Wang Yijuan and Yu Liangzao: Lenin’s Practice and Thought on the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)’s Courage in Self-Revolution
The courage to engage in self-revolution is a distinct marker that separates Marxist parties from all other political parties, and it is an inevitable requirement for a proletarian party to realize its historical mission. In the practice of leading the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) [RKP(b)] to explore the path of socialist development, Lenin consistently adhered to self-revolution—that is, the courage to publicly admit the Party's own errors, to struggle against these errors, and to draw lessons from them to ensure the Party always advanced along the correct political line. Using history as a mirror, one can understand the rise and fall of states. In the New Era of socialism with Chinese charactersistics, revisiting Lenin's thought is of great significance for strengthening the Party’s self-construction.
I. The Practice of Self-Revolution within the RKP(b) under Lenin's Leadership
(1) Lenin led the Party in a resolute struggle against "revolutionary phrase-mongering"
In the early stages following the victory of the October Revolution, a dispute arose within the RKP(b) regarding whether the Soviet regime should sign the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk [1] with Germany. Certain individuals within the Party spread "revolutionary phrase-mongering" (革命空谈) and opposed signing the peace treaty. Lenin engaged in a resolute struggle against this, marking an important attempt by Lenin to lead the RKP(b) in self-revolution.
From January to March 1918, Soviet Russia was in the early aftermath of the revolution's victory. The smoke of the First World War still lingered, and the nascent Soviet regime was surrounded by imperialism, facing the danger of attack and subversal. Seeking to escape imperialist assault and consolidate power, the Soviet regime dispatched a delegation to negotiate with the Germans, striving to sign a peace treaty and withdraw from the war to gain a "breathing space" (喘息机会). At this time, a group of "Left Communists" led by Bukharin emerged within the RKP(b). They advocated continuing the war against German imperialism to support the proletarian revolution in Germany. This was a "Leftist" (左倾) [2] trend of thought. Lenin led the RKP(b) in a resolute struggle against it, conducting a severe critique of this "Leftist" trend. Lenin wrote articles such as "On Revolutionary Phrase-mongering," "The Itch," and "A Painful but Necessary Lesson," and led the Party Central Committee in meetings on February 17, 18, and 23, 1918, emphasizing the necessity of signing the treaty and criticizing the ideological errors of the "Left Communist" group. Lenin pointed out: "The 'slogan' of revolutionary war in February 1918 is a hollow phrase, without any real, objective basis. Sentimentality, wishful thinking, anger, and indignation are its only content at present. And a slogan with only such content is called revolutionary phrase-mongering." Clearly, by labeling the Left Communists' proposals as "revolutionary phrase-mongering," Lenin was conducting a profound and severe critique of this "Leftist" trend of thought. He further noted that the danger of "revolutionary phrase-mongering" lay in its utility to German imperialism for launching attacks on the Soviet regime, thereby leading the cause of the Russian proletariat toward defeat.
Simultaneously, to thoroughly explain the harmfulness of the Left Communists' "revolutionary phrase-mongering," Lenin exposed and criticized their various "pretexts." Their most deceptive pretext was that signing this treaty was "a disgrace and a betrayal of Latvia, Poland, Courland, and Lithuania." They attempted to use this as an excuse to oppose the treaty. Lenin, however, believed this seemingly internationalist argument showed that the "Left Communists" had fallen into a trap set by the Russian bourgeoisie (who were opposing the treaty for that exact reason). Lenin stated: "This argument is a trap that the bourgeoisie intentionally set for the Russian Bolsheviks, and a portion of the Bolsheviks, out of a fondness for phrase-mongering, have unwittingly fallen into it." It can be seen that the "Left" was blindly echoing the views of the Russian bourgeoisie, unaware that this was exactly the situation the bourgeoisie wished for. They knew that continuing the war with Germany would highly likely subvert the Soviet regime and return power to the hands of the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, the British and French bourgeoisie also favored Russia’s continued war against Germany, their ambitions being quite plain. They hoped to use the war to tie down German forces while simultaneously weakening the nascent Soviet regime and sabotaging the proletarian revolution. Lenin pointed out: "The British and French bourgeoisie have set a trap for us: 'Dear friends, go and fight now, we will benefit greatly from it. The Germans will plunder you, gain enough in the East, and then sell out cheaply in the West, and incidentally, the Soviet regime can be overthrown... Fight, dear "allies" the Bolsheviks, we will aid you!'" Thus, Lenin clearly saw Russia's true situation and the danger of revolutionary phrase-mongering: namely, that it would not liberate Soviet Russia from war but would instead leave the Soviet regime enslaved by German imperialism, placing it in dire straits. As Lenin said: "If we refuse the peace treaty offered to us, then 'the gravest defeat will force Russia to conclude an even more disadvantageous separate peace.' Facts prove the situation is even worse... Whoever opposes the immediate signing of even the most draconian peace treaty is ruining the Soviet regime." Therefore, "one must oppose revolutionary phrase-mongering; one must definitely oppose it."
Through Lenin's tireless efforts, a consensus was finally reached within the RKP(b). The Soviet regime signed the peace treaty with Germany on March 3, 1918, and withdrew from the war. This meant Lenin had won the victory in the struggle against "Leftist" errors on this issue. During this period, Lenin identified the harmful nature of the "Left" errors, pointed out the reasons they committed these errors, advocated for a resolute struggle against them, and led the Party's practical efforts. One could say this was an important attempt at "self-revolution" by a proletarian party after seizing power. It demonstrates that the meaning of self-revolution lies in the Party's courage to struggle against various internal errors, whether they be ideological or practical. Only by conducting intra-Party struggle and correcting internal errors can the Party ensure its cause advances in the right direction.
(2) Lenin's profound reflection and self-criticism regarding the Great Debate on the role of trade unions
Just as the Russian Civil War was ending, a great debate broke out within the RKP(b) regarding the role of trade unions, and during the debate, several political factions with their own programs appeared within the Party. Lenin regarded this as a "luxury" (奢侈行为) that delayed the Party's work and an act that "undermined Party unity," something that must never happen again. This is another example of Lenin leading the Party in self-revolution.
From November 2 to 6, 1920, the Fifth All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions was held in Moscow. The conference proposed that the methods of trade union work must change—specifically, replacing administrative-command military methods with democratic methods to adapt to the needs of peaceful construction. However, Trotsky opposed using new methods in trade union work. He raised the slogan of "shaking up" (整刷) [3] the trade unions, calling for "tightening the screws" and the immediate "statization of the trade unions." His meaning was that the trade unions needed a reorganization, shifting cadres skilled in following military orders into union work, strengthening administrative-command management, and using trade unions to replace the economic management functions of the Soviet state, believing the state would no longer manage economic work in the future. Had his proposals been implemented, it would have inevitably changed the nature of trade unions and greatly weakened the functions, role, and organizational strength of the Soviet state. Consequently, the entire RKP(b) engaged in a debate over the nature and role of trade unions. At this time, political factions with their own programs formed within the Party, including the "Trotskyites," the "Workers' Opposition," the "Democratic Centralists," the "Buffer Group," the "Nogin Group," the "Ryazanov Group," and the "Ignatov Group." They each held meetings to explain their programs and published articles in newspapers to propagate them. Given this situation, and given the ideological and political errors of these factions, Lenin wrote articles such as "The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes," "The Party Crisis," and "Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Present Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin," conducting serious critiques and struggle. At the Tenth Congress of the RKP(b) in March 1921, the "Resolution on the Role and Tasks of Trade Unions" was passed, reaffirming the Party’s correct views and bringing the tumultuous debate to a close. After the debate, Lenin engaged in profound reflection, pointing out that this internal debate was a "luxury" that wasted time and delayed the Party's work, and an erroneous act that jeopardized the Party’s unity of thought and action.
At the Tenth Congress, Lenin pointed out that the debate on the trade union issue was "a luxury that is indeed absolutely impermissible; we undoubtedly made a mistake in conducting this debate, failing to realize that we were prioritizing a question that, according to objective conditions, should not have been prioritized. We engaged in this luxury without realizing that we were thereby greatly diverting attention from the urgent, serious, and imminent problems of the crisis." In Lenin's view, the Party at that time was engaged in a life-and-death struggle with internal and external enemies and was facing urgent problems like crop failure, economic destruction, and army demobilization. In such dire circumstances, the Party should not have wasted time debating meaningless questions but should have focused on the primary issues; in particular, multiple political factions with their own programs should not have appeared. Lenin also pointed out the danger of such debates, stating: "All our enemies (and they are countless) in their innumerable foreign newspapers, repeatedly echo and spread the slanders of our bourgeois and petty-bourgeois enemies in the Soviet Republic: where there is debate there is dispute, where there is dispute there is discord, and where there is discord the Communists will be weakened, so seize the opportunity to crush them while they are weak! This has already become our enemies' slogan." Thus, Lenin recognized that internal disputes over different political views were extremely harmful, as they would not only create an unstable domestic political situation but also weaken Party unity and the dictatorship of the proletariat, potentially leading to its collapse. To avoid such consequences, Lenin proposed at the Congress that such great debates must not occur again: "The Party Congress should draw the proper lessons from this, supplement the Central Committee’s political report with them, fix them, confirm them, and turn them into an obligation that the Party must observe—into a law." At the Tenth Congress, Lenin also led the formulation of the resolution "On Party Unity," calling for the immediate dissolution of all political factions and forbidding their formation in the future. If anyone committed such an error again, even a member of the Central Committee, they would be expelled from the Party. In Lenin’s thought, the purpose of opposing great debates and factional activities was to strengthen the Party's unity and its centralized power. He led the Party through the struggle to achieve this goal. This was a major event in Lenin's leadership of the Party's self-revolution. He saw the grave consequences of internal debates and factionalism, criticized them seriously, and demanded their elimination in the future. This process was the very process of the Party's self-revolution.
(3) Lenin admitted certain failures of the "War Communism" policy during the Civil War and resolved to correct the errors with a new policy
During the Russian Civil War, the RKP(b) and the Soviet regime adopted extraordinary measures such as the "surplus-appropriation system" (粮食征集制), the "closing of markets," and the "rationing system." Reflecting on this afterward and admitting the errors constitutes a classic example of Lenin leading the Party in self-revolution.
In 1921, as the three-year Civil War ended, the Soviet regime encountered a severe political and economic crisis. Facing this, Lenin publicly admitted the failures of the War Communism policy, acknowledged the errors in grain collection and other areas, and led the entire Party in searching for the root causes of these errors, while promptly adjusting policies and measures. From 1918 to 1920, to adapt to the war situation and concentrate all forces to crush foreign armed intervention and domestic rebellions, the RKP(b) and the Soviet regime decided to implement War Communism. While its implementation provided the material prerequisites for defending the fruits of the October Revolution and consolidating the nascent Soviet regime, serious problems were exposed as practice developed. Facing these problems, Lenin believed that "committing errors is not scary for the fighting party of an advanced class; what is scary is persisting in the error, and being hypocritically ashamed to admit and correct the error." At the Tenth Congress of the RKP(b), Lenin conducted a profound self-criticism of the problems and failures of War Communism and demanded their correction.
First, Lenin recognized the problems and errors of surplus appropriation [4]. Surplus appropriation meant that in order to guarantee food supplies for the front lines and the cities, peasants were forced to hand over to the state all agricultural products remaining after accounting for their own rations and seeds. The government paid a certain amount of currency to the peasants, but in practice, it often collected the grain without compensation. Due to this policy and its measures, eighty percent of the peasants made enormous sacrifices, delivering their surplus or even their entire grain stock to the state for free. These peasants themselves were left in a state of hunger and cold. Consequently, as soon as the Civil War ended, they could no longer tolerate the state's grain collection system and rose up in unrest and riots to oppose these policies and measures. The most influential of these was the Kronstadt Rebellion of March 1921, which seriously threatened the existence of Soviet power. Against this backdrop, Lenin and the RCP(B) [5] first recognized and publicly admitted the failures of surplus appropriation, and second, announced that the RCP(B) and the Soviet government had decided to immediately change grain policy to improve the production and living conditions of the peasantry. As Lenin pointed out: "We must immediately show the broad masses of peasants that we are prepared to change our policy, provided we never leave the revolutionary path, so that the peasants can feel that the Bolsheviks are willing to immediately improve their unbearable situation at any cost." This policy was the New Economic Policy (NEP), which replaced surplus appropriation with a tax in kind [6]. Its purpose was to win the political support of the broad peasantry and build a solid worker-peasant alliance by improving their living conditions. Shortly thereafter, in "On the Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution," Lenin directly and publicly admitted the mistake. He noted: "We planned (or perhaps it is more accurate to say we imagined without sufficient forethought) that we could, by direct orders of the proletarian state, regulate the state production and distribution of products on communist principles in a small-peasant country. Life has shown that we were wrong." It is evident that Lenin fully realized the failures and problems of surplus appropriation and saw that only by implementing a tax in kind "can we adapt to the tasks of the proletariat; only such a food policy can consolidate the foundations of socialism and lead socialism to complete victory." That is to say, Lenin demanded the use of the tax in kind to correct the errors and problems of surplus appropriation.
Secondly, Lenin recognized the problems and errors of the "closed market" and advocated for the correction of this mistake by permitting free trade. It is well known that another important component of War Communism was the abolition of commodity exchange and the closing of markets. After the war ended, Lenin admitted: "We have made many mistakes in this regard and have gone too far: we have gone too far in the nationalization of commerce and industry, and in the prohibition of local turnover. Was this a mistake? Of course it was a mistake." Clearly, he deeply realized that closing markets would be detrimental to the development of small-scale production and the improvement of productive forces. He proposed that after the implementation of the tax in kind, commodity exchange and market relations must be rapidly restored. As he said: "In essence, the small peasant can be satisfied by two things. First, there needs to be a certain freedom of turnover, a certain degree of freedom for the small private owner. Second, there needs to be a way to obtain commodities and products. If there is nothing to circulate, what kind of freedom of turnover is that? If there is nothing to trade, what kind of freedom of trade is that!" "Freedom of turnover is freedom of trade... freedom of turnover and freedom of trade refer to the exchange of commodities between various small owners." His meaning was that only through freedom of circulation and trade, and by maintaining and developing exchange relations mediated by money, could the production and life of the peasants be brought onto a normal path of development, thereby creating sufficient economic conditions for Soviet Russia’s transition to socialism.
It is not difficult to see that the New Economic Policy—replacing surplus appropriation with a tax in kind and replacing the closed market with free trade—is precisely a classic example of Lenin leading the Party in self-revolution. This practice not only led Lenin to form his ideas on developing commerce in the autumn of 1921, but more importantly, it demonstrated that the RCP(B) carried forward the excellent character of not fearing to admit mistakes, viewing mistakes calmly, and seriously correcting them. It showed that they had put self-revolution into practice.
(4) Lenin severely criticized the erroneous tendency within the Party of being unable to conduct economic work and demanded its rapid over-coming.
During the implementation of the NEP, the fact that Communists were not good at management and did not know how to do business became a major problem facing the development of the Party’s cause; furthermore, many of them were unwilling to learn management and business. Recognizing and overcoming this danger of insufficient capability was also an important practice of Lenin leading the Party in self-revolution.
As mentioned earlier, the replacement of War Communism by the New Economic Policy meant that Soviet Russia abandoned the "direct transition" method in favor of a "roundabout transition" to socialism. However, the development of new things is never smooth sailing, and the implementation of new policies will inevitably encounter unavoidable contradictions and problems. For instance, at the 11th Congress of the RCP(B), Lenin publicly admitted that during the NEP period, Communists did not know how to do economic work and were even less adept at leading it. He believed that Communists were doing poorly and were very unskilled in economic construction. As Lenin said: "We do not know how to manage. This is the fundamental lesson. If we cannot prove within the next year that we can manage, then Soviet power will not be able to survive." Clearly, Lenin soberly saw the danger of this error. In his thinking, this error was specifically manifested in three "political lessons":
The first political lesson was the failure to fully realize the importance of establishing a solid worker-peasant alliance. Lenin pointed out: "The new economy we tried to establish was not linked with the peasant economy. Are they linked now? Not yet. We are only beginning to seek such a link." As early as the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets in December 1921, Lenin pointed out that the most fundamental and essential question of the Russian Revolution and all future socialist revolutions is the relationship between the working class and the peasantry—the establishment of a solid alliance between them. This was the essence of Soviet Russia’s implementation of the NEP. Yet Communists had done far from enough in this regard, failing to fully prove to the peasants that Communists were their most sincere and reliable helpers and allies. Lenin also pointed out that the failure to further consolidate the worker-peasant alliance was not only the main lesson of the past year of implementing the NEP, but that improving work in this area was the primary political criterion for completing the tasks of the following year.
The second lesson was that Communists did not understand and were unwilling to learn how to do business. He said: "The problem is that although a responsible Communist may be excellent, known by all to be loyal and honest, having suffered in penal servitude and unafraid of death, he still does not know how to do business because he is not a businessman; he has not learned and does not want to learn this trade, and he does not understand that he must start from the very beginning." His meaning was that managing the economy requires a business mind; if one does not understand the trade, lacks experience, and is unwilling to learn seriously, then no matter how strong the Communist's socialist enthusiasm, initiative, or excellent character may be, they will still be unable to manage the economy well. Reality proved that the performance of Communists in this regard was indeed inferior to that of trained ordinary shop assistants. Lenin believed that all Communists should see this, admit this fact, and learn to do business with humility and the conviction that they do not understand the trade and must start from scratch, thereby changing the new problem of the Party being inept at leading the economy.
The third lesson was that Communists could not correctly understand state capitalism. He said: "On the question of state capitalism, our press and our Party have both made a mistake; they have succumbed to intellectualism and fallen into liberalism, trying to understand state capitalism in a 'clever' way by looking through old books. But what is written in those books is something else entirely—they write about state capitalism under a capitalist system, and not a single book has been written about state capitalism under a communist system. Even Marx did not think to write a single word on this subject." At that time, Soviet Russia had completed the shift in the focus of its work, and the primary task was to use state capitalism to develop the economy. In this period, Soviet Russia's state capitalism included the implementation of concession [7] systems, leasing systems, cooperatives, and acting as purchasing and marketing agents, among others. Realizing state capitalism was conducive to the rapid recovery and development of production and the improvement of the level of productive forces, and it could obtain the necessary products to meet the needs of the people's lives. At such a time, if state capitalism were not correctly understood, it would affect the implementation of this policy. Proceeding from this, Lenin required the broad membership to understand the necessity and importance of implementing state capitalism, to learn how to trade, and to achieve results in the process of developing production and the economy.
The facts show that in the process of implementing the NEP, Communists failed to rapidly improve the production and living conditions of the peasants, improve worker-peasant relations, or consolidate and develop the worker-peasant alliance. Their lack of understanding and unwillingness to learn business, and their inability to effectively lead the economy, were all obstacles and problems facing the development of the RCP(B) and Soviet power. Lenin clearly pointed out these problems, severely criticized the relevant people and matters, and demanded that they quickly correct their shortcomings and issues. This also reflected Lenin and the RCP(B)’s spirit of having the courage for self-revolution.
II. Lenin's Thought on the Importance of the Party Daring to Admit Its Own Mistakes and Self-Revolution
In the process of consolidating Soviet power and restoring the national economy after the October Revolution, Lenin not only led the RCP(B) in the practice of self-revolution but also expounded important ideas on the significance of the ruling party admitting its own mistakes and engaging in self-revolution. His thoughts consist of the following content:
First, daring to admit mistakes and having the courage for self-revolution helps Communists clarify their mission and advance the Party's cause. The historical mission of the proletarian party is to establish a communist society and achieve human emancipation. Whether this cause can proceed smoothly is inevitably linked to whether the proletarian ruling party can persist in self-revolution. As Marx and Engels said: "Only in a revolution can it succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages and become fitted to found society anew." In the thought of Marx and Engels, there is a logical necessity between the Party's self-revolution and the fulfillment of its historical mission; the process of achieving communism is the process of Communists' continuous self-revolution. On this basis, Lenin pointed out: "We are not afraid to admit our mistakes and are not afraid to make repeated efforts to rectify them—then we shall reach the very summit." His meaning was that as the ruling party of the world’s first worker-peasant state, the Bolshevik Party had no prior governing experience to draw upon, and the problems it faced were dynamically changing. Therefore, the Party would inevitably encounter problems and make mistakes in the process of governing; but as long as all members dare to admit and correct mistakes and persist in self-revolution, they will certainly be able to resolve risks and reach the victorious "summit"—the grand goal of achieving communism.
The facts show that Lenin seriously implemented this idea in practice. For instance, he admitted that Communists had made the error of "revolutionary phrase-mongering" [8] and advocated for its immediate correction and the unification of thinking within the Party so the whole Party could clearly recognize the revolutionary situation; he admitted that the debate within the Party regarding the role of trade unions was a "luxury" that prevented the Party from concentrating its energy on central work and main tasks, and that the emergence of various political factions with different programs within the Party would lead to its ideological and organizational disintegration; he admitted the inadequacy of War Communism and timely adjusted policies to promote the implementation of the NEP to accelerate the pace of transition to socialism; and he admitted that the Party was not good at business or leading the economy during the NEP and required the Party to quickly change this situation. In Lenin’s thought, whether the Party’s cause proceeds smoothly depends on whether the Party's self-revolution is carried out resolutely and thoroughly. This is what he meant when he said: "We now understand our tasks far more clearly, specifically, and plainly than before; we are not afraid to point out our mistakes openly for the purpose of correcting them." The meaning here is that only if the ruling RCP(B) is not afraid to point out its mistakes, admits its mistakes, and resolutely corrects them—or in other words, has the courage for self-revolution—can it advance its cause.
Second, having the courage to admit errors and engage in self-revolution is conducive to promoting theoretical innovation and continuously driving the development of theory. Self-revolution not only enables a proletarian governing party to weed through the old to bring forth the new, but also allows the Party—on the basis of grasping objective laws and trends of social development—to break through traditional concepts and institutional mechanisms that obstruct the revolutionary cause, thereby promoting transformation in the ideological sphere and driving theoretical development.
First, in the process of criticizing the "Military Opposition," [9] Lenin proposed the ideas of establishing Party organizations and the system of political commissars within the Red Army. Following the victory of the October Revolution, in order to strengthen the construction of the Red Army, Lenin proposed the idea of employing former military specialists. However, disputes over this issue arose within the Party at the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B). A section of people formed the so-called "Military Opposition," which opposed a regular Red Army and the implementation of iron discipline in the military, denying the necessity of recruiting former military specialists. In response, Lenin sternly pointed out: "The whole error of your opposition lies in the fact that, because you are tied to that guerrilla habit by your own experience, and to those heroic traditions which will always be remembered, you refuse to understand that this is now a different period. Now, the primary issue is that we must have a regular army, we must transition to a regular army with military specialists." It was also during this process that Lenin proposed the establishment of Party organizations and the political commissar system in the Red Army, perfecting military theory and thought.
Second, in the process of opposing "Left-wing" tendencies, Lenin formed the propositions and ideas for implementing state capitalism. In April 1918, as Lenin gained a clear view of the domestic situation, he proposed the idea of shifting the focus of work—namely, advocating that the focus of Party and state work shift from political and military struggle toward economic construction, state management, and the development of production. During this period, Lenin pointed out that "state capitalism" was a necessary stage for the Soviet regime's transition to socialism. However, the "Left Communists" denied the necessity of this transitional stage, advocating for immediate nationalization and opposing the implementation of state capitalism. In view of this, Lenin criticized these erroneous "Left-wing" views in his article "'Left-Wing' Childishness and the Petty-Bourgeois Mentality," [10] arguing for the importance and necessity of implementing state capitalism. He noted: "State capitalism would be a giant step forward, even if... we were to pay more than we are paying now, for it is worth paying 'for tuition,' for it is useful for the workers, for the most important thing is to eliminate disorder, economic ruin, and slackness, for to allow the anarchy of small proprietors to continue is the greatest and most serious danger, which will undoubtedly ruin us (if we do not overcome it), while to pay a larger tribute to state capitalism will not only not ruin us, but will lead us by the most reliable path to socialism." Clearly, Lenin realized that there was nothing for the Soviet regime to fear in state capitalism; on the contrary, for the Russia of that stage, it possessed realistic progressiveness. Lenin not only demonstrated the importance of state capitalism theory but also proposed concrete measures for its implementation, such as practicing special "redemption" [11] for civilized capitalists and learning from the organizers of trusts—the capitalists themselves—thereby advancing the rapid development of the Soviet Russian economy.
Finally, while criticizing the erroneous ideas of the Mensheviks—who claimed Russia lacked the conditions to realize socialism and opposed the October Revolution—Lenin proposed the idea of the particularity of Russia's path of social development, promoting theoretical innovation. The important role of Lenin's aforementioned practices is self-evident; they not only formed a unique Russian socialist theory to point the way forward for the Soviets, but also steadied the Bolshevik Party's pace toward communism.
Third, having the courage to admit errors and engage in self-revolution is conducive to strengthening the Party’s organizational construction and enhancing its advanced nature and purity during the process of self-criticism. Lenin once noted: "Self-criticism is absolutely necessary for any party that is vibrant and full of vitality." In his thought, the process of a proletarian party's self-criticism is the process of its self-revolution; it is the process of its self-perfection. As a proletarian party, and especially as a proletarian governing party, it can only temper and produce its advanced nature and purity and become the advanced detachment of the proletariat by conducting self-criticism—or rather, by conducting self-revolution. After the victory of the October Revolution, most members within the RCP(B) maintained the true character of vanguard fighters, remaining modest and prudent while fulfilling their duties. However, some members relaxed their ideological remolding after the revolutionary victory and became tainted by old, bad ideas and styles of work, leading to undesirable phenomena such as bureaucratism, formalism, and hedonism within the governing party. In practice, Lenin deeply recognized the danger of these phenomena, believing that if bureaucratism were allowed to grow unchecked, it would not only infringe upon the interests of the proletariat and the broad masses of the people but also damage the good image of the proletarian governing party and state organs, seriously weakening the Party's advanced nature and purity. Proceeding from such thoughts, he proposed a series of measures to oppose bureaucratism, such as utilizing the power of the legal system, streamlining institutions, and strengthening internal Party supervision. It is worth noting that in September 1921, Lenin wrote the article "On Purging the Party," [12] solemnly proposing that the broad masses of workers and peasants are very good at identifying bureaucrats within the Party; therefore, criticisms from the masses must be accepted, and those elements who have become divorced from the workers and peasants must be cleared out of the Party. He said: "In purging the Party, it is an important matter to pay attention to the opinions of non-Party laborers. This will enable us to achieve great results, making the Party a much stronger vanguard of the class than before, a vanguard more closely linked with its class, and more capable of leading its class to victory amidst many difficulties and dangers." His emphasis here on the opinions of non-Party laborers meant that the governing party should accept the criticism of the workers and peasants, act according to their views, and purge those elements who have lost touch with the masses. In his thought, this process is the process of the governing party’s self-revolution. After undergoing this process, the advanced nature and purity of the proletarian governing party will be greatly improved, making it more capable of playing the role of the proletarian vanguard in practice.
III. Profound Inspirations for the Self-Revolution of the Communist Party of China
The practice and thought of self-revolution by Lenin and the RCP(B) provide important inspirations for strengthening the construction of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in the New Era.
First, Lenin resolutely opposed engaging in "grand debates" within the Party and opposed the emergence of political factions with different programs, requiring the use of the Party's political construction as a means to uphold the authority of the Party Central Committee and the Party's leadership position. Lenin's practices and thoughts in this regard inspire us that we must take political construction as the overarching principle to strengthen Party building. Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has attached great importance to the Party’s political construction, placing it in the primary position. This is both an inheritance of the distinctive characteristics of a Marxist party and a development of party advantages unique to the Chinese-path. In his 2016 speech at the rally celebrating the 95th anniversary of the founding of the CPC, Xi Jinping pointed out: "Taking the political life within the Party seriously is the foundation for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party. To manage the Party, we must first start with political life within the Party; to govern the Party strictly, we must first start by tightening political life within the Party." It is evident in his thought that the Party’s political construction is of paramount importance and is the essential foundation for advancing Party building comprehensively and effectively. Subsequently, in the report to the 19th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping pointed out again: "Put the Party's political construction in the primary position. To talk politics with a clear-cut stand is the fundamental requirement for our Party as a Marxist party. The Party's political construction is the fundamental construction of the Party, determining the direction and effect of Party building." It is easy to see that as practice develops, the important role of the Party's political construction has been raised to an unparalleled height. In the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping raised this issue once more. He said: "Strengthen the Party's political construction, enforce strict political discipline and political rules, implement the primary responsibility of Party committees (Party leadership groups) at all levels, and improve the political judgment, political understanding, and political execution of Party organizations and Party members and cadres at all levels." In short, strengthening the Party’s political construction is one of the important measures to strengthen the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. As for how to strengthen the Party's political construction, the New Era has brought new requirements. First, enhance the "Four Consciousnesses" and firm up the "Four Confidences." In particular, it is necessary to enhance the "consciousness of the core" and "alignment consciousness," so that the Party is closely united around the Party Central Committee, consciously maintaining a high degree of consistency with the Party Central Committee in thought, politics, and action, aligning with the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, and aligning with the spirit of the Party Central Committee's instructions. This further eliminates the bad habits of forming "cliques and factions" [13] and takes firm steps toward the beautiful vision of the prosperity, strength, and long-term stability of the Party and the country. Second, resolutely uphold the "Two Establishments" and earnestly achieve the "Two Upholds." It is necessary to deeply recognize that the Party's establishment of Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the whole Party, and the establishment of the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, are of decisive significance for the development of the cause of the Party and the country. Resolutely uphold General Secretary Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the whole Party; resolutely uphold the authority and centralized, unified leadership of the Party Central Committee. This is both an important measure for the Party to deeply advance various tasks and the key to implementing the Party's line, principles, and policies.
Second, Lenin admitted that the Party and the state power had made errors during the period of the Civil War, proposing the replacement of the surplus-appropriation system [14] with a tax in kind [15], and allowing free trade to improve the production and living conditions of the peasants, thereby facilitating the establishment of a solid worker-peasant alliance. The aforementioned practices and thoughts provide important inspirations for the CPC in the New Era to resolve issues concerning peasants, agriculture, and rural areas (the "three rural issues"). First, attach great importance to the "three rural issues." Since the 18th National Congress of the CPC, resolving the "three rural issues" has become the top priority of the work of the whole Party. Xi Jinping pointed out: "We must persist in using a 'macro-historical view' [16] to look at issues concerning agriculture, rural areas, and peasants. Only by deeply understanding the 'three rural issues' can we better understand this Party, this country, and this nation. We must see that in building a modern socialist country in all respects and realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, the most arduous and heavy tasks remain in the rural areas, and the most extensive and deepest foundation remains in the rural areas." He means that although marked results have been achieved in "three rural" work currently, it still faces important issues such as an unstable agricultural foundation, a large income gap, and unbalanced urban-rural development. Only by stabilizing the peasants, agriculture, and rural areas can we better respond to risks and challenges, accelerate agricultural modernization, comprehensively advance rural revitalization, and follow the path of urbanization unique to the Chinese-path. Second, consolidate and expand the achievements of the poverty alleviation struggle. As is well known, China achieved a comprehensive victory in the battle against poverty at the end of 2020. On this basis, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee clearly proposed the important task of "achieving an effective link between the consolidation and expansion of poverty alleviation achievements and rural revitalization," indicating that poverty alleviation work is not yet over and the task of preventing people from falling back into poverty in formerly impoverished areas remains heavy. This is because, although a considerable portion of households lifted out of poverty have secured their basic livelihoods, their foundation remains fragile and their income levels are still low; they could return to poverty at the slightest risk. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure an effective connection between consolidating achievements and rural revitalization, and we must never allow a situation where comprehensive poverty alleviation is announced on one hand, while large-scale returns to poverty occur on the other. Regarding how to further consolidate the results of poverty alleviation, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has proposed specific measures, such as improving dynamic monitoring and assistance mechanisms to prevent a return to poverty, strengthening follow-up support for relocation from inhospitable areas, promoting multi-channel employment, and strengthening social management, thereby advancing the effective implementation of the rural revitalization strategy. In the report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC, Xi Jinping made important expositions on revitalizing the countryside and agriculture. He said: "Comprehensively promote rural revitalization. In building a modern socialist country in all respects, the most arduous and heavy tasks still lie in the rural areas. Persist in the priority development of agriculture and rural areas, persist in the integration of urban and rural development, and smooth the flow of urban and rural factors. Accelerate the construction of a strong agricultural country, and solidly promote the revitalization of rural industry, talent, culture, ecology, and organization." He also put forward the following specific requirements: firmly hold the "red line" of 1.8 billion mu of arable land [17], build all basic farmland into high-standard farmland, strengthen the support of agricultural science, technology, and equipment, improve the income guarantee mechanism for grain farmers and the benefit compensation mechanism for main production areas, and ensure that the "rice bowl" of the Chinese people is held firmly in their own hands. It is necessary to establish a "broad food view" [18] and build a diversified food supply system. These instructions from Xi Jinping serve as the ideological guide for the whole Party and the people of the whole country to consolidate the great achievements of poverty alleviation, further revitalize agriculture and the rural areas, and promote the construction of a modern socialist country.
Finally, during the period of the New Economic Policy, Lenin admitted that Communists were not adept at economic management and found themselves in a passive position in their work; he strongly urged Communists to overcome attitudes of arrogance and conceit [19] and to earnestly study professional skills in order to master the cause of economic construction. This similarly offers important enlightenment for CPC members in the New Era to overcome the "danger of a lack of ability." Since the 18th CPC National Congress, the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has attached great importance to the "Four Tests" and "Four Dangers" facing the Party. The "Four Tests" comprise the test of governance, the test of reform and opening up, the test of the market economy, and the test of the external environment; the "Four Dangers" comprise the danger of a lack of drive [20], the danger of a lack of ability, the danger of becoming divorced from the masses, and the danger of passivity and corruption. As Xi Jinping pointed out at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th CPC Central Committee: "Under new historical conditions, great changes have occurred in the international and domestic situations; the 'Four Tests' and 'Four Dangers' facing the Party are long-term, complex, and severe." Furthermore, at the second plenary session of the 19th CPC Central Committee, he noted: "We must bravely face the 'Four Tests,' resolutely overcome the 'Four Dangers,' continue to promote the great new project of Party building in the New Era, and unwaveringly make the Party stronger and more vigorous." Among these, the "danger of a lack of ability" is one of the "Four Dangers," manifesting specifically in six areas: insufficient capacity for learning, political leadership, reform and innovation, scientific development, law-based governance, and risk management. It can be said that our Party soberly recognizes that if its abilities are insufficient and its skills are not strong, it will be unable to resolve the various risks on the road ahead, let alone realize the Great Dream of national rejuvenation. Therefore, how to improve these abilities is a prominent issue facing the strengthening of Party building.
This requires: First, increasing the intensity of learning to resolve the danger of a lack of ability through professional and systematic study. Strengthening the construction of a learning-oriented political party is the primary measure for enhancing governing capacity. As clearly stated in the Guidelines on Internal Party Political Life Under New Circumstances, in order to adapt to the requirements of the times and the development of the cause, the broad ranks of Party members should "extensively study knowledge in various fields—economics, politics, culture, society, ecological civilization, as well as philosophy, history, law, science and technology, national defense, and international affairs—to improve their capacity for strategic, innovative, dialectical, law-based, and bottom-line thinking, and to raise the professional level of their leadership capabilities." It is evident that Communists must not only value, be diligent in, and be adept at learning, but must also apply the advanced results of their learning to the processes of governance and development. Only by taking the initiative to study and studying hard can the danger of a lack of ability be overcome, thereby improving the CPC’s governing capacity.
Second, adhering to the viewpoint of practice and resolving the danger of a lack of ability through practice. The world today is facing great changes unseen in a century [21], and the severe international and domestic situations also reflect that strengthening Party building is a complex and tortuous process. In this process, to develop masterful skills, one must face one's own deficiencies squarely, summarize experience through practice, explore objective laws, and strive to enhance one's comprehensive abilities.
Third, strengthening ideals and convictions to resolve the danger of a lack of ability through distinct political confidence. Xi Jinping pointed out: "With firm ideals and convictions, one stands higher, possesses a broader vision, and develops an open mind; one can maintain the correct political direction, remaining neither proud nor impetuous in times of victory and prosperity, nor dejected or wavering in times of difficulty and adversity. One can withstand the tests of various risks and hardships, consciously resist the erosion of all kinds of decadent ideas, and forever preserve the political character of a Communist." Clearly, only by strengthening ideals and convictions—namely, firming up faith in Marxism and the long-term ideal of Communism, and strengthening confidence in our path, theory, system, and culture [22]—can we consolidate our foundation, enhance the Party’s creativity, combat effectiveness, and cohesion, resolve the danger of a lack of ability, and shoulder the new missions and tasks bestowed by the times. In his report to the 20th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping proposed: "All of us in the Party must remember that comprehensively and strictly governing the Party is an unceasing journey, and the Party’s self-revolution is an unceasing journey. We must never succumb to feelings of slackening, fatigue, or wariness of struggle. We must persist over the long term in promoting comprehensive and strict Party governance, further the great new project of Party building in the New Era, and lead social revolution through the Party's self-revolution." It is evident that all Party members, especially Party cadres, must withstand these tests and maintain the courage and spirit to continue the struggle. This is the organizational and political guarantee that the Chinese Communist Party will forever maintain its governing status and ensure that the "People's Rivers and Mountains" [23] remain evergreen for ten thousand years.