Han Qi: Reasons for the Return of Left-wing Governments in Latin American Countries and Their Potential Impacts
At the beginning of the 21st century, an unprecedented political phenomenon occurred in Latin America: in most countries across the region, left-wing governments came to power one after another. This wave began in 1998 with Hugo Chávez’s electoral victory in Venezuela, followed by electoral wins in countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Haiti. If Cuba is included, 13 Latin American countries were considered to have left-wing governments by 2010. Although these governments achieved significant successes in the struggle to eliminate poverty and inequality, this "leftist wave" began to fracture during the second decade of the 21st century due to various factors—including a new round of U.S. intervention, the sharp drop in international raw material prices in 2014, a new political offensive by the right wing, and political corruption in some countries. Starting with the 2009 coup against then-president Manuel Zelaya in Honduras, right-wing governments secured a series of electoral victories.
However, just as people thought the Latin American left’s challenge to neoliberal ideology had failed and the "turn to the left" had ended, the region unexpectedly began a second "turn to the left." The turning point was the 2018 electoral victory of López Obrador in Mexico, followed by the left coming to power in Argentina (2019), Bolivia (2020), Peru (2021), Chile (2022), Honduras (2021), Colombia (2022), and Brazil (2023). Combined with countries long governed by the left such as Venezuela (with Maduro’s re-election in 2018), Nicaragua (with Ortega’s re-election in 2021), and Cuba, by January 2023, left-wing countries in the region accounted for approximately 90% of the total area and 90% of the total population, characterized by their broad scope and large scale.
The rise of the second wave of left-wing governments in Latin American countries is the result of multiple internal and external factors acting together.
Shortly after the first wave of left-wing governance in Latin America receded, a second wave emerged. While this situation may seem surprising, careful analysis reveals it was no coincidence but rather the result of the combined action of multiple internal and external factors.
The restoration of normalcy in electoral politics created the conditions for the alternation of left and right-wing governance. As a regional phenomenon, the "pendulum phenomenon" of alternating left- and right-wing parties in power emerged in the 21st century. Prior to this, in the 20th century, the "pendulum phenomenon" was expressed more as a cycle alternating between autocracy and democracy. By the mid-1970s, only three countries in Latin America (Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) were democracies; the rest were military regimes or dictatorships. Starting in the late 1970s, Latin America experienced a wave of democratization. By 2000, it had completed the transition from military to civilian rule and established electoral democratic systems, normalizing the alternation of power. However, before 1998, with the exception of the Cuban government, newly inaugurated governments were uniformly right-wing. Nevertheless, the democratic transition paved the way for the later emergence of the left-wing government bloc. The first wave of left-wing governments took the historical stage precisely by utilizing the dissatisfaction of the majority of voters with neoliberal reforms, as well as the background of U.S. "recognition" of Latin American electoral democracy and its (temporary) cessation of intervention. It must be emphasized that the "left" and "right" mentioned here are limited to distinctions within the bourgeois camp [1]. Furthermore, these left-wing governments are defined in relation to the governments of the 1990s that actively promoted neoliberalism—that is, the standards for "left" and "right" are based on the Latin American reality of the time, rather than traditional leftist criteria. Typically, the right advocates for market-based resource allocation and promotes neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, liberalization, marketization, and internationalization, viewing electoral democracy as the standard for political freedom. The left, meanwhile, insists on the role of state intervention in resource allocation and believes the meaning of democracy is broader, encompassing citizens' social rights and the protection of vulnerable groups. Both propositions find support and attraction in Latin American countries. Following the brief period of right-wing rule in the second decade of the 21st century, the reversal of domestic and international situations led to another resurgence of the left. This is inextricably linked to "political cycle" factors; because voters possess a psychology of seeking change [N], a desire for new political alternation as a result of dissatisfaction with the status quo became an expected outcome.
The pandemic and global inflation facilitated a turning point. In 2020 and 2021, the pandemic spread extensively across Latin American countries. Hospitals were overcrowded, medical supplies were scarce, and healthcare systems faced collapse. In some countries, scenes emerged of bodies abandoned in the streets and endless queues for oxygen. Due to the massive impact of the pandemic, Latin American economies suffered a recession as high as 7% in 2020—including 11.1% in Peru, 9.9% in Argentina, 8.2% in Mexico, 7% in Colombia, 6% in Chile, and 0.39% in Brazil—setting the worst record since the 20th century. In the social sphere, unemployment rose rapidly, the impoverished population increased significantly, the poverty rate climbed to 33%, and the extreme poverty rate rose to 13%, regressing to levels from over a decade ago. Large segments of the middle-income group slid into poverty. As demand was suppressed by the pandemic, inflation had already begun to rear its head; the pandemic also caused supply chain bottlenecks and exhausted fiscal resources. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 led to rising global fuel prices and increased transport costs, further exacerbating Latin American inflation. Consequently, unemployment, inflation, and poverty became intertwined, and social security continued to deteriorate. The pandemic stimulated demand for public policy; the control of the pandemic was closely related to state medical capacity and even overall levels of governance. At this time, the neoliberal advocacy for shrinking the role of the state and limiting social rights was rejected by the people. Under the influence of the pandemic and inflation, Latin American voters chose to abandon right-wing parties in power and turned to support left-wing candidates who promised increased social spending.
The intensification of inequality and social exclusion increased the left’s power of discourse. Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world; its high level of inequality has persisted from the 1770s to the present. The Gini coefficient has long remained around 0.5, and even exceeded 0.6 in Brazil at one point. Beyond the Gini coefficient, Latin American social inequality is manifested in low enrollment rates and poor quality in primary and secondary education, high percentages of the population living below the poverty line, and low percentages of the population enjoying legal protection, medical security, and social welfare. neoliberal reforms pushed Latin American inequality to new heights. In 1990, the proportion of the poor in the total population reached 51.2%, the extreme poverty population reached 15.5%, and the Gini coefficient was above 0.51. In the first decade of the 21st century, left-wing governments increased social spending on healthcare, education, housing, and food, successfully lifting tens of millions out of poverty. The Gini coefficient for the entire region fell from 0.52 in 2002 to 0.46 in 2018; the poverty rate dropped from 45.4% in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014, while the extreme poverty rate dropped from 12.2% to 7.8% over the same period, marking massive achievements in the fight to eliminate poverty. It is precisely these achievements that more easily evoke positive memories of the first wave of left-wing governance among voters; people hope the second wave can be a continuation of the first. The masses hold very realistic hopes, such as whether their children can attend a local public school providing basic services and quality education, whether they can enjoy free medical care and first-class nursing when ill, and whether they can secure a decent pension through their work in old age. The solutions left-wing candidates provide for inequality and poverty involve "better" wealth distribution—specifically including more tax reforms and more regulations. They often harshly criticize the wealth of the rich and private companies, questioning the effectiveness of the market economy. They have become spokespersons for the discourse of "justice," constantly updating its expression. These expressions are highly attractive to lower- and middle-class voters.
The governance crises of right-wing governments forced the populace to make new choices. The rise of left-wing governments is linked to the governance dilemmas of the right. In Mexico, the victory of López Obrador cannot be explained without the failure of the National Action Party (PAN) governments (2000–2012) and the disappointing return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (2012–2018). López suffered presidential campaign defeats in 2006 and 2012, but it was precisely because previous governments failed to effectively control drug violence and because of the corruption of the Enrique Peña Nieto government that López succeeded in his third campaign in 2018. The downfall of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was largely due to irresponsible management of the pandemic; meanwhile, during his term, the Amazon rainforest suffered record destruction and the impoverished population increased by 33 million. Conversely, his opponent Lula, during his previous presidential terms, had brought approximately 29 million Brazilians into the middle-income group. In Argentina, the return of Alberto Fernández and Kirchnerism [2] is likewise inexplicable without the economic failure of the Mauricio Macri government. Due to social inequality, poverty, pervasive corruption, the rise of organized crime, and the destruction of the rule of law environment, "what we see in Latin America is people voting against those in power." As one Latin American scholar pointed out: "This is a punishment for existing governments. I don’t know if you can say Latin Americans have become more leftist, but I am certain they are angrier at their governments." It is precisely the failure of right-wing governments—their inability to fulfill campaign promises and their helplessness in the face of crisis—that provided the left with a new opportunity to reinvent itself.
Left-wing forces adopted flexible and pragmatic political strategies in their campaigns. In this new context, the political strategies of left-wing forces displayed greater flexibility and pragmatism. They knew how to communicate with the masses and how to cater to the key demands and core interests of various strata to the maximum extent.
Regarding campaigns and governing platforms, they occupied a position of discursive advantage by declaring that their left-wing parties or movements held a mission to seek the interests of the people. Yet they did not cling stubbornly to traditional leftist propositions; instead, they advanced with the times to propose more inclusive agendas. For example, the "Approve Dignity" (Apruebo Dignidad) alliance of left-wing parties led by Gabriel Boric in Chile based its governing philosophy on socialist values, emphasizing universal democracy, progressive change, and pluralistic solidarity. Its agenda included avant-garde propositions from the global left-wing movement, such as feminism, environmentalism, reproductive rights, and the recognition of same-sex marriage. Former Peruvian President Pedro Castillo won the election on a socialist platform; his governing plan included containing the pandemic, increasing public investment in education and health, increasing taxes on domestic and foreign companies, and, through constitutional reform, increasing the state's share of profits from copper mining companies. However, to gain the support of business owners, Castillo stated he would not establish a radical left-wing government similar to those in Cuba or Venezuela, and his government was more moderate. In the face of market failure, the first wave of left-wing governments utilized the commodity export boom to promote equity through greater public spending; the second wave has sought to realize the desire for solving inequality by calling for a new agenda—respect for human rights, indigenous rights, the rights of women and sexual minorities, attention to climate and environmental protection, and public health.
Regarding campaign methods, the left was willing to abandon radical styles, move toward the center, and choose diverse alliances. For instance, the margin by which Lula defeated Bolsonaro was provided by the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)—the party led by Michel Temer, who had previously... [text cuts off]
years, using their votes in Congress to oust Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff. During his campaign, Lula also united with his former Social Democratic rival, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and selected the centrist Geraldo Alckmin as his running mate. Lula did not hesitate to reconcile with Marina Silva, a former presidential candidate and Minister of the Environment who had previously challenged him from the left, and secured the Evangelical vote by pledging not to support abortion or the liberalization of drugs. Gustavo Petro of Colombia, who in his early years participated in left-wing guerrilla movements, ran unsuccessfully for the presidency twice in 2010 and 2018 after signing a peace agreement with the government. Petro built an alliance with the "Santos faction" (who supported the former president Juan Manuel Santos) and maintained close ties with the Liberal Party of former president César Gaviria. He nominated the environmentalist Francia Márquez as his running mate to form the "Historic Pact for Colombia" coalition, ultimately winning the election. In addition to Brazil and Colombia, the presidential elections in Peru and Chile were also decided in second-round runoffs, undergoing processes of negotiation and compromise with campaign rivals to eventually win the support of swing voters and even voters from the opposing camp.
Changes in the "US factor" assisted the return of the Left to power. After the Trump administration took office in early 2017, it adjusted its policy toward Latin America. On the one hand, it reduced aid to the region, adopted "zero tolerance" toward undocumented immigrants, and practiced economic and trade protectionism and unilateralism by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and signing the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On the other hand, it struck out at left-wing governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, continuously increasing economic sanctions and blockades while uniting with right-wing countries to exert collective pressure on these three nations. This undermined Latin American integration and marginalized extra-regional powers such as China and Russia, thereby fostering a temporary period of "leftist retreat and rightist advance" in Latin American regimes. However, the Trump administration's approach—being unwilling to offer the "carrot" while brandishing the "big stick"—ultimately harmed the interests of the Latin American people and intensified the contradictions between Latin American countries and the United States. Simultaneously, the US failure in Afghanistan signaled that the "Giant of the North" [4] was in decline. With the departure of the Trump administration, right-wing regimes in Latin America were replaced by the Left in rapid succession. The Biden administration has weakened the international environment of "maximum pressure" [5] applied to Latin American left-wing regimes during the Trump era, which has been conducive to the political pendulum swinging left once again.
From the above, it can be seen that the institutional foundation for the return of the Left is the normalization of electoral politics. The fundamental cause is long-standing poverty and inequality. External causes include the occurrence of the pandemic and economic crises, alongside the mitigation of US "maximum pressure" on leftist forces. Meanwhile, the short-term internal factor was the right-wing governments’ helplessness in the face of worsening economic and social crises, combined with the flexible and pragmatic political strategies adopted by leftist forces to adapt to the voters' psychological desire for change. Looking at the internal logic among these causes, as long as the fundamental reasons do not undergo significant change, a new cycle of alternation between Left and Right will occur again. The duration of this "second wave" of leftist rule depends, in the short term, on its capacity to handle crises and, in the long term, on whether it can achieve a major breakthrough in resolving the problems of poverty and inequality.
Challenges Facing the Governance of the Second Wave of Left-Wing Governments in Latin American Countries
Although the second wave of leftist governance in Latin America has become a fait accompli, both internal and external situations have changed considerably compared to the first wave. As previously mentioned, the commonality between the two waves is that they were both catalyzed by crises; the last one resulted from the crisis of failed neoliberal reforms, while this one stems from the crisis brought about by the mismanagement of the pandemic. Both crises stimulated the demands of the middle and lower classes for change. What differs, however, are the conditions following the assumption of power. When the previous wave of leftist regimes emerged, it coincided with the period around "9/11," when the focus of US foreign policy shifted toward counter-terrorism, leaving it with no time to attend to Latin America. This provided Latin American leftists with a developmental opportunity. Furthermore, the acceleration of the process of Chinese-path modernization brought a demand for Latin American commodities. Supported by the export boom, Latin American leftist leaders were able to implement and expand social programs to satisfy the demands of the lower classes. Conversely, after this wave of leftist regimes took power, Latin American governments faced heavy fiscal pressure from the pandemic, soaring inflation triggered by the Ukraine crisis, and the threat of a global economic recession. Uncertainties are increasing across the board. Simultaneously, the social structure of Latin America has undergone marked changes; the proportion of the middle class has increased significantly, and more attention must be paid to their demands. Consequently, leftist governance faces more complex challenges:
First, consolidating the foundation of the ruling party and achieving regime stability. In this wave, many left-wing parties took power winning by only a slim majority. For example, Lula won in Brazil with 50.8% against 49.2%; former Peruvian President Castillo won with 50.1% against 49.9%; and Petro in Colombia won with 50.4% against 47.4%. Upon taking office, many ruling parties did not hold a majority in the legislature. For instance, former President Castillo’s party in Peru held only 37 of 130 seats; Boric’s coalition in Chile held only 37 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of 43 seats in the Senate; and the ruling party in Honduras held only 50 of 128 seats. The result of this situation is usually a government exhausted by right-wing obstructions, struggling to pass bills, and finding policy implementation difficult. For example, Gabriel Boric, who became President of Chile in March 2022, saw his support rate fall below 30%. In September 2022, voters overwhelmingly rejected the draft of the new constitution promoted by the Chilean government. In Peru, Castillo faced two consecutive impeachments from the opposition after taking office. To avoid further impeachment, he announced the dissolution of Congress on December 7, 2022, and the establishment of an emergency government, but was subsequently imprisoned by the judiciary. The Peruvian Congress passed an impeachment motion to remove him from office, with the then-Vice President Dina Boluarte taking over as interim president. However, in Brazil, Lula promised after the election: "I will govern for 215 million Brazilians; there are not two Brazils." Lula stated he would seek support from people across all classes through more pragmatic and inclusive policies and strive to build a national consensus on development—an approach viewed favorably by observers. In Colombia, since taking office, Petro has made many positive moves in domestic and foreign affairs. On the hundredth day of his administration, a poll released by the National Consulting Center of Colombia showed that 62% of respondents approved of the president’s performance. The first two leaders mentioned above lacked political experience, while the latter two are highly experienced, which demonstrates that governing capacity is crucial.
Second, carrying out corresponding social reforms and fulfilling campaign promises. During the pandemic, Latin America experienced its most severe economic and social crisis in history. Social conditions worsened across all countries; for example, poverty levels rose sharply and income inequality intensified significantly, with the living conditions of the middle-income population declining precipitously. If the new governments are to maintain their legitimacy, they must fulfill their campaign promises, strengthen reforms in employment, education, health, and the rights of minority groups, and maintain support for the most vulnerable families. However, to deal with the pandemic crisis and its social impact, governments exhausted their treasuries. The fiscal situation in most countries has deteriorated, leaving very few available public resources. New governments have little budgetary maneuvering room for social reforms. Some Latin American scholars have pointed out that during the first wave of leftist rule, the prices of raw materials exported by most Latin American countries skyrocketed. "This enabled them to increase social spending and significantly reduce poverty. But without this external engine, these policies cannot be sustained." Therefore, if left-wing governments wish to ensure sustainable public fiscal spending, they must find ways to expand fiscal revenue, implement tax system reforms, establish macroeconomic governance mechanisms, and shorten the cycle of economic recession.
Third, promoting economic recovery and achieving economic growth. An important prerequisite for social reform is the achievement of economic growth. Although the current global economic situation remains grim and complex, Latin American countries can still hope to restore growth if they can seize opportunities. First, the Ukraine crisis has caused global prices for energy and grains to rise sharply. Since Latin America's primary exports are oil, soybeans, beef, and coffee, as well as mineral products like copper and iron, Latin American products can partially replace the raw materials from Russia that are under embargo by Western countries. The rise in oil prices has also brought life back to the Venezuelan economy, even prompting subtle changes in US-Venezuela relations. Second, the adjustment of global trade patterns has brought opportunities to Latin America in the form of "nearshoring." In April 2022, the US House of Representatives proposed the Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act. According to estimates by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), "nearshoring" could create US$78 billion in annual exports for Latin America in the short to medium term, with Mexico potentially accounting for nearly half. Finally, it is crucial whether Latin American countries can keep pace with the current revolution in new technologies. Latin American countries should reconsider their production policies and change their production models in a timely manner to seize the opportunities of the technological revolution. Particular attention should be paid to sectors that can transform the production structure and have great development potential, such as "energy transition, electric vehicles, the circular economy, the bioeconomy, healthcare manufacturing, digital transformation, the care economy, sustainable tourism, MSMEs, and the social and solidarity economy." These suggestions from ECLAC [6] indicate the direction for the economic recovery of Latin American countries.
Fourth, changing economic and social structures to promote the transformation of development models. Changing the economic structure focuses on improving productivity, while changing the social structure focuses on breaking inequality. During the first wave of leftist rule, Latin American leftist politicians such as Chávez, Morales, and Correa proposed a holistic alternative to neoliberalism—namely, "21st Century Socialism"—but this led to intense conflict with conservative forces. The goals proposed by the new wave of leftist rule are relatively moderate, focusing on promoting the transformation of development models and driving sustainable economic and social development. Many left-wing leaders are now highly concerned with how to reduce the environmental costs of economic growth and escape the economic model of relying on low-value-added exports. Luis Arce’s government in Bolivia has stated it will promote domestic industrialization through import substitution, while Alberto Fernández’s government in Argentina hoped to promote industrial production and improve manufacturing levels. These left-wing governments have all expressed the intention to transform economic and production systems to create more and better jobs. Regarding social equality, Latin American left-wing governments have also noted that education should be transformed into a genuine driver of social mobility and economic growth, and that gender inequality must be truly eliminated while advancing and improving social security systems. However, under the current internal and external environment, the realization of these goals is a long-term task for left-wing governments, albeit a fundamental one.
Following the second wave of leftist governance in Latin American countries, since their governing philosophies and enacted policies differ from those of right-wing governments, some distinct impacts will emerge domestically and internationally.
The adjustment of domestic policies by left-wing governments will favor the middle and lower classes. Left-wing governments typically value the role of the state, advocate for social equity, promote sustainable development, and emphasize that one cannot purely pursue economic growth but must also seek the rational distribution of wealth. One commonality among second-wave leftist leaders is the advocacy for resolving severe economic inequality and prioritizing poverty reduction measures. Once these policies are implemented, the welfare of the middle and lower social classes will improve. For example, in his first hundred days, Colombian President Petro submitted several important bills to Congress, including the establishment of the Ministry of Equality, tax reform, the establishment of land and peasant ownership, and the "Total Peace" law. He delivered 600 hectares of land to 50 peasant families, including land that had been seized by paramilitaries. To help impoverished mothers improve their quality of life, he launched the "Mothers as Heads of Household" social assistance program, where each beneficiary receives a monthly subsidy of 500,000 pesos. During his campaign, Bolivian President Luis Arce made ten economic promises. One year after taking office, he had completed three, including the distribution of "Hunger Vouchers" starting in December 2020 to mitigate the negative impact of the pandemic (1,000 Bolivianos per person). Simultaneously, the VAT refund system under Supreme Decree No. 1355 came into effect, allowing low-income groups with an average monthly income equal to or less than 9,000 Bolivianos to enjoy tax rebates.
Law No. 2277 proposed a "Great Wealth Tax," involving levies on high-value real estate, personal property, and income. Other various commitments are currently moving forward. Similar initiatives by left-wing governments to improve income distribution and expand social rights will improve the situation of the lower and middle classes.
Left-wing governance will promote regional integration. The first wave of left-wing governance led to a proliferation of regional organizations, such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (2011), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (2004), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (2004), and the Pacific Alliance (2011), among others. However, during the subsequent period of right-wing rule, the activities of these regional organizations decreased significantly. Given the dilemmas of domestic governance, the second wave of left-wing regimes may have higher expectations for enhancing their own strength through regional cooperation. Currently, many left-wing governments have shown a strong interest in reorganizing regional integration and promoting regional cooperation. For example, Argentine President Fernández is the current pro tempore president of Mercosur; in March 2021, President Fernández successfully hosted the celebrations for the 30th anniversary of the founding of Mercosur and stated that he would further deepen internal cooperation within the bloc during his term. In September 2021, Mexico successfully hosted the 6th Summit of Heads of State and Government of CELAC. Colombia has proposed the revitalization of the Andean Community, inviting two former members who had withdrawn, Venezuela and Chile, to rejoin. Chilean President Boric has expressed that he attaches greater importance to the Pacific Alliance. Shortly after taking office, at the 7th CELAC Summit held on January 24, 2023, President Lula announced Brazil's formal return to the CELAC family (Brazil had announced a temporary withdrawal in 2019) and called for the creation of a "regional community with a shared future."
Left-wing governance will strengthen cooperation with China. Left-wing governments generally have a higher degree of identification with China's political system, party system, and ideology, and the two sides share more common ground. One of the five Chinese characteristics of Chinese-path modernization is "modernization of common prosperity for all people." Many Latin American leftists have stated that the most attractive aspect of China's development path is that it ended absolute poverty, finished building a moderately prosperous society in all respects [7], and brought the people's lives to a new level. The achievements China has attained have won the admiration of the Latin American left, who hope to cooperate with China and learn from and draw on China's experience.
Left-wing governance will make the conditions for China-Latin America cooperation more favorable. In 2021, the trade volume between China and Latin America reached a record high of $451.591 billion, a year-on-year increase of 41.1%, and China continued to maintain its position as Latin America's second-largest trading partner. The number of Latin American countries that have signed cooperation documents with China to jointly build the "Belt and Road" has reached 21. However, the coordination mechanisms and coordination strategies of both sides still need to be improved. Left-wing governance helps to activate Latin American regional integration organizations, thereby contributing to the strengthening of overall China-Latin America cooperation. Of course, Chinese enterprises should also be fully prepared mentally for the resource nationalism policies of certain left-wing governments.
Left-wing governance is conducive to neutralizing the United States' containment and disruption of China-Latin America relations. Compared with the first wave of left-wing governance, although this wave of left-wing governments has a more moderate and pragmatic attitude toward the United States—for instance, the López Obrador administration in Mexico signed the revised USMCA with the United States and Canada; Chilean President Boric stated he would not take sides and would implement a balanced diplomacy consistent with national interests; and Brazilian President Lula expressed hope to maintain equally good relations with both the United States and China—the left still possesses an anti-American tradition compared to the right and never hesitates to criticize the United States' hegemonic foreign policy. For example, at the Summit of the Americas held in June 2022, because the United States did not invite government officials from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to participate, Mexican President López Obrador was the first to criticize the U.S. approach, and leaders from Mexico, Bolivia, Honduras, and other countries refused to attend. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, Brazilian President Lula pointed out in a media interview that the United States and the European Union were equally responsible for the outbreak of the crisis. Mexican President López Obrador stated that Mexico would remain neutral and criticized the United States for being unwilling to provide funds to support the development of the Americas while providing money to support Ukraine, calling it "placing the cart before the horse" [8]. To break away from U.S. influence, Colombian President Petro announced the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela in August 2022 and criticized the U.S. listing of Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism as "unjust."