Tang Xin: Dilemmas and Overcoming Strategies Facing CPN (Maoist Centre)
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) [CPN (Maoist Centre)] is currently one of the two largest communist parties in Nepal and stands as the third-largest political party in the country’s political arena. While the CPN (Maoist Centre) remains a significant political force, it faces numerous long-term dilemmas. Whether it can overcome these difficulties and challenges will determine the developmental direction of the CPN (Maoist Centre) and even the broader Nepalese communist movement.
The CPN (Maoist Centre) was once considered a political force capable of fundamentally transforming the face of the Nepalese state. However, after the establishment of the Republic in 2008, the party generally began to lose its advantages and entered a period of decline. Currently, the CPN (Maoist Centre) faces problems and challenges including an identity dilemma, an organizational dilemma, a mass base dilemma, and an external pressure dilemma.
(I) Identity Dilemma
The identity dilemma refers to the CPN (Maoist Centre)’s increasing loss of distinctiveness compared to other political parties, especially the two major parties: the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) [CPN (UML)].
First, the revolutionary character of the CPN (Maoist Centre) has gradually faded. For the UCPN (Maoist) [1], following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2006, the party gradually participated in and became part of the construction of the new state system. It no longer controls armed forces and has, in fact, repudiated the justice of the "People's War" [2]. After undergoing this transformation, the CPN (Maoist Centre) lost its "anti-establishment" characteristics and gradually became an "electoral" party that maintains the current system. Essentially, all party activities revolve around obtaining governing status through participation in elections or parliamentary struggle, indicating that the CPN (Maoist Centre) has largely become an "intra-system" party operating according to the rules of parliamentary power struggle.
Second, the patriotic credentials of the CPN (Maoist Centre) have come under suspicion. After the founding of the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal, the CPN (Maoist Centre), in the process of adapting to a peaceful environment, took several actions perceived as contrary to patriotism or even as selling out national interests. For example, the verbal stance of the CPN (Maoist Centre) toward the controversial U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) aid agreement was to strive for aid without harming national sovereignty or drawing Nepal into a global struggle for hegemony. However, on September 14, 2017, the Nepali Congress-led government officially signed the agreement with the MCC. As the second-largest party in the government, the CPN (Maoist Centre) did not take effective measures to resist despite full knowledge of the controversial terms; instead, it consented to the signing. On February 20, 2022, the coalition government submitted the agreement to the House of Representatives where it was passed. The main text remained unmodified, with only a non-binding "interpretive declaration" attached to express views on relevant clauses. As a member of the coalition government, the CPN (Maoist Centre) effectively acceded to the demands of the Nepali Congress.
Third, the "Maoist" characteristics of the CPN (Maoist Centre) are also disappearing. After the establishment of the Republic, the UCPN (Maoist) stepped-by-step relinquished the party's control over armed forces and returned assets confiscated from landlords and capitalists. At the Seventh General Convention of the UCPN (Maoist), a major shift occurred in the party line; references to "protracted people's war" and "New Democratic Revolution" were no longer mentioned. Following this significant pivot, the "Maoist" theoretical color of the CPN (Maoist Centre) was greatly diluted. In May 2018, when the CPN (Maoist Centre) merged with the CPN (UML) to form the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), Marxism-Leninism was established as the guiding ideology, which objectively further weakened its "Maoist" identity. By the time the CPN (Maoist Centre) was reinstated following a Supreme Court ruling in March 2021, it faced a very severe identity crisis.
(II) Organizational Dilemma
The organizational dilemma refers to the fact that the CPN (Maoist Centre) has undergone debilitating splits, the role of the party organization has been weakened, and the principle of democratic centralism is frequently undermined.
During the "People's War," the CPN (Maoist) [3] exerted unprecedented leadership and cohesion, attracting various left-wing progressive forces and national liberation movements to its side and becoming the leading core of the revolution. After 2008, the UCPN (Maoist)—and the later renamed CPN (Maoist Centre)—encountered continuous trouble and suffered multiple splits, which seriously affected the party's strength and organizational integrity.
First, due to fundamental disagreements over the party line, the conflict between the faction led by Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) and Baburam Bhattarai and the faction led by Mohan Baidhya (Kiran) and Ram Bahadur Thapa (Badal) intensified. Internal opposition figures like Baidhya and Thapa accused Prachanda and Bhattarai of taking a "revisionist" path. They advocated for continuing the New Democratic Revolution, launching urban armed uprisings, and establishing a People's Republic of Nepal. Meanwhile, the side led by Prachanda and Bhattarai insisted on proceeding along the line of completing the peaceful constitution-making process and building a Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. From June 16 to 18, 2012, the opposition led by Baidhya decided to form a separate Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M), causing the UCPN (Maoist) to lose at least one-third of its strength.
Second, the announcement by Bhattarai—long regarded as the "number two figure"—to withdraw from the UCPN (Maoist) was another blow to the party. On September 26, 2015, due to differing views on provisions regarding Madhesi [4] ethnic rights in the new constitution drafted by the Constituent Assembly, Bhattarai announced his resignation from the UCPN (Maoist) and his parliamentary seat, forming a new political party shortly thereafter. Bhattarai had been a key ally of Prachanda and a primary theorist within the party; his departure further weakened the party's strength and prestige.
Third, the failure of the CPN (NCP) merger and integration had a significant impact on the CPN (Maoist Centre). On May 17, 2018, the CPN (Maoist Centre) merged with the CPN (UML) to form the CPN (NCP), becoming the most powerful communist political force in Nepal's history. However, because the CPN (NCP) could not break the deadlock regarding power distribution, guiding ideology, and national governance, factional struggles intensified, leading to a de facto split. On March 7, 2021, the Supreme Court of Nepal issued a dramatic ruling on the ownership of the party name, legally declaring the merger void. Facing the chaotic political situation caused by the dissolution of the CPN (NCP), the reinstated CPN (Maoist Centre) generally maintained its integrity, but some important leaders like Ram Bahadur Thapa and their followers chose to join the CPN (UML). The work of reconstructing party organizations at all levels and its wing organizations has also troubled the party.
The CPN (Maoist Centre) has also performed poorly in implementing democratic centralism. Upon entering the peaceful period, the UCPN (Maoist) and the subsequent CPN (Maoist Centre) failed to properly implement collective leadership and democratic centralism. Party meetings became rubber stamps for confirming results rather than venues for frank discussion, replaced instead by bargaining between individual leaders and various "small circles." After the reinstatement of the CPN (Maoist Centre) in March 2021, although the Party Central Committee led by Prachanda engaged in a degree of self-criticism, the fundamental problems remained unresolved. After the conclusion of the Party's Eighth National Congress, the appointment of the Party Central Committee Vice-Chairmen, General Secretary, and Political Bureau faced "difficult births" (stalling). The Central Committee cannot effectively exercise collective leadership or implement democratic centralism, sparking fears within the party of Prachanda’s "arbitrary decision-making" [5].
(III) Mass Base Dilemma
The mass base dilemma refers to the emergence of problems in the CPN (Maoist Centre)’s party management and governance, leading to a continuous decline in electoral performance, a steady loss of its mass base, and the realistic danger of becoming detached from the masses.
On one hand, the mass base of the CPN (Maoist Centre) shows a trend of daily attrition. In 2008, the CPN (Maoist Centre) participated in the first Constituent Assembly elections, winning 37% of the 601 seats, reflecting the full trust and strong expectations of the Nepalese people. By the 2013 second Constituent Assembly elections, the UCPN (Maoist) suffered a massive setback, falling to the third-largest party. In the first national legislative elections following the promulgation of the new constitution in 2017, the CPN (Maoist Centre) won 53 of the 275 seats (19.3%) in the House of Representatives. While the proportion of seats increased, the actual votes received did not grow; furthermore, as the party had formed an electoral alliance with the CPN (UML), the actual achievements were very limited. As seen in Table 1, the number of votes obtained by the CPN (Maoist Centre) has continuously declined, which reflects the mass base and its changing trends more accurately than the actual seats won.
On the other hand, various problems in the party's management and governance have exacerbated the danger of the party becoming detached from the masses. The loss of ideals and convictions, bureaucratic styles of work, individual opportunism, and a climate of degeneracy and corruption are eroding the party's body. In February 2013, the UCPN (Maoist) held its Seventh National Congress following its public split. Delegates demanded an investigation into corruption within the leadership, criticized the luxurious lifestyles of some senior leaders, and expressed concern over the danger of the party’s degeneration. To gain more votes and seats in elections, the party relaxed theoretical education, training, and quality management of party members and cadres to a certain extent, recruiting "political stars" through office appointments and promises of power. Some opportunists took the chance to infiltrate the party, while simultaneously provoking struggles and speculative activities within the party for political power, such as seats or offices.
(IV) External Pressure Dilemma
The external pressure dilemma primarily concerns the competition the CPN (Maoist Centre) faces from the two mainstream parties—the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML)—and the danger of losing its political influence.
On one hand, the CPN (Maoist Centre) is at a disadvantage in the competition with the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML). Both the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML) have been active in the Nepalese political arena since the 1990s, possessing a broad voter base and rich experience in parliamentary competition. The UCPN (Maoist) originally emerged as a political force for revolutionary state change, adding a new option to Nepalese politics and temporarily igniting the political enthusiasm of the broad laboring masses. However, as the political situation developed and the CPN (Maoist Centre) integrated into "mainstream politics," its political status continued to decline and its uniqueness increasingly faded. As a left-wing party, the CPN (Maoist Centre) has gradually lost ground to the CPN (UML) in the struggle for leadership; meanwhile, due to differences in fundamental theoretical lines, it is also difficult for the party to compete alone against the Nepali Congress for voters. Under these circumstances, achieving left-wing unity is the most realistic strategic choice for the CPN (Maoist Centre). However, the failure of the CPN (NCP) merger attempt and the approach of the 2022 general elections forced the CPN (Maoist Centre) to continue its political maneuvering between the two major parties.
On the other hand, the "tripartite" political structure of Nepal does not favor the long-term development of the CPN (Maoist Centre). Since 2008, the CPN (Maoist) and the subsequent CPN (Maoist Centre) have emerged as the third major political force. Due to the weakening of its strength after 2013, the CPN (Maoist Centre) has often functioned as a "pivotal third party"—that is, by exploiting changes in the political situation and choosing to support either the right-wing Nepali Congress or the left-wing CPN (UML), it secures political interests through bargaining. This suggests that the current CPN (Maoist Centre) finds it difficult to play a leading role in the fundamental strategy of national development; instead, it occupies the tactical position of a "political opportunist." While the CPN (Maoist Centre)'s political spectrum is left-wing and theoretically more radical than that of the CPN (UML), its actual political status contradicts its theoretical political identity. The CPN (Maoist Centre) frequently violates its promises: when allied with the CPN (UML), it may submit to the latter’s moderate ideology, further losing its revolutionary character; when allied with the Congress Party, it objectively weakens leftist forces and becomes an assistant to pro-Western policies, thereby dealing a blow to the party’s identity as a revolutionary left-wing force.
II. The CPN (Maoist Centre)’s Analysis of and Response to the Problems
From December 26, 2021, to January 2, 2022, the CPN (Maoist Centre) held its Eighth General Convention. This convention took place amidst the turbulent political situation caused by the failure of the CPN merger and while the party was besieged by difficulties both internally and externally. The political report adopted by the convention analyzed and responded to the current problems facing the party, proposed a series of countermeasures, and mapped out the party’s direction for the next period.
(A) Analysis of the Domestic and International Situations
Regarding the international situation, the CPN (Maoist Centre) believes the world is currently in a stage of globalized finance monopoly capitalism. A characteristic of finance capitalism is the investment of surplus capital—concentrated in the hands of capitalists—into the financial sector rather than the productive sector, yielding massive profits in a short time. The mode of profiting through investment, profit, and reinvestment in the production sphere has been replaced by profiting through direct financial investment. Developed capitalist countries use the guise of "protectionism" to develop their own economies while demanding "privatization" and "liberalization" from the least developed countries to extract their natural resources and cheap labor. The capitalist mode of production is the primary cause of the increasing problems facing nature and human society today; the intensification of the movements of the fundamental contradictions of capitalism has plunged the world into crisis. As communists, they must adhere to Marxism as a guide, resolutely expose and criticize the essence of globalized imperialism and finance capitalism, earnestly safeguard and guarantee the rights of the people, and push the struggle for national independence to new heights.
Regarding the domestic situation, the CPN (Maoist Centre) believes the current primary task is to defend the Constitution and consolidate the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal. The report reviewed Nepal's natural and historical conditions, affirming the progressive historical significance of the Nepalese national democratic revolution in opposing imperialism and feudalism and establishing a federal democratic republic, as well as the important leadership role played by Nepalese communists in the revolutionary process. The CPN (Maoist Centre) holds that the current political situation revolves around defending or overturning the progressive achievements confirmed by the Constitution. The party must strengthen its own building, resist external interference, form a united front with all forces that defend the Constitution, the federal democratic system, and national independence, and formulate socialist-oriented economic and social development policies.
(B) Analysis of the Development of the Socialist Cause in Nepal
The CPN (Maoist Centre) maintains that the continuous development of productive forces, driven by science and technology, promotes the intensification of the inherent contradictions of capitalism and the formation of the objective material basis for socialism. Current scientific and technological progress has promoted a great development of productive forces; a deeper understanding of the world has confirmed the correctness of dialectical materialism and historical materialism. However, science and technology are currently used as tools for capital to earn profits rather than directly serving human civilization. A sharp contrast has formed between the poverty of the majority and the extreme wealth of a tiny minority, as well as between developed countries and the vast number of least developed and developing countries. The material basis for socialism is increasingly mature. Communists must formulate a revolutionary ideological and political line of action to advance the cause of socialism from the perspective of protecting the interests of nature, society, and all humanity.
The CPN (Maoist Centre) summarized the historical process, experiences, and lessons of the Nepalese communist movement. The report affirmed the party's active contributions during the democratic revolution and the peace period, while conducting self-criticism regarding problems since the signing of the peace agreement [6]. These primarily include: First, the party's democratic centralism was not well implemented, and there was a lack of clear political direction. Second, the failure to clarify the political line led to factionalism and anarchism within the party, as well as attempts to undermine the peace agreement; at that time, pushing for the completion of the constitution-drafting and the remaining work of the peace process was the party's only choice. Third, there was no serious discussion in party meetings regarding theoretical propositions such as "Prachanda Path" [7] after the start of the peace process, which caused ideological disunity. Fourth, during the process of merging and integrating the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), liberal and lax thinking provided an opportunity for the Oli faction [8] to carry out its "conspiracies and tricks."
The CPN (Maoist Centre) elaborated on Nepal's future revolutionary strategy:
First, the Constituent Assembly and the drafting of the new Constitution are important components of the Nepalese peace process. The achievements of the Nepalese national democratic revolution are concentrated in the 2015 democratic Constitution. For the first time, the Nepalese people were able to exercise their rights and participate substantively in the constitution-drafting process. The revolution ended the monarchy as the representative of the feudal system and established a republican polity. An institutionalized federal structure replaced the highly centralized political system, and an institutionalized, secular democratic spirit replaced religious theocracy. The revolution promoted the creation of a democratic Constitution with space for development, pushed for land reform, ensured basic civil rights such as education, healthcare, housing, and food, and established an inclusive democratic system. It explicitly stipulated a political system based on popular elections and multi-party competition, as well as the development of socialism on this basis. The revolution redefined the Nepalese state, announcing that Nepal would uphold an independent foreign policy based on defending its sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, and safeguarding its national interests.
Second, the Nepalese national democratic revolution has two limitations: first, the revolution did not eradicate feudal remnants at their root; second, the revolution was inevitably affected by bureaucratic capitalism and external interference. The state did not establish a sound electoral system and governance method according to the people's expectations and historical necessity, nor did it complete the definition of oppressed classes, nationalities, regions, and communities or establish mechanisms for the protection of their rights. Therefore, the party must complete the remaining tasks of the people's democratic revolution under the guidance of socialist revolutionary policies.
Third, because the Nepalese bourgeoisie was also granted partial leadership during the revolution, it has always hoped to limit the revolution to the bourgeois sphere. As the bourgeois revolution is basically completed, the bourgeoisie has split: one part has become a patriotic, democratic, and progressive force upholding the Constitution; the other part has split into bureaucratic bourgeoisie and reactionary right-wing elements funded by external forces. The contradiction between the Nepalese people and the bureaucratic capitalism and feudal remnants supported by external forces has become the current primary contradiction.
Finally, the report pointed out the principles, policies, strategies, and development direction of the socialist revolution in Nepal. These include: 1) Using Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the party's guiding ideology; 2) Clarifying that Nepal is in a specific stage of capitalist development and that the party must take the establishment of scientific socialism as its direction; 3) Under conditions where the class struggle is developing deeply and political forces tend toward balance, the party must formulate a strategy serving the socialist revolution and commit to achieving socialist-oriented social justice and prosperous development; 4) By strengthening the party's ideology, politics, organization, mass relations, and development work, the party must resolutely dismantle all conspiracies and tricks of reactionary forces, thereby resolutely and systematically completing all preparations for socialist construction.
(C) Responding to Theoretical Issues and Formulating Party Policies
The political report of the Eighth General Convention of the CPN (Maoist Centre) devoted an entire chapter to responding to seven theoretical issues of concern within the party. First, looking at historical experience, it is impossible to establish the foundation of socialism by immediately holding elections. However, because the establishment of an inclusive, proportional federal democratic republic in Nepal was a socialist-oriented political system established under the primary leadership of the Communist Party, the fundamental nature of this transformation makes it possible to prepare for building socialism through peaceful competition and the rule of law, while maintaining the flexibility to adjust as the situation changes. Second, it is necessary to build a communist revolutionary party led by a high-quality leadership collective, adhering to a proletarian worldview, resolutely struggling against any counter-revolutionary ideology, ensuring the whole party understands established development plans and key milestones, and initiating discussions within the party on how to advance ideological, cultural, and socialist construction to point the way for the party's next steps. Third, Marxism determines specifically when to adopt peaceful action or armed struggle based on the situation of the struggle and the balance of political forces. Currently, it appears that a combination of both may be adopted during the transition to socialism. The party currently advocates for establishing a united front through peaceful means, taking the first steps of socialist construction well, and remaining alert to changes in the situation. Fourth, communists should adhere to proletarian internationalism, but the possibility and necessity of establishing a revolutionary international organization for communism ultimately depend on the specific positions of the communist movement and the specific conditions of the international class struggle. Currently, countries have not yet prepared for the establishment of a revolutionary international organization acceptable to the people of the world. The party must continue to advance the joint struggle against globalized imperialism, deeply study both the positive and negative experiences of the international communist movement, and attach importance to drawing wisdom from the communist theories and practices of other countries. Fifth, the availability of a socialist foundation is inseparable from scientific and technological progress and the development of productive forces, but these cannot replace the fundamental status of human labor. Technological development itself is a product of human labor and will continue to serve the requirements of the development of human civilization. Sixth, in the process of establishing a socialist foundation, it is necessary to broadly unite various social classes, mass organizations, and all possible political parties through different forms, emphasizing and consolidating the level of development of the united front. Seventh, although the bourgeois-democratic revolution has basically ended, Nepal has still not resolved the issues of external interference and national independence. The party must implement socialist revolutionary policies and guidelines for building prosperous socialism, resolutely clear away feudal remnants, oppose external interference, and safeguard national independence.
The report stipulated the policies, plans, and work outlines to be adopted by the Party. Regarding Party affairs, theoretical study and training must be carried out across the entire Party to ensure that the line, principles, and policies adopted by the Congress are correctly implemented; the Party's organizational work must be improved, highlighting the principle of democratic centralism; the mechanism of criticism and self-criticism must be restored at all levels of Party committees, from the Central Committee down to the grassroots; Party committees at all levels should formulate, implement, and realize concrete work plans to urge Party cadres to fully integrate with social productive labor and the masses; Party organizations at all levels and all Party cadres should pay special attention to financial discipline and maintain openness and transparency in financial affairs; the improvement of the cultural quality of Party cadres and the regulation of their lifestyle and conduct [9] should be strengthened. Regarding the setup of departments and the formation of the united front, the Party must strengthen the leading role of ideological and political work over Party institutions and the united front; inherit the revolutionary spirit and ideology by commemorating revolutionary martyrs and providing for the families of martyrs; establish specialized agencies to focus on and properly handle the subsequent resettlement of former People's Liberation Army [10] fighters; thoroughly complete the peace process in accordance with the spirit of the peace agreement; and Party organizations at all levels should push for the efficient operation of parliaments and governments at all levels to enhance the quality and level of the Party's work. Regarding production development and construction, the fundamental goal is to liberate the economy from the hands of the bureaucratic-comprador [11] class and firmly grasp economic development in the hands of the people, promoting production and construction through the development of an independent and autonomous state-owned economy; formulate a brand-new land-use policy and emphasize the realization of self-reliance in the field of agricultural product supply; launch social production and development movements to create a favorable atmosphere for generating more jobs, thereby escaping the predicament of labor outflow and relying on foreign remittances to sustain national operations. Regarding people's education, health, and social security, the Party must clarify that education is the foundation of civilized progress and social prosperity, and take the formulation of a scientific national education policy as the primary task for promoting educational reform; should adhere to a materialist standpoint and perspective to formulate national sanitation and health policies to protect the people's health rights and interests; should attach importance to natural disaster prevention and control, formulate scientific land-use policies and implement long-term disaster management plans, and the Party, affiliated sectors, and the united front should establish disaster prevention and mitigation management departments, taking specific policies, plans, and measures to promote the construction of a disaster prevention and mitigation system.
III. Preliminary Effects and Prospects of the CPN (Maoist Centre) Overcoming Its Predicament
Facing the test of the 2022 national general election, can the CPN (Maoist Centre) maintain and restore its political influence, advance the Nepalese communist movement, defend Nepal's sovereignty and independence, and achieve economic and social prosperity and development? This depends on how the CPN (Maoist Centre) responds to the coming difficulties and challenges.
(1) Maintaining political influence is the primary task of the CPN (Maoist Centre)
In 2022, Nepal will hold local, provincial, and central elections, which are also the second general elections since the promulgation of the new Constitution. Resolving the crisis of survival and maintaining political influence is the primary task of the CPN (Maoist Centre).
The victory of the Left Alliance and the merger and establishment of the Nepal Communist Party (NCP) saved the CPN (Maoist Centre) from the predicament of increasing marginalization. In the 2017 general election, the CPN (Maoist Centre) formed a Left Alliance [12] with the CPN (UML) and won the election by an overwhelming majority. After the NCP was merged and established in 2018, Prachanda, Chairman of the CPN (Maoist Centre), became one of the joint chairmen of the party, and important party leaders such as Ram Bahadur Thapa and Narayan Kaji Shrestha became members of the Central Secretariat, also occupying seats in the Standing Committee and the Central Committee. As the political situation changed, the NCP formed two major powers: the Prachanda-Nepal faction and the Oli faction. The former gradually gained a majority advantage within the party and demanded that the Oli faction make concessions in power distribution and national governance, leading to increasingly intensified contradictions between the two sides.
Due to the dissolution of the NCP, the CPN (Maoist Centre) once again faced a survival crisis of losing political influence. In December 2020, after learning that the Prachanda-Nepal faction was preparing to take action through Party and parliamentary procedures, the Oli faction decided to dissolve the House of Representatives, leading to the de facto split of the NCP; due to the Supreme Court's ruling in March 2021, the NCP was declared void, and the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) were restored, after which both parties fell into a predicament. The Madhav Kumar Nepal faction decided to return to the CPN (UML), and Prachanda lost an important ally. Although the CPN (Maoist Centre) did not trigger further factional struggles, it had to face the possibility of losing political influence in the 2022 general election once again. To resolve the survival crisis, the CPN (Maoist Centre) moved closer to the Nepali Congress, aiming to overthrow the Oli government and setting the condition that Sher Bahadur Deuba, President of the Nepali Congress, serve as Prime Minister. At the same time, it united with the Madhav Kumar Nepal faction of the CPN (UML) and the Upendra Yadav faction of the People's Socialist Party (Janata Samajwadi Party) to form a political alliance, which successfully took office.
The governing alliance formed out of opposition to the Oli government is highly tactical. It can be said that the governing alliance is a tactical alliance aimed at the 2022 general election under the special political conditions caused by the abolition of the NCP. The Nepali Congress holds a dominant position in the alliance and holds the initiative in policy-making, its purpose being to exploit divisions on the Left and the opportunity of taking office to strike at the CPN (UML), and to create as many political achievements beneficial to the party as possible to win the general election; the CPN (Maoist Centre), by supporting the Nepali Congress, maintains its political status as a major party in Nepal, gains an advantage in the struggle for leadership of the Left, and can exert a certain influence on the government's governance policies. In the local elections on May 13, 2022, the CPN (Maoist Centre) participated as a member of the governing alliance, winning 121 mayoral positions and 126 deputy mayoral positions nationwide, maintaining its position as the third-largest party. It can be foreseen that although the CPN (Maoist Centre) has not yet fundamentally reversed the trend of declining influence, it should be able to continue to occupy a place in the Nepalese political arena in the 2022 national general election.
(2) Promoting theoretical innovation is the inevitable choice for the CPN (Maoist Centre) to escape its identity crisis
The issue of guiding ideology and the fundamental line is the fundamental way for the CPN (Maoist Centre) to escape its crisis and predicament, and it is also a basic issue that the Nepalese communist movement must face to continue developing.
On the one hand, the comparative advantage of the CPN (Maoist Centre) in organization provides a basis for promoting theoretical innovation. After the NCP was cancelled, the Nepalese political arena fell into chaos and turmoil, and all major parties found themselves in trouble. Although some leaders of the CPN (Maoist Centre) defected, the Party's organization is generally intact, with no serious factional struggles or differences of opinion. It can be seen that the CPN (Maoist Centre) holds a certain comparative advantage in Party organization, which creates relatively good conditions for the entire Party to seriously reflect on issues of theoretical line.
On the other hand, the CPN (Maoist Centre) has realized the importance and urgency of solving theoretical and line issues. The Party's 8th National Congress focused its central agenda on theoretical issues. The political report of the Congress clarified that Nepal is in a special type of capitalist society. This specificity stems from the inherent characteristics and achievements of Nepal’s national-democratic revolution [13]—in which the Communist Party played a major leading role—namely, the new Constitution and the federal democratic republic system it established. It confirmed that Nepal has currently entered the stage of socialist revolution, and that the contradiction between the Nepalese people and bureaucratic capitalism and feudal remnants supported by external forces is the primary contradiction in current society, manifested primarily as the struggle to defend the new Constitution and the new system against restoration and regression; the main task of the Party at the current stage is to complete the peace process and the remaining work of the democratic revolution, and to establish the foundation for building socialism under the guidance of the strategy of socialist revolution; during the period of socialist revolution, the Party may adopt a form of struggle combining armed struggle with peaceful struggle, currently adopting peaceful struggle while maintaining flexibility to develop as the situation changes; the Party's goal is to achieve scientific socialism in Nepal.
Currently, the CPN (Maoist Centre) still needs to further promote theoretical innovation. The 8th National Congress of the CPN (Maoist Centre) clarified basic theoretical issues such as the current nature of Nepalese society, primary contradictions, the nature of the revolution, forms of revolution, revolutionary tasks, and the future of the revolution, but there are still many important contents that need further elucidation. For example, although the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) have different judgments on the nature of Nepalese society, primary contradictions, and the future of the revolution, the theoretical content proposed in the political report of the 8th National Congress of the CPN (Maoist Centre) does not clearly reflect uniqueness. The report did not elaborate on the goal of "establishing scientific socialism," nor did it specify the steps to achieve this goal, nor did it answer questions such as whether to establish a people's democratic system led by the Communist Party, whether to establish a socialist economic system with public ownership of the means of production and distribution according to work as the mainstay, whether to achieve planned and proportionate economic development, or whether to establish the guiding position of Marxism in ideology. In contrast, the CPN (UML)'s theory of "People's Multi-Party Democracy" provides clearer answers; the analysis in the report of the current social class status, basic characteristics, and primary contradictions in Nepal still requires rigorous analytical testing; and the specific principles and policies proposed in the report did not demonstrate their own uniqueness.
(3) Promoting broad unity in the Nepalese communist movement is a necessary measure for the CPN (Maoist Centre) to restore its vitality
As one of the largest parties in the Nepalese communist movement, the CPN (Maoist Centre) bears a heavy responsibility and obligation to achieve unity. When the NCP was merged and established on May 17, 2018, people once believed that the unprecedented unity of the Nepalese communist movement would soon become a reality; however, this unity fell into a predicament almost from the beginning. The failure of the NCP brought great turmoil to the Nepalese political situation, seriously frustrated the development of the Nepalese communist movement, and left the public feeling deeply disappointed. The historical experience of the Nepalese communist movement, the failure of the NCP, and all the facts that followed have repeatedly proved that only by forming and consolidating the unity of various communist parties and political groups in Nepal can the Nepalese communist movement make substantial progress.
Currently, the Nepalese communist movement also faces many problems.
First are fundamental theoretical differences. Represented by the theory of "People's Multi-Party Democracy" proposed by the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre)'s advocacy of "Nepal's Path to Socialism in the 21st Century," these involve major theoretical and practical issues such as whether Nepal is a capitalist society, how to understand the current federal democratic republic system in Nepal, what the primary contradiction in current Nepalese society is, what the main tasks of communists are at the current stage, and what forms of struggle to adopt. However, these differences are not irreconcilable. The CPN (Maoist Centre) should not only clearly propose its own theoretical views but also actively build theoretical discussion platforms for communist parties, make scientific judgments on current Nepalese society and revolutionary strategies, and develop Marxist theory that conforms to Nepal's national conditions.
Second are the factional struggles between and within various communist parties in Nepal. The tradition of factionalism in the Nepalese communist movement is by no means something that individual parties can solve overnight; it can only be overcome through efforts in sincere dialogue and cooperation among various parties and factions. The CPN (Maoist Centre) needs to summarize the positive and negative experiences of the Party in dealing with factional struggles, implement the principle of democratic centralism, and adhere to the mass viewpoint and the mass line, so that it possesses the ability to become the advocate and organizer of unity in the Nepalese communist movement; it should also engage in extensive contact with various communist parties, including the CPN (UML), committing first to achieving coordination on specific issues, establishing a united front, reasonably managing differences, and gradually achieving the integration and unity of all parties.
Third, the intensity of maintaining national sovereignty and defending national independence still needs to be strengthened. After the collapse of the NCP, the right wing, represented by the Nepali Congress, utilized the split of the Left to lead the formation of a coalition government, showing pro-American and pro-Western tendencies. Even in the face of difficult predicaments, the CPN (Maoist Centre) should take a clear and firm patriotic stand. On major matters of principle involving national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, it should unite with communists across the country to resolutely defend them and oppose all acts and proposals that damage Nepal's national independence.
Fourth, continue to uphold and carry forward proletarian internationalism. Internationalism is an inherent attribute of Marxism; the cause of communism is a cause concerning the liberation of all humanity, and carrying forward the spirit of proletarian internationalism is an inevitable requirement for those who would be Communists. Nepal’s unique physical geography and geopolitical conditions, as well as the current reality that the country has not yet thoroughly cast off its appearance of poverty and backwardness, also present an objective requirement for Nepalese Communists to secure the support of all progressive forces in the world by participating in the international communist movement. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) [14] should strengthen its ties with Communist parties and socialist countries across the globe, particularly by expanding cooperation and exchange with the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China, to jointly promote the international communist movement and the cause of the Nepalese socialist revolution.
( About the Author: Tang Xin, Lecturer, School of Marxism, Beijing Jiaotong University ) Web Editor: Tongxin Source: Socialism Studies (《社会主义研究》), 2023, No. 1