Wang Shaoyuan: A Political Narrative of the Logic of the Rise and Fall of the Workers' Party's "Labor Socialism" in Brazil
As the largest left-wing party in Brazil, the Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) has consistently committed itself to fighting for the interests of the lower and middle classes since its founding on February 10, 1980. In the 1990s, against the backdrop of neoliberal penetration pushed by the United States, the Cardoso administration implemented neoliberal reforms characterized by "liberalization," "marketization," and "privatization." This led to a gradual decline in the Brazilian economy and a serious intensification of social contradictions, fueling a rising public outcry against neoliberalism. Within this context, the PT raised the banner of "Labor Socialism," winning the support of the Brazilian people and securing the presidency in 2002, ushering in a new stage of development for the country. Under the governing philosophy of "Labor Socialism," the PT adopted a policy approach of "change through moderation," employing steady and pragmatic economic policies while emphasizing the coordinated development of economy and society. However, after successfully taking power, the PT did not adopt the left-wing reformist path it had consistently advocated—resisting neoliberalism to carry out social transformation. Instead, it shifted from a radical left-wing party at its inception to a moderate left-wing party, seeking a "Third Way" between the "Left" and the "Right."
To understand the development process of the PT's governing phase from 2003 to 2016—moving from weakness to strength and back to weakness—one must analyze the logic behind the rise and fall of "Labor Socialism." Based on the political practice of "Labor Socialism," the PT’s period in power can be divided into a period of prosperity (2003–2010) and a period of decline (2011–2016). Analysis reveals that the substantive role "Labor Socialism" could play was inherently limited. In the short term, whether the PT’s "Labor Socialism" concept could have a positive impact on Brazil depended on whether changes in the external international market environment were conducive to Brazil's economic development and social stability. In the long run, "Labor Socialism" was not a scientific governing philosophy; it failed to fundamentally dissolve the endogenous factors that have long constrained Brazil's economic growth and could not safeguard the sustainable development of Brazilian economy and society. The PT needs to seek a new way to break through the current impasse. In essence, the governing philosophy of "Labor Socialism" violates the general principles of scientific socialism, lacks the logic of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, and lacks political identification with the "Two Inevitabilities" [1]. Exploring these factors is of great significance for uncovering the mystery of the rise and fall of the "Labor Socialism" model, as well as for China to guard against the erosion of neoliberalism and to build socialism with Chinese characteristics.
I. Theoretical Propositions of the Brazilian Workers' Party's "Labor Socialism"
Since its founding, the PT has declared itself a socialist party. At the end of May 1990, the party established "Labor Socialism" as its guiding ideology, opposing capital exploitation and hegemonism, emphasizing democracy, equality, and freedom, and adhering to thorough substantive democracy and a pluralistic political stance. During its time in power, the PT maintained the governing philosophy of "Labor Socialism," a period characterized by both achievements and challenges.
(1) A Policy Approach Following the "Path of Least Resistance"
After taking office, the PT did not completely reject neoliberalism, nor did it adopt radical left-wing reform measures. To achieve economic development and social stability under the logic of "Labor Socialism," President Lula [2] promised that Brazil would "advance change in tranquility" and proposed the goal of achieving social justice and promoting economic development through "peace and gentleness." Thus, "Labor Socialism" policy was not intended to achieve a total rupture with the original system; rather, it sought to establish a government of gradual reform within the framework of Brazil's existing economic order. Building on its reflection upon and transformation of neoliberalism, the PT government promoted "Labor Socialism" through a pragmatic governing philosophy.
Economically, the PT did not completely disavow the policies of privatization, trade liberalization, and financial liberalization implemented by the Cardoso administration, but instead pursued pragmatic, utilitarian reform measures. The PT government made economic development its primary goal, using primary fiscal surpluses, floating exchange rates, and inflation targeting as the three pillars of economic stability while encouraging private investment and exports. During Lula's tenure, Brazil's socio-economy achieved rapid development. Specifically: from 2003 to 2005, the average annual GDP growth rate was 3.4%; from 2006 to 2011, it reached 4.4%. In 2007 and 2008 in particular, the Brazilian economy entered a "golden age of growth," with growth rates staying above 5%, even reaching 7.5% in 2010. One could say the Lula administration achieved a miracle of global economic growth, representing the glory of Latin American resurgence. Politically, to fulfill its promise of economic stability and maintain its governing position, the PT continuously sought "political allies" domestically. The PT placed great importance on exchange and cooperation with center-left parties and even right-wing parties, uniting all forces that could be united. This protected its governing status to an extent but also led to political compromises. For instance, Lula appointed Henrique Meirelles—a banker from the opposition Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB) and former president of BankBoston—as Governor of the Central Bank; he appointed Antonio Palocci, former mayor of Ribeirão Preto, as Minister of Finance; and he appointed neoliberal economists to key positions in economic departments. This series of actions dispelled the concerns of domestic and foreign investors and secured social stability in the early period of PT rule, but it also sowed the seeds for the party's later decline.
Under a pragmatic governing philosophy, the PT on one hand implemented moderate and pragmatic economic and political policies to alleviate credit crises at home and abroad and promote economic recovery. On the other hand, to safeguard its position, it insisted on "change in tranquility" to maintain political stability. In essence, however, the PT attempted to use the "thorough democracy" of a mass alliance to obscure the lack of true popular subjectivity [3]. "Labor Socialism" lacking subjective participation often sinks into the mire of pluralism, ignores the subjective creativity of the masses, and completely violates the standpoint of the people as the subject.
(2) Policy Propositions Striving for the Interests of "Class C"
The so-called "Class C" refers to the division of Brazilian social strata into five levels: A, B, C, D, and E, where Class C is also known as the "new middle class." Most people in Class C originally belonged to the lowest rungs of society but achieved upward mobility during the PT's rule due to economic growth, increased employment, and improvements in the minimum wage and social welfare. The PT always prioritized economic growth as a national goal, but social problems such as the wealth gap did not improve proportionally with that growth; Brazil's poverty and income polarization remained severe. The PT government implemented a series of measures to win the interests of "Class C."
First, it introduced a series of poverty reduction policies. After Lula took office, based on the task of eradicating hunger and reducing poverty rates, he successively implemented several poverty alleviation measures and plans, such as "Zero Hunger" (Fome Zero), the "First Job Program," and the "Family Allowance" (Bolsa Família) program. Through the implementation of "Zero Hunger," over 100 million Brazilians benefited, and the extreme poverty population was significantly reduced. Additionally, the Lula government emphasized increasing literacy rates in rural areas, implemented the "Education Grant" program and the "Second National Land Reform Plan," and improved rural infrastructure, addressing the status quo of rural poverty and difficult access to education. This promoted education and economic levels in rural areas and addressed intergenerational poverty. The reduction in the number of people in poverty allowed Brazil to incubate a new social group: "Class C." During the Lula administration, Class C gained substantive benefits, Brazil's Gini coefficient steadily decreased, and social contradictions were further eased. Furthermore, the Lula government implemented various measures in employment, healthcare, education, and social security, such as providing micro-loans with low interest for low-income populations, raising the minimum wage, the "Program to Eradicate Child Labor," the "Program to Support Family Farming," and the "Basic Medicine Assistance Program." After Dilma Rousseff took office, she continued the moderate and pragmatic policies of the Lula government, expanding poverty reduction and social welfare policies through the launch of the "Brazil Without Extreme Poverty" plan, the "Green Grant" program, and the "My House, My Life" program.
Second, it achieved the goal of reducing poverty rates. Active fiscal policies, booming exports, and the raising of the minimum wage and transfer payments promoted a virtuous cycle of economic growth and distribution. This cycle drove the reduction of poverty and inequality during the PT government. The Lula administration carried out bold reforms focused on reducing the poverty rate, such as improving the labor market, national pensions, income transfers, and the "Family Allowance" program. Poverty and social inequity were significantly improved, with the poverty rate falling from 37.5% in 2001 to 20.9% in 2011. Consequently, Lula won the political support of "Class C" and successfully secured reelection in 2006.
However, during the administration of Lula’s successor, President Rousseff (2011–2016), severe economic fluctuations and political instability reduced the government’s fiscal spending and coordination capacity. Although welfare measures continued to be introduced, they did not fundamentally solve Brazil’s social problems, and the PT eventually lost its governing status. The PT’s governing experience demonstrates that a development model relying solely on economic growth is unscientific. To comprehensively solve Brazil’s various social problems, the government needs to adopt all-encompassing policies to alleviate social contradictions before it can achieve comprehensive sustainable development.
II. The Prosperity Phase of 2003–2010: An Analysis of the PT's "Labor Socialism" Policies
On January 1, 2003, Lula was sworn in as president. The PT became the first left-wing party in Brazilian history to successfully govern. Lula's election rekindled the Brazilian public's expectations for future economic and social development. During Lula's eight years in office, the practice of "Labor Socialism" achieved the golden growth of the Brazilian economy in the first decade of the twenty-first century and made outstanding contributions to solving prominent social issues such as the serious wealth gap.
(1) Rapid Growth in Trade Export Volume
[Image] From the data in Table 1, it can be seen that exports were not the primary driver of Brazil's sustained economic growth. Between 2006 and 2011, exports accounted for only 5.6% of GDP, with an average annual growth rate of 0.2%. Compared to government consumption, private investment, and especially private consumption, their role was minimal. Although exports and capital inflows could not entirely dictate economic growth, they were sufficient to offset the constraints of the balance of payments. Brazil's foreign exchange reserves increased from $54 billion in 2005 to $379 billion in 2012, rising from 6.1% to 16.8% of GDP.
The rapid growth in trade export volume promoted the development of the Brazilian economy. During Lula's tenure, the economy grew rapidly (2003–2006, 2007–2010) (see Table 1). The main factors driving this growth included the 1999 devaluation of the Real, the global economic boom of the early 21st century, and China's expanding demand for primary commodities. Between 2001 and 2005, Brazil's export labels grew by 64% and export prices rose by 24%, leading to a massive increase in trade revenue. During this period, export growth accounted for 43.5% of the growth in total demand, which was the primary reason the GDP growth rate rose from 1.1% in 2003 to 5.8% in 2004. The global economic boom also brought increasing foreign direct investment and portfolio investment to Brazil: net capital inflows in 2003 and 2004 were approximately $15 billion, reaching $116 billion in 2010, and staying between $80 billion and $100 billion annually thereafter.
However, the PT (Worker’s Party) government retained parts of the neoliberal policies from the Cardoso era, which limited the momentum of export growth. These constraints included contractionary fiscal and monetary policies, floating exchange rates, inflation targeting, and the liberalization of capital flows. To fulfill his promise of economic stability, reassure the opposition, minimize capital flight, and avoid conflict with powerful forces committed to neoliberalism in the financial and industrial sectors, Lula adopted a strategy of compromise. In light of these conciliatory tactics, economic growth could not achieve sustainability by relying solely on foreign trade.
2. The Increase in the Minimum Wage Standard
Tax revenues generated by export growth allowed the Lula government to expand transfer payments and raise the minimum wage [4], thereby initiating a new cycle of economic growth. However, the failure of the Cardoso government's neoliberal policies also made it clear to the PT that even when external conditions favor development, traditional neoliberal policies remain incapable of bringing sustainable economic growth to Brazil.
In his second term, Lula modified some of his previous policy approaches. In addition to the compromised implementation of neoliberal policies, he proposed a "Neo-Developmentalist Agenda" favoring the lower and middle classes. This shift allowed the Brazilian economy to maintain steady growth. According to statistics, during Lula’s administration, the PT created approximately 21 million jobs. Notably, from 2003 to 2014, the average real income of Brazilian residents grew by 70%, while the unemployment rate fell by 3%. This gradual increase in income promoted further improvements in distribution. For instance, wages as a share of GDP fell from 50% in 1980 to 36% at the beginning of the 21st century; by 2011, this figure had returned to 50%.
Analysis of Table 2 shows that the Lula government’s minimum wage policy achieved significant results, with the real minimum wage increasing by 27% between 2006 and 2012. This growth had a massive impact on the low-income labor force. In 2005, 73% of formal employees and 47% of informal and self-employed workers earned between one and three times the minimum wage; by 2011, these proportions rose to 79% and 49%, respectively. The increase in the minimum wage did not only affect the labor market; it also catalyzed improvements in social security across the board, including pensions, social insurance, and unemployment benefits.
3. The Flourishing of Financial Credit
In the realm of financial credit, personal credit drove economic growth. Data shows that from January 2005 to December 2011, personal credit as a share of disposable income increased from 8% to 42%. Household credit and new consumer loans further propelled rapid economic expansion. For example, the proportion of households with at least one credit card rose from 15% to 25%. For citizens with incomes between three and five times the minimum wage, credit card usage rose from 30% to 43%.
On one hand, the Lula government promoted reforms in financial credit to reshape the state’s decision-making capacity and achieve coordinated economic and social development. The national treasury injected capital into the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) to provide loans and other financial support to domestic enterprises. This move accelerated the development and expansion of Brazilian national enterprises, such as Itaú Unibanco, Banco Bradesco, Embraer, the construction firm Odebrecht, the mining company Vale, the beverage group Ambev, the steel group Gerdau, and BRF (Brasil Foods). In 2007, the PT government implemented the "Growth Acceleration Programme" (PAC) to speed up infrastructure construction. Subsequently, it launched a "Large Housing Programme" (Minha Casa, Minha Vida) and provided additional fiscal allocations for education, health, and other public services. These were aimed at restoring the government's decision-making capacity, reducing external economic dependence, and promoting coordinated and orderly socio-economic development.
On the other hand, policies such as public spending, transfer payments, and expanded investment further stimulated economic prosperity. Faster economic growth, the increasing normalization of employment, and rising employment rates—alongside export growth—increased tax revenue and social security funds. This provided nearly all the funding for public spending, transfer payments, and investment. According to the 2012 article Neo-developmentalism and the Challenges of Economic Policy-making during the Rousseff Administration by Morais and Saad-Filho, from 2003 to 2008, Brazil's average primary fiscal surplus declined only slightly to 2.3% of GDP, while domestic public debt as a proportion of GDP fell from 55% in 2002 to 40% in 2010.
4. The Drastic Reduction of the Impoverished Population
Active fiscal policies, booming exports, and the increase in the minimum wage and transfer payments facilitated a virtuous cycle of economic growth and distribution. This, in turn, drove the reduction of poverty and inequality during the PT government, leading to unprecedented economic prosperity.
Statistics show that in 1993, Brazil had 60 million people living in poverty, accounting for 41% of the total population. By 2003, the number remained at 60 million, though the proportion had decreased to 35%. By 2012, the impoverished population fell below 30 million, or 15% of the total. Furthermore, the Gini coefficient declined: from the mid-1970s to 2001, the Gini coefficient for per capita household income in Brazil hovered near a high of 0.6; by 2012, it had dropped to 0.53. The reasons for this decline were improvements in the labor market, state pension policies, and income transfer policies, such as the conditional cash transfer program "Bolsa Família."
Therefore, economic growth under PT leadership was initially export-driven. This was followed by policies to increase minimum income, specifically raising the minimum wage and implementing income transfer schemes supported by personal credit. In contrast, exports gradually lost momentum, while government spending and private investment remained secondary. The Lula government achieved economic growth and income distribution through limited, non-confrontational policies based on resident income. Under favorable external conditions, these policies could be sustained spontaneously by the market. However, many problems existed in the implementation process. For instance, private investment failed to rebound; the productive structure underwent no major transformation; public investment was insufficient to support the modernization of national infrastructure; and social policies did not fundamentally resolve unequal income distribution. During Lula’s tenure, the PT adopted pragmatic "Labor Socialist" economic and social policies, enabling the Brazilian economy to gradually recover from the depression of the late 19th century [5] and achieve economic growth and social stability. Yet, when external conditions turned unfavorable, the limitations of the "Labor Socialism" proposition became increasingly prominent, leading to the socio-economic decline of Brazil during the Rousseff administration from 2011 to 2016.
III. The Phase of Decline (2011–2016): An Analysis of the PT’s "Labor Socialist" Policies
Dilma Rousseff took office as President in January 2011. Inheriting the guiding ideology of "Labor Socialism," the Rousseff government implemented a series of new policies to achieve faster economic growth and social stability. However, as the limitations of "Labor Socialism" became apparent, progress in growth and distribution stagnated. Ultimately, this led to Rousseff’s removal from office, and the PT lost its hard-won governing status.
1. Prominent Structural Supply Issues
Structural supply and demand issues in Brazil’s industrial sector are long-standing. Whether under Lula or Rousseff, the PT remained committed to changing Brazil's imbalanced industrial structure. However, faced with deep-seated structural maladies, their efforts appeared to have limited effect.
In 2006, Brazil's current account and trade surpluses reached their peak at $13 billion and $45 billion, respectively, before beginning a gradual deterioration. With the introduction of quantitative easing by the US, UK, EU, and Japan, a constant influx of foreign capital helped Brazil avoid solvency issues. Although Brazil’s commodity trade maintained a surplus until 2013, after 2006—while the volume of commodity exports remained constant—growth in export revenue was almost entirely due to rising prices. In contrast, Brazil's import volume nearly doubled. Since 2007, the current account had been deteriorating; in 2014, the fiscal deficit reached $100 billion, equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. It was not until 2015, following the devaluation of the Brazilian currency, that the fiscal deficit decreased. However, accompanying these structural supply issues was a continuous economic downturn, plunging Brazil into its worst economic crisis in history.
2. Rising Inflation Rates
Starting in 2013, Brazil's inflation rate rose increasingly, and the Real continuously depreciated. The exchange rate played a key role in controlling inflation and international integration since the early 1990s; on this point, the PT continued the neoliberal policies of the Cardoso government. The Brazilian Real remained persistently overvalued, with the average exchange rate rising from 3.08 Reais per USD in 2003 to 1.67 Reais per USD in 2011. By 2013, the Real fell to 2.25 per USD. The devaluation of the Real raised import prices in the domestic market, causing the inflation rate to break through the "upper limit" of the 2.5% to 6.5% annual target range set by the Central Bank. This led to a stalemate in the government's macroeconomic policy: if they continued to control inflation through high interest rates and an overvalued exchange rate, it would increase the current account deficit and exacerbate the economic slowdown; if they restricted wages and transfer payments to cut aggregate demand, it would hinder economic growth and income distribution. Consequently, the PT government used price subsidies and administrative pricing to control inflation—measures that had limited effect and high fiscal costs.
3. Severe Income Polarization
Various poverty alleviation projects and social welfare systems implemented by the PT government brought Brazil's impoverished population to a historic low, pushing Brazilian society toward fairness and justice. However, income polarization remains severe, and the gap between rich and poor remains high in horizontal comparisons. Brazil's tax return data shows that since the PT took power, improvements in income distribution have been minor, with the income of high-income groups remaining stable. From 2006 to 2011, the top 0.1% of earners held nearly 10% of the national income, while the top 1% held 25%. Tax data and household surveys indicate that from 2006 to 2012, the Gini coefficient for Brazil's per capita household income stabilized around 0.69. The decline in the Gini coefficient was mainly due to the contribution of capital profits and interest, which are not taxed in Brazil.
Therefore, during the PT's tenure, policies such as increasing public pensions, conditional cash transfers, and more equal income in the labor market achieved partial equity in income distribution to some extent. Yet, they simultaneously preserved severe inequalities between low- and high-income groups and in the distribution of income and capital. While the income of the poor increased, reducing poverty and wage inequality, the income of the wealthy did not decrease. This polarization leads to the following consequences: first, policies regulating distribution through the minimum wage and transfer payments will inevitably reach their limits; second, the middle class is squeezed by the elite’s efforts to maintain status, the improvement of the poor’s lives, and the scarcity of high-paying jobs; third, reducing polarization and increasing the income of low-wage earners will raise the cost of urban services.
4. Internal Factions Obstructing One Another
The Workers' Party's (PT) pragmatic governing philosophy essentially revealed issues such as a deviation in its party identity and mutual constraints between internal factions. The successful election of PT Chairman Lula had a significant impact both internationally and domestically. From an international perspective, the anti-capitalist and anti-neoliberal concepts long proclaimed by the PT caused concern among foreign neoliberal forces and investors; domestically, the Brazilian lower and middle classes were full of expectations for the PT’s rise to power, anticipating the arrival of the fair, democratic, and free world the party had described. However, the PT did not adopt the radical leftist policy reforms it had proclaimed before taking office. Instead, it partially continued the neoliberal economic policies of the Cardoso [6] government, failed to touch the fundamental interests of the Brazilian upper class, and did not carry out deep-seated socialist transformation of Brazil's political economy. The PT promoted "change within peace," adopting moderate and pragmatic economic and social policies with leftist characteristics. This series of policies only temporarily mitigated social contradictions and did not fundamentally resolve the core contradictions pointed toward by Brazil's wealth gap and social inequality. Today, Brazil remains one of the countries with the largest wealth gaps in the world. It can be said that the PT government was a "left-wing government without a left-wing agenda." Some figures within the PT as well as the radical left in Latin America believe that the PT government's pragmatic policy propositions were a betrayal of leftist principles. The mutual interference of internal forces within the PT eventually led to a split in the party.
In summary, during the later period of the PT's rule, the limitations of "Labor Socialism" gradually became prominent. During the middle and late stages of Rousseff's administration, Brazil's structural supply and demand issues became acute, inflation rose daily, and income polarization became serious; meanwhile, the PT faced a crisis of identity. A Brazilian economy driven by external environments or a boom in private investment is unsustainable, as reflected in the following three aspects: first, Brazil's economic growth was built on an increase in foreign trade volume, while the growth driven by domestic trade demand was accompanied by low investment and backward productivity; second, given the persistent global economic crisis, the contribution of Brazilian exports to economic growth was limited; third, the decline of the Brazilian economy led to the internal disintegration of the PT itself. Therefore, the concept of "Labor Socialism" fell into a stalemate, and it became difficult for Brazil to achieve sustainable economic growth and social development.
IV. Reflections on the Logic of the Rise and Fall of the Brazilian Workers' Party's "Labor Socialism"
The Brazilian Workers' Party declared its adherence to socialist concepts at its founding, but in the process of governing, it went against its original aspiration and founding mission, gradually transforming its governing philosophy into a left-leaning "Labor Socialism." During the fifteen years of PT rule, the government achieved "golden growth" for the Brazilian economy in the first decade of the 21st century, making outstanding contributions to resolving prominent social problems and contradictions such as the serious wealth gap. However, behind Brazil's prosperity, the seeds of recession and hidden dangers were sown. During Rousseff's administration, the economic downturn and the emergence of social contradictions further exposed the limitations of "Labor Socialism," and the achievements made during the PT's rule were virtually eroded. This eventually led to the PT losing its governing status amidst a chorus of boos. Through an analysis of the logic of the rise and fall of "Labor Socialism," we reflect on the reasons for the PT's loss of power as follows:
First, the PT's policy reforms were confined to the concept of "Labor Socialism" rather than scientific socialist theory. As a left-wing trend of thought, "Labor Socialism" maintains a critical attitude toward the existing capitalist system and attempts to use moderate means to transform capitalism. However, in the process of criticizing capitalism, it cannot scientifically reveal the basic contradictions of capitalism or correctly understand the objective laws of socialism replacing capitalism, and thus it cannot point out the correct direction and path for transcending and replacing capitalism. Even when pragmatism had backfired, the PT remained obsessed with "Labor Socialism," failed to thoroughly promote political systemic reform, and attempted to move closer to the far-right, leading to the party's internal disintegration. The PT was not destroyed because it was too "left"; on the contrary, it fell from power in the process of leaning toward the right.
Second, ideology concerns the flag and the path [7]. Because different "left" and "right" trends of thought surged through Brazilian society, it was difficult for Brazil to form a unified ideology. During the PT's rule, capitalism was deeply rooted and difficult to eliminate completely. The Brazilian PT relaxed its ideological work, adopted volatile propositions, and failed to grasp ideological leadership. From the Lula government's implementation of neo-developmentalist policies to the Rousseff government's adoption of state interventionist policies, all were to no avail. When private investment gradually decreased, public finances deteriorated, inflation rates climbed, and GDP growth declined, the PT turned back to neoliberalism. These factors ultimately caused a diversification of Brazil’s guiding ideology, leading to the capture of its public opinion strongholds and the loss of its governing position.
Finally, the "people-centered nature" (人民性) is the most distinctive character of Marxism. With changes in the international and domestic situations, the Brazilian PT shifted from its initial declaration of standing firmly with the middle and lower classes to gradually detaching itself from the broad masses in the later period, even uniting with right-wing parties. The PT attempted to use the "thorough democracy" of a mass alliance to cover up the essence of the "absence of the subject," [8] which ultimately dismantled its base of popular support. Therefore, the theory and practice of the PT, lacking the participation of the people as the subject, often fell into a dilemma of pluralistic self-construction, thereby deviating from the standpoint of the historical materialist conception of history.
In conclusion, the Brazilian Workers' Party held high the banner of "Labor Socialism" and created a "Brazilian miracle"; however, after experiencing a brief period of prosperity, it rapidly declined. The "rise" was due to the resistance against neoliberalism, while the "fall" was due to the failure to completely abandon capitalism, instead attempting to use reformist methods to overcome the peripheral and dependent status of a Third World country within the world capitalist system. From the perspective of Marxist theory, Lula's "Labor Socialism" contained many unscientific elements: such as compromises with neoliberalism, a lack of the people's subjectivity, and the failure to form a clear and firm top-level design. This allowed Bolsonaro, the candidate of the far-right Social Liberal Party, to become president after the PT fell from power. However, during Bolsonaro's term, due to the pressure of a continuous economic downturn and the disastrous COVID-19 pandemic, he failed to win the support of the Brazilian people. On the contrary, the Brazilian people began to look back at the economic prosperity and social stability during the PT's rule, and their identification with socialism has been continuously strengthening. Although in recent years Brazilian left-wing parties, including the PT and the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB), have been confined in a right-wing vortex, "Labor Socialism" remains highly appealing and indispensable. Lula announced on the morning of May 7 this year [2027] that he would represent the PT in the 2022 Brazilian general election. In recent opinion polls, public support is mainly concentrated on former President Lula and current President Bolsonaro. With Lula's return to the political arena, Brazil's center-left parties may regain governing power. If the Brazilian Workers' Party wishes to win in the confrontation with the right-wing conservative forces led by Bolsonaro, it needs to adhere to its original socialist concepts while following the laws of historical development, making continuous adjustments, reforms, and improvements according to global and national conditions, truly maintaining a firm "people's standpoint," and uniting the masses. Only in this way can "Labor Socialism" glow with vigorous vitality in the post-pandemic era, further promote sustainable socio-economic development in Brazil, and achieve its own great transcendence.