Yi Xianfei: The Historical Evolution of Western Marxism's Evaluation of Engels' Philosophy and the "Theoretical Hyperbole"
Since the publication of Lukács’s History and Class Consciousness in 1923, Western Marxism has existed for nearly a century. In its initial phase, Western Marxism interpreted Marxism along a path that differed both from the positivism, reformism, and Neo-Kantianism of the Second International [1], and from Leninism. As Engels was one of the founders of Marxism, it was inevitable that Western Marxism would evaluate his philosophy while seeking alternative ways to re-interpret Markdown. Viewed diachronically, Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy underwent two major shifts.
The Evaluation of Engels’s Philosophy in Early 20th-Century Western Marxism
The First World War brought profound political, economic, and cultural disasters to humanity; objectively, it also exposed the internal contradictions of capitalism more clearly, further prompting reflection on the capitalist social system. Meanwhile, the victory of the Russian October Revolution brought hope to segments of the Western proletariat and working people, allowing them to see the possibility of escaping exploitation and oppression. However, in the subsequent years between 1918 and 1923, the proletarian revolutions that broke out in countries such as Germany and Hungary ended in failure. The stark contrast between the failure of proletarian revolutions in Western countries after WWI and the victory of the October Revolution prompted early Western Marxists to examine Soviet Russian (and later Soviet Union) Marxism—namely Leninism—while simultaneously reflecting on the root causes of the failed revolutions. Because Russia at this time was implementing a system of the dictatorship of the proletariat entirely under the guidance of Leninism, and Leninist philosophy was dominated as the only correct ideology, early Western Marxists began to realize through their reflections that Leninism-Stalinism lacked universality and could not be blindly transplanted to other European countries. This reflection was manifested in the philosophical thought of early Western Marxists, opening another path for the interpretation of Marxism and forming the first evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western Marxism.
Regarding dialectics. Early Western Marxists all opposed Engels’s extension of dialectics to the realm of nature—that is, they opposed the "dialectics of nature" founded by Engels. Lukács noted: "Engels’s discussions in Anti-Dühring... dialectics is a continuous process of transition from one definition to another, the constant sublation [2] of contradictions and their mutual transformation; thus, one-sided and rigid causality must be replaced by interaction. But he does not even mention the most fundamental interaction, namely the dialectical relationship between subject and object in the historical process, let alone place it in the methodological center it deserves." Lukács believed that Engels misunderstood Marx’s historical dialectics and mechanically extended historical dialectics to nature. In Lukács's view, dialectics can only be the dialectics of subject and object, which can only be practiced by human beings; dialectics cannot exist in nature. Nature, detached from man, is similar to Kant’s realm of the "thing-in-itself," which cannot be known or grasped. Korsch pointed out: "Lenin and his followers one-sidedly turned dialectics into the object, nature, and history; they depicted cognition merely as the passive mirror-like reflection of this objective existence by subjective consciousness." While Korsch does not directly evaluate Engels here, he similarly opposes applying dialectics to nature, believing instead that there is only a dialectical relationship between "being" and "consciousness." Gramsci noted: "The causal principles used by natural science to explain human history are actually an arbitrary hypothesis, if not a return to the explanations of old systems of thought." Gramsci believed the dialectics of nature was an arbitrary hypothesis that could not be applied to the explanation of causality in human history. In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci also criticized Engels’s dialectics as an attempt to prove certain cosmic laws.
Regarding ontology. Gramsci did not agree with Engels’s positioning of Marxist philosophy. He believed that Marxist philosophy does not study matter from the perspective of natural science, but rather from the perspective of practice. Gramsci emphasized: "As for Engels’s statement that 'the materiality of the world is proved by the long and laborious development of philosophy and natural science,' it should be analyzed and made more precise." Marxist philosophy is a monism of practice that transcends materialism and idealism based on the starting point of practice, whereas Engels’s is a vulgar, closed materialism. In Marxism and Philosophy, Karl Korsch, analyzing Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, noted: "For them, all philosophy is equated with bourgeois philosophy," "likewise, they are precisely not opposing a particular philosophical system—they want to eventually overcome and replace philosophy with scientific socialism," and "philosophy itself is not abolished merely by abolishing its name." Korsch argued that what Engels opposed was always bourgeois philosophy and that he did not intend to abolish philosophy; his true thought was to both inherit and transcend philosophy. Furthermore, like Hegel, he sought to overcome the "contradiction between individual sciences and the philosophy that stands above them," and he wanted to maintain a limited area of independence within philosophy.
Regarding epistemology. Korsch consistently opposed reflection theory (Wiederspiegelungstheorie); he believed that cognition is not a passive "mirror-like reflection." If cognition is described merely as the reflection of objective existence by subjective consciousness, the dialectical relationship between being and consciousness is destroyed. Lukács believed that there were problems with Engels’s concept of practice: "Engels believes that practice is the criterion for testing theory, viewing experiment and industry as typical examples of proving this point... Engels’s thesis is theoretically incomplete because it ignores the fact that the field of practice (without changing its basic structure) has become broader and more complex through the developmental process, mediated by more processes." Lukács argued that the concept of practice should be broader, whereas Engels narrowed Marx’s concept of practice, confining it to the fields of experiment and industry.
Main characteristics of early Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy. On one hand, the three representative figures of early Western Marxism generally did not identify with Engels’s dialectics of nature. Lukács has long passages on this in History and Class Consciousness. Korsch’s expressions in his works are more implicit; he rarely criticizes Engels directly, instead targeting successors led by Lenin. Gramsci also described Engels’s dialectics as proving a kind of cosmic law. However, early Western Marxism’s judgment of Engels’s philosophy was not a total rejection, but a partial one. They all affirmed that Engels made important contributions to Marxist philosophy. Lukács and Korsch frequently cited Engels in their works to argue for the correctness of their views. Gramsci consistently referred to Marx and Engels collectively as the "founders of the philosophy of praxis." On the other hand, early Western Marxism always used Marx as the baseline when evaluating Engels’s philosophy. The reason early Western Marxist scholars called for a "return to Marx" was that, in their view, all the errors of Engels’s philosophy lay in his misunderstanding of Marx, necessitating a re-interpretation. Yet they also admitted that Marx and Engels cannot be separated and that their theory is a single entity. Lukács believed that, except for dialectics, Engels’s theories differed little from Marx’s. In Marxism and Philosophy, Korsch also used the collective term "Marx and Engels" to refer to Marxist philosophy. Therefore, in the eyes of early Western Marxists, understanding Engels’s philosophy could only ever be based on Marx; starting from Marx, it was impossible to talk about Engels outside the context of Marxism. However, because they did not identify with Engels’s dialectics of nature, they inevitably created an antithesis between Marx and Engels.
The main reasons for early Western Marxism’s evaluation of Engels’s philosophy. First, the influence of the domestic and international political environments in which the individuals were situated. The 1920s and 30s were the peak of proletarian revolutionary outbreaks following the end of WWI. Lukács joined the revolution in 1918 and moved to Vienna after the revolution failed in 1919. Korsch participated in the failed Hamburg Uprising in Germany in 1923. Gramsci was arrested while leading the Communist Party of Italy in the struggle against fascism. The repeated failures of real-world revolution made them more willing to seek the theoretical foundations for a practical path within philosophical theory. Later Western Marxism has been called a "revolution in the study," which is not unrelated to the failures of their early revolutionary encounters. Consequently, this formed the characteristic of Western Marxism favoring theory over practice. Second, individual philosophical and cultural backgrounds. The philosophical and cultural cultivation individuals received had a great influence on the development of their theories. In his early years, Lukács encountered thoughts from Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Kierkegaard, and was influenced in literature by Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. Regarding Korsch, it goes without saying that being German, he carried the flavor of Classical German Philosophy, whereas Engels’s dialectics of nature seemed to him more like British and American positivism and empiricism. Gramsci was deeply influenced in his early years by the Italian idealist philosopher Croce. Third, early Western Marxists’ affirmation of Marxism. They believed that Marxism could save society. The victory of the Soviet Union had already confirmed this. Since the revolutions after WWI failed, it could only mean that "problems" had arisen with the subsequent successors. As Engels was not only a successor of Marxism but also one of its vital founders, early Western Marxism would not take a completely negative attitude toward Engels’s philosophy. Fourth, early Western Marxists’ affirmation of human subjective agency was reflected in philosophy as their expectation for changing history—the hope that individuals could change the course of history. In the very first sentence of the main text of History and Class Consciousness, Lukács quotes a line from Marx’s Theses on Feuerbach: "Philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it." This shows Lukács’s affirmation of human subjective agency; naturally, he would hold a negative attitude toward Engels’s dialectics of nature, which diminished human initiative.
The Evaluation of Engels’s Philosophy in Mid-20th-Century Western Humanist Marxism
Because the irreconcilable contradictions within the capitalist system became increasingly sharp, capitalist countries led by Germany, Japan, and Italy embarked on a path of external expansion, eventually leading to the outbreak of World War II. WWII was one of the most serious man-made disasters in human history. Thereafter, Western scholars’ critiques of capitalism increased, and they simultaneously conducted deeper reflections on human existence itself. In academic terms, the public release of Marx’s Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 was hailed as a treasure by Western Marxists. They believed they had discovered a humane, humanistic, and anthropological Marx, which stood in stark contrast to the Marx of the "anthropological void" after his youth. That is, once the "Young Marx" was discovered, Western Marxists began to construct "two Marxes." This triggered waves of Humanist Marxist trends in Western countries, including some scholars of the Frankfurt School, Freudo-Marxists, and Existentialists, with Merleau-Ponty and Sartre being the most prominent representatives. They pushed Humanist Marxism to its climax. As humanism occupied a dominant position in Western Marxism, the evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western Marxism underwent significant changes accordingly.
On the issue of dialectics. Merleau-Ponty...
Merleau-Ponty argued that Engels’s dialectics of nature was a methodological dialectic and lacked ontological significance. He asserted: "Dialectic is this continuous intuition, the coherent reading of actual history," and "it is only in a secondary and derivative sense that there is a dialectic of nature." He further noted: "Every science produces its own dialectic, and Engels did not grant philosophy the right to arrange the results of the various sciences into a single primordial dialectic." Therefore, he believed Engels’s intention to construct a vast, all-encompassing dialectics of nature was erroneous. Sartre, in his article "Marxism and Revolution," analyzed the issues of Darwinian biological evolution and the physical problems of liquefaction and vaporization in Engels's Dialectics of Nature, pointing out: "What Engels proclaims as scientific method is nothing but the simple and pure movement of his mind: proceeding from the world of science to the world of naive reality, then back to the world of science and the world of pure sensation." In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre further emphasized: "As for the dialectic of nature, it can in any case only be an object hypothesized by metaphysics." Sartre’s evaluation of Engels’s dialectic appeared extremely sharp; he completely disagreed with Engels’s thoughts on the dialectics of nature, viewing them as nothing more than a "metaphysical dream."
Regarding the issue of ontology, Merleau-Ponty cited Engels’s statement in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy—that philosophy is "both superfluous and impossible"—to argue that philosophy did not exist for Engels, let alone a philosophical system. Even if it did, it consisted only of immature philosophical thoughts. In a letter to Roger Garaudy, Sartre wrote: "What I understand by Marxism is historical materialism premised on an internal dialectic of history, rather than dialectical materialism, if by dialectical materialism you mean this metaphysical dream of imagining one has discovered a dialectic of nature." It is evident that Sartre was vehemently opposed to dialectical materialism as inaugurated by Engels, considering it not to be Marxism but rather an erroneous form of metaphysics.
Regarding the issue of epistemology, Merleau-Ponty pointed out: "By grafting dialectics onto a metaphysics of materialism... [one] replaces history as the relationship between people embodied in 'things' with an opaque 'second nature' defined as primary. On the theoretical level, this uses the full power of 'understanding' to close off history, just as on the level of action, it replaces total praxis with a technical activity." On the surface, Merleau-Ponty was referring here to Lenin’s epistemology, but in reality, it was an evaluation of Engels’s epistemology. This is because he opposed the epistemology formed by Engels’s "grafting" of materialism and dialectics. Sartre remarked: "Everyone is free to believe that the laws of physics and chemistry exhibit a dialectical reason, or free not to. In short, within the realm of inorganic natural facts, all assertions made are extra-scientific." Sartre denied the identity of thinking and being; that is, even if science were dialectical, we would not necessarily be able to perceive it—we can only perceive the dialectical nature of our own thinking. Consequently, while denying Engels’s dialectics, Sartre simultaneously rejected Engels’s epistemology.
The evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western Humanist Marxism is characterized by several main features. First, the fundamental tone of their critique remains unchanged, centering likewise on Engels’s dialectics of nature. However, Western Humanist Marxism transitioned from a critique of Engels’s thoughts on the dialectics of nature to a holistic critique of his philosophical thought. They generally believed that Engels had no philosophy, that the dialectics of nature was merely a metaphysical idea, and that dialectical materialism was an utterly erroneous philosophical form. Second, while the evaluation of Engels’s philosophy by Western Humanist Marxists appears similar to that of early Western Marxism, the underlying logic underwent a significant shift. This shift was brought about by the different "benchmarks" they used to evaluate Engels. They abandoned the early perspective of using Marx as the benchmark for scrutinizing Engels and instead turned to the perspective of existentialism or other philosophical schools. This led to a collision between Engels’s philosophy and the ideas of other Western philosophical traditions. Sartre, for instance, consistently evaluated Engels from an existentialist perspective. In general, mid-20th-century Western Humanist Marxist scholars exhibited vast differences from Engels—one of the founders of Marxism—in their interpretations of Marxism, which led to a massive contrast in their evaluations of his philosophy.
There are four primary reasons for this contrast. First, mid-20th-century Western Humanist Marxism focused on the critical nature of Marxist philosophy rather than its scientific nature. In their view, the most important function of Marxist philosophy was its capacity for social critique, and they often neglected its scientificity. Consequently, Engels, as an interpreter of Marxist philosophy, was seen as having provided an incorrect interpretation, making his philosophy inherently wrong. Their self-identification as Marxists was based on an acceptance of a socio-historical standpoint. They borrowed Marx’s socio-historical theory to criticize capitalism while considering dialectical materialism to be entirely "unnecessary." Second, the influence of philosophical culture played a role. In the first half of the 20th century, philosophy underwent significant development, most notably the linguistic turn and the "phenomenological movement." These two philosophical trends changed previous philosophical approaches and advocated for transcending the modern "binary philosophy" of materialism and idealism. Thus, modern philosophers looked back at modern [post-Renaissance] philosophy from a "superior" position. Because of this, when evaluating Engels’s philosophy, they tended toward "total negation," viewing it as a "metaphysical dream." Third, mid-20th-century Western Humanist Marxism abandoned the practice of early Western Marxism where "every mention of Engels necessitated a mention of Marx," instead turning their gaze toward Engels as an independent individual. To them, the evaluation of Engels’s philosophy was "merely" an evaluation of Engels’s philosophy, requiring no link to Marx. Even a total negation of Engels’s philosophy would not affect the correctness of Marx’s social critical theory. Fourth, the emphasis on "the human" was always central to the Western Humanist Marxist evaluation of Engels. Due to World War II, people’s sense of crisis and disillusionment regarding capitalism deepened once again. "The human" re-emerged as the theme of the era. In their view, Engels’s philosophy neglected the human, representing precisely a "humanistic vacuum." Given this presupposition, their denial of Engels’s philosophy was inevitable.
Evaluations of Engels’s Philosophy by Scientistic Western Marxism
The rise of Scientistic Marxism is closely linked to the development of Humanist Marxism. In 1956, the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union criticized Stalin’s cult of personality, exposed his "atrocities," and attributed all policy failures to him. This unscientific attitude toward Stalin led some scholars to doubt the scientificity of Marxism. Meanwhile, the number of Western scholars interpreting Marxism through humanism increased. In the 1960s, Humanist Marxism reached its peak. Scientistic Marxism emerged precisely as a reflection on Humanist Marxism. Its primary representative was Althusser, and they sought to restore the scientificity of Marxism. "This trend attempted to combine structuralism with Marxism to complete a new exploration of Marxism; its essence was a certain degree of return to Engels’s philosophical direction."
Regarding dialectics, Althusser pointed out: "Despite Engels's astonishing genius, his thought cannot be compared to that of Lenin. Usually, he simply placed these things side-by-side rather than thinking of them in a unified relationship." Althusser did not attack Engels’s dialectics of nature, but he believed that while Engels was a genius, he lacked "connective" philosophical thought and failed to break free from positivist methods. Colletti, in Marxism and Hegel, noted: "However, for Engels—for whom the word dogmatism was naturally (entirely) linked to metaphysics—this discourse presented itself in a distorted sense: the cause of metaphysics was nothing other than science. Therefore, to eliminate metaphysical dogmatism, one had to oppose non-contradictory scientific thinking." He continued: "However, for Engels, scientific non-contradiction is a form of metaphysics, while idealistic or metaphysical logic is the logic of the new 'science'." Colletti believed Engels had inverted dialectics and the principle of non-contradiction. The principle of non-contradiction, which serves as the standard of science, was treated by Engels as metaphysics, while dialectics, which is metaphysical, was understood by Engels as a scientific method. Thus, he believed Engels caused extreme damage to the scientificity of Marxism.
Regarding ontology, Althusser pointed out in Lenin and Philosophy: "He never really broke with the positivist themes of The German Ideology. For although he advocated systematic study of philosophy, for him, philosophy must disappear, because philosophy is nothing more than a 'craftsman's laboratory' in which the philosophical categories necessary for science in the past were formed. Those times have passed. Philosophy has completed its work." Althusser accused Engels of failing to escape positivism; for Engels, philosophy was merely a "craftsman’s laboratory" and was ultimately to be transcended. Subsequently, Althusser pointed out problems in Engels’s view of the object of philosophical study: "In fact, if the object of philosophy is pure thought, then Engels would find himself a Kantian without a transcendental subject." Colletti argued that Engels’s philosophy, like that of Henri Bergson, shared a common theoretical core despite entirely different goals, forms, and programs: the critique of the intellect and the principle of non-contradiction.
Regarding epistemology, Althusser stated: "Engels did clarify for us one of the conditions for the formation of an event in the history of theory: precisely, the theoretical revolution. We see that only by establishing the concepts of theoretical events or facts emerging in the history of knowledge can a history of knowledge be established." Althusser affirmed Engels’s contribution to the history of epistemology. At the same time, however, he accused Engels of being vague regarding the concept of the object of knowledge, empirically conflating the object of knowledge with the real object. Colletti carefully examined the philosophies of Hegel and Engels. He believed Hegel’s entire philosophy was "split and disconnected by a profound contradiction; its 'method' and its 'system' are perpetually in conflict." Engels, he argued, inherited exactly this contradiction from Hegel—the doctrine of the identity of thinking and being. Therefore, Engels’s epistemology could only be contradictory.
In general, first, Scientistic Western Marxism held many criticisms of Engels’s philosophy, but compared to the total negation of Western Humanist Marxism, there was a shift. This can be considered a form of return to Engels’s philosophy. In Althusser’s evaluation in particular, there was no lack of praise for Engels’s genius. Second, evaluations of Engels’s philosophy by Scientistic Western Marxists mostly focused on the relationship between Engels’s philosophy and science. In their view, Engels’s research spanned the two fields of natural science and philosophy. Engels’s ontology, methodology, and epistemology all bear the traces of science. Third, although both represented dissenting voices regarding Engels’s philosophy, the evaluations by Humanist Marxism and Scientistic Marxism stood in sharp opposition. Humanist Marxism opposed Engels’s dialectics of nature, believing he severed the link between Hegel’s and Marx’s dialectics, causing Marxism to become scientific and positivist. Conversely, Scientistic Marxism criticized Engels for inheriting Hegel’s erroneous "material dialectic," causing Marxism to become metaphysical and ultimately lose its scientificity.
There are several reasons for the scientistic Marxist evaluation of Engels's philosophy. First, it stems from a negation of Western humanistic Marxism. The rise of scientistic Western Marxism was closely linked to the emergence of Western humanistic Marxism; specifically, it appeared as a trend of thought opposed to the humanization of Marxism. This anti-humanization stance was reflected in their evaluation of Engels’s philosophy. On the surface, like the humanistic Marxists, they negated Engels's philosophy to re-interpret Marxism, but in substance, scientistic Marxism ran in the opposite direction to humanistic Marxism. Second, they sought to "abandon Engels to save Marx." While there are many differences between Western Marxism’s interpretation of Marxism and orthodox Marxism, they nonetheless believed in Marxism. Consequently, when encountering theoretical problems, they would modify the theoretical periphery of Marxism (Engels’s philosophy) to prevent the core (Marx’s philosophy) from being modified. As the logical pragmatist Quine stated: "Any statement can be held true come what may, if we make drastic enough adjustments elsewhere in the system." Third, it was driven by the development of science and the investigation into the relationship between science and philosophy. The massive development of science brought unprecedented prosperity. All disciplines had to undergo scientific testing to possess a legitimate basis for existence. Philosophy found itself in an awkward predicament, where science—originally born from philosophy—turned back to become the benchmark for philosophy. Engels’s dual identity as both a scientist and a philosopher similarly influenced the scientistic Western Marxist evaluation of his philosophy. Fourth, it involved a negation of metaphysics. The metaphysical thoughts within Engels's philosophy were a focal point for scientistic Western Marxists. To guarantee the scientificity of Marxism, they believed they had to discard its metaphysical elements.
The "Theoretical Dilemma" and "Theoretical Bluster" in the Western Marxist Evaluation of Engels's Philosophy
The First World War made early Western Marxist scholars realize the many inevitable problems in the development of the capitalist system, leading them to turn toward socialism to seek a way out. However, while actively seeking this exit, they encountered successive failures. Faced with such failures, they began to reflect upon their guiding ideology—Marxism. This formed the philosophical evaluation of Engels's philosophy within early Western Marxism. When early Western Marxists researched Engels, they primarily based their work on the exposition of Engels’s texts while conducting partial comparative analyses of the differences between him and Marx. Early Western Marxists believed that Engels had misunderstood Marxist philosophy. First, they argued Engels mistakenly extended Marx’s historical dialectics to nature, resulting in the dialectics of nature. Second, they claimed Engels narrowed and weakened Marx’s concept of "practice." This led to a decline in the status of the "human" within Engels’s philosophy; simultaneously, human subjective initiative and infinite creativity could no longer be guaranteed. This opened a door for the later humanistic Marxism. Furthermore, early Western Marxism did not entirely negate Engels’s philosophy. At the same time, their evaluation of Engels remained inseparable from Marx, always taking Marx as the foundational point. Finally, because early Western Marxists did not have access to the first edition of the Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA1) [12], their philological resources were limited. Consequently, before World War II, the West generally did not focus on philological or textual criticism. This is one of the reasons why early Western Marxist scholars were unable to truly separate Marx from Engels.
In the 1950s, after experiencing the Second World War, Western Marxist scholars realized that the rapid development of capitalist science and industrial technology had not brought happiness to the majority. "Especially after WWII... a mode of human existence marked by 'consumerism' became rampant, gradually trending from the West until it was accepted by the rest of the world. Conversely, some insightful Western figures conducted profound reflections from various angles: Is this mode of existence the one humans need and ought to have? Are people truly happy under this mode of existence? Can humans continue to live according to this mode? Where will it lead us? Do we need to seek a new mode of existence? How, ultimately, should humans live beautifully in this world? Where lie the necessity and reality of the human pursuit of a beautiful life?" They increasingly focused on the human being itself and the state of human existence. This post-war reflection pushed humanistic Marxism to its climax. First, their research on Engels was no longer limited to the textual exposition of ideas; they placed Engels’s philosophical thought within a philosophical system for analysis. When evaluating Engels, they focused on the integrity of his philosophical system and the status of "the human" within it. Second, they negated Engels's philosophy entirely, viewing his philosophical system as a form of metaphysics or claiming there was no philosophy in Engels at all. This was, of course, related to modern philosophy’s demand to transcend the "binary philosophy" of materialism and idealism prevalent in the early modern period. Finally, from the perspective of an anatomist, they stripped Engels's philosophy away from Marxism. Although both early Western Marxists and the humanistic Marxists of the 1950s raised the "human" question in Engels's philosophy, the former did so from the perspective of "practice," while the latter did so from the perspective of "existence."
In the 1960s, scientistic Marxism emerged as a trend of thought opposing humanistic Marxism. First, they believed that Marxism possessed not only a value dimension but, more importantly, a scientific dimension. They argued humanistic Marxism ignored the scientificity of Marxist philosophy. In their interpretation of Marxism, scientistic Marxism could be seen as a return to Engels's philosophy. As Wang Yuchen [13] emphasized: "The essence of Althusser’s view of Marxist philosophy is to oppose both the humanist interpretation and the determinist or teleological interpretations, striving to defend the relationship between the scientific nature of Marxist theory and its ideological function." When Althusser researched Engels, he often performed a "symptomatic reading" [14] of the texts. Second, although the scientistic Marxists of the 1960s held a critical attitude toward Engels, they still identified with his philosophical thought in certain aspects, including affirmations of his creativity. Finally, their evaluations of Engels always began with the relationship between philosophy and science. Although the humanistic Marxists of the 1950s and the scientistic Marxists of the 1960s both criticized Engels, their internal logics differed greatly. Humanistic Marxism believed Engels severed the link between Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, turning Marxism into something scientific and positivist. Scientistic Marxism, however, believed Engels inherited Hegel's erroneous dialectics, thereby making Marxism metaphysical.
It can be said that the Western Marxist critique of Engels was largely aimed at consolidating their own "idiosyncratic" theories; that is, they preset Engels’s thought as the antithesis of their own theories, affirming themselves by negating the other. For instance, to showcase their own "humanism," they presupposed that Engels's "nature" was divorced from human practice, and they unilaterally emphasized Marx's humanism and Engels's materialism, severing the link between the two—a move characterized by exaggeration. In reality, Marx and Engels were consistent in their views on the dialectics of nature: for Marx, his dialectics and materialism were established on the basis of the complex interaction between society and nature. These two constituted a unified reality requiring a unified scientific explanation. Marx included both society and nature within the dialectical system; even if he believed the dialectics of nature were developed "less" fully than social dialectics, he did not negate it. Furthermore, for Engels, our understanding of nature is dialectical and made possible through human practice, including the experimental methods introduced by science and technology. Finally, the Western Marxist critique of contemporary capitalism actually dovetails with Engels's ideas on the dialectics of nature. Engels constructed a dialectical concept of nature through the "nature-society" connection. It is precisely because of the alienated society of capitalism that the laws of natural regeneration and sustainable development are destroyed, resulting in a global ecological crisis; these stem exactly from the artificial severance of the relationship between natural reality and human consciousness.
The historical evolution of the evaluations of Engels by the three major schools—early Western Marxism, humanistic Western Marxism, and scientistic Western Marxism—reflects the transitions of Western capitalism and the internal differentiation of Western Marxism. Among these three schools, representative figures who opposed Engels's philosophy appeared to stand on an anti-capitalist footing. However, whether they belonged to the "Right" or the "Left," they maintained inextricable links with capitalism and never escaped the tendencies of various bourgeois ideologies. Therefore, their critiques of Engels's philosophy are perfectly suited to Marx’s evaluation of bourgeois politicians in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: "The bourgeois, especially the bourgeois raised to the level of a statesman, is always wont to compensate for his practical meanness by theoretical bluster." Looking back at the Western Marxism that launched critiques against Engels, the fundamental reason for the emergence of "theoretical bluster" (理论浮夸, lǐlùn fúkuā) is exactly as Marx stated: a serious deficiency in "practice." Western Marxists who criticize Engels, detached as they are from the vivid practice of proletarian revolution, find it difficult to escape a petty-bourgeois standpoint. Lacking a thorough understanding of historical materialism, they engage in wanton theoretical bluster, fabrication, and theoretical intimidation. Ultimately, they inevitably move toward the opposite of Marxism and become the dust of history. Thus, by examining the Western Marxist attitude toward Engels's philosophy, we can instead further unearth its theoretical depth, rich connotations, and resilient vitality.