Ge Shuzhen: Between Nationalism and Internationalism: The Evolution and Political Participation of the Communist Party of Israel
I. The Arduous Explorations of the Palestine Communist Party During the Mandate Period
The communist movement in the Palestine region was closely linked to the Zionist movement. Early members of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) were Jews from Russia and Eastern Europe who opposed Tsarist autocracy, strove for liberation, and actively participated in the Bolshevik Revolution. In March 1919, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was founded as the predecessor to the PCP. It was one of the earliest Marxist parties established in the Middle East, and its early theoretical propositions and political practices were heavily tinged with Zionism. At its first national congress in October of the same year, the party declared: "Our party openly proclaims that Proletarian Zionism closely links the realization of the Zionist ideal with the success of the socialist revolution... Our party is convinced that Zionism will be realized in a socialist form, or it will not be realized at all. Our party will oppose all other forms of Zionism, both bourgeois Zionism and compromising proletarian Zionism." The distinct Jewish nationalist characteristics of the SWP laid the groundwork for the party's subsequent convoluted development.
In April 1921, the Socialist Workers Party changed its name to the Palestine Communist Party (PCP). The Jewish nationalist thought within the PCP’s revolutionary theory ran counter to the ideals of proletarian internationalism, drawing skepticism and criticism from the Comintern. To practice the internationalist ideals of the communist movement and to gain support from the vast Arab population in Palestine, the PCP, after careful consideration, agreed to the Comintern's demand for "nativization" (also termed "Arabization") [1] at its Fourth Congress in July 1923. It recognized the right of Arabs to participate in all agendas and party discussions and ceased its pursuit of Zionism—a move of profound significance in the PCP’s history. This shift in political thought paved the way for the PCP’s alignment with the Comintern; in March 1924, the PCP officially joined the Comintern, becoming a member of the international communist movement. Subsequently, the PCP’s political stance remained highly consistent with that of the Soviet Union, openly opposing the Zionist movement, supporting the Arab struggle for rights, and seeking to build a "Jewish-Arab" anti-imperialist united front. Throughout the 1920s, although the PCP held multiple meetings to implement Arabization policies and reach out to the Arab population, the results were negligible. In mid-August 1929, anti-Jewish riots broke out in Palestine, resulting in over 130 Jewish deaths and more than 300 injuries. Following the riots, the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) stated in a resolution that the errors revealed by the PCP were "due to the PCP’s failure to boldly and clearly implement Arabization from top to bottom." Under heavy pressure from Stalin and the Comintern, the PCP’s focus throughout the 1930s shifted from the previous "Jewish line" toward an "Arab line." The primary measures included:
First, facilitating a shift in party leadership and increasing the number of Arab members. In late December 1930, the PCP held its Seventh Congress in Jerusalem. Following adjustments, the number of Arab and Jewish delegates was equal, while the Central Committee was composed of three Arabs and two Jews. For the first time in the PCP’s history, Arabs held a majority in the party’s leadership bodies. Second, actively cultivating Arab leadership cadres. Between 1929 and 1935, over thirty Arab party members were sent to the Soviet Union for professional development training to study Marxist-Leninist thought and the principles of democratic centralism. Upon returning to Palestine, they assumed leadership positions within the Communist ranks to develop the local communist movement. Third, emphasizing the development of inter-party relations with other Arab Communist Parties. To expand its influence and secure external aid, the PCP established friendly relations during the 1930s with Communist Parties in countries such as Syria and Lebanon. Both sides exchanged representatives for visits and even participated in the formulation of each other’s internal policies. For instance, the Jewish communist Nahman Listvinsky was invited to a meeting in Beirut, where he suggested that Syrian communists change their attitude toward certain Syrian national parties and groups. Fourth, vigorously supporting the Arab national liberation movement. The 1930 Seventh Congress of the PCP established a basic line of supporting the Arab national liberation movement. During the subsequent Arab Revolt (1936–1939), the PCP explicitly opposed the British Mandate authorities and Jewish immigration. At the Pan-Arab Congress held in Syria on September 8, 1937, PCP representatives explicitly supported the proposal that "Palestine belongs to the Arabs," affirming the Arab character of Palestine and opposing the Peel Commission partition plan [2].
The Arabization of PCP policy was a major turning point in the party's history. However, this policy and the efforts to practice internationalism encountered repeated crises in the face of the complex national, religious, and territorial conflicts in Palestine. During the three-year Arab Revolt, the PCP’s stance of unconditional support for the Arab nationalist movement caused significant injury to the national sentiments of Jewish members. After the outbreak of World War II, British policies strictly limiting the immigration of European Jewish refugees to Palestine also sparked fierce debate within the party, leading to increasingly severe internal divisions. Following the dissolution of the Comintern in May 1943, the Jewish faction within the party retained the original PCP name, while the Arab faction merged with other Arab communist organizations to form the "National Liberation League." The Soviet Union intervened actively in this split after the war. On October 22, 1948, under Soviet pressure, the two factions reconciled and merged to form the "Communist Party of Israel" (Maki [3]). They declared their commitment to ensuring the smooth implementation of the UN Partition Plan, called for the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state, and expressed their intent to continue the struggle for the communist cause in the Palestine region.
Generally speaking, during the Mandate period, the political propositions of the Palestine Communist Party underwent major changes under the intervention of the Soviet Union and the Comintern: shifting from supporting to opposing the Zionist movement; shifting the party’s direction from a Jewish line to an Arab line; and shifting from supporting a bi-national state to supporting the partition of Palestine into Arab and Israeli states. After the 1920s, to strengthen the organizational building of Communist Parties, the Comintern promoted the policy of "Bolshevization" [4] across all member parties. This required all branches to absolutely obey the centralized leadership of the Comintern, treating it as the unified organization of the world communist movement and clearly opposing sectarianism and "alliance-ism." As a branch of the Comintern, the PCP naturally had to submit to this concept, eventually evolving toward a vision of Jewish-Arab unity where everything followed the commands of the CPSU or even Stalin personally.
II. The Political Practice of the Reorganized Communist Party of Israel
The Maki (CPI) reorganized in the early years of the Israeli state was a party composed of both Arabs and Jews. although the 1948 Soviet support for the establishment of Israel differed greatly from the party’s previous policy of opposing Zionism and supporting Arab nationalism, the framework of Israel’s parliamentary democracy provided a platform and opportunity for various political parties, including the Communist Party, to conduct open, regular, and continuous activities.
The CPI was small in scale; around 1956, its membership was between 4,000 and 5,000, including at least 2,700 Jews and 1,300 Arabs. In terms of recruiting new members, the CPI was more attractive to Arabs than to Jews; the party drew more members from new immigrants than from those born in Israel or those who had settled in Palestine before World War II. Regarding origins, in 1961, 54.6% of CPI members came from Europe, 29.8% from the Palestine region, and 15.6% from Asia, Africa, and the Americas. In terms of leadership, the CPI Central Committee had about 20 members and the Politburo had 7. In 1957, the Central Committee included 14 Jews and 6 Arabs; in 1961, it had 14 Jews and 5 Arabs. The composition of the Politburo in both years was 5 Jews and 2 Arabs. Despite the significant Jewish advantage, the CPI followed in the footsteps of the Soviet Union, basing itself on the realities of post-independence Israel and balancing the interests of both the Arab and Jewish nations. It made due contributions to practicing national equality and protecting the weak.
The CPI actively participated in parliamentary elections, viewing the Knesset (parliament) as an important stage for realizing socialist ideals. In the first parliamentary elections in 1949, the CPI won 4 out of 120 seats; in 1951, it won 5; in 1955, it won 6; in 1959, it won 3; and in 1961, it won 5. As the only legal party at the time with a large Arab minority membership, the CPI consistently advocated for Arab interests, demanding that the Israeli government grant Arabs equal status, end military rule [5], and cease discrimination in fields such as employment and education. It encouraged the development of Arab culture and condemned any signs of official discrimination against Arabs. In 1955, only 1% of Arab student applications were accepted by Israeli universities. Regarding the difficulty Arabs faced in attending university, the CPI published articles accusing the government of deliberately failing Arab students in entrance exams to keep the Arab masses in a state of ignorance, thereby ensuring their perpetual obedience.
To attract Arab votes, the CPI also placed special emphasis on promoting its bi-national character. During the 1951 elections, the CPI highlighted its "Jewish-Arab" attribute among Arabs and cited two Arab members—Tawfik Toubi (ranked second on the candidate list) and Emile Habibi (ranked fourth)—as proof of the party's commitment to defending Arab rights and opposing government policies. At the party’s campaign opening in Nazareth, General Secretary Shmuel Mikunis defined the CPI program as: "The Communist Party's defense of the Arab minority is the defense of democracy." The Arab response to the Communist Party's devoted assistance was, more or less, confined to parliamentary elections. Generally, Arab support for the CPI was higher than Jewish support, and their interest in joining the party was also greater. About half of the CPI's votes came from Arab-populated areas; for example, in the 1949 election, the CPI won 50% of the vote in Nazareth. A 1961 CPI statement showed that Jewish members accounted for 74.3% of all members and Arabs 25.7%, yet at that time, Arabs constituted only 11% of the total Israeli population.
The CPI always relied heavily on Arab support. This approach succeeded partly due to the party's historical experience before the founding of the state and partly due to the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict. Before 1948, the party prioritized recruiting Arabs and supported Arab revolts; after independence, the Middle Eastern political stage played a crucial role in Arab support for the CPI. For example, during the 1956 Suez Crisis, the CPI openly condemned the war as aggression by Britain, France, and Israel against Egypt. In a report to the Central Committee at the 15th CPI Congress in 1965, leader Meir Wilner summarized official Israeli policy as "colluding with imperialist forces against the Arab masses." Furthermore, as the Cold War intensified and Soviet influence in the Middle East grew, the CPI became a primary venue for some Israeli Arabs to express nationalist sentiments. In a context where the question of Palestinian sovereignty remained unresolved and Arab nationalist parties were extremely weak, many Israeli Arabs cast their votes for the CPI. However, the CPI’s defense of Arab interests caused it to remain a marginal party in the Israeli Knesset for a long time, and its increasing reliance on Arabs reinforced its marginal status in an Israeli society where Jews were the overwhelming majority.
While maintaining a clear-cut stance in support of Arabs, the CPI also put forward unique insights into various domestic issues based on essential socialist principles and the realities of post-independence Israel, thereby advancing the communist movement in Israel.
The Maki is the spokesperson for the working class and resolutely defends their interests. Given the severe unemployment and hardships of people's livelihoods in the early days of the state's founding, the Maki called on the government to take strong measures to force capitalists to initiate public projects, hire unemployed workers, and improve living standards. Regarding the rationing system implemented by the Israeli government for supplies starting in 1949, the Maki accused the government of allocating too much of the budget to police and religious affairs while leaving far from enough for health, education, and immigration quotas. They emphasized that the rationing system harmed the workers' lives, restricted consumption, and would lead to severe unemployment. Similarly, the Maki opposed the arms race conducted by the state under the guise of maintaining security, arguing that this would seriously affect Israel's economic development and damage the interests of workers.
The Maki strove to seek welfare and justice for the broad masses in its immigration policy. To address complex immigration issues, the Knesset [6] passed the Law of Return on June 5, 1950. The Law of Return upheld the conditional granting of immigration rights to Jews, allowing "qualified Jews" to return and guaranteeing their freedom of religion, but opposing the immigration of Jews who endangered public safety and health. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion explicitly stated: "I oppose bringing criminals, madmen, and Jews who endanger public safety and health to Israel, only to put them in prison or send them to hospitals. Jews migrate to Israel to build this country, for cultural and national rebirth, not to sit in jail." The Maki displayed a cautious attitude toward the Law of Return, believing that while the bill contained reasonable considerations for national politics and security, it was not sufficiently just or rigorous. They feared it could be abused by the government to shut out political dissidents, resulting in the loss of equal rights for Jews. Communist MK [7] Meir Vilner once said: "No one has the right to define who will endanger national security, because national security is a political concept that can be used as a tool by the ruling party and the government against other political parties." This suspicion was not without merit. In November 1951, to alleviate the worsening economic situation, the Ben-Gurion government decided to change the immigration policy by setting entrance standards for immigration applications, aiming to improve the "quality" of immigrants, limit their number, and reduce the government's burden. Thereafter, "the Jewish Agency examined immigration conditions such as health status, assets, age, and labor capacity to ensure that immigrants coming to Israel could contribute to national construction." This situation ran contrary to the original ideals of the Law of Return and was precisely what the Maki had feared.
From the perspective of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the defense of Jewish national dignity, the Maki also opposed accepting post-war economic aid and reparations from the United States and Germany. The Maki opposed accepting aid under President Truman’s Point Four Program, believing it would affect Israel's political and economic independence. On February 26, 1951, when the U.S.-Israel Point Four agreement was signed, the Maki pointed out that "this agreement takes Israel a step further into the strategic and economic plans of the Western bloc," and that Israel’s action in accepting U.S. help placed itself "under the control of war maniacs." The Maki also opposed accepting German reparations, believing that accepting this compensation would mean recognition and forgiveness of the Bonn government, taking "blood money" from the hands of executioners—essentially selling out the Jewish people. Therefore, when the reparations agreement was signed between Israel and the West German Bonn government on September 10, 1952, the Maki pointed out that the agreement was "a victory for the neo-Nazis who are preparing to launch a new world war."
Before the mid-1960s, the Maki embraced beautiful ideals, propagated socialist thought, and made positive contributions to achieving peaceful coexistence between the Arab and Jewish nations, safeguarding the legal rights of the lower classes, and promoting social stability. During this period, nationalist and internationalist concepts achieved a brief fusion, and the contradictions between the two were temporarily suppressed. However, over time, against the international backdrop of the Cold War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, more and more disagreements emerged within the Maki over issues of ethnicity, education, and security, eventually leading to a split.
III. Disagreements and the Split of the Communist Party of Israel
Disagreements between Jewish and Arab members within the Maki had existed for a long time. As early as 1958, Arab Communist MK Emil Habibi proposed establishing an independent Arab Communist Party to grant the Arab people the right to national self-determination and urged the separation of those areas primarily inhabited by Arabs from Israel. This proposal triggered a strong reaction from almost the entire Israeli media. Although the proposal was not accepted by the Knesset, it reflected at least the unspoken aspirations deep in the hearts of many Arab members. In August 1965, the Maki's disagreements became public at the party's 15th Congress. The two opposing factions each elected a Central Committee and a Politburo. The Jewish faction, led by Shmuel Mikunis, continued to use the name "Communist Party of Israel" (Maki), while the Arab faction, led by Meir Vilner, called itself the Jewish-Arab Communist Party (Rakah, the New Communist List of Israel). The split of the Maki originated from conflicts present in the party's early history: "attempting to incorporate Jews and Arabs into one party against a background where the two ethnic groups were divided by their respective nationalist tendencies," and "the hope of winning souls even when communism and Zionism were difficult to reconcile." The essence of the split was that nationalism and internationalism are naturally difficult to fuse, manifesting as serious political disagreements between the two factions within the party.
Regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict and the existence of the State of Israel, both sides recognized Israel's legal right to exist but held different views on the causes of tension between Israel and its neighbors. The Arab faction believed the threat of conflict stemmed from "imperialist conspirators opposing anti-imperialist Arab countries with the help of Israeli rulers," placing the ultimate blame on Britain, the United States, and the Israeli government. The Jewish faction, however, believed the possibility of Arab countries instigating war also existed, that not all Arab countries were anti-imperialist, and denied equating Israel's interests with those of imperialist countries. At the same time, they pointed out that British and American oil companies colluded with certain Arab oil-producing countries, and this alliance exerted pressure on Israel, becoming a significant cause of conflict. Regarding the path to resolving the conflict, the Jewish faction believed only after neighboring Arab countries first recognized the State of Israel could issues such as Israel's recognition of the Palestinian Arabs be resolved. Conversely, the Arab faction believed Arab countries would only recognize Israel after the Palestinian question had been handled justly and peacefully.
Regarding Arab nationalism and Zionism, both Arab and Jewish party members had complex feelings. The Maki had always shown strong sympathy and support for nationalist movements in Arab countries and their leaders (such as Nasser); this sentiment was reinforced by the unjust treatment Israeli Arabs suffered in daily life. For example, in the education system, many schools separated Jews and Arabs based on the language they spoke. Although Jewish members condemned such differential treatment, the injury felt by Arab members and their thirst for equal citizenship could not be fully empathized with by their Jewish comrades. Meanwhile, Jewish members also opposed the undiscriminating acceptance of certain progressive and anti-imperialist goals of Arab countries, believing this would put the Maki in the dangerous position of being led by the nose by the Arab nationalist movement. Similarly, on the issue of Zionism, the Arab faction continued to criticize the movement, accusing Zionists and imperialist powers (especially the U.S.) of forming an alliance. The Jewish faction, however, said "it is a national movement that is neither fully opposed nor fully favored, but one where its positive aspects are affirmed while its negative aspects are negated."
Regarding Soviet foreign policy, the Maki had faithfully followed Moscow's line until 1965, after which this attitude gradually changed. On the relationship between the Soviet Union and Middle Eastern countries, the Jewish Communists feared for national security and strongly opposed the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Arab world, while the Arab faction praised Soviet policies regardless of whether they related to Israel. When the Soviet Union's relations with China and Czechoslovakia soured, the Arab members offered strong support, calling it proletarian internationalism. Even after the split, they insisted, "we resolutely condemn the splitting activities of the Chinese leadership, which have brought great harm to the entire international movement for the liberation of the people." For this reason, the Maki leadership led by Shmuel Mikunis reluctantly concluded that "Moscow's policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict is based on Great Power interests and has opportunistic tendencies..." and that "the Soviet Union's ultimate goal is not to restore peace in the region, but to strengthen its position by supporting Arab regimes that are often far from progressive."
The outbreak of the Third Middle East War [8] in 1967 further widened the rift between the two factions. Rakah accused it of being "an aggressive war instigated by the Eshkol-Dayan-Begin government," believing the war originated from the ill-intentioned plots of imperialist countries in the region. They expressed support for UN Security Council Resolution 242 and demanded Israel withdraw from newly occupied lands. Maki, however, maintained that the Arab countries were the aggressors and supported the Israeli government's occupation of the new territories, believing the war resulted from Arab countries uniting to destroy Israel, and that Israel had merely "repelled and defeated an aggression that threatened her existence, without attacking her neighbors." The war also caused disagreements between the two factions on domestic policy. Subsequently, Maki supported the view of Israel's national militarization and voted for official policies in budget meetings, while Rakah repeatedly opposed militarization measures in the budget and opposed American aid.
The split of the Maki had a major impact on both factions. First, the split left Maki in a difficult position, no longer recognized by the Soviet bloc. At the start of the split, to facilitate reconciliation between the "hostile brothers," the Soviet Union summoned leadership from both factions to Moscow for talks, but with little effect. Thereafter, Maki's relationship with the Soviet Union drifted further away; they accused the Soviet Union of deviating from its policy of non-intervention in the Indo-Pakistani and Sino-Indian conflicts. Leader Moshe Sneh even pointed out that Arab countries should be held responsible for the Arab-Israeli conflict. This assertion not only increased the rift with the Arab faction but also caused strong dissatisfaction in Moscow. After the Third Middle East War, Rakah was recognized by the Soviet bloc as the "official Communist Party of Israel" among the two factions. Following this, the Communist parties of most socialist countries in the world recognized Rakah, with only the Communist parties of Romania, the Netherlands, and Switzerland continuing to recognize only Maki's status. Second, the split dealt a heavy blow to the Jewish faction's competition on the Israeli political stage. In the fifth Israeli parliamentary elections in November 1965, Maki won only one seat, while Rakah won three. After the Third Middle East War, Maki lost a large number of Arab votes due to its shift in traditional policy, becoming increasingly marginalized in the Knesset. In the 1969 elections, Maki won one seat and Rakah won three. In the 1973 elections, Maki won no seats, while Rakah won four. After the death of Maki leader Moshe Sneh, Mikunis struggled alone. Having failed to gain the trust of Israeli Jews or the support of the Arab masses, Maki held a party congress in June 1975 and announced its voluntary dissolution, disappearing from the Israeli political stage.
After the dissolution of Maki, Rakah, led by Vilner, subsequently took the name "Communist Party of Israel" and continued to promote its pro-Soviet and pro-Arab line, increasingly relying on Arab votes. Since the Communist Party had long prioritized defending the interests of the working class and called on the government to give due attention to ensuring employment and safeguarding workers' rights, it gained the support of many Israelis and its ranks continued to grow. "From the 19th Party Congress in 1981 to the 20th in 1985, the number of party members grew by 30.2%, and party branches increased from 86 in 1981 to 95 in December 1985. In the four years from 1985 to 1989, the net increase in party members was 12%."
The split and changes in the Communist Party of Israel during the 1960s and 70s had complex reasons. In regions of conflict, a party where ethnic contradictions exist will ultimately, inevitably split along nationalist lines. In the case of the Maki, its nationalist forces included both Zionism and Arab nationalism, a narrowness that contradicted the internationalist principles of Marx and Lenin. After several rounds of struggle, the Maki eventually moved toward a split.
IV. Theoretical Explorations of the Communist Party of Israel after the Changes in Eastern Europe
Following the drastic changes in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the world socialist movement fell into a low ebb. The Communist Party of Israel (CPI) withstood the massive shocks brought about by these transformations, remaining unswerving in its adherence to Marxism-Leninism and the socialist direction, and continued to strive for the prospects of Arab-Israeli peace and socialism. The CPI is a Marxist-Leninist party built upon the foundations of revolutionary socialist thought; it is a "self-renewing revolutionary socialist party" and the "party of the working class and all exploited strata." Entering the 21st century, the CPI convened its 24th, 25th, and 26th National Congresses in 2004, 2007, and 2012, respectively. Based on its specific historical stage and the concrete national conditions of Israel, the Party has applied and developed Marxism creatively, exploring numerous issues concerning the theory and practice of capitalism and socialism. It has achieved a series of theoretical results and forged a unique path of development.
The CPI has conducted a powerful critique of contemporary capitalism. The Program of the Communist Party of Israel, adopted at the 24th National Congress in April 2004, states: "The backward capitalist system, centered on US imperialism, is filled with deep systemic contradictions due to its lack of justice, destruction of the global environment, and embezzlement of the fruits of workers' labor. Therefore, at the beginning of the new millennium, this transformation is particularly active. Financial globalization is not the way out of the social crisis, but its main cause." The CPI maintains: "The globalization of capital and the rapid development of modern industry, technology, information systems, and media are all utilized by capital in an attempt to achieve centralized control over resources, capital, and wage labor. However, this also creates the material basis for the solidarity of the international workers' movement, instantiating Marx and Engels' slogan: 'Workers of the world, unite!'" Taking Israel as an example, the CPI also attacks the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a tiny minority of capitalists, which deepens social inequality. It pointed out that in the first decade of the 21st century, economic inequality in Israel was second only to the United States among OECD countries. In 2010 alone, 1.8 million people in Israel (25% of the total population) lived below the poverty line; over eight years (2002 to 2010), the proportion of children living in poverty grew from 20% to 36%.
The CPI maintains rational reflections on contemporary socialism. Faced with increasing global social, environmental, and economic problems, more and more people have begun to contemplate and explore new alternative social models to achieve social justice. The CPI believes that "socialism is not a static social system, but a constantly developing and renewing social path." It points out that "in today's Israel, the concept of socialism has not disappeared from public discourse; therefore, Communists need to integrate the concept of socialism with Israeli reality to build a force for socialist change." To realize the socialist ideal, the Party is dedicated to defending the cause and rights of laborers, improving their living standards, protecting human rights, opposing discrimination, and protecting democratic freedoms. It is committed to ensuring equal civil and national rights for Arab citizens of Israel, defending Arab housing and property rights, and upholding the brotherhood between Jews and Arabs. It is dedicated to protecting the rights of women, youth, children, and foreign workers. Through practical action, the CPI has demonstrated its loyalty to the socialist system and its enthusiasm for the socialist cause.
The CPI maintains objective judgments regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Party has always insisted on resolving the conflict through peaceful means, always considering the protection of the common interests of both the Arab and Jewish nations, and opposing the Israeli occupation of Arab territories. Its Program explicitly states that the Party is a "party of Jews and Arabs serving all citizens and representing the interests of both the Jewish and Arab peoples," proposing a path toward a just and stable peace between Palestine and Israel. Both the 25th and 26th Congress reports proposed a "Peace Program" for Palestine and Israel, the basic contents of which include: Israel's withdrawal from Arab territories occupied by war since 1967; the resolution of the Palestinian refugee issue in accordance with United Nations resolutions within the framework of peace negotiations; the realization of national self-determination for Palestinian Arabs and the establishment of a sovereign state; Israeli withdrawal from East Jerusalem and Lebanon; the dismantling of all settlements in occupied territories; the return of the Golan Heights to Syria; and the signing of peace agreements with Arab countries based on peaceful coexistence and non-interference in internal affairs.
The CPI maintains a continuous identification with Party building [N1]. The CPI continues to adhere to the principle of democratic centralism, believing that this principle "ensures internal democracy, freedom of speech, and the combination of collective leadership with individual responsibility, while maintaining a unified national policy and strictly implementing resolutions." It integrates the principle of democratic centralism throughout the entire process of Party building. The CPI also attaches particular importance to the role of the Front for Peace and Democracy (Hadash). In 1977, the 18th Congress of the CPI decided to establish the "Front for Peace and Democracy" to promote peace between Israel and Arab countries and to safeguard the interests of Arabs within the country. The CPI's proposal received a positive response, and many Jewish and Arab social organizations joined the Front, "such as the Black Panthers and the socialist Matzpen movement." Entering the 21st century, the CPI still believes the Democratic Front should be strengthened and is committed to "building a broad Jewish-Arab left-wing front... striving for broad common action based on consensus with other political parties, sectors, and dissidents." It has repeatedly relied on the Democratic Front to carry out struggles to achieve peace between Israel and Palestine, defend the rights of workers and the masses, oppose sectarian discrimination and religious oppression, and strive for equal rights for women, achieving notable results.
V. Conclusion
While fully affirming the CPI's achievements in promoting Arab-Israeli peace and exploring the path of socialist development, one must also recognize the many dilemmas facing the Party. The greatest problem is the decline in support among Arabs, leading to a decrease in the CPI's influence in parliamentary politics. The CPI was previously popular among Arabs due to its opposition to the Zionist movement, its support for Arab countries, and its unremitting struggle for the national and civil rights of the Arab people in Israel. However, since the 1970s, with the progression of democratization in Israeli society and the strengthening of Arab national consciousness, some nationalist organizations—such as the "Sons of the Village" (Abnaa el-Balad) movement and the Nationalist Progressive Movement (NPM) established by university students—have challenged the Communist Party's ideology and political leadership, attempting to break its dominance in representing Palestinian Arab national aspirations. After entering the 1980s, Israeli Arabs became more politically mature, forming their own parties and running independently in elections. Arab votes that originally went to the CPI were seriously diverted by Arab national parties. Since the 1990s, the advantage of Arab national parties among Arab voters has become increasingly evident, and due to the loss of its mass base, the CPI’s seats in parliamentary elections have failed to exceed four. Its performance in political elections has been poor, and its status in the political arena has gradually become marginalized.
Looking at the developmental history of the CPI, it can be seen that the Party respects and protects the interests of smaller nations, dedicates itself to resolving the national independence and liberation movements of both the Arab and Jewish peoples, and strives for peaceful coexistence between the two, possessing a unique binational character. However, since its inception, the CPI has struggled to survive in the cracks between nationalism and internationalism. The grand ideal of proletarian internationalism has constantly and violently collided with the national sentiments of Zionism and Arab nationalism, leading to internal strife [N2] and frequent contradictions.
The conflict between internationalism and national interests has also destined the development of the CPI to be anything but a smooth road. Internally, Jewish and Arab members, swayed by national sentiments, have failed to empathize with one another. Domestically, because the CPI opposes Zionism, it has failed to gain the support of the Jewish majority in Israel. Internationally, influenced by the Arab-Israeli conflict and the hegemony struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States, the CPI failed to make better choices between national interests and international disputes. All of this makes its internal contradictions difficult to eliminate and has prevented significant progress in parliamentary struggle. Although the CPI firmly follows the socialist road, the current low ebb of the world socialist movement, the complex nature of the Palestine-Israel conflict, and the CPI's own weak capacity for self-reform and innovation have led to slow development and limited influence. In the future, the CPI needs to exert more effort in strengthening the Party's power, expanding its public influence, and enhancing alliance and international cooperation with left-wing forces worldwide.