Asbjørn Wahl / Wang Jun, Wang Xiaokun (Trans.): The Elephant in the Room: The Crisis of Left-Wing Parties in Europe
Over the past few decades, critical voices within European left-wing parties regarding the political development of the European Union (EU) have grown increasingly loud. Particularly following the 2007–2008 financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone crisis, left-wing parties raised numerous criticisms in response to the austerity policies introduced by the EU. Simultaneously, unemployment remained persistently high, while the EU’s role as a social pillar failed to manifest. Neoliberal economic integration continued to operate at full throttle, strengthening the market's influence over social development.
In any case, while criticisms of the EU have remained sharp, they have not been well reflected in the political strategies of the Left. Indeed, particularly when reflecting on the various crises and political developments in Greece, significant new questions have been raised. In January 2015, after the Coalition of the Radical Left (Syriza) won the general election and took power, it abandoned its own political program. The government was more or less forcibly placed under EU management—or, as many critics put it, the Syriza government succumbed to the EU. This submission was not only supported politically by representatives of Syriza itself but was also defended by representatives of most other left-wing parties and "transform! europe."
Critics within Syriza and other European left-wing organizations have all raised the question: can the EU actually be reformed from within? This issue was further highlighted by the various measures the EU (or the Troika: consisting of the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) took against other countries heavily afflicted by the crisis—Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. Is withdrawing from the Economic and Monetary Union, and subsequently from the Eurozone or even the EU, an important political tool that the Left should utilize? Or should a social Europe be constructed by controlling and reforming the EU from within? Naturally, the answer to this question is of major strategic significance for the European Left.
However, several major left-wing parties seem to lack both the capacity to resolve this issue and the willingness to engage in the discussion. Consequently, the question of the relationship with the EU has in many ways become "the elephant in the room" (房中象) for many such parties. This certainly includes discussions on Syriza's experience in power; however, placing it on the agenda of European Left forums appears to be somewhat difficult. Behind this reluctance, we find different ways of understanding the role and characteristics of the EU, especially how they have developed and evolved over a long period.
I. The European Left Parties in Disarray
Whether in terms of quality or quantity, the strength of European left-wing parties is very weak. Their characteristics stem from the following factors: over the past few decades, left-wing parties have been plagued by political and ideological crises and have failed to become the dominant force in responding to the economic crisis; the welfare state has come under attack, and inequality and poverty have become increasingly severe, and so on. It is primarily far-right forces that have managed to exploit the growing public discontent. In the national elections held in EU member states in 2017 and 2018, the votes won by right-wing parties doubled, rising from 10.3 million to 22.1 million. During the same period, left-wing parties stagnated, receiving only about 10 million votes. In the European Parliament elections held in May 2019, support for left-wing parties fell further, while support for far-right parties climbed again.
Over the past few decades, many left-wing parties have undergone a series of internal reorganizations. In Italy, very little remains of the traditional left-wing parties; their clumsy political strategies more or less brought about their own end. In France, contradictory trends have emerged. Since Jean-Luc Mélenchon left the French Socialist Party in 2008 and participated in the founding of the French Left Party (Parti de Gauche), he has been a leading figure among French left-wing parties. In 2009, Mélenchon created the Left Front (Front de Gauche) electoral alliance based on this party, which included the French Communist Party (PCF) and other left-wing parties. However, the alliance between the Left Party and the PCF was fragile and eventually collapsed. Consequently, the Left Front was officially dissolved in 2018. In any case, by this time, Mélenchon had already created another new organization—France Unbowed (La France Insoumise). This party (or movement) nominated Mélenchon as its candidate in the 2017 presidential election, successfully winning nearly 20% of the vote in the first round, but it received less than 6.3% of the vote in the 2019 European elections. The PCF, which was traditionally and historically once highly influential, is now at its lowest point in history, receiving only 2.5% of the vote in the last election and even being ousted from the European Parliament for the first time since 1979. The German Left Party (Die Linke) performed poorly in the last election, losing another quarter of its support and receiving only 5.5% of the vote.
In Eastern Europe, left-wing parties are few and far between. Only the left-wing party in the Czech Republic, with the help of the traditional influence of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia, managed to gain representation in the 2019 European Parliament elections. In Slovenia, the newly formed Left Party (Levica) performed well in the last national parliamentary elections but met with failure in the EU elections. In Belgium, the Workers’ Party of Belgium (PTB/PVDA) achieved impressive electoral results (obtaining 14.5% of the vote in the French-speaking region) due to its clear class positioning and radical program. In Greece, compared to other parties within the Party of the European Left, although support for Syriza has declined overall (the party won 36% of the vote in the 2015 national elections), it still obtained a relatively high percentage of the vote (far exceeding 23% in the 2019 EU elections). That is to say, although Syriza served as the faithful executor of the Troika’s brutal austerity policies—and these policies had a huge negative impact on the Greek Left and even the wider European Left—the party still maintains a significant amount of support.
In the European Parliament, most left-wing parties belong to the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL) group. Following the May 2019 European Parliament elections, this group has 41 MEPs (11 fewer than the previous term). This alliance is a hybrid composed of parties with different orientations, and the divisions between parties are often quite perplexing. Some people refuse to recognize these parties as parties in the traditional sense, and some even argue that they are not left-wing parties at all. Alliances are formed and changed from time to time, and political adjustments are sometimes made for opportunistic purposes to ensure they do not fragment.
Simultaneously, a struggle for leadership of the European Left is continuously unfolding through initiatives to form new alliances. Some parties have declined; on the surface, there seem to be no issues, but in reality, problems abound. The question of the relationship with the EU has more or less become an important factor in the current internal competition between the three major left-wing groups.
The Party of the European Left (EL) was founded in 2004 and currently has 26 member parties, holding the status of a political party within the EU system. However, the EL is more like an organizational network or a coordinating body than a well-organized political party. Besides this party, there are two other organizations in Europe dedicated to building competitive networks or alliances among left-wing parties: the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 (DiEM25) and Mélenchon's France Unbowed.
Part of the reason Mélenchon wants to establish an alternative alliance is his dissatisfaction with the EL, his opposition to Syriza’s submissive practices in Greece, and his attempt to establish a distinct political image. A few years ago, due to conflicts with the PCF, Mélenchon led the French Left Party out of the EL. France Unbowed, the new party created by Mélenchon, has not joined the EL. Prior to the 2019 European elections, Mélenchon acted aggressively in an attempt to form an alternative organization to break free from the shackles of the EU. He received support from the Portuguese Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda) and the new Spanish party Podemos ("We Can"). In April 2018, these parties issued a joint statement titled "A Citizens' Revolution for Europe – Lisbon Declaration: Now the People!" Shortly thereafter, left-wing parties from Denmark, Sweden, and Finland also joined the Lisbon Declaration.
The founder of the third alliance is Yanis Varoufakis, who, together with DiEM25, created the "European Spring" alliance aimed at participating in the 2019 European elections. The core plan of this alliance is to realize "A New Deal for Europe," inspired by the New Deal reforms implemented by Franklin D. Roosevelt in the United States during the 1930s. As for DiEM25, it has neither positioned itself as a political party nor does it consider itself a member of the left-right spectrum. It seeks to unite relatively small and new organizations to establish a broader alliance that goes beyond the Left Bloc and Podemos. This indicates that the movement was skeptical of Varoufakis’s intention to establish a larger alliance of traditional left-wing parties. Varoufakis wanted to run as a German candidate in the European elections; although he was unsuccessful, this provoked great anger within the German Left Party. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, DiEM25 met with complete failure. However, in the Greek national elections held shortly thereafter, the movement’s Greek member party won 9 seats, including Varoufakis’s own seat.
It is also worth noting that Bonapartist tendencies [1] (i.e., the individualistic tendency to establish party organizations or movements aimed at winning political office for an individual) are emerging in European politics. More importantly, this is a profound reflection of the cross-party crisis in the current European political spectrum. From the perspective of left-wing parties, both Varoufakis’s DiEM25 and Mélenchon’s France Unbowed bear distinct Bonapartist characteristics: loose organizations lacking democratic structures, dependence on electronic communication, a primary focus on media strategies, and entrenched leaders. Podemos may be more controlled by a group of scholars from the Complutense University of Madrid—who founded the party in 2014—but the leadership is unwilling to admit this. With the development of "de-democratization" under Alexis Tsipras, Syriza has also shown the same tendency, although the party’s structure is more traditional.
II. Sharp Criticism of EU Policies
Although certain EU policies are sometimes criticized, Social Democracy (parties) and the mainstream European trade union movement have always been enthusiastic supporters of the EU. In many countries, particularly the Scandinavian countries and certainly France (along with the PCF), left-wing parties once openly opposed the decision to join the EU. However, as time has passed, demands to withdraw from the EU have gradually weakened.
What exactly are the reasons that make the relationship between many left-wing parties and the EU so problematic and almost unpredictable? Historically, there are two major factors:
The first factor is the ideological narrative accompanying the founding of the EU (or the European Economic Community), which consists of two major goals: first, that the EU should lay the foundation for achieving lasting peace in Europe; second, that the EU should become a tool for Europeans to achieve social progress. After undergoing two world wars (both triggered by European nation-states)
In the wake of that catastrophe, the political promise of peace exerted immense appeal. Consequently, almost all political forces across the spectrum from right to left supported, and continue to support, these objectives. Moreover, through the continuous development of the welfare state in the post-war period, the majority of people felt that social progress was indeed arriving.
The second major historical event was François Mitterrand’s 14-year presidency in France (1981–1995). Mitterrand implemented a radical left-wing social democratic program, including extensive nationalization, economic redistribution, and increased political intervention across numerous sectors. Within the labor movement, many viewed this as the beginning of the construction of a socialist Europe. However, Mitterrand’s reforms collapsed after less than two years. The reasons for the failure of these political reforms, and the possibility of alternative policies, remain subjects of debate. In any case, because France was already committed to joining the European Monetary System [2], it faced demands from the European Community (EC, now the EU). Just as today, numerous requirements from the EC constrained the implementation of Mitterrand’s policies. Consequently, Mitterrand had to bow to the EC’s demands, making his presidency the last attempt by social democrats to implement an extensive socialist reform program in Europe (with the possible exception of the failed wage-earner fund reforms in Sweden during the 1980s). Based on this experience, Mitterrand and his Finance Minister Jacques Delors concluded that future socialist or social-democratic (Keynesian) policies must be linked to the development of the European Economic Community rather than the nation-state. Thus, committing to European economic integration became the policy of the French Socialists and eventually the pursuit of social democrats throughout Europe. However, as Martin Höpner, a social scientist at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne, has argued: "To say that 'more Europe' will bring us closer to a social Europe is simply a myth."
To this day, EU peace and social progress remain the core content of the mainstream narrative. However, the French Socialists and others have begun to question this project. They found that economic integration had been achieved—through deregulation—but no progress had been made in what they call the "social pillar." Although they claimed they would control market forces through increasingly strong political governance and regulation, what people witnessed instead was the continuous strengthening of market forces, while the development of the social dimension stalled.
How socialist and social democratic politicians could so easily believe that a supranational structure like the European Economic Community—centering on the "four freedoms" (free movement of capital, goods, services, and people) and lacking a democratic framework overall—could become a tool for building a social Europe remains an open question. Even more incredible is that this belief persisted after the adoption of the Single European Act (which established the EU single market in 1986), the Maastricht Treaty (signed in 1992, leading to further integration and creating the EU), the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in 2007 as a reformulated version of the EU Constitution that had been rejected in 2005 referendums in France and the Netherlands), and a series of other neoliberal legislative texts, agreements, and treaties.
Currently, two primary developments are crucial for understanding the increasing criticism of the EU within left-wing parties in recent years: the institutional and policy developments of the EU following the 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 Eurozone crisis, and the role the EU played in opposing the Syriza government following the 2015 Greek elections.
To rescue financial markets from the severe financial and Eurozone crises—or rather, to save capitalism—national governments and the EU injected massive amounts of capital into private banks. This led to a surge in fiscal deficits and government debt in many member states. Under the Stability and Growth Pact, the EU required member states to restore economic balance, resulting in drastic cuts to public budgets, significant decreases in public sector wages, exploding unemployment rates, and severe impacts on labor rights, pensions, and working conditions (so-called "internal devaluation," as Eurozone countries no longer had the option to devalue their own currencies). The EU's social pillars were no longer simply set aside—they were under direct assault, and the criticism of left-wing parties and popular discontent followed closely behind.
The actions of the "Troika" [3] against the Syriza government drew even more criticism from left-wing parties. How brutal was the power the European Central Bank (ECB) exercised by using its monopoly to stop injecting capital into Greek banks to force the Greek government to surrender and flaunt its authority? And how helpless is a single (small) member state when facing such power? The Tsipras government was neither able nor willing—nor prepared—to use the only means at its disposal, namely exiting the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the Eurozone, to counter this power; in the end, it could only surrender.
III. Can the EU Be Reformed from Within?
The first reaction of many was that the EU must be reformed through the united struggle of European left-wing parties. At the same time, however, new contradictions emerged. Some on the left began to ask a decisive question: Can the EU be reformed from within? What happens if a left-wing party wins a domestic election but is prevented from implementing its domestic policies? The Syriza government's capitulation to the EU/Troika provided a powerful piece of evidence for this discussion, making an exit from the Eurozone or even the EU (i.e., "Grexit") a possible strategy.
Yanis Varoufakis has become a leading advocate for reforming the EU from within. After breaking with Syriza, he founded "DiEM25" (Democracy in Europe Movement 2025). In the movement's founding documents, three demands were made of the EU: first, the immediate transparency of all major EU institutions; second, the return of responsibilities for public debt, banking, migration, and distribution policies to member state parliaments within one year through existing institutions and "creative interpretations" of existing treaties and clauses; and third, the convening of a constitutional assembly within two years to transform Europe into a fully democratic state by 2025, possessing a sovereign parliament that respects national autonomy and shares power with national parliaments, as well as elected regional and local assemblies.
In an interview with Jacobin magazine, Varoufakis spoke about his and DiEM25's goal of changing the EU from within: "Therefore, our duty is to prove to Europeans that it is entirely possible—though certainly not easy—to take over EU institutions, realign their policies and practices according to the Europe they aspire to, and launch a grand debate from the grassroots about the democratic EU we need."
That is all! It must be admitted that this sounds quite naive, especially since this policy is supported neither by an analysis of the power relations and power structures within the EU, nor by a mature strategy to guide the practice of struggle, nor has it garnered popular support.
Some on the left oppose exiting the EU on principle and for ideological reasons. They believe that the EU, and even the EMU, represents a historical progression beyond the nation-state and should be defended. In this view, exiting the EMU or the EU is not only futile but also carries the danger of sliding into collusion with far-right nationalists and authoritarian forces. Therefore, the EU must be defended in the name of internationalism, while its neoliberal policies must simultaneously be resisted. Many social democrats support these ideas, even though internal struggles against neoliberalism rarely occur among them. A significant portion of left-wing parties also supports these views.
Costas Lapavitsas is a professor of economics at the University of London. In January 2015, he was elected to the Greek Parliament as a Syriza candidate, but he parted ways with the party and Tsipras after the government capitulated to the Troika. Lapavitsas has been a very active participant in this debate. Regarding those who view the EU as an internationalist project that needs support, Lapavitsas points out:
This is precisely the problem with European left-wing parties today. As an inherently progressive force, their attachment to the EU hinders their own progress; in reality, they have been integrated into the framework of European neoliberal capitalism. It has become increasingly clear that left-wing parties have severed their ties with their traditional supporters—the poor masses of Europe—and therefore must look elsewhere for political representation. ... Inevitably, the vacuum created by the left has been steadily filled by some of the worst political forces in European history, including far-right parties.
Today, Lapavitsas and other leftists view the EU as an obstacle to implementing radical left programs, especially in light of the lessons from Greece. They believe that both the EU and the EMU possess numerous structural and institutional barriers. In a previous article, I summarized six such obstructive factors: (1) the democratic deficit, which has increased rather than decreased in recent years; (2) constitutionalized neoliberalism, which renders socialism and Keynesianism illegal within the EU; (3) irreversible legislation, as treaty amendments require unanimous consent; (4) the Euro becoming an economic shackle, while the central bank remains outside democratic control; (5) uneven development among member states, making united resistance extremely difficult; and (6) the extension of the power of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), a classic example being the so-called "Laval Quartet" (four rulings in 2007 and 2008 in which the ECJ weakened trade union rights). Now we can add a seventh: (7) a comprehensive system of financial sanctions against treaty violations, although the potential sanctions included in the Stability and Growth Pact were temporarily suspended during the COVID-19 crisis.
IV. Plan B: Violating the Treaties
However, the struggle to reform the EU from within—while not a revolution to topple the EU—remains perhaps the most significant position for the majority of left-wing parties, serving as a path toward "another Europe," at least in practice. An alternative position has gradually formed around "Plan B," pioneered by Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Since its launch, this strategy has undergone certain changes in both form and content. This plan was proposed based on the lessons of Syriza's failure, with the aim of preventing similar occurrences.
The policy consists of two components: first, formulating a clear plan of action to confront EU institutions should a left-wing party win in a member state; and second, establishing a European alliance of political parties, movements, and economists to develop a common strategy for implementing this policy—a strategy that combines unilateral consultation with withdrawal from the Eurozone, various existing treaties, conventions, and other agreements.
In January 2016, Mélenchon, along with Varoufakis, former Italian Finance Minister Stefano Fassina, and Oskar Lafontaine, former Finance Minister in the German Social Democratic government and leader of the Left Party (Die Linke), jointly organized the first Plan B conference in Paris. Following this meeting, Varoufakis withdrew from Plan B because he had established DiEM25, whose goal was clearly to reform the EU from within. Plan B operates as a somewhat loose and flexible organizational network, with varying levels of participation in its meetings. Initially, participants were mainly from various left-wing parties, trade unions, social movements, and other organizations. Regardless, it has gradually evolved into a limited network of left-wing parties.
There is still a lack of clarity regarding how this initiative should be understood, particularly how it would be implemented when political conditions allow. The following points, though not exhaustive, provide a general overview of Plan B:
(1) Its focus is on what left-wing parties can and should do when they win government power in one or more member states and begin to implement policies that conflict with EU regulations. (2) Plan B is to be implemented in the event that Plan A is rejected. Plan A refers to ordinary negotiations with EU institutions, aimed at reaching an agreement on pursued policies within the framework of EU treaties and laws. (3) Activating Plan B would mean that a left-wing government does not accept the various restrictions imposed by the EU, but instead focuses on implementing its own economic and political reforms at the national level, openly and proactively suspending relevant treaties, while simultaneously mobilizing at the European level to support this process.
At times, one might get the impression that Plan B primarily serves as an early warning mechanism or a tactical maneuver during Plan A negotiations. Perhaps Mélenchon believes that France is strong and important enough that it could implement policies violating EU regulations through the mere use of threats. If this is the case, he most likely underestimates the powerful economic and political forces that a left-wing government—even in France—would face.
For decades, capitalist forces have gained a staggering position and institutional power through the neoliberal offensive and the construction of an increasingly autocratic neoliberal supranational structure via the EU. These forces will not willingly relinquish all this without a struggle. The flaw in Plan B lies in its lack of a strategic analytical assessment of these power relations. If such a strategy is to be implemented, the possibility of a full-scale confrontation with the EU must be considered. Therefore, a government choosing to implement this plan must be prepared to prioritize the Economic and Monetary Union (Eurozone) and EU membership on its agenda. Particularly under the impact of the financial and Euro crises, the EU has formulated and implemented many conventions and regulations to forcibly impose its requirements on member states, including extensive sanctions for any violations. Consequently, Plan B must be more concrete and aggressive, and it must be well-publicized as a prerequisite for any potential future mobilization.
The degree of support for Plan B among political parties is also a question worth considering. For those parties far from government power, Plan B is clearly just a theoretical model. Meanwhile, divisions among other parties on the EU issue remain a problem, as evidenced by the "Stockholm Plan B Conference" held in April 2019. At this meeting, representatives from the small Polish "Left Together" (Razem) party, the British Labour Party, and the Irish Sinn Féin all appeared as loyal supporters of the EU. Delegates discussed several political challenges facing Europe today, and although criticism of EU neoliberalism remained widespread, the Plan B strategy itself did not seem to become a significant topic.
V. "Serving as Cannon Fodder for Racism and Nationalism"
Despite the sharp criticism left-wing parties level at the EU, and the fact that some parties more or less believe that violating EU agreements might be necessary under certain circumstances, a reverse political development has simultaneously emerged. As the hostility of far-right parties toward the EU grows daily, the positions of many left-wing politicians and activists, who were originally strongly critical of the EU, have begun to waver. This situation was particularly striking during the Brexit campaign. During the campaign leading up to the referendum on June 23, 2016, I visited several left-leaning individuals who might have originally joined the campaign and voted for Brexit, but ultimately did not do so because they did not want to become "cannon fodder" for racism and nationalism. The reason was that far-right parties and their movements became the main driving force of the Brexit campaign, and thus racism, xenophobia, and right-wing nationalism occupied the dominant position.
Even before the Brexit campaign, the fear among some left-wing parties of cooperating with far-right parties hostile to the EU was growing. Over the years, I have attended many gatherings and meetings of European left-wing networks and organizations, and I have often sensed this fear. Beyond the worry of being tied to racism and nationalism, some believe that withdrawing from the EU or the fragmentation of the EU would only strengthen right-wing parties, which history has proven to be very dangerous for Europe. Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the EU must be transformed from within through social struggle.
The Left Party of Sweden is a recent and prime example of how the above viewpoint has gained acceptance among European left-wing parties. On the one hand, the party is part of the Plan B network; on the other hand, at its conference in February 2019, the party decided to abandon its previous position advocating for Sweden’s withdrawal from the EU. In an interview, party leader Jonas Sjöstedt listed three reasons for this decision: first, political reality has changed dramatically, especially with the increasingly severe climate crisis and the rise of right-wing extremism; second, the Swedish Left Party "will never support racism and nationalism" (referring to the Brexit campaign); and third, the European Left has become increasingly critical of the EU, meaning the Swedish Left Party has more allies in how it views the EU. Consequently, Sjöstedt pointed out that the European Left must face the EU of today and work to build a better EU.
From media reports or interviews with Sjöstedt, it is not entirely clear whether abandoning the policy position of withdrawal is merely a tactical expediency based on the current situation, or if it signifies a lasting, principled strategic change. There is a huge difference between the two positions, as they are based on two vastly different assessments of EU reform. In Sweden's current situation, there are many tactical reasons not to prioritize a slogan like "exit the EU." In a situation similar to that of Greece, where a left-wing party has won government power, this issue becomes crucial. The demand to exit the EU or the Eurozone is no longer a purely theoretical question; it determines the possibility of a left-wing government implementing its policies or submitting to the EU.
In the interview, when asked directly, "Is it a good strategy to abolish a political demand just because someone you disagree with proposes it?" Sjöstedt’s answer raised new questions: "I believe that the EU-critical position dominant in the Nordic countries must draw a clear line against nationalism and racism. We are neither like the UK Independence Party (UKIP) nor do we support anti-EU racists. There is a chasm separating us. One must have a clear understanding of this."
Understanding this political logic is not an easy task. If there truly is a chasm separating the Swedish Left Party's criticism of the EU from that of the racists and nationalists, where is the problem? Why does the Left Party need to change its EU policy to avoid being associated with racism and nationalism? If it is necessary to pursue a completely different policy, even if it leads to a break with the EU, isn't it important for the Left Party to provide a reasoned and grounded critique of the EU and its policies? As Sjöstedt pointed out, the fact that the Brexit campaign was dominated by nationalism and a xenophobic agenda provides strong evidence of the failure of the Labour Party, the Momentum movement (which supports Labour in elections), and the trade union movement to critique the EU and the far-right. They could have used the public's dissatisfaction with the EU and its policies, politicized it, and transformed it into a battle against an increasingly authoritarian neoliberal EU.
Regardless, the Labour Party and Momentum, and even most members of the British trade union movement, remained loyal supporters of the EU project. Over the years, the European populace has accumulated massive forces of legitimate dissatisfaction with the neoliberal EU, but [the Left] gave up the opportunity to become the representative and spokesperson for this force. In other words, they ceded the monopoly on radical criticism of the EU to far-right parties, thereby allowing the far-right to monopolize the power to frame this struggle within their own political and ideological framework. Thus, it is not surprising at all that the Brexit campaign took on nationalist and xenophobic characteristics.
VI. Low-Level Class Struggle
The political development of society cannot exist in isolation from class struggle. Although national conditions vary, the notion that the European left-wing parties and trade union movements are in crisis is not a new viewpoint. Within this crisis, the significant role and character of the EU are reflected in the process of political-economic development from Keynesianism to neoliberal hegemony. The introduction and operation of the Euro as a single currency marked a key step in the neoliberal reforms representing the EU. Simultaneously, this placed capitalist forces in a superior position in the struggle against the labor movement, which inevitably had a profound impact on Europe's left-wing parties.
Following the 2007–2009 financial crisis and the Euro crisis, the EU's conservative fiscal austerity policies were reinforced once again. At the same time, it adopted increasingly authoritarian forms, institutionalized them through new legislation (such as the "Six-Pack," "Two-Pack," the European Semester mechanism, and the Fiscal Compact, etc.), and granted the European Court of Justice a more prominent status through the "Laval Quartet" [4]. The dismantling of the welfare state and the frustration of the trade union movement have become indispensable components of modern EU institutions and politics; the EU is no longer a means for achieving social progress.
This change has greatly weakened the power of the trade union movement, causing Western European unions to lose half of their members between 1980 and 2015. Among these, the decline in the private sector was the largest. "Deindustrialization" or the relocation of industrial enterprises to Asia and other low-cost countries (capital's globalization strategy) has led to the further weakening of trade union movements in regions that were traditionally powerful, well-organized, and adept at struggle. Moreover, while union rights stipulated in labor law have changed due to sabotage—including restrictions on bargaining and strike rights—rising unemployment has weakened the bargaining strength of unions.
The eastward expansion of the EU and the establishment of a common labor market have played a particularly important role. This is not only because of the huge wage differences between Eastern and Western European member states but also because of mass unemployment, which in the countries hardest hit by the crisis (Greece, Spain) climbed to 30%, with youth unemployment even double that. This has given employers significant leeway to hire non-union labor, pitting workers against one another and causing the labor market to be flooded with social dumping and lawless chaos.
Under these circumstances, the trade union movement has been forced onto the defensive and has experienced a profound political and ideological crisis. In particular, the vast majority of organized unions at the European level have clearly distanced themselves from the members they are supposed to protect. They still cling to the historic compromise reached between labor and capital—a compromise that formed the basis of growth and prosperity in the post-war period but was sabotaged by employers once the balance of power shifted in their favor. Consequently, the brutal austerity policies implemented by the EU are understood as policy errors rather than expressions of conflicting class interests. Thus, the task becomes convincing governments and employers through social dialogue that current policies are wrong and must be corrected, rather than mobilizing for a struggle to achieve a transformation in the balance of class forces.
The crisis of left-wing parties must be interpreted within the context of these developments in the class struggle—where the trade union movement is rooted in social partnership, ideology, and a generally low level of class struggle. Therefore, it is understandable that the danger of left-wing parties becoming more closely integrated with the EU’s Brussels-based politico-administrative apparatus is not caused by specific external pressures.
VII. The European Left: A Diagnosis
As we have seen, European left-wing parties are a heterogeneous group of organizations. In the 20...
For most of the century, two dominant political tendencies emerged within the labor movement: Communism and social democracy. Following the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the rupture of the class compromise in Western Europe, both political projects appeared to have reached their end. Traditional Communist parties in Western Europe, ranging from those oriented toward Moscow to the reformed Eurocommunist variants (Italy and Spain), gradually went into decline. Over the past few years, we have also witnessed the successive collapse of social democratic parties. Those that survived have seen their influence diminished, have more or less abandoned their traditional ideologies, and have largely accepted "soft" neoliberal policies.
Some current European left-wing parties are recently established, consisting of mergers or reorganizations of various small groups and parties, but they do not necessarily maintain strong links with past historical traditions. Most of them are relatively moderate organizations politically. They lack deep roots in the working class and the trade union movement. Such parties rarely formulate sophisticated socialist strategies or conduct profound analyses of the economy and power relations. Conversely, they exhibit significant socio-liberal and socio-democratic tendencies (a perspective that has gained more ground in recent years as the neoliberal tendencies of traditional parties holding those ideologies have become increasingly apparent).
With few exceptions, left-wing parties have a stronger parliamentary orientation, focusing on a limited number of single issues of public concern and seeking media attention, while their capacity to mobilize forces at the grassroots level of society is extremely weak. Consequently, we can conclude that we are in a "Gramscian moment" [5], where the old is dying and the new cannot be born.
Wolfgang Streeck, a German professor of sociology, emeritus director of the Max Planck Institute, and former Social Democrat, described the disadvantage and further decline of left-wing parties in the 2019 EU elections as follows:
Today is an era of rapid shifts in political loyalty. But if not now, when can left-wing parties hope to gain more electoral support from European workers and middle-class reformers? There is an urgent need for an explanation of the Left's disastrous failure... The primary and most fundamental reason is clearly the overall lack of a set of realistic anti-capitalist or at least anti-neoliberal left-wing political strategies targeted at the EU. There has not even been a debate on the critical question of whether the EU can become an instrument for anti-capitalist politics.
The goal of many European left-wing parties is usually to enter government as a coalition partner to a dominant neoliberal social democratic party. For the vast majority of left-wing parties that have attempted this method in countries such as France, Italy, Norway, and Denmark, they have experienced everything from negative to catastrophic consequences. Despite this, left-wing parties in countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and the Nordic countries—whether or not they have served in such governments—still harbor such ambitions. Spain’s Podemos, founded in 2014, which claimed to be neither left nor right and opposed the "caste" (as they call the elite and political class), allied itself with the United Left, adjusted its stance, and joined a coalition government with the Socialist Party.
This "suicidal" tendency is difficult to understand, especially when we observe that left-wing parties usually fare much better when they adopt a strategy of not joining such governments, but instead limiting themselves to providing critical support to social-democratic-led governments to prevent right-wing coalitions from taking power. These parties have shown that they have a better chance of advancing their own policies, including the opportunity to mobilize grassroots forces, rather than reaching compromises behind the closed doors of parliamentary chambers. Swedish historian, journalist, and author Åsa Linderborg dissected this dilemma in an article on the development of the Swedish Left Party:
It is not easy to summarize the performance of the Left Party. Although it is the only party possessing anti-capitalist critical power, for 25 years the party has been striving to become a legitimate partner of the Social Democrats. For years, the party has supported policies implemented by the right wing of the Social Democrats, including tax cuts and the weakening of redistributive policies. They voted for budget regulations that harmed the Swedish economy. The result has been a deepening of class inequality and an extreme concentration of social wealth. The welfare state and democratic institutions have been undermined as a result.
There are further indications that the relationship between many left-wing parties and the EU lacks coherence. For example, an increasing number of left-wing parties support the "Plan B" strategy, which is highly demanding and confrontational. Yet at the same time, they do very little to promote the development of this strategy; instead, at the European Parliament and national levels, they pursue policies that do not reflect this confrontation. This confrontation, inadvertently or otherwise, ends up becoming part of a strategy to reform the EU from within.
Violating EU treaties under specific conditions does not mean that left-wing parties must always make "treaty violation" their most fundamental demand. This is a matter of strategy and tactics. Strengthening the mobilization of left-wing forces must, as a starting point, be based on a concrete analysis of concrete conditions [6], including a specific analysis of actual social power relations. In instances of sharp class struggle, any left-wing party risks repeating the mistake of Syriza—namely, allowing EU institutions and treaties to impose massive obstacles to progressive development. The emergence of the possibility and necessity of exiting the Eurozone or even the EU will not be determined by our will. The choice will inevitably be brutal: either abandon the struggle for social(ist) reform and remain within the EU, or break with the EU to continue the struggle. For any genuine left-wing party, surrender is never a bright path.
Admittedly, to achieve victory in the struggle to violate EU treaties or choose to exit the Eurozone or the EU, there must be large-scale mobilization from the bottom up and unity with external forces. To this end, party organizations, members, and coalition partners must be fully prepared for this struggle. Unfortunately, the current situation is not as one would hope.
If left-wing parties do not wish to implement anti-EU policies for fear of being grouped with racists and nationalists, the difficulties facing their EU policies will only intensify, even if this general position might be limited to specific events like the Brexit referendum. The reality is quite the opposite. If the goal of left-wing parties is truly to weaken the status of the EU as an authoritarian neoliberal center of power, then exiting the EU becomes a powerful tool available to them. The Brexit movement itself is not the root cause of the creation and strengthening of far-right parties in European countries, nor is it the main reason these parties have come to power in countries like Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Poland. It is not the radical criticism of the EU by left-wing parties that should be held responsible for the rise of nationalism and far-right parties, but the EU's current policies themselves. It is these policies that have destroyed the normal lives of countless workers, inducing growing discontent and a persistent sense of helplessness.
For left-wing parties, the only way out of this crisis is to launch their own struggle—at the opposite end of the abyss of far-right criticism—by advancing internationalism, solidarity, and anti-racist politics to oppose and critique the authoritarian neoliberal EU. The development of an internationalist, solidary, and unified Europe is predicated on defeating the institutionalized, authoritarian neoliberal EU, to be replaced by a unified Europe built on the foundations of democracy, solidarity, and self-determination.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to recognize the serious political and ideological crisis facing European left-wing parties, to research and dissect the role and characteristics of the EU, and to formulate a genuine anti-capitalist strategy. In this regard, the "Plan B" strategy will play an important role in supporting and promoting further development. This requires formulating a strategy and providing a clear explanation; if developed properly, this process has the potential to facilitate the necessary radicalization of European left-wing parties.