Xuan Chuanshu and Zhao Xiaohui: The Return of the German Green Party to the Federal Government and Its Policy Direction Toward China
In the 20th federal parliamentary elections held in 2021, the German Green Party (Alliance 90/The Greens) secured 14.8% of the vote and 118 seats, trailing only the Social Democratic Party (SPD) (25.7% of the vote, 206 seats) and the Union (CDU/CSU) (24.1% of the vote, 197 seats). Not only did they regain their status as the third-largest party in the Bundestag after a 16-year hiatus, but they also successfully formed a "traffic light coalition" with their former center-left allies, the SPD, and the right-leaning Free Democratic Party (FDP), occupying five cabinet seats including the Foreign Minister. For the Greens, this was undoubtedly their best electoral performance since the end of the Cold War; for Germany, a coalition government of this model was also a first.
The success of the German Greens in this election has sparked significant debate. Some Western scholars believe that the Greens' victory and participation in government might help bridge social rifts in Western countries and arrest the trend toward political polarization, as the party is seen as a moderate force that transcends left and right, supports progress, and rejects polarization. Conversely, some Chinese scholars argue that the ascent of a Green Party with left-wing leanings might bring negative impacts to Sino-German and even Sino-European relations. What, then, is the actual nature of the German Green Party? Why was it able to emerge so prominently in this general election after a long period of marginalization? Why was the "traffic light coalition" successfully formed? And what stance will the Greens take—and what role will they play—regarding relations with China? To address these questions, this article intends to analyze them one by one within the analytical framework of parliamentary politics, aiming to make a rational judgment on the foreign policy, and especially the China policy trajectory, of the new German government in which the Greens participate.
I. The German Green Party: From the Marginal Left to the Moderate Center
Since its founding in West Germany in 1980, the German Green Party has consistently endeavored to participate in elections at various levels, including local, federal, and European parliaments, seeking to influence German domestic and European political directions through parliamentary politics while constantly evolving in the process. Taking its participation in the federal government as a benchmark, we can roughly divide the development of the German Green Party into three stages.
The first stage was as a grassroots opposition. At its inception, the German Green Party, like other European Green parties, was a protest party with left-wing tendencies—an "anti-party party" and "anti-parliamentary" force integrated from new social movements such as the ecological, peace, and feminist movements. However, its membership was more diverse and its issues broader than its counterparts. In its value orientation, it adhered to the principles of "ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and non-violence," with the public slogan "neither to the right, nor to the left, but forward," aiming not to rule but to participate in politics. However, in the process of actual political participation, these positions and goals constantly encountered real-world challenges. Particularly in the mid-to-late 1980s, after entering the Bundestag and the European Parliament, and even joining coalition governments at the state level, a debate erupted within the party between the "Fundis" (fundamentalist idealists) [1] and the "Realos" (realist pragmatists). The former insisted on "moral purity" and wished to remain in opposition; the latter focused on "electoral feasibility" and advocated for maximizing electoral gains to manifest their power and will through governance. This debate reached a temporary conclusion with the victory of the pragmatists at the 1988 party congress. Consequently, the German Greens gradually transformed from a protest party to a governing party, and from Euroskeptics to Europhiles, eventually becoming a force strongly advocating for European integration. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the drastic changes in Eastern Europe, and the setbacks to the socialist movement, the German Greens absorbed some members of communist and socialist parties. Especially after the 1993 merger of the West and East German Green parties into "Alliance 90/The Greens" (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), while the party’s strength increased, the ideological rifts between internal factions widened further.
The second stage was as a "junior partner" in a governing coalition. After more than a decade of experience and accumulating strength in various parliamentary activities, the German Greens entered the federal government for the first time after the 1998 general election, forming a "Red-Green coalition" with the SPD led by then-Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. This marked the transformation from a protest party and parliamentary opposition to a governing party, serving as the "junior partner" of the coalition. Participation in government undoubtedly provided the Greens with the opportunity to put their concepts into practice, but it also sowed seeds of internal disagreement and even division. During their tenure, nearly one-third of the party members left due to dissatisfaction with the Greens' support for German participation in NATO military actions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Before the 2002 federal election, the German Greens were forced to revise their basic program for the first time, expanding their value orientation from "ecology, social justice, grassroots democracy, and non-violence" to "ecology, self-determination, expanded equality and vibrant democracy, non-violence, and human rights." Although no specific new proposals were put forward, due to the severe floods in Germany that year, the Greens—who emphasized ecological protection—still secured their position as the third-largest party in parliament and continued to participate in the coalition government. In the 2005 federal election, the Greens dropped from the third to the fifth-largest party in the German parliament. The SPD, facing electoral defeat, had to compromise with the Union (CDU/CSU) and join a governing coalition led by Angela Merkel, forming a "Grand Coalition." From then on, the "Red-Green coalition" ceased to exist, and the German Green Party began a 16-year period in opposition.
The third stage was a period of reflection and adjustment as an opposition party. Facing electoral losses and the frustration of returning to opposition, the German Greens undertook self-reflection, attempting to integrate the long-standing internal views of the idealists and pragmatists into a unified "radical realism." Simultaneously, the party began to utilize its opposition status to make various adjustments. On one hand, it took advantage of the SPD's weakening left-wing image—a result of its participation in the coalition government—to seize center-left political space and absorb traditional SPD voters. On the other hand, it experimented with various types of governing coalitions at the state level, forming not only "Red-Green" coalitions with the SPD in Baden-Württemberg, but also "Black-Green" coalitions with the CDU in Hesse, and "Red-Red-Green" coalitions with the SPD and the Left Party (Die Linke) in Thuringia. In other words, the German Greens became increasingly pragmatic and flexible in policy, accepting coalitions with the center-right, center-left, and even the radical left. In 2017, they even attempted to negotiate a "Jamaica coalition" with the CDU/CSU and the FDP. Although these negotiations collapsed due to the withdrawal of the FDP, they nonetheless elevated the political status of the German Greens. Meanwhile, the German Greens performed well in the European Parliament elections of 2009, 2014, and 2019, maintaining their status as the largest Green party among EU member states while seeing their share of votes and seats steadily climb. In the 2019 European Parliament elections in particular, the German Greens surged to become the second-largest German party in the European Parliament, second only to the CDU.
After more than 40 years of development and evolution, the political spectrum of the German Green Party has seen its initial left-wing and idealistic colors gradually fade, replaced by an increasingly thick pragmatic style of the center. In terms of political status, the German Greens have grown from a marginal anti-party and anti-parliamentary force into a key player in German politics and the European Parliament.
II. Subjective and Objective Reasons for the Continuous Growth of the German Green Party
In Western parliamentary politics, a party ultimately demonstrates its influence through participation in elections, and electoral results are deeply influenced by the objective environment and subjective choices. After 16 years of accumulation, reflection, and adjustment, the German Green Party achieved an impressive performance in the 2021 federal election. Behind this victory lie several subjective and objective reasons.
(1) Western society has suffered deeply from political polarization
For a long time, Western countries have prided themselves on their democratic and liberal order. However, since the 2008 global financial crisis, the West has entered a period of "democratic recession," where economic crises, social stratification, and political polarization have broken out with increasing severity. Right-wing populist forces in various countries have seized dominance over the discourse of state-building, and the liberal order so often touted by the West has begun to "fall apart" [2]. As the standard-bearer of Western society, the United States saw its political polarization reach a historical peak during the era of Donald Trump. The Trump administration emphasized "White First" internally, pursuing racism and nationalism, which resulted in social rifts and racial conflict; the social foundation of the democratic polity was hollowed out, and society lost its basis for stability. Externally, it emphasized "America First" and embraced protectionism, not only launching trade wars against a series of countries including China but also continuously "withdrawing from groups" [3], thereby undermining the global economic order. It can be said that the wave of right-wing populism and political polarization driven by Trump has existed to varying degrees in countries on both sides of the Atlantic, allowing the people of Europe and America to witness the series of social disorders brought about by polarization. In response, they look forward to rebuilding order. In recent years, European countries have indeed shown signs of returning to moderate politics.
For instance, in France, Emmanuel Macron led his self-created party, La République en Marche!, to not only defeat Marine Le Pen—the candidate of a right-wing populist party with a clear anti-immigrant, anti-refugee, and anti-globalization platform—in the 2017 presidential election, but also to become the largest and most influential new party in the 2019 European Parliament. In 2020, Macron further defended the national consensus by firmly saying "no" to religious extremism through a new religious policy targeting domestic extremists, thereby winning support from Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Cyprus, and the European Union. Macron's success and the support he received from European nations indicate that France and Europe at large have begun to reflect on and counter polarized politics, which to a certain extent arrested the continuous spread of right-wing populism in Europe following Brexit and Trump's election.
Furthermore, the European Parliament elections serve as a bellwether for European politics. Compared to the 2014 elections, most Green parties in European countries achieved good results in the most recent 2019 European Parliament elections, resulting in a "Green Wave," with the performance of the German Greens being the most prominent. While the German Greens' vote share (and seats) in the 2014 European elections had decreased compared to 2009—primarily because, under the influence of the financial crisis, extremist parties characterized by populism, nationalism, and anti-European integration dominated the electoral process—the 2019 elections saw a limited overall performance by anti-European or Euroskeptic populist forces. Instead, pro-European, centrist-liberal parties and ecological Green parties performed more strongly. This suggests that the European public has, to a certain extent, accepted the image of Green parties as reformers who have shed their radical left-wing and idealistic traits.
Beyond the further decline of traditional mainstream parties, the success of Macron—the "star pupil" in the fight against polarized politics—and the rise of the "Green Wave" in the recent European elections share a common cause: extremist populist and nationalist parties are becoming increasingly unpopular. The public desires the emergence of moderate politicians and parties with a political style distinct from those that manufacture antagonism and division. The emergence of such an atmosphere on the European continent is clearly favorable to the German Green Party as it moves toward a moderate, centrist position.
(2) A hollowed-out center in German domestic politics
The party that has long occupied an important position on the German political stage is the center-right Union (CDU/CSU). After Merkel’s 16 years in power, the public grew weary. In particular, disadvantaged and marginalized groups were highly dissatisfied with her recent policies of opening the nation's doors to overseas migrants and using German taxpayers' money to bail out other Eurozone members. The federal government led by the Union gradually lost the people's support. In the 2017 election, 49% of German citizens expressed dissatisfaction with the government; by 2021, this proportion had risen to 57%.
It is evident that the vast majority of voters harbored a desire for change. This psychological drive for change made voters more inclined to support parties capable of better planning for the future, and in their eyes, the Greens appeared to be a strong choice. Furthermore, since Angela Merkel stepped down as party chair, the Union [4] has failed to produce a political figure capable of maintaining party unity; internal power struggles have intensified and fissures have deepened. Armin Laschet, whose prestige and seniority failed to command general respect, was elected as the Union's chancellor candidate primarily as a result of internal infighting. This combination of unfavorable factors led to a massive exodus of traditional Union voters, approximately 920,000 of whom turned to the Greens, making them the largest source of voter migration for the party.
Next, we turn to the center-left Social Democratic Party (SPD). Since the beginning of the 21st century, Germany's federal government has seen three "Grand Coalitions" (2005–2009, 2013–2017, and 2017–2021), all of which were dominated by the Union, leaving the SPD in a subordinate position. Throughout more than a decade of coalition governance, the Union and the SPD engaged in constant mutual compromise; in particular, the subordinate SPD found it increasingly difficult to define itself, leaving voters unable to discern its stance. In surveys of voter perception regarding party platforms, the SPD's image was the most blurred, with only 41% of voters able to identify its position. Next was the Union at 42%, while the Greens were the only party for whom more than half of voters (56%) could clearly judge their stance. Thus, in this election, as the SPD returned to its status as the largest party, the sole trend in its voter loss was toward the Greens; 260,000 former SPD voters chose the Greens in this election, making them the third-largest source of the Green Party's migrated voters.
Finally, we look at some far-right or far-left parties that, while not at the center of German politics, still play an important role. For instance, the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany (AfD), which rose rapidly on the German political stage in recent years and once became the third-largest party, draws its voters mainly from the states of eastern Germany where the economy is relatively fragile and the outflow of young people is severe. People remaining there supported the AfD out of fear that their jobs would be displaced by immigrants, but as the immigration issue faded, their support rate gradually declined. Additionally, the Free Democratic Party (FDP), which has long played a balancing role in the German power structure, was the fourth-largest party in the Bundestag before this election. Since abandoning the "Black-Yellow-Green" [5] coalition negotiations in 2017, the party has gradually pivoted to the right, subsequently sharing a similar voter base with the AfD and seeing its support rate decrease. As the successor to the former Socialist Unity Party of East Germany [6], the Left Party (Die Linke) has also been plagued by internal factional strife. Not only are there deep contradictions between the "Communist Platform" (KPF) and the "Forum of Democratic Socialism" (FDS) factions, but the split within the leadership has also intensified. There has been long-term public infighting and mutual attacks between former party chairs Katja Kipping and Bernd Riexinger on one side, and the former parliamentary group leader Sahra Wagenknecht and her husband (himself a former party and parliamentary leader) Oskar Lafontaine on the other, due to differing policy stances on immigration, European integration, and the voter base. This led to a failure of the Left Party to secure voter trust. Moreover, in the final weeks before the general election, the Union resorted to its old tricks, once again utilizing the "Red Socks Campaign" [7] to attack the far-left parties and warn voters of the potential disaster a "leftward slide" might bring. This significantly impacted the Left Party, which was already burdened by its historical baggage. Consequently, the SPD and the Greens—belonging to the same left-wing camp but holding more moderate positions—absorbed many migrated voters from the Left Party. Polls show that 480,000 former Left Party voters chose the Greens in this election, making them the second-largest source of the party's migrated voters.
(3) Active Preparations by the German Green Party Prior to the Election
Taken together, the favorable international atmosphere and the hollowing out of the German political center provided space for the survival and development of the Green Party. These are external factors, but what truly allowed these external factors to take effect was the multifaceted preparation done by the German Greens themselves before the election.
On the one hand, distinct from the populist rhetoric of the AfD and the exclusionary political discourse of the CDU/CSU, the German Greens adopted a new political discourse. They advocated for active engagement, communication, and interaction, promoting an optimistic discourse strategy rather than one of pessimism and fear, so as to echo the emotional shifts of the electorate. To maintain their distinct party character, the Greens reaffirmed traditional values in their campaign program, reshaped environmental issues, advocated for an ecological economy, and promoted climate-friendly development. On August 3, 2021, the Greens submitted their "Save the Climate, Protect the People: An Emergency Climate Protection Program for the Next Federal Government," proposing ten plans—including accelerating the development of renewable energy, moving the coal phase-out up to 2030, transforming the federal budget into a climate budget, making the EU a climate pioneer, and advancing climate diplomacy—thereby effectively solidifying the party's traditional voter base. It can be seen that 82% of Green voters in this election chose the party because they agreed with its campaign program. Furthermore, while adhering to traditional issues such as environmental protection, the Greens focused on learning from past lessons, changing their previous skepticism toward the free market and the simplistic practice of emphasizing "prohibitions." Instead, they advocated for cooperation with enterprises to advance environmental protection and emphasized seeking a balance between ecological protection and market protection to avoid protecting the environment at the expense of social justice. In this way, the German Greens "combined the concept of an ethic of responsibility with the promotion of citizens' material well-being," further eliminating the long-standing factional struggle between "moral purity" and "electoral viability," and projecting a more decisive and unified image. This clear and unified party image became one of the important reasons the Greens attracted voters.
On the other hand, to strengthen party unity, the German Greens elected pragmatic members Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck as joint leaders on April 19, 2021, and nominated the former as their candidate for chancellor, striving to unify the bickering party factions behind a realist path. Of course, as the Green chancellor candidate, Baerbock also had clear weaknesses. For example, compared to the chancellor candidates nominated by the Union and the SPD—Laschet and Olaf Scholz—Baerbock was younger and lacked political and governmental experience; she was also involved in scandals regarding alleged resume fabrication and plagiarism, causing the Greens' support rate to slide. However, polls indicated that only 10% of Green voters felt the chancellor candidate's performance had a significant impact on their vote. That is to say, Baerbock's personal weaknesses did not have a decisive impact on the Greens' election results.
III. The Successful Formation of the "Traffic Light Coalition"
In recent years, the hollowing out and fragmentation of the German party landscape has deepened. The Bundestag has evolved from the previous "three-legged stool" of the Union, the SPD, and the FDP to a current state where six parties coexist. According to the German Constitution, only a party or a governing coalition that secures more than half of the seats in the Bundestag can form a government. The current fragmentation of parties in the house makes it increasingly difficult for a single party, or even two parties, to form a government in coalition. Regarding the results of the 2021 general election, since neither the Union nor the SPD intended to collaborate again in a Grand Coalition, a three-party coalition became the inevitable choice. Therefore, immediately after the general election, both the SPD and the Union sought to lead the formation of the new government, making the Greens and the FDP, who followed closely behind, the "kingmakers." The SPD's eventual choice to cooperate with the Greens and the FDP to successfully form a government was primarily based on the following five factors.
First is the factor of legitimacy. Since German reunification, there has never been a precedent in which the largest party in the Bundestag failed to form a government, leading the second-largest party to take the lead. Although the SPD only narrowly surpassed the Union in this election, it reflected, to a certain extent, the voters' preference for a federal government led by the SPD. If the Greens and the FDP had chosen to cooperate with the defeated Union, it would have negatively impacted their own images and shaken public confidence in democratic procedures and the federal government. Therefore, for the Greens and the FDP, prioritizing negotiations with the SPD was the more legitimate choice.
Second is the factor of historical experience. At the federal level, the only time the Greens participated in government was the "Red-Green" government formed in cooperation with the SPD from 1998 to 2005. At the state level, the Greens currently participate in the governance of ten federal states, of which five are in cooperation with the SPD, three with the Union, and two with both the SPD and the Union. Therefore, in terms of governing experience, the cooperation between the Greens and the SPD is more extensive and the cooperation model more mature. Furthermore, in May 2016, the SPD won the state parliament elections in Rhineland-Palatinate and subsequently formed the first state-level "Traffic Light Coalition" government with the Greens and the FDP. In another election five years later, the SPD won again, and the state government maintained the "traffic light" model. Five years of experience with this model at the state level provided the foundation and confidence for the three-party coalition negotiations after this general election.
Third is the factor of governing programs. On the German political spectrum, the three parties are not aligned; in particular, the SPD and the Greens are far removed from the FDP. However, in this election, the campaign programs of the three parties were all adjusted and moved toward each other. Scholars have differentiated the campaign programs of Germany's major parties along two dimensions: economic policy and social policy. On the "left-right" axis of economic policy, the Greens and the SPD are relatively close, both supporting state intervention, while the FDP stands at the furthest right (excluding the AfD), emphasizing market freedom. In the dichotomy between progressive and traditional social policy, the three parties are relatively close, all pursuing social change. However, compared to their own 2017 election programs, while pursuing reform, both the SPD and the Greens began to lean slightly toward supporting market freedom. Meanwhile, the FDP, while basing itself on market freedom, showed a tendency to support some state intervention. The convergence in the overall direction and the proximity in positioning of the three parties' programs increased the chances of forming a "Sovereign-Red-Green" (Traffic Light) coalition.
Fourth is the factor of voter psychology. According to a survey report released by the German polling agency Infratest Dimap on October 7, 2021, 63% of voters believed that the SPD candidate Scholz would be a good chancellor; in contrast, only 14% believed the Union candidate Laschet was fit for the office. Regarding the future government formation, the "Traffic Light Coalition" received the highest level of expectation, with 53% of voters supporting it. Most people held a pessimistic view of a "Jamaica Coalition" [8]. To respond to voter demands, the Greens and the FDP naturally had to take public opinion into account during coalition negotiations.
Fifth is the factor of party will. The SPD's opportunity to return as the largest party was hard-won, as sixteen years had passed since it last led a government; thus, having been in a subordinate position within the Grand Coalition, the SPD naturally cherished this opportunity to form a government. For the Greens, they were certainly more willing to participate in a government led by the SPD, as the two parties had experience in a joint federal government and were closer in values and concepts than other parties. The FDP had abruptly withdrawn from exploratory negotiations with the Union after the 2017 election, leading to a "difficult birth" for the new government. This not only negatively impacted its image but also cast a shadow over relations between the two parties. Therefore, the FDP also tended to choose an alliance with the SPD and was more willing to seek common ground while reserving differences during negotiations to avoid the lessons of the previous failed talks. Thus, after the election results were released, the Greens took the lead in holding talks with the FDP; on October 6, they officially announced the commencement of exploratory talks with the SPD to form a new government. On October 15, the three parties reached a preliminary agreement on forming a coalition. On October 21, the "Traffic Light Coalition" began formal negotiations. On November 24, the three parties announced the content of the coalition agreement, and the coalition negotiations concluded smoothly. Finally, on December 8, the SPD candidate Scholz was declared chancellor, Green leader Habeck became Vice Chancellor and Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Protection, and Baerbock became Foreign Minister, marking the official debut of the new German government.
IV. The German Green Party’s Policy Positions Toward China
In Germany's most recent federal election, China emerged as a significant issue of heated debate among the competing political parties. The coalition members—the Greens, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), and the Free Democratic Party (FDP)—all expressed concern regarding China, and to varying degrees criticized Merkel for being "too weak" towards China and for her "economy-first" approach. However, by comparison, the Green Party exhibits a distinct ideological character and maintains a significantly tougher stance toward China. This can be glimpsed from the China policy proposals in the party’s election manifesto and its various public statements. We must maintain a sufficient level of vigilance regarding this.
First, regarding the basic tone toward China, the Greens clearly define China as a "partner, competitor, and systemic rival" for Germany and Europe. This is the fundamental position repeatedly clarified and emphasized in the election manifesto and by the party’s two co-chairs on various occasions. In their manifesto, the Greens explicitly advocate for a "values-based diplomacy" that defends human rights and guarantees peace, listing China separately in the foreign policy section as a systemic rival. Annalena Baerbock, the Green Party co-chair who serves as Foreign Minister in the new federal government, stated in an interview as a chancellor candidate that Germany must strive for a policy of "dialogue and toughness" toward China. She believes that while it is difficult for Germany to simply sever ties with China, it must stand firm on its own values. Although the coalition agreement reached by the three parties after the election results did not provide an explicit definition of China policy, it stated that they would future-proof "multilateral cooperation worldwide, especially close ties with those countries that share our democratic values." Clearly, emphasizing an alliance based on democratic values has become a consensus among the three parties, and China is the "other" [9] positioned outside this alliance.
Second, in terms of economic and trade relations, the German Green Party hopes to continue developing trade ties with China to secure the best market access and competitive environment for domestic investment. Major German political parties, including the Greens, fully recognize that they must engage in constructive dialogue and seek cooperation with China in the economic and trade fields; maintaining good economic relations with China has already become an important external condition for Germany’s economic and social development. However, the Greens also unilaterally exaggerate China’s "heterogeneity" in terms of values, as well as its influence and unfair competition in fields like science, technology, and the economy. Throughout the campaign, Green Party co-chair Baerbock repeatedly made it clear that if the Greens participated in forming a new government, they would tighten German and European trade policy toward China, emphasizing that trade must be linked to environmental protection and "human rights," even declaring "no business without human rights." Obviously, this will interfere with future China-Germany economic cooperation, obstruct the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), and perhaps even lead to its collapse.
Third, regarding China's internal affairs, the German Green Party insists on departing from so-called human rights principles to continuously criticize China. Furthermore, the state of Bavaria—a major source of votes for the Greens—is a primary base for "East Turkestan" [10] elements within Germany. In the future, the new government featuring Green participation may increase pressure on China regarding issues related to Xinjiang and Tibet.
Finally, regarding climate change and environmental protection, the Greens hope to conduct constructive dialogue with China, while simultaneously emphasizing that this cannot come at the expense of third countries or "human and civil rights." Ecological protection is a very important field for constructive cooperation between Germany and China. Resolving the global issues that concern the Greens and their coalition allies, such as climate change and carbon neutrality, requires China’s cooperation. This is the fundamental reason why Green leaders emphasize that they "cannot cut ties with China." However, while emphasizing "joint efforts," "compliance with sustainable production standards," and "transparency roadmaps," the Greens also stress that the goal is to "address China's climate crisis," implying China's international responsibility for environmental protection. At the same time, they do not forget the "human rights principle," "demanding that cooperation with China must never be at the expense of third countries or human and civil rights." Therefore, ecological and climate protection policy can serve both as a new breakthrough point for the new German government to initiate China-Germany cooperation, and as another pretext to exert pressure on China.
V. Conclusion
Although the German Green Party has shed much of the heavy idealism of its founding years and gradually moved toward realism, its ideological color remains distinct, and it continues to adhere to traditional values. To a certain extent, this was an important factor in helping the Green Party win the election and enter the government; it may also become an important driving force for adjusting Germany's foreign relations. Therefore, we should have a relatively sober understanding of the Greens’ return to the federal government and its impact on China policy.
First, we must not simply judge that the Green Party's rise to power is more conducive to the development of China-Germany or China-EU relations based on its left-wing character. In fact, in this federal election, almost all major German parties mentioned China in their election manifestos. By comparison, the Green Party’s manifesto devoted the most space to China policy and maintained the toughest stance. The party unilaterally exaggerates China’s heterogeneity in values and its influence in science and technology. This attitude will, to some extent, influence the German public and other political parties' views on China, and may even directly push the German government—and even the EU—to adjust current China policies toward a tougher stance. This has been confirmed by research reports from several institutes, including the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS).
Second, the German Green Party’s toughness toward China does not mean it is pro-American. In fact, the Greens have repeatedly called for Germany and the EU not to rely excessively on "external forces"—a term that includes both China and the United States. In the view of Green co-leader Robert Habeck, Europe is a socio-ecological market economy that differs from both China and the United States. The difference with China, however, is not just in policy but in values, leading to the designation of China as a systemic rival. Similarly, the Greens differentiate between their attitudes toward China and Russia. Relatively speaking, they are tougher when mentioning Russia; when mentioning China, while expressing a tough stance, they also acknowledge the necessity of dialogue and cooperation. Clearly, the German Green Party's goal is to build a strong European "community of values" capable of effectively resisting crises and reducing dependence on external powers, rather than targeting China alone.
Finally, the tough stance of the German Green Party during the campaign does not necessarily dictate its governance policy after taking office. From the perspective of electoral strategy, the focus on and toughness toward China during the election was largely a consideration for winning votes. Once in power, the Green Party must face political reality and a dilemma: on the one hand, based on "principles of values," it must take a tough stance on China; on the other hand, in the face of global challenges such as climate change, the pandemic, terrorism, and migration, it must cooperate with China. Moreover, Germany's own economic development cannot be separated from China, which has been Germany’s most important trading partner for five consecutive years. If the Greens cannot balance these two aspects, they will encounter what former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder called the "limitations of 'moral diplomacy'—simply placing values above realistic interests." Furthermore, they will not be able to provide the "way out" or "model" for divided Western democracies to escape the predicament of political polarization as Western scholars expect.
In light of this, after the German Green Party participated in the government and secured the position of Foreign Minister, Germany's relations with China may face adjustment or even restructuring. At the same time, there remains a possibility for improvement and room for effort. This possibility and space come both from the realistic needs after participating in governance and from the consensus between the two countries on relevant concepts, such as sustainable development, the pursuit of peace, and non-violence.