Li Han: From Left-Wing Guerrilla to Left-Wing Ruling Party: The Experience of Nicaragua's Sandinista National Liberation Front
The Sandinista National Liberation Front of Nicaragua (FSLN, hereafter referred to as the Sandinistas) is a successful model of a guerrilla movement transitioning into a political party in Latin America. From the late 1950s through the 1990s, hundreds of guerrilla organizations were active across the region. They primarily took Marxism and socialism as their guiding ideologies, opposing the United States, resisting dictatorships, and fighting inequality. The guerrilla movements of Latin America reached their peak in the 1960s and 70s. Starting in 1978, Latin America began to experience the most extensive and enduring wave of democratization in its history; marked by the rise of civilian governments or the overthrow of dictatorial regimes, Latin American countries successively established democratic systems. From 1980 to 2010, there were 127 armed organizations in Latin America, 15 of which attempted to form political parties. The primary guerrilla forces that successfully formed parties or even achieved governance include the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) in El Salvador, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), the Democratic Unification Party (PUD) in Honduras, the 19th of April Movement (M-19) in Colombia, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Tupamaros National Liberation Movement (MLN-T) in Uruguay.
The Sandinistas also represent a classic case of successful new party building in Latin America. Between 1978 and 2005, 307 new political parties emerged across 18 Latin American countries. Among these, only 11 qualify as successful cases of party building, meaning the success rate for party construction in Latin American countries is only 4%. Within these successful cases, two were parties formed by guerrilla movements: the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador. The Sandinistas developed their party organization during the violent revolution of the late 1970s, possessing a broad mass base, a solid political foundation, and high internal party cohesion. This article intends to conduct a preliminary study of the Sandinistas’ experience in party building and governance, aiming to provide a case study and material for the study of Latin American left-wing parties.
I. The Successful Transformation from Left-Wing Guerrilla Movement to Modern Left-Wing Political Party
The Sandinistas are a left-wing mass party with socialist tendencies in Nicaragua. The movement seized power through revolution in 1979, establishing the "Gunnery of the Government of National Reconstruction." In the early 1980s, it became the nation’s primary political force and a national party, governing until 1990. After losing the 1990 national elections, it fell from power. In 2006, the Sandinistas won the general election again and have governed continuously to the present day. The successful transformation of the Sandinistas from a guerrilla force into a left-wing party and its sustained development is primarily attributed to its focus on organizational construction, the continuous strengthening of party cohesion, the emphasis on expanding the party's social base, and a more pragmatic ideological framework.
(1) Focusing on organizational construction and striving to strengthen the party's organizational advantages
The Sandinistas possessed natural organizational advantages in their transition from a guerrilla force to a political party. The party inherited the guerrilla movement's organizational structure, discipline, and decision-making processes.
The Sandinistas possess a strict vertical leadership structure. To a certain extent, its organizational development has always possessed party-like attributes. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, a group of young people within the Socialist Party of Nicaragua, led by Carlos Fonseca, grew dissatisfied with the party’s inaction. In 1961, they launched a military revolutionary organization—the Sandinistas—which combined Marxism-Leninism with Sandinismo [1] to oppose imperialism and dictatorship. After Fonseca’s death, the organization split into three factions: the Prolonged People's War (GPP) faction, the Proletarian faction, and the Insurrectional (Tercerista) faction. Each faction had its own organizational structure, leadership, and distinct political program. Disagreements existed regarding how to achieve a successful revolution and what path to take after seizing power. The GPP faction emphasized concentrating revolutionary forces in rural areas to gradually raise the consciousness of peasants and marginalized groups, seizing power when the time was right. The Proletarian faction advocated for the leadership of the working class and opposed alliances with the bourgeoisie. The Insurrectional faction proposed allying with the bourgeoisie, including private business owners, high-level intellectuals, and religious leaders. In 1979, led by the Insurrectional faction, the three factions reunified. In July, the Sandinistas announced the establishment of a National Joint Committee composed of leaders from the three factions to lead a broad alliance of students, trade unions, peasants, and economic elites to overthrow the Somoza family dictatorship. The unity of the three factions ultimately led the revolution to victory; the GPP and Proletarian factions gradually accepted the alliance's position, and the ideology of the Insurrectional faction became dominant.
Following the revolutionary victory, the Sandinistas defined themselves as a vanguard party, defending a Marxist-Leninist organization based on "democratic centralism" and emphasizing vertical centralized leadership. This concept was based on three vital components: a top leadership level known as the "National Directorate" (Dirección Nacional), a party apparatus composed of a small number of people, and "mass organizations" (Organizaciones de Masas) consisting of many social organizations. The party's organizational structure is divided into four levels: national, provincial, municipal, and grassroots. At the national level, the National Directorate is the highest leading body of the party, composed of nine revolutionary commanders. Additionally, there is a Sandinista Assembly at the national level, composed of 77–110 party members holding government positions, which serves representative and deliberative functions. The intermediate party organizations are the Departmental Commissions of the Party (CDR) distributed at the provincial and municipal levels, whose members are directly appointed by the National Directorate. These are the highest-level party organizations in the localities. Municipal Party Committees are subordinate to the Departmental Commissions and are led by a secretary. Grassroots Party Committees (Comités de Base) consist of 5–20 party members. Their function is to ensure Sandinista actions and political mobilization. The entire organizational framework of the Sandinistas is built around "party members." The party constitution clearly distinguishes between party members and followers. The number of Sandinista party members grew rapidly: in 1978, there were only 67 members; by 1981, there were 1,500; and before the 1990 elections, the party possessed approximately 50,000 members.
(2) Strengthening disciplinary construction and continuously enhancing party cohesion
Although the Sandinistas experienced internal divisions during their transformation, the party's cohesion was not weakened. By adhering to the party's centralized leadership and strict party discipline, the Sandinistas made the party more resilient, achieved stability in the core leadership, and ensured internal unity, thereby enhancing the party's cohesion.
Disagreements arose within the Sandinistas due to the loss of the 1990 election. The party split into the "Renovators" and the "Principled" (orthodox) factions. The primary leader of the former was former Vice President Sergio Ramírez. The Renovators believed it was necessary to engage in dialogue with other political forces to consolidate Nicaragua’s nascent and fragile rule of law. The latter, calling themselves the "Democratic Left," controlled the party apparatus and grassroots organizations, with Daniel Ortega as their primary leader. This faction tended toward opposing the new government, maintaining the party's militancy, and proposed that the "Sandinistas make more active commitments to the poor, the party's revolutionary mission, and its vanguard nature." As the National Directorate failed to effectively unify the whole party, the Sandinistas held an extraordinary congress to resolve their differences. The two factions engaged in an open conflict over leadership at the extraordinary congress in May 1994. The result of the meeting was Ortega’s election as General Secretary, with the Democratic Left gaining dominance. In January 1995, the Sandinistas officially split. Ramírez and others withdrew to form the Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS).
The 1995 split marked the beginning of a new phase for the Sandinistas under Ortega’s leadership. Ortega had distinguished himself as early as the 1984 election, serving as president for six years, and was the presidential candidate in the 1990 general election. Since 1996, the Sandinistas have held a party congress almost every year, establishing Ortega’s leadership and maintaining the stability of the core leadership. Ortega is regarded as the undisputed leader within the party, and under his leadership, the Sandinistas achieved reunification.
Furthermore, the Sandinistas actively revised the party constitution to strengthen party leadership. The 2002 party statutes placed particular emphasis on party discipline and centralized leadership. The revised constitution requires members to abide by party discipline and mandates that all members and subordinate organs obey the decisions of the highest leading organs. It calls for a severe crackdown on any form of factionalism, splittism, or opportunism to strengthen party unity; members who violate the constitution or discipline, disobey party resolutions, or seriously slander or attack the party leadership are to be expelled.
(3) Emphasizing alliances with all social strata and continuously expanding the party's social base
Based on its history as a revolutionary left-wing movement, the Sandinistas have clear political principles and a relatively radical ideology. However, when participating in electoral politics, the party construction process needs to be more inclusive and representative to attract a majority of voters and obtain a higher approval rating. To adapt to the domestic electoral environment, the Sandinistas collaborated with various popular organizations—such as trade unions, student organizations, and peasant federations—turning them into potential voters.
The Sandinistas possess a strong capacity for alliance-building, focusing on uniting with all social strata. During the revolutionary period, they allied with the "Group of Twelve"—composed of prominent intellectuals, businesspeople, and professionals—to overthrow the Somoza regime, forming a cross-class alliance. After the revolutionary victory, these prominent figures joined the Sandinistas and held important posts, broadening the party's social character. Furthermore, the Sandinistas always maintained that the masses must join social organizations. These organizations played an extremely important role in mobilizing large numbers of people to carry out revolutionary tasks. The party constitution states that the task of social organizations is to protect and encourage the revolution and to cultivate true revolutionaries. The Sandinistas maintained close alliances with the National Union of Farmers and Ranchers (UNAG), the Sandinista Workers' Central (CST), the Association of Nicaraguan Women (AMNLAE), the 19th of July Sandinista Youth (JS-19J), and the Sandinista Defense Committees (CDS). The representatives of these mass organizations were appointed by the Sandinistas, providing the party with a broad social and organizational foundation. According to the party statues, the Sandinista Front is a party composed of diverse social elements that places the interests of the people above all else.
(4) Adapting to the new development environment with more pragmatic ideological concepts
In the 1980s, the Sandinistas adhered to revolutionary ideals; party leaders openly declared themselves Marxists-Leninists, and the guiding ideology was Marxism-Leninism and Sandinismo, with socialism as the revolutionary direction. During their eleven years of continuous governance (1979–1990), they promoted political pluralism, allowing various political organizations to operate freely and absorbing their representatives into the government. Economically, they implemented a mixed economy, allowing the state-run economy (accounting for about 40% of the total) to "peacefully coexist" with the private economy. They pursued a non-aligned foreign policy but, in practice, developed increasingly close ties with the Soviet Union and Cuba, while relations with the United States deteriorated.
After losing the general election in 1990, the Sandinistas became an opposition party. To adapt to the electoral political environment and the era in which they found themselves, the party's ideological concepts became more pragmatic. In the 2006 general election, Ortega stated he had abandoned the radical ideas of his youth. After winning the election, the Sandinistas returned to power in 2007 and have governed continuously for over 16 years. Ortega, serving as president again, has to some extent dampened the radical colors of the ideology, with the party proposing the establishment of a "Christian, Socialist, and Solidary Nicaragua." The party asserts that "the Sandinistas advocate for the maintenance of a socialism that conforms to historical and realistic conditions; the characteristics of this socialism include promoting workers, small and medium producers, peasants, indigenous communities, the self-employed, various organizations exercising direct ownership, self-management, and community forms, as well as protecting national production, distribution, and commercialization; under the space protected by the state, it maintains a relationship of coexistence and harmony with traditional private property rights."
II. Why the Sandinistas Have Achieved Long-Term Continuous Governance
The FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) is Nicaragua's longest-governing and largest left-wing political party. Since winning the general election in 2006, the FSLN has governed for 16 consecutive years. In November 2021, Daniel Ortega was elected president with 75.87% of the vote, achieving his fourth consecutive re-election. During its tenure, the FSLN has created a "Nicaraguan exception": achieving sustained economic growth and stable social development in a country characterized by long-term backwardness and poverty. The party’s ability to govern continuously is closely linked to its long-term emphasis on Party building, its achievement of strong governance results, and its firm control over the military and police.
(1) Long-term emphasis on Party building and skill in synthesizing historical experience
The FSLN’s ability to maintain continuous governance is closely related to its long-standing focus on Party building [2] and its ability to summarize historical experiences and lessons. Transitioning from a guerrilla movement to a political party and navigating the rotation between being in power and in opposition, it has achieved long-term continuous governance. Its ability to respond to changing environmental challenges within Nicaragua's political development is a result of Party building serving as a vital channel for maintaining its vitality.
Regarding Party building, the FSLN places particular emphasis on the construction of the Party's mass base and organizational system. The FSLN has consistently maintained close ties between the Party and the masses, prioritizing the protection of the people's interests in its work. In multiple Party congresses, the FSLN has emphasized that its policy propositions are intended to seek benefit for the people, protect their interests, and ensure they enjoy genuine political power. It emphasizes direct participatory democracy, opposes neoliberalism, formulates various social development plans for poverty alleviation and the eradication of illiteracy, and vigorously promotes various livelihood programs. Consequently, the FSLN has maintained high public approval ratings and possesses a solid social and mass base. Furthermore, the FSLN pays great attention to the Party's organizational construction, especially at the primary level. By continuously strengthening primary-level congresses and Party committees, the Party's ideology and propositions are disseminated and implemented. Simultaneously, the FSLN actively leverages the primary-level Party organizations' role in mobilizing the public for elections, preparing for electoral work, absorbing talent, and cultivating young Party members. Compared to other Latin American left-wing parties, possessing a comprehensive organizational system is a distinct advantage for the FSLN.
The FSLN is adept at summarizing historical experiences and lessons to ensure its own survival and development capacity. After suffering three consecutive electoral defeats, the FSLN drew lessons and took the initiative to seek cooperation with anti-Sandinista forces, thereby reducing the obstacles to its continuous governance. During the 2004 commemorations of the 25th anniversary of the Sandinista Revolution, Ortega publicly apologized for the attacks on members of the Catholic Church in the 1980s. The Archbishop of Managua, a leading anti-Sandinista figure for decades, accepted Ortega’s invitation and held a Mass to commemorate the revolution. This laid the foundation for pragmatic cooperation between the FSLN and the Church. Additionally, Ortega proposed a reconciliation with private enterprises. In the 1980s, the Higher Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP) opposed the state-led economic model promoted by the FSLN and publicly announced its withdrawal from the Council of State. Thereafter, due to the FSLN’s opposition to neoliberal policies, relations between the two sides remained tense. Before the 2006 election, Ortega reached out to COSEP with a reconciliation proposal, promising that upon election, private enterprise would play an important role in government departments, thus launching a strategic partnership. After the FSLN returned to power in 2007, it readjusted its relationship with the private sector. The government established a "dialogue and consensus" model with COSEP, the country's most important business chamber, and their cooperation gradually became formalized and institutionalized. The FSLN allowed COSEP to participate in national economic governance and hold formal positions within government departments.
(2) Achieving strong governance performance, laying an important foundation of legitimacy for continuous governance
First, the foundation of governance has been continuously solidified. After returning to power in 2007, the FSLN proposed the establishment of a new political system and the implementation of direct democracy—that is, returning power to the people and expanding citizen participation. The operating mechanism of direct democracy is the Citizen Power Councils, which are open to everyone in the community. The FSLN also vigorously promoted the development of small and medium-sized enterprises to meet the needs of workers, peasants, and small producers, while opposing the monopoly and concentration of large capital. These measures effectively consolidated the FSLN’s governance base.
Second, significant results have been achieved in economic growth. During the FSLN’s 16 years of continuous governance, particularly from 2007 to 2018, Nicaragua achieved a degree of sustained economic growth and stable social development. In 2015, Otaviano Canuto, an Executive Director at the International Monetary Fund, described Nicaragua as "a success story in the making." From 2010 to 2017, Nicaragua's average economic growth rate was 5.1%, exceeding the average growth rate of the Latin American region. Although the Nicaraguan economy declined after 2020 due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, its growth remained higher than the regional average. In 2020, Nicaragua’s economy grew by -1.8%, compared to a Latin American average of -6.8%. In 2021, the Latin American region saw a recovery rebound of 6.7%, and 3.7% in 2022; during the same period, Nicaragua’s economy grew by 10.3% and 3.8% respectively, both higher than the regional average.
Third, remarkable progress has been made in social development. The FSLN government focuses on maintaining social equity and justice and improving the well-being of the people. Since 2007, a series of social reforms have been implemented, striving to eradicate poverty and reduce inequality. Government social policies cover healthcare, sanitation, education, and infrastructure. From 2009 to 2016, the series of poverty reduction programs implemented by the Ortega government achieved significant results. The national poverty rate and extreme poverty rate decreased from 42.5% and 14.6% to 24.9% and 6.9%, respectively. Furthermore, Nicaragua is regarded as the "safest country in Central America." Central America is a region where violent crime is most rampant. Among them, the "Northern Triangle" composed of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador has homicide rates among the highest in the world. In 2020, the homicide rates in Honduras and Guatemala reached approximately 36 and 37 per 100,000 people, respectively, while Nicaragua's homicide rate was 4 per 100,000.
Additionally, the FSLN's insistence on maintaining national sovereignty and independence has also earned it a high reputation. The FSLN has a revolutionary tradition of daring to oppose US hegemony in order to safeguard national sovereignty and independence. President Ortega has repeatedly condemned US interference in Latin American affairs at international conferences and protested US sanctions against Nicaragua. In April 2022, to protest the Organization of American States' (OAS) interference in its internal affairs, the Ortega government announced Nicaragua's withdrawal from the OAS.
(3) Firmly controlling the military and police, providing vital support for continuous governance
The Nicaraguan National Army and National Police originated from the Sandinista People's Army and the Sandinista Police established by the FSLN. This is the most solid and enduring legacy left by Sandinismo. After the victory of the 1979 revolution, the FSLN established the Sandinista People's Army and the Sandinista Police, subordinate to the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior, respectively. Their initial core members were all FSLN guerrillas who had participated in the uprising against the Somoza regime. The Sandinista government attached great importance to the political education of these two organizations. After the FSLN lost power in 1990 and right-wing forces took office, these two organizations transitioned into the Nicaraguan National Army and National Police; however, all heads of the General Staff and military regions were still served by Sandinista officers. Consequently, they possess a strong sense of belonging to the FSLN. Since 2007, the National Police have repeatedly emphasized their "Sandinista origins." In 2020, marking the 41st anniversary of the founding of the National Police, Ortega pointed out that "the National Police is the Sandinista Police, because it represents the historical continuity and evolution of the revolutionary organization." The FSLN's firm control over the military and police has provided vital support for its continuous governance, which is also a major difference between it and many left-wing governing parties in Latin America.
(4) Dividing opposition forces and striving to maintain political advantage
The FSLN has adopted a strategy of divide and rule toward the opposition, which has resulted in the opposition being weak and fragmented, while providing opportunities for the FSLN’s continuous governance. Since the FSLN returned to power in 2007, the influence of Nicaragua's main opposition parties, the Constitutionalist Liberal Party (PLC) and the Independent Liberal Party (PLI), has waned; they have failed to present a challenge to the FSLN in either parliamentary or local politics. From 2006 to 2022, the number of seats held by the PLC decreased from 25 to 9, including a low of only two seats in 2011. The seats held by the PLI decreased from 26 to 1. Meanwhile, many disagreements exist within the opposition parties, and their leaders have been unable to coordinate effectively. Competition between the two major opposition parties outweighs cooperation, preventing the formation of a consolidated alliance. The "Civic Alliance" and the "National Blue and White Unity," the main opposition forces emerging during the 2018 protests, are loosely organized, lack strong leaders, and have negligible political influence; they have also failed to form an alliance with traditional opposition parties. Therefore, the governing FSLN has been able to consistently maintain its status as the largest party. In the 2021 general election, the FSLN controlled 75 seats in the National Assembly, forming a majority advantage of more than two-thirds. Furthermore, the governing FSLN has held an absolute advantage in numerous municipal elections.
(5) Focusing on strengthening cooperation with left-wing forces in other countries to seek regional and international support
At the regional level, amidst the rise of the "Pink Tide" in Latin America, the FSLN government has actively participated in regional organizations constructed by Latin American left-wing countries. In 2007, Nicaragua joined the "Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America" (ALBA) promoted by left-wing governing countries such as Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia, expanding cooperation with relevant countries in fields such as economy, trade, and energy. The FSLN government became a major anti-US force in the Western Hemisphere. The FSLN actively supports the practical explorations of "21st-century socialism" in Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, promoting Nicaragua as an important component of the Latin American left-wing "Pink Tide." Meanwhile, the FSLN government remains a major participant and promoter of the São Paulo Forum, strengthening dialogue with multiple Latin American left-wing parties to jointly oppose imperialism and neoliberalism. In recent years, because the FSLN government employed tough measures to respond to domestic protests and took actions in the 2021 general election that were unfavorable to opposition candidates, it has been condemned and sanctioned by the OAS. The São Paulo Forum has stood by the FSLN, explicitly rejecting OAS resolutions and resolutely supporting the FSLN.
At the global level, the FSLN government actively promotes cooperation with developing countries, including China. Both times Nicaragua established diplomatic relations with China occurred during FSLN governance episodes. The governing FSLN has historical ties with China; China provided support to Ortega during his initial period of governance, leading to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Nicaragua and China in 1985. In 1990, the right-wing Nicaraguan government "restored diplomatic relations" with the Taiwan authorities. China announced the suspension of diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. On December 10, 2021, the Ortega government announced that Nicaragua had restored diplomatic relations with China. In 2022, as Nicaragua joined the "Belt and Road" initiative, bilateral economic and trade cooperation opened a new chapter.
III. The FSLN Needs to Address New Governing Challenges
The FSLN won the general election again in 2021, and Ortega was successfully re-elected as president, beginning a new five-year term in January 2022. However, faced with a complex situation at home and abroad, the governance environment the FSLN must navigate has become more complicated, and the prospects for long-term governance face certain uncertainties. In the new governance environment, the FSLN government needs to address a series of new governance challenges—particularly the need to further strengthen Party building, maintain social stability on the basis of achieving economic growth, alleviate political and social crises, and mitigate the adverse impacts caused by external risks.
(1) Further strengthening Party building and continuously improving governance efficiency
The FSLN has successfully governed for more than 16 consecutive years. Adapting to changes in the governing environment, enhancing governing efficiency, and improving the capacity to resist risks constitute the primary challenges it faces. Although the FSLN has consistently emphasized strengthening Party building, its internal construction still faces a series of issues, manifested primarily in rigid organizational structures, an incomplete theoretical system, and an underdeveloped cadre corps. Under the conditions of long-term governance, if these problems are not effectively ameliorated, they may reduce governing efficiency, cause a degree of damage to the Party’s prestige and image, and affect the realization of its goal of long-term governance. Only by achieving the goal of advancing with the times and engaging in reform and innovation in areas such as ideological and theoretical construction, organizational construction, cadre training, and institutional construction can the Party maintain its vanguard nature and vitality. Furthermore, the governing environment for the FSLN following its victory in the 2021 general election is more severe than in the past; domestic contradictions and international sanctions from European and American countries have presented the Party with a stern test of its governance. Strengthening Party building, improving governing efficiency, effectively safeguarding the fundamental interests of the masses, and seeking an independent path of development are the primary issues the FSLN must prioritize to stabilize its foundation of governance.
(2) Restoring economic growth and striving to create a favorable governing environment
Affected by the continuing domestic political and social conflicts of 2018, as well as the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and two hurricanes in 2020, the Nicaraguan economy continued to contract from 2018 to 2020, with economic growth rates falling to -3.4%, -3.8%, and -1.8%. The World Bank predicts that in 2023, the Nicaraguan economy will slide to approximately 2.0% growth, down from the 2022 level of roughly 4%. In the first eight months of 2021, Nicaragua's public debt increased to approximately $9.2 billion, accounting for 67.5% of GDP, of which foreign debt reached $7.5 billion. Simultaneously, the economic assistance received by Nicaragua has dropped significantly. The primary donor country, Venezuela, has long been a political and economic ally of Nicaragua; however, because that country has fallen into a dual political and economic crisis, the economic aid provided to Nicaragua has decreased sharply. Additionally, the United States has adopted a series of punitive measures against Nicaragua, restricting multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund from providing loans to the country. In 2021, the amount of international aid Nicaragua received was basically the same as in 2020, which was less than 50% of the 2017 level.
Affected by sluggish economic growth, the government faces increased fiscal pressure, its capacity for social spending is limited, and the sustainability of social policies and programs is under threat. In 2020, the government's social spending accounted for 11.4% of GDP, of which social security expenditure accounted for less than 10%. The economic recession has led to intensified poverty and inequality; from 2020 to 2022, the impoverished population rebounded, accounting for approximately 50% of the total population. To this end, the Ortega government must dedicate itself to boosting the economy, restoring economic growth, and improving the people's livelihood. This also represents a stern test of the Ortega government's governing capacity.
(3) Alleviating social contradictions and maintaining the overall stability of politics and society
The FSLN government still needs to take measures to alleviate the consequences of the political and social crisis. The large-scale social protests that broke out in 2018 lasted for several years, leading the country into its most serious political crisis since the 1980s. This political crisis gave birth to new anti-Ortega political forces and eroded the alliance between the government, big business, and the church. Furthermore, the economic recession and political-social conflicts have not yet been effectively resolved. Regret among certain social groups toward the governing FSLN remains strong, and Ortega's approval rating has dropped to its lowest level in over a decade. After 2021, the scale of social protests decreased and gradually returned to calm, but the root causes that led to the political crisis have not been fundamentally eliminated, the contradictions between the governing party and the opposition have not been resolved, and social discontent continues to emerge. If Nicaragua’s economic or political situation deteriorates sharply, demonstrations and protests may break out again, and divisions may appear within the regime. If handled improperly, this could trigger new conflicts. Alleviating social contradictions and maintaining social stability is one of the difficult problems the FSLN government must confront.
(4) Improving the external environment and promptly neutralizing the adverse effects of external risks
Since the FSLN returned to power in 2007, bilateral relations between Nicaragua and the United States have remained tense. The United States has continuously increased sanctions against Nicaragua. From 2008 to 2011, the United States announced the freezing of Nicaragua's status as an aid recipient and formally closed the "Millennium Challenge Account" assistance project for Nicaragua. From 2012 to the present, the United States has accused Nicaragua of electoral irregularities and a lack of transparency, consistently attempting to suspend various forms of aid to Nicaragua through multilateral institutions or direct domestic action. The legitimacy of the 2021 Nicaraguan general election was widely questioned by Western countries; more than 40 countries, including the United States, Britain, the European Union, and the Organization of American States, refused to recognize the election results. The Ortega government has faced external isolation and sanctions. U.S. President Biden issued a statement banning President Ortega, his wife Vice President Rosario Murillo, and several ministers and high-ranking officials from entering the United States. Britain and Canada also announced a new round of sanctions against several Nicaraguan government officials. In October 2022, citing the strengthening of cooperation between the Nicaraguan government and Russia, the United States expanded its sanctions against Nicaragua, including measures to prohibit U.S. companies from operating in Nicaragua's gold sector and imposing restrictions on Nicaragua's imports and exports. The continuous suppression by Western countries acts as both a pressure and a catalyst [7] for the Ortega government, driving it to explore measures and countermeasures to break through Western diplomatic isolation and sanctions and to enhance its political legitimacy. How to improve the external environment is a question the Ortega government cannot avoid.
The Nicaraguan FSLN is a left-wing mass-based party; whether in its process of party building or its path of growth, its ideological orientation or its governing experience, it possesses a certain degree of typicality. The ideology of the FSLN possesses the general characteristics of a left-wing party, favoring socialist propositions, advocating for the construction of a "socialist Nicaragua," and supporting the practical explorations of "21st-century socialism" in Latin American countries such as Venezuela. However, it has a clear pragmatist orientation and has not implemented large-scale socialist practical explorations in its own country in the manner of Venezuela and other nations. The Party also joined the Socialist International and possesses some characteristics of a social-democratic party, yet its flavor of democratic socialism is neither typical nor strong; rather, it reflects more the characteristics and traits of the Latin American Left and the features of national socialism [8] within the Latin American region.
The FSLN emphasizes the Party's organizational and disciplinary construction and has achieved good governing performance during its long-term governance. In terms of revolutionary historical achievements and governing experience, it possesses advantages that are difficult for other political parties in the country to match. However, as a party that has governed consecutively for many years, the FSLN still faces immense governing pressure and a series of severe challenges. Although it is the largest political force in Nicaragua, possessing deep social foundations and powerful political and social influence, it also has defects that are difficult to overcome. After winning the 2021 election, how the FSLN will further strengthen its building as a governing party, maintain political and social stability, and neutralize the adverse effects brought about by external risks are major issues it needs to resolve in the future.
(Author: Li Han, Deputy Secretary-General and Assistant Researcher at the Center for Central American and Caribbean Studies, Institute of Latin American Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences)