance. Restricted by both internal conditions and the external environment, recently inaugurated left-wing administrations in Latin America will find it difficult to achieve satisfactory performance in the short term. Some observers believe that a wave of large-scale social protests will return to Latin America, posing a major threat to ruling left-wing parties. It is expected that the frequency of the pendulum effect in Latin American politics will accelerate, and the cycle of alternation between left and right will become more frequent.
III. Causes of the New Left-Wing Wave in Latin America
The emergence of the current left-wing wave in Latin America shares common or similar roots with the previous "Pink Tide" but also has its own unique causes. Jorge Nathanson believes that the recent wave is not a simple return to the traditional left, but rather the rise of a "New Left" characterized by the New Era [5]. Claudio Schuftan [6] also argues that the emergence of the latest wave is related both to the political particularities within Latin American countries and to numerous deep-seated causes, including the intensification of poverty and inequality under the impact of economic crises, growing dissatisfaction with democracy and institutions, the disintegration of traditional party systems, and public anger toward corruption. Summarizing these points, the main reasons for the appearance of the current left-wing wave in Latin America are as follows:
First, the new wave is an inevitable result of the pendulum effect in Latin American political development. If the emergence of the "Pink Tide" at the beginning of this century was primarily because various social strata hoped to correct the flaws of the neoliberal development model dominated by previous right-wing governments and its negative social consequences, then the emergence of the new left-wing wave is more about the hope across society to reverse the predicament of economic and social development through a rotation of ruling parties. Looking at the history of Latin American development, during periods of rapid economic growth and relative political and social stability, public satisfaction with the government is usually high, making it easier for ruling parties to achieve continuous governance. Conversely, during periods of economic downturn and political or social instability, public resentment toward the government increases, typically making a change in the ruling party more likely. After 2015, the Latin American left experienced a regional ebb, and a group of right-wing parties came to power in succession. After taking office, these right-wing governments failed to reverse the downward economic trend; indeed, many countries fell deep into economic crisis and recession, and the social situation continued to deteriorate. Affected by the dual impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and a severe global economic recession, the Latin American economy declined by 6.8% in 2020, with a per capita drop as high as 7.6%. In 2021, although economic growth in Latin America was higher than expected, it was insufficient to reverse the negative effects of the pandemic, let alone ensure sustained growth. The lagging effects of the massive economic recession continue to ferment, and countries face a grim situation of high unemployment and poverty rates, intensified inequality, and increased social unrest. All sectors of Latin American society generally hope to reverse the economic and social predicament through a change of government.
Second, the left's advocacy for social equality is more attractive to the public under current economic and social conditions, helping to facilitate the return to power of Latin American left-wing parties. During the "Golden Decade" of the Latin American economy after 2003, left-wing governments increased the intensity of social public policies, and the regional social situation improved significantly. From 2005 to 2012, the growth rate of public expenditure for social policies in Latin American countries was twice the rate of economic growth, and the proportion of social expenditure in GDP rose from 14% to 19%. From 2000 to 2013, the poor population in Latin America was reduced by nearly half, and the poverty rate dropped from 41.7% to 27.9%, reaching a historical low; the success of poverty reduction was considered the primary achievement of left-wing governments. During the right-wing governing cycle that began after 2015, the economic recession and the subsequent spread of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a decline in the social spending capacity of governments, leading to increased unemployment and poverty, which resulted in the gains of over a decade of poverty alleviation since the start of the century being entirely wiped out. Regarding unemployment, the average unemployment rate in the Latin American region was 8.4% in 2019, and reached 10.6% by the end of 2020, with the unemployed population increasing to 30.1 million. Among them, the employment situation for youth aged 15–24 deteriorated severely, with one out of every four young people unemployed. In the second quarter of 2021, the average unemployment rate in the Latin American region remained above 10%. Regarding poverty, regional poverty and extreme poverty rates reached 30.5% and 11.3% respectively in 2019, regressing to levels around 2012, and increased further to 33.7% and 12.5% in 2020. Alongside the increase in unemployment and poverty, income distribution has further deteriorated; the Gini coefficient for the Latin American region rose by 2.9% in 2020, further intensifying inequality and social polarization. Israel Navarro believes that, facing these hardships, the Latin American left utilized polarized rhetoric in the vein of a "new class struggle," positioning voters in a debate between protecting the privileges of the few or the interests of the poor majority, thereby prompting voters to abandon the right and choose the left.
Third, the fermenting anti-establishment and anti-incumbent mentality of the public has boosted the rotation of ruling parties and the return of the left to power. The public in Latin America lacks basic trust in the transparency of policy implementation by the public sector, the credibility of state institutions and systems, and the governance capacity of governments to solve deep-seated structural problems through reform—it has even formed a habitual negative expectation. As the spread of the pandemic led to economic recession, frequent corruption scandals, and the intensification of social contradictions, public disappointment with government credibility and governance capacity reached a peak. Many people have even developed a mentality of opposing whoever is in power as a means to express their dissatisfaction and anger toward state institutions and their efficiency. Under these circumstances, party rotation and government change became the keynote of elections in the Latin American region. In the 2021 general elections, with the exception of Nicaragua, changes in ruling parties occurred in Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Honduras. Except for Ecuador, left-wing parties were victorious in all these countries. Navarro and others believe that, in the eyes of most voters, left-wing candidates who won recent elections—such as López Obrador in Mexico, Fernández in Argentina, Arce in Bolivia, Castillo in Peru, Castro in Honduras, and Boric in Chile—do not necessarily represent a left-wing position, but rather represent anti-establishment forces. In other words, voters cast their ballots for them not because they believe in left-wing ideology, but because they hope to punish the current government through their vote. As Paulo Velasco pointed out, the consequences caused by public dissatisfaction "can only be borne by the ruling party." Voters, dissatisfied with the right-wing governments of the time, chose to break with them and cast their votes for left-wing candidates.
IV. Development Prospects for the Latin American Left
The emergence of a new left-wing wave shows that the Latin American left possesses strong vitality. The re-emergence of left-wing forces has greatly changed the political ecosystem and the balance of political forces in the Latin American region. However, ruling left-wing parties in Latin America face immense pressure in governance, and their development is subject to many constraints, making it difficult to fundamentally reverse the pendulum effect of regional political development.
On the one hand, the environment for the growth of the Latin American left is relatively favorable, and there is still new space for its development. Latin American countries have long lacked profound social transformations, which has resulted in persistent and serious phenomena of "social exclusion" and "marginalization." Consequently, the broad middle and lower classes have a demand to change the unequal social structure and achieve social fairness; thus, the ideas and propositions of the left possess great attraction and appeal. During the more than ten years after entering the 21st century, Latin American countries utilized favorable conditions of sustained economic growth to make clear progress in poverty alleviation, improving income distribution, and promoting social fairness, but they did not fundamentally resolve inherent social problems. In the vast majority of Latin American countries, the problem of unfair income distribution remains serious, social wealth is highly concentrated in the hands of a few, poverty is widespread, and the public's sense of injustice remains strong—more than 90% of Latin Americans believe that income distribution in their country is unfair or extremely unfair. After 2020, the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic further highlighted the fragility of Latin American society. In 2021, among the more than 600 million people in Latin America, the populations in poverty and extreme poverty were as high as 201 million and 86 million, respectively. In this context, public dissatisfaction with the status quo and the desire for change coincide with the propositions of the Latin American left. As long as the problems of poverty and social injustice in the region are not fundamentally improved, left-wing thought and parties will continue to maintain great appeal, influence, and vitality, and there remains space for the further growth of the Latin American left.
On the other hand, influenced by many institutional and systemic constraints, the governance prospects for ruling left-wing parties in Latin America still contain many uncertainties. The multi-party system is a basic feature of the political systems in Latin American countries, and concepts such as representative democracy, checks and balances, multi-party competition, and party rotation are deeply rooted. To protect their vested interests, the elite groups that have long controlled the developmental process in Latin America will not easily accept the indefinite rule of any party or politician. Driven by historical inertia, some Latin American voters have also developed "weariness" and concern regarding the negative consequences of long-term rule by a single party or politician. Even if some left-wing parties can achieve good governance results, it is difficult to break through the shackles and constraints of the existing system. Under these circumstances, the change of ruling parties through competitive elections is a "normal state" of Latin American political development; any party can only survive and develop through coexistence and competition with other parties. Therefore, under existing institutional arrangements, most left-wing parties in Latin America will likely find it difficult to achieve long-term continuous governance. Additionally, the prospects for the left are limited by the defects of the political systems themselves. The systems in Latin American countries lack the capacity for self-repair and self-regulation; state power organs usually become arenas for party rivalry rather than platforms for cooperation. Major parties constrain and undermine one another, seriously damaging the function and efficiency of state institutions. Many major parties in Latin American countries lack consensus on major issues such as national development, often placing the narrow interests of their own party—or even the personal interests of their leaders—above the long-term and fundamental interests of the state. Many parties and politicians form alliances for temporary gain and split for narrow self-interest, prioritizing their respective agendas and lacking the ability to seek consensus. In such an environment where multi-party competition and the risk of party turnover are normalized, ruling left-wing parties in Latin America cannot break through the constraints of the existing system, nor can they ensure their own long-term rule.